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In short, if you do not guard your intellect you cannot attain purity of heart, so as to be counted 
worthy to see God (cf. Matt. 5: 18).  Without such watchfulness you cannot become poor in spirit, 
or grieve, or hunger and thirst after righteousness, or be truly merciful, or pure in heart, or a 
peacemaker, or be persecuted for the sake of justice (cf. Matt. 5: 3-10).  To speak generally, it is 
impossible to acquire all the other virtues except through watchfulness.  For this reason you must 
pursue it more diligently than anything else, so as to learn from experience these things, unknown 
to others…. 
 
—attributed to St. Symeon the New Theologian1 
 
 
Love for our neighbor, being made of creative attention, is analogous to genius. 
Creative attention means really giving our attention to what does not exist. 
 
—Simone Weil2 
 
 
I saw well why the gods do not speak to us openly, nor let us answer.... How can they meet us face 
to face till we have faces? 
 
—C. S. Lewis3
                                                 
1
 Nicodemus et al., eds., The Philokalia: The Complete Text, vol. IV (Boston: Faber and Faber,1979), 72. 
2
 Simone Weil, Waiting for God (New York: Putnam, 1951), 112. 
3
 C. S. Lewis, Till We Have Faces; a Myth Retold (New York: Harcourt, 1957), 252. 
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CHAPTER I  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Whatever one generation learns from another, it can never learn from a predecessor the 
genuinely human factor.  In this respect, every generation begins afresh, has no task other 
than that of any previous generation, and comes no further, provided the latter didn‘t 
shirk its task and deceive itself. 
                                         —Johannes de Silentio1  
 
 
The present dissertation isolates and analyzes the different historical approaches 
to the systematic theological problem of the union of the doctrines of creation and grace.  
In offering that analysis, I also advance my own proposal for how the different ways of 
relating these doctrines can guide us to a renewed answer to that problem, one that avoids 
the difficulties of the past.  I advance that proposal, first, by looking through the history 
of engagement with the issues surrounding this problem so as to distill a set of themes 
and patterns of relating those themes.   Second, I develop the insights gleaned from this 
survey to argue for a genuinely coherent approach to the issues bound up with this 
problem of unity.  Both my way of framing this problem as one of the unity of the 
doctrines of creation and grace and the conclusions of my analysis are rather 
idiosyncratic in relation to the present theological conversation surrounding these issues.  
Therefore, further explanation of this approach and its justification is in order.      
 
 
                                                 
1
 Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling; Repetition, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, 
Kierkegaard's Writings (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 121. 
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The Unity of Creation and Grace as a Doctrinal Problem 
 
Concerns in Roman Catholic Theology 
The problem of the unity of the doctrines of creation and grace, as a distinct 
systematic theological problem, is first raised in twentieth century Roman Catholic 
theology.  It is not that the problem appears there in precisely these terms, but rather that 
the arguments in contemporary Roman Catholic theology serve to clarify the stakes of 
what is in fact a perennial problem for Western systematic theology.  Though the dispute 
in question has its roots in post-Enlightenment European Roman Catholic thought, the 
issue of this unity finally comes to a head in the twentieth century in the dispute with 
post-Tridentine Neo-Scholastic thought regarding the natural desire for the supernatural.  
The specific details of the disagreement between Karl Rahner and Henri de Lubac will be 
analyzed in some detail in Chapter Two.  Presently, I would like to frame that dispute so 
as to set it within a larger context, where its intersection with similar issues in 
contemporary Protestant thought can come into relief.   
First, contemporary Roman Catholic engagement with the question of the unity of 
creation and grace is shaped by the legacy of three distinct schools of Thomism: Neo-
Scholasticism, the New Theology, and Transcendental Thomism.  As Gerald McCool has 
convincingly argued, these three schools are the result of different reactions to a unique 
convergence in nineteenth-century Roman Catholic thought up to Vatican II.
2
  The 
                                                 
2
 The reader should consult Gerald A. McCool, Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth Century: The 
Quest for a Unitary Method (New York: Seabury Press, 1977), 216-40, Gerald A. McCool, From Unity to 
Pluralism: The Internal Evolution of Thomism (New York: Fordham University Press, 1989), 5-38, Gerald 
A. McCool, The Neo-Thomists, Marquette Studies in Philosophy (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press : 
Association of Jesuit University Presses, 1994), 25-42.  For a summary of the intellecutal background and 
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unique convergence McCool isolates is the combined influence of the issuance of Dei 
Filius (1870) by the ecumenical council of Vatican I under Pius IX and the disciplinary 
document, Aeterni Patris (1879), by Leo XIII.  McCool insists that it is not the issuance 
of either one of these decrees that is significant, but the peculiarity of their combined 
influence that makes the difference.
3
  As the Apostolic Constitution on Faith, Dei Filius 
established the gratuitous and supernatural character of faith and defined its relationship 
to natural reason.  Aeterni Patris, a document with the juridical authority of the Bishop of 
Rome, declared that Thomism would be the philosophical education seminarians were to 
receive.  McCool notes how together these two documents, while de jure distinct, were 
read together in such a way as de facto mandating a rejection of modernity in general as it 
pertained to the relation of faith and reason, and the specification of Thomism as the 
church‘s official response.4  The result was that the various experiments with post-
Kantian thought that had appeared earlier in France (e.g., de Maistre, de Bonald, 
Lamennais, and Bautin)
5
 and Germany (e.g., Hermes, von Drey, and Günther)
6
 were 
quashed, while the so-called Aristotelian synthesis of Aquinas was construed as the sole 
salve for the wounds of modernity.
7
  What is important here for my purposes is to 
highlight the effect this had not of settling modern questions, but of displacing them into 
the field of Thomist interpretation.      
This displacement runs in tandem with a second point.  Such apparent rejection of 
modernity and this positive valuation of Thomism gave rise in some quarters to a 
                                                                                                                                                 
aftermath of these developments, see McCool, Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 1-36 and 241-
67. 
3
 McCool, Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 216-40. 
4
 Ibid., 228-36. 
5
 See Ibid., 37-58. 
6
 Ibid., 59-88. 
7
 Ibid., 228-36. 
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peculiar, quasi-Heideggerian narrative of the Destruktion of the history of modern, 
secular metaphysics.  But rather than Heidegger‘s story, which situates subjectivity at the 
apex of the metaphysical forgetfulness of Being, this narrative tells of a fall from the 
unity of nature and grace as conceived by Aquinas‘ original understanding of the 
ontological difference.  Gustav Siewerth appears to be the progenitor of this approach in 
his The Fate of Metaphysics From Thomas to Heidegger,
8
 and it was further popularized 
by von Balthasar, who later adopted it in v. III of The Glory of the Lord.
9
  Variations of 
its basic claims have since been developed by Louis Dupré, Michael J. Buckley, and John 
Milbank, among others.  Not only do such narratives embody the suspicion of modernity 
and reliance on Aquinas discussed above, but they move beyond this to claim that a 
proper Thomism is capable of evading these modern questions altogether.   
    I have called attention to these points because I believe that together they have 
set the terms for the current discussion of nature and grace in three ways.  First, that 
discussion tends to begin with the notion that modernity represents an essential challenge 
to the inherent meaningfulness of worldly experience.  This is perhaps clear from the fact 
that the response to Dei Filius and Aeterni Patris (including the genealogical approach) 
was to limit significantly or evade altogether Kantian and post-Kantian influences on 
theology.  Second, on the basis primarily of the genealogical approach, the nature/grace 
problematic has become the idiom in which not only to reaffirm the inherent 
meaningfulness of experience, but also to specify (in largely Thomist terms) its proper 
locus in one of three domains of experience: namely, objectivity, subjectivity, or 
                                                 
8
 See Gustav Siewerth, Das Schicksal Der Metaphysik Von Thomas Zu Heidegger, Gesammelte Werke 
(Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1987). 
9
 See Hans Urs von Balthasar, Seeing the Form, trans. Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis, The Glory of the 
Lord, Vol. 1 (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1983). 
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ontology.  This has the effect of dividing the responses between those who understand 
this meaning to be principally an epistemological (objectivity vs. subjectivity) question, 
and those who see it as an ontological one.  And, finally, the different accounts of the 
nature/grace relation formulated by the three schools of Thomist interpretation (Neo-
Scholasticism, Transcendental Thomism, and the New Theology) can be understood to 
directly correlate to these three loci of objectivity, subjectivity, or ontology.  I will turn 
my attention in what follows to bearing out this claim.     
 
Neo-Scholasticism.  In the present nature/grace discussion, Neo-Scholasticism is 
often styled as the reactionary element of twentieth-century Roman Catholic thought.  It 
is important to bear in mind, though, that this group of thinkers was only attempting to be 
faithful to Dei Filius and Aeterni Patris.  As they understood it, adhering both to 
Thomism and the positive natural knowledge of God required a staunch defense of 
epistemological realism over against Enlightenment rationalism and Kant‘s 
transcendental idealism.  Securing the objectivity of truth was the only conceivable way 
to maintain the inherent meaningfulness of the world, which demanded an absolute 
rejection of subjectivity tout court.     
This bears on questions of nature and grace.  Because Dei Filius‘ insisted on the 
supernatural character of faith, Neo-Scholasticism thus invoked a second, revealed order 
of knowing that transcended what was objectively given to natural reason alone. It was 
gratuitous and superadded: the order of redemption, which had been, again, objectively 
entrusted to the Church and was wholly dependent on God‘s grace.  This second order 
made the necessarily qualification that whatever meaning was ―naturally‖ available, it 
6 
 
was not itself saving.  This functioned as an extension of their rejection of subjectivity: 
not only is natural meaning objectively given, but salvation itself has its objective basis in 
the offices and sacraments of the Roman Catholic Church.
10
   
This, as we know, engendered the most disputed point in the nature/grace 
discussion as we now have it.  If there is a natural domain of meaning, then there must be 
a corresponding natural telos to which reason is ordered, quite apart from its order to and 
reception of supernatural grace.  There must be a ‗pure nature‘ apart from grace, and 
there must also be a twofold end for human being—one in proportion to the natural 
operation of the intellect, and the other gratuitously added.
11
   
 
The New Theology.  Two schools stood in conflict with this approach: the so-
called nouvelle théologie and Transcendental Thomism.  The two schools emerged from 
a common root: the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century work of Maréchal, 
Rousselot, and Blondel, each of whom had insisted on the integrity of natural reason and 
the supernatural character of faith, but as a dual appropriation and destabilization of post-
Kantian philosophy.
12
  While they insisted that this did not contradict Aquinas (Blondel 
                                                 
10
 This interpretation of Neo-Scholasticism as concerned, principally, with the objectivity of truth in 
opposition to (largely Kantian) subjectivity is indebted to McCool, Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth 
Century, 1-36.  His discussion of ―ontologism‖ (pp.113-28) and his overarching thesis regarding doctrinal 
pluaralism (pp.1-16 and 241-67) have also influenced my discussion of the following categories.  I am also 
grateful to Sean Hayden for the tenacity with which he has interjected the question of subjectivity into our 
theological conversations.  Despite our disagreements, that tenacity has aided my interpretation of what is 
at stake between these three schools.   
11
 Representatives would be French Dominicans, who followed in the footsteps of the Dominican 
commentators, Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, and Bañez.  These were Gardeil, Garrigou-LaGrange, and 
Maritain.  See McCool, The Neo-Thomists, 16-95.  One can also see this same emphasis on objectivity, as I 
have been able to ascertain, in Reinhard Hütter‘s understanding of the Spirit‘s incarnation in the practices 
of the Church.  See Reinhard Hütter, Suffering Divine Things: Theology as Church Practice (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2000). 
12
 On this heritage, the reader should consult  McCool, From Unity to Pluralism: The Internal 
Evolution of Thomism. 
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much less so), they did dispute the Neo-Scholastic insistence on objectivity and a twofold 
telos for human being.  Where the New Theology and Transcendental Thomism parted 
ways was in their conception of the locus of the experience of meaning.   
Although each began with the subjective starting point that Blondel referred to as 
the ―method of immanence,‖ they sought to show an irreducible dynamism in the 
constitution of subjectivity.  As Henri de Lubac put it in The Discovery of God, clearly 
repeating Maréchal (and agreeing with Rahner), God is implicitly known – or 
prethematically known – in every act of knowing.  As Lubac later argued in The Mystery 
of the Supernatural, this dynamic orientation disclosed the ontological fact of our 
creaturehood, associating the inherent meaningfulness of reality directly with the integral 
unity of nature with the supernatural.
13
   
As I said above, the common perception is that Neo-Scholasticism and the New 
Theology stand at polar opposites of a continuum on the nature/grace question, with 
Transcendental Thomism as a mediating idea.  While this is partly true, it obscures the 
sense in which this notion of the ontological integrity of nature and the supernatural is, in 
fact, a radical application of the anti-modernist, anti-subjectivist impulse behind Neo-
Scholasticism‘s epistemological realism. As both The Drama of Atheist Humanism and 
his essay ―The Internal Causes of the Weakening and the Disappearance of the Sense of 
the Sacred‖ demonstrate, from very early on Lubac agreed with Neo-Scholasticism that 
the modern view of the world was diseased.  The difference, however, is the New 
                                                 
13
 It is important to note that this association of the New Theology with the dynamism of subjectivity is 
actually more prominent in Surnaturel, despite the common assumption to the contrary.  There his reliance 
on an analysis of subjectivity as the basis for the understanding of the image of God is the key to 
understanding his ideas.  It is later, in The Mystery of the Supernatural, that the ontological register comes 
most fully into view, because his disagreement with Rahner‘s ―ranscendental approach appeared to force 
this on him.  A more detailed argument is made for this reading in Chapter Two.   
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Theology prescribed a stronger treatment than epistemological and institutional 
objectivity could deliver.  The communion ecclesiology for which Lubac laid the 
groundwork in Corpus Mysticum, having expressed it earlier in Catholicism, was perhaps 
the fullest expression of this.  Indeed, Lubac roundly indicted the objectivism of the Neo-
Scholastic ecclesiology for perpetuating the Enlightenment rationalism it purported to 
oppose.  What was really needed, he insisted, was a kind of Heideggerian reduction of 
subjectivity to ontology, within which to reunite the objective and the subjective poles of 
experience in an account of created being as God‘s gratuitous self-expression.  This is a 
different diagnosis of the problem of meaning: namely, one in which the only proper way 
to restore it is through a recovery of an ontological vision that can restore the integral 
relation of grace to nature.   
 
Transcendental Thomism.   Despite their common origin in the Neo-Thomism of 
Maréchal and Rousselot, this was not Transcendental Thomism‘s conclusion.  
Transcendental Thomism always sought to retain a role for subjectivity in all knowing.  
This is apparent in Rahner‘s Spirit in the World, where the human person is described as 
a Schwebe, a tensed ―hovering,‖ within and above, matter and spirit.  Similarly, the other 
great Transcendental Thomist, Bernard Lonergan, argued in Verbum that the act of 
knowing is not the same as simply looking, but always demands a moment of self-
appropriation.
14
  As he notes, the significance of Aquinas‘ emphasis on the inner word 
requires the meaning given in manifestation be bound up with the subject‘s active 
                                                 
14
 Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. 
Doran, vol. 2, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988). 
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engagement with the world.  That is, although reality is inherently meaningful, there is 
always something for the subject to do in apprehending it.     
This has important implications for its understanding of nature and grace.  
Transcendental Thomism agrees with the New Theology that this dynamic structure 
displays a fundamental orientation to God.  But, like Neo-Scholasticism, they regard the 
notion of ―pure nature‖ as a necessary hypothesis.  Rahner‘s term is that the idea of a 
pure nature is a ―remainder concept,‖ a Restbegriff.  While there is no worldly experience 
in which grace is absent, this does not mean that human experience as such (i.e., 
ontologically) is grace.  But if one is to maintain that difference while insisting on the 
graced status of all experience, then one must ―transcendentally‖ conceive something like 
―pure nature‖ in order to say how this is so.  Grace is experienced as grace in the very 
self-transcendence displayed in the subject‘s active engagement of knowing the world.  
In this way, the union of nature and grace is intimately bound up with an affirmation of a 
transcendental subjectivity.  It is just this pattern of thinking that unites both Neo-
Scholasticism and the New Theology against Transcendental Thomism—a position that 
the unfortunate aftermath of Vatican II, as well as the Communio-Concilium divide, has 
framed too much in terms of modernity and secularity.     
 Each perspective offers some account of the inherent meaningfulness of 
experience, and that perspective is intimately bound up with some account of the 
nature/grace relation.  Different conceptions of that relation result from where a given 
perspective locates this meaning.  For Neo-Scholastic objectivity, nature and grace are 
separate spheres; for the New Theology‘s ontology, nature and grace are integrally 
10 
 
united; and, for Transcendental Thomism‘s subjectivity, nature and grace are united in 
the event of self-transcendence.   
Neo-Scholasticism and Transcendental Thomism offer epistemological accounts.  
But because Neo-Scholastics are epistemological realists, their emphasis on the 
distinction of nature and grace reflects a corresponding reality of distinct ontological 
planes.  Transcendental Thomism‘s greater sensitivity to the dynamic and historical 
quality of knowledge leads it to affirm an orientation toward transcendence in every act 
of knowledge.  This displays a basic continuity of grace with nature, rather than two 
distinct ontological planes.  The Neo-Scholastic position represents a negative stance 
toward modernity, and Transcendental Thomism offers a nuanced positive assessment.  
The New Theology, like Neo-Scholasticism, also represents a negative 
assessment of modernity—and one focused on a rejection of subjectivity.  But, just as 
Transcendental Thomism offers a more nuanced (positive) assessment of modernity than 
Neo-Scholasticism, the New Theology represents a more nuanced (negative) account of 
subjectivity.  Agreeing with Transcendental Thomism that the structure of subjective 
knowing displays the continuity of nature and the supernatural and the fundamental 
integrity of nature and grace, the New Theology nonetheless contends that this unity is 
only properly conceived in ontological rather than epistemological terms.   
Because Neo-Scholasticism and Transcendental Thomism agree that the 
nature/grace distinction is first decided epistemologically, it is their disagreement over 
subjectivity that lies at the heart of their different visions of the nature/grace relationship.  
Further, while Neo-Scholasticism and the New Theology both seek to evade subjectivity, 
their different conclusions regarding the nature/grace relation are finally decided with 
11 
 
respect to their different epistemologies, giving the question of subjectivity priority over 
ontology in that distinction.  Finally, Transcendental Thomism and the New Theology 
agree on the nature/grace distinction because of an epistemological agreement.  Their 
differences pertain only to the value of subjectivity—whether what it preserves with 
regard to doctrinal distinctions is outweighed by perceived concessions to modernity. 
 The decisive factor in that discussion appears to be that of specifying the nature 
and role of the human being as an agent in her own right: how it is that she can be said to 
be self-determining and what role that has in relationship to the divine determination.  
What remains throughout this approach is the notion that the unity of the two doctrines, 
of nature and grace, must be conceived metaphysically.
15
  This metaphysical emphasis is 
in keeping with the Thomist orientation of Aeterni Patris.   
 
Protestant Intersections 
But beyond this internecine dispute among Roman Catholics, the question of the 
role of the human agent is repeated in different terms among Protestants.  The issues here 
repeat this basic line of differentiation between objectivity, subjectivity, and ontology.  
Perhaps the most salient contemporary manifestation of this tension has been the disputes 
over the analogia entis and the point of contact for revelation (Anknüpfungspunkt).  The 
former has received more recent focused attention, but their concerns are essentially the 
same, as they pertain to different aspects of a common problem.  It is not an accident that 
Karl Barth stands at the center of both.  Barth‘s own actualist theological vision was in 
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 It will be helpful at this point to direct to the reader to the specific use of the terms ―metaphysics‖ 
and ―ontology‖ as they are deployed in this dissertation at pp. 36-39 and 75-78. 
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most respects much more consistent with the transcendentalist approach of post-Kantian 
thought in that it remained bound up with some notion of the irreducible freedom of 
human self-determination.
16
 This set him in opposition to Erich Przywara‘s vision, which 
sought out a kind of harmonious ontological union of the analogical and dialectical points 
of view.
17
  Such is the perspective characteristic of Siewerth and von Balthasar, as well.  
Yet, the proximity to Barth was recognized by von Balthasar and Barth himself—and this 
is displayed in his rejection of Brunner, whose emphasis on the transcendental starting 
point he resolutely rejected in ―Nein!‖18  The ontological aspect of his thought, which had 
been so largely underdeveloped in the early work, later emerged and was explicitly 
acknowledged (with direct reference to von Balthasar) in The Humanity of God.
19
   
It is the young Dieterich Bonhoeffer, however, who has made the most helpful 
contribution to an understanding of these larger issues in contemporary theology.  His 
two dissertations, Communio Sanctorum and Act and Being, formulate a response to the 
issues surrounding these questions in terms of classical metaphysical categories of being 
and becoming/act, the one and the many, time and eternity, and/or form and matter.  The 
issue in question is how to think the active appearance of something new in relationship 
                                                 
16
 This point will be developed in more detail in Chapter Three.  On the somewhat idiosyncratic use of 
the term ―actualist‖ in relationship to Barth‘s work, which stands in contrast with the use of the same term 
in relationship to Aquinas, see George Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth: The Shape of His Theology 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
17
 The definitive text is Erich Przywara, Analogia Entis: Metaphysik (Einsiedeln: Johannes-Verlag, 
1962).  The reader should also consult Erich Przywara, Logos: Logos, Abendland, Reich, Commercium 
(Düsseldorf: Patmos-Verlag, 1964).; Erich Przywara, In Und Gegen: Stellungnahmen Zur Zeit (Nürnberg: 
Glock und Lutz, 1955).; Erich Przywara, Gott: Fünf Vorträge Über Das Religionsphilosophische Problem, 
Der Katholische Gedanke; Veröffentlichungen Des Verbandes Der Vereine Katholischer Akademiker Zur 
Pflege Der Katholischen Weltanschauung (München: Oratoriums-Verlag, 1926).  The standard English 
translation of an admittedly early, and therefore limited, work is Erich Przywara, Polarity: A German 
Catholic's Interpretation of Religion, trans. Alan Coates Bouquet (London: Oxford University Press 1935). 
18
 See Emil Brunner and Karl Barth, Natural Theology: Comprising "Nature and Grace" (London: The 
Centenary Press, 1946). 
19
Karl Barth, The Humanity of God, trans. John Newton Thomas and Thomas Wieser (Richmond: John 
Knox Press, 1960), 44. 
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to the existence of what already is, but in such a way that this appearing is not already 
accounted for in terms of what is.  Bonhoeffer‘s concerns are focused principally on the 
question of revelation, rather than grace as such.  In this regard, Bonhoeffer begins where 
the Roman Catholic dispute ends: namely, with the attempt to ―overcome the difference 
between a transcendental and ontological starting point of theology.‖20  Bonhoeffer‘s 
work is so significant precisely because of the manner in which he understands this 
problem in terms of a transcendental and anthropological question of activity and 
becoming in its intersection with the ontological question of form and stability.  For 
Bonhoeffer, as a Protestant thinker, this is not primarily a matter of ―nature and grace,‖ 
but that of the proper starting point for theology: namely, revelation.  And this required 
some account of the relationship of the appearance of something new within the given.   
Bonhoeffer‘s proposal is extraordinary, and my work in the present study owes 
much to his vision.  Bonhoeffer‘s unique response to these difficulties is to focus on the 
significance of ethics and to argue that act and being can only be truly united in the 
church as the continued manifestation of the person of Christ.
21
  As Bonhoeffer makes 
clear, such an understanding is only possible when the church is primarily—indeed, 
only—understood as the assembly of believers (Gemeinde) and not as an institution 
(Kirche).  Only as such is the church—in fact, only as the church—are human beings 
authentically acting (becoming) such that difference (matter, time, multiplicity, 
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 Ernst Feil, The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, trans. Martin Rumscheidt (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1985), 10.  Ernst Feil, Die Theologie Dietrich Bonhoeffers. Hermeneutik, Christologie, 
Weltverständnis, Gesellschaft Und Theologie: Abteilung Systematische Beiträge (München: Matthias-
Grünewald-Verl, 1971).  The reader should note Bonhoeffer‘s early appreciation of and engagement with 
Przywara in Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Act and Being: Transcendental Philosophy and Ontology in Systematic 
Theology, trans. Hans-Richard Reuter, Wayne W. Floyd, and Martin Rumscheidt (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1996), 59-80. 
21
 Feil, The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 10. 
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particularity) and being (unity, form, eternity, unity, universality) are one.
22
  In this way, 
Bonhoeffer proposed what can be called a uniquely Protestant response to this problem in 
that he insists that the issues in question are only understood and resolved with primary 
reference to redemption, which he understands (following his teacher, Seeberg) in largely 
ethical terms.
23
  The unity of act and being occurs, that is, only insofar as God‘s action is 
seen as coextensive with the church‘s orientation toward recognition of the neighbor.  In 
this relation, a mutuality is established wherein we exist as individuals-together (church) 
as a collective-individual (Jesus.)  Being is here revealed as relational.  The work is an 
extraordinary achievement, and yet it is precisely where it succeeds that its failures are 
most apparent.  Enumerating these will help me to further isolate the problem of the 
dissertation as a whole.     
First, Bonhoeffer encounters the problem in question as a matter of a 
transcendental or ontological starting point for revelation, and seeks out what Dumas 
rightly recognizes is an ontology without metaphysics.
24
  He seeks to articulate the 
absolute priority of revelation, but in a manner that unites the transcendental and 
ontological starting points as opposed to falling decisively into either one.  However, this 
is itself a metaphysical position, and it is shown to be such by virtue of Bonhoeffer‘s own 
way of framing the question in terms of the classical categories.  This is a strange mistake 
to make for the kind of Lutheran theologian Bonhoeffer is, as it frames the question of 
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 Ibid. 
23
 Bonhoeffer, Act and Being.  Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio: A Theological Study of the 
Sociology of the Church, trans. Clifford J. Green (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998).   
24
 André Dumas, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Theologian of Reality, trans. Robert McAfee Brown (New 
York,: Macmillan, 1971), 97-117.  It is in this way, despite his proximity to Levinas, Bonhoeffer is to be 
distinguished from him.  Bonhoeffer remains almost strictly Heideggerian in this regard, and his reference 
to ethics remains personalist in orientation, in the manner of Edith Stein, and does not achieve the strong 
critique of ontology developed later in Levinas.   
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the priority of revelation in terms of the very philosophical categories he seeks to 
overturn.   As a result, he occludes the central doctrinal content that revelation discloses, 
opting instead for a particularly formal (though unique) instance of this more general 
metaphysical problematic.  Even if one asserts with Bonhoeffer that the proclamation and 
reception of the Word of God in the church is the only resolution of that problematic, it is 
necessary to recognize this distinctively metaphysical orientation.
25
  As I will suggest 
later in the dissertation, it is an entirely different matter to say that the questions posed 
here demand metaphysical answers than to argue that they are essentially metaphysical 
questions.  The final value of Bonhoeffer‘s proposal is decided on this point.   
Second, there is the added complication that Bonhoeffer‘s interpretation of these 
metaphysical problems is largely Idealist.
26
  This fact is particularly recognizable in that 
he uses the Hegelian terms, Aufheben and Aufhebung, to describe his procedure for 
uniting act and being.  Bonhoeffer begins with the dialectical separation of thought into 
being and action, and then attempts to mediate their union in the church.  Beyond merely 
orienting the question of revelation philosophically, he has thus conceived the 
relationship of being to act in terms of a separation.  This fact gives his treatment of 
revelation an overridingly Hegelian hue in that it renders the substantial content of being 
something only realized in and through an Aufhebung that is achieved in and through 
one‘s relation to an historical event.  Bonhoeffer absorbed this Hegelianism from his 
teacher, Reinhold Seeberg, as well as from the philosopher Eberhard Grisebach.
27
  But, 
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 Bonhoeffer, Act and Being, 31, especially n. 20. 
26
 I mean to point to a central confusion in the Idealist tradition over the nature of the determinate 
content of being—a confusion that, Chapter Four notes, is essentially Gnostic and Manichaean in its 
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27
 See James C. Livingston, Modern Christian Thought, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
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insofar as he makes this a problem specifically of relation and not knowledge, Bonhoeffer 
develops his answer in terms of what Heidegger will refer to as a fundamental ontology 
rather than metaphysics.
28
   
Finally, this last point leads immediately to the most salient insight of the 
resultant ontology, which concerns its focus on the ethical structure of human relations 
within being.  As such, Bonhoeffer‘s fundamental ontology is essentially personalist in 
the mode of Martin Buber, Ferdinand Schiller, Gabriel Marcel, and Edith Stein.
29
  This 
personalist influence is most likely also due in part to the tradition of Ritschlian 
liberalism he learned under the tutelage from Reinhold Seeberg.
30
  This way of framing 
the question of revelation, in contrast to the problems presented by the transcendental and 
ontological analysis and toward that of ethics and human personhood, has the effect of 
rendering the question of act and being a matter of authentic and effective human agency.  
Much like John Zizioulas, Bonhoeffer resituates the traditional metaphysical problem of 
the One and the Many around personhood and the structures of thought necessary for its 
genuine affirmation.  When he concludes that Being-itself is personal, even communal, 
he nonetheless allows the metaphysical cast of the problem to overrun his own ethical 
orientation.  That is, he articulates the problem of personhood as a particular instance of 
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the more general problem of unity and multiplicity.  The fact that his answer is not itself 
metaphysical but ontological is not pertinent.
31
   
As I will show below, Bonhoeffer‘s particular way of framing this matter in terms 
of a fundamental ontological relation is largely characteristic of the Protestant 
formulation of the unity of creation and grace.  This approach begins with the concrete 
reality of division and alienation, not so as to ontologize this division, but in order to refer 
that division to a deeper unity—one disclosed in and through the event of personal 
encounter.  It is in this encounter that truth of being is revealed to be relational.  This 
truth is not apprehensible, he maintains, apart from this relation, and the presumption of 
doing so is only an expression of the cor curvem in se of speculative (i.e., sinful) 
reason.
32
  He makes this claim in continuity with Martin Luther, but it is also ultimately 
derived, as we will see, from Augustine.    
 
Common Concerns 
From out of these problems in both contemporary Roman Catholic and Protestant 
theology, three predominant questions emerge, all of which pivot on the question of 
human agency.  The first is whether the problem of human agency can be avoided by 
appeal to a kind of ―naïve‖ or dogmatic—one might even say, positivist—realism.33  
Representatives of this approach adopt a decidedly metaphysical approach to the problem 
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 Indeed, I will suggest below that Levinas helps us see how Heidegger‘s procedure is also guilty of 
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 See the discussion in Bonhoeffer, Act and Being, 7, 16,41- 46, 58, 80, 89. 
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 This phrase is Bernard Lonergan‘s.  See Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human 
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in question, and stand in the tradition (or basic assumptions) of Neo-Scholasticism.  
Presently, thinkers taking this route take up the mantle of Garrigou-Lagrange, Gilson, 
and/or Maritain.  Though Protestant, it is appropriate to include Wolfhart Pannenberg 
here as well.  Their thought emphasizes the divisions between the orders of nature and 
grace by locating the fulfillment of the former wholly in an objective order of grace that 
is coextensive with ecclesiastical structure.  As such, the order of grace fulfills the order 
of nature, but is decisively distinct from it.  The second question is whether it is possible 
to reduce this agency to ontology, as we see in Lubac.  The third question is whether it is 
possible to develop a successful mediation of the personal agency and universal 
determination in the mode of Bonhoeffer.   
However, there is the possibility of a fourth option, which I have sought to set out 
in this dissertation.  That fourth possibility would avoid being lost in the thicket of the 
act/being problematic on the one hand, and thrashing about in the stale water of 
modernity, on the other, by insisting on gaining clarity first at the level of Christian 
doctrine.  Something of this point has already been noted in relation to Bonhoeffer‘s 
approach to these questions.  Indeed, it is stunning the extent to which it goes unnoticed 
that the ―nature/grace‖ pairing in Roman Catholic theology places a speculative concept 
(nature) together with a doctrine (grace).  The common assumption seems to be that 
―nature‖ is somehow synonymous with ―creation.‖  But, as I will show, the term ―nature‖ 
developed in Scholastic theology as a discretely transcendental concept that mediated the 
unity and differentiation of two doctrines, creation and grace.  Further, as already noted 
in relation to Bonhoeffer, the issues at stake in the theology of revelation are not resolved 
by showing a unique theological resolution to a metaphysical problem.  That is, 
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revelation is not the proper mediating category to resolve the problem of unity (being) 
and differentiation (act).  Nor is this difficulty overcome by framing this question of unity 
and differentiation in terms of a dialectic of alienation (sin) and authenticity (grace).   
Again, the issue is not primarily oriented by a metaphysical difficulty, but by a 
concern to articulate the proper unity of the claims entailed by two doctrines.  In each 
case, the stakes are greatly clarified once the doctrinal register is recovered over against 
strictly metaphysical concerns.  Framed as a matter of doctrine (―creation and grace‖) 
rather than speculation (―nature and grace‖), this discussion becomes less about the 
securing of meaning for worldly experience, and more about properly understanding and 
relating God‘s acts of creating and redeeming.  And, it is just here, where we are lead to 
conceive the intersection of divine and human actions, that the question of agency can 
appear once again in a fresh way, outside of (even if coincident with) metaphysical 
concerns.   
 
Method of Analysis: Archaeological Record of the Present 
My method of analyzing this problem of the unity of creation and grace is 
fundamentally archaeological in the sense deployed by Michel Foucault and as adopted 
by Edward Farley in Ecclesial Reflection: An Anatomy of Theological Method.  I say my 
method is ―archaeological‖ in order to distinguish it from the kind of genealogical 
surveys characteristic of post-Nietzschean and post-Heideggerian thought noted above in 
Siewerth, von Balthasar, and Dupré.  I have in mind, as Foucault notes in reference to the 
Annales School, an analysis that can unlock the depths within a network of ideas, rather 
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than the mere historical succession of those ideas as such.  Noting his own reliance on 
Foucault, Farley describes his procedure: 
Positively, the term archaeology suggests an investigation of the strata which underlie 
beliefs, symbols, actions, and institutions.  I would not do justice to the metaphor if I 
restricted it to strata analysis.  The science of archaeology works with strata in order to 
reconstruct the events and process of the prehistorical past.  Likewise, this 
archaeology…will have a sequential or developmental reference…The primary effort, 
however, is to expose the strata themselves, the various levels of presupposed symbols 
and axioms taken for granted….34 
 
My own process is very similar in relationship to the doctrines in question.  Unlike 
Foucault, however, my goal is neither latently structuralist nor overtly historicist.  What I 
am tracing is not the manner in which a discourse generates its object from out of the 
discontinuities within the discursive field (its excess, as it were), but rather the manner in 
which these questions of Christian theology give differentiated discursive expression to a 
central metaphysical truth that has yet to be articulated adequately.  Indeed, my work here 
is premised on the assumption that this metaphysical insight has not been clearly stated, 
and my archaeological survey is intended to bring it into relief.  In this way, I am 
essentially using Foucault‘s procedure in the opposite direction: not tracing the historical 
construction of the metaphysical concepts that cover over the failures in a discourse, but 
investigating the failures in the discourse that disclose the metaphysical reality they 
presume and seek to express.  In this regard, my assumptions are thoroughly realist, and, 
as I have already suggested, are tied to a peculiar construal of human agency.     
In beginning this archaeological investigation, it is necessary to first eschew all 
metaphysical and ontological interpretations of the problem in question, and to treat the 
question in strictly doctrinal terms.  This allows the problem of nature and the 
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supernatural and sin and grace to appear as a dispute concerning the proper relationship 
of the two doctrines, creation and grace.  In this respect, I follow Kathryn Tanner‘s work 
God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment? in conceiving the 
pertinent issues in terms of the fundamental ―grammar‖ of Christian theology.35  If there 
are metaphysical issues to be confronted (as I insist there are), those issues arrive 
subsequent to this doctrinal investigation and must not serve as its basis.  It is for this 
reason that conceiving this question, on the one hand, solely in terms of the 
nature/supernatural is essentially to predetermine the analysis in favor of a metaphysical 
architecture of ontological identity.  Conversely, to view the matter solely in terms of the 
doctrine of redemption, wherein creation is the identifying term that unites the 
differentiations of existence in a dialectic of harmony (grace) and alienation (sin), is to 
predetermine the analysis in favor of a fundamental ontology of mediated social relation.   
To frame matters in this way, then, is not only to fail to achieve a real conversation 
between the different perspectives, but a mystification of the problem.   
It is not only the fact that this is a problem of uniting the doctrines of creation and 
grace that is thereby mystified, but so also is the extent to which that peculiar set of issues 
sits at the heart of Christian theology.  Indeed, some decisive punctuation of this union 
directs the focus of every theological vision, and can generally be associated, stylistically, 
more with Irenaeus or Augustine.
36
  On the one hand, there is an approach that sees a 
continuous order of growth from creation to redemption (Irenaeus and Origen) and, on 
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the other, that of a devastating corruption of one order and the introduction of another 
(Augustine.)  Such issues run, as Augustine himself realized upon reading Paul, into the 
very heart of the apostolic witness of scripture, and continue to affect its reading in the 
present.  The answers one gives to such questions inevitably determine the ‗style‘ of 
thought one adopts.  It is my concern with the problems and insights that result from this 
Western heritage that have led me to exempt Eastern Christianity from my study, as their 
perspective has always been essentially an elaboration on Irenaeus and Origen.  But 
within Western Christianity, genuine insight into the demand of the newness introduced 
by the order of redemption has made the problem of continuity and harmony of order 
particularly acute.  And the basic decisions made on this question of unity is and remains 
in some sense definitive for all theological visions.
37
   
In addition, what I am speaking of here as the ―problem of the union of the 
doctrines of creation and grace‖ already presupposes aspects of the study itself, and many 
of these presumed elements have already begun to appear.  My use of this phrase refers to 
what is traditionally thought of as the relationship of the order of creation to the order of 
redemption.
38
   This traditional concern emphasizes the doctrinal frame and allows them 
to define the question and its answer, while recognizing the extent to which those 
answers reach well beyond the propriety of the doctrinal register itself.  The question is 
how systematic theology should understand the order of existence in creation in its 
coherent relation to the order by which God redeems it.  The emphasis is not only on the 
fact that these doctrines do actually imply a specific order, but also on the fact that there 
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are two distinct orders that are nonetheless related.   It is this aspect of the question that 
renders this matter of the unity of the two doctrines a unique status in systematic 
theology.  This uniqueness is related to two factors.   
First, the suggestion that the doctrines of creation and grace imply an order is to 
say that the theological truth affirmed in the claims that the world is created and graced 
has as its corollary a distinct rationale, coherence, and intelligibility in its application to 
reality.  In most cases in the history of Christian theology, this order is associated with 
some understanding of natural law, as it pertains to the doctrine of creation, or some idea 
of ecclesiastical or sacramental relations resulting from God‘s work of redemption.39  In 
each instance that order is conditioned by and integral to God‘s purposes for each.  This 
―second-order‖ matter of the specific kind of order  implied by a ―first-order‖ doctrine is 
particularly idiosyncratic in systematic theology as it refers to what Lonergan called a 
distinctively ―speculative‖ moment in the doctrinal task, but which is probably better 
thought of simply as metaphysical (or abstractive.)
40
  This assertion underscores the sense 
in which certain doctrines (e.g., the hypostatic union or the Trinity) are not simply the 
elaboration and specification of scriptural teaching, but also involve the articulation of 
certain clear conclusions about reality that are to be drawn from those teachings in their 
application to reality.  In the case of the doctrines of creation and grace, there is a 
distinctively metaphysical component that has an immediate experiential referent for the 
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reality of the claims made.  What is the order, or rationale, for reality implied by the 
doctrine of creation?  What is the order, or rationale, for reality specified by the doctrine 
of grace?  Extrapolation to that order is necessarily an abstraction from the doctrine in 
question.
41
   
Second, however, is the fact that these orders are understood in some sense to be 
at least formally discrete.  The order of reality abstracted from the doctrine of creation is 
not necessarily the same order as that abstracted from the doctrine of grace.  Insofar as 
the question of reality is specifically raised by this abstraction, the problem of distinction 
between the doctrines is particularly formidable.  That question pertains to what extent 
the differentiation of the doctrines applies to the reality of order specified by the 
abstraction.  Is the order specified by the doctrine of redemption the same reality as the 
order specified by the doctrine of creation?  If so, then are the orders also identical?   And 
if they are, then the nature of the distinction must be specified.  If they are not identical, 
then some account must be given of how these two distinct orders refer to a common 
reality.  But the option also remains that the realities specified by the orders are in fact 
different.  If this route is taken, it is how the reality of creation is related to the reality of 
redemption that must be stated.  The fact that the two are argued to be distinct realities 
does not alleviate the theological burden of relating them.     
By framing the discussion in this way, I am then in a position to analyze the two 
distinct ways of answering these questions, the Roman Catholic and Protestant 
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paradigms, respectively.  A word must be said, before proceeding, about my use of this 
term ―paradigm.‖  I intend this use of the term in more of a Platonic sense than its more 
common use inspired by Thomas Kuhn.
42
  Yet, my use here shares much with Kuhn and 
is intended to include his notion that a paradigm orders an entire frame of reference for 
interpreting data.  Despite wanting to retain this sense, when I suggest that there are 
different ―Roman Catholic‖ and ―Protestant‖ paradigms for uniting creation and grace, I 
want to call to mind simultaneously the more comprehensive sense maintained by Plato‘s 
paradeigma.   
As Kuhn uses the term, ―paradigm‖ is closer to what Plato understood as an 
―image,‖ which Eric D. Perl has defined as ―a mode in which reality itself is presented 
and apprehended.‖43  As a result, for Kuhn, a paradigm is something like a conceptual 
architecture in and through which reality is ordered.
44
  Sallie McFague has further 
elaborated on this connection, noting that a paradigm functions as ―a set of basic 
assumptions or commitments in a field of study or tradition which defines the issues 
considered, the methods used, the answers allowed.‖45  But, what I have in mind here 
refers to the sense in which the paradigm is not simply a ―model,‖46 but functions also as 
a ―plan, pattern, or design‖ that is ―prior to, independent of and irreducible to‖ its 
particular images.
47
  In this case, specific paradigms are not simply ways of ordering data 
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but are also manifestations of a plan, pattern, and design, which is itself present in the 
images, and is not reducible to the image.
48
  As Perl states, Plato‘s paradigms are ―at once 
immanent universals and transcendent paradigms—or, since we have overcome their 
opposition, we can equally well say that they are at once transcendent universals and 
immanent paradigms.‖49   
This dual use of the term, when applied, as I do here, to distinctively ―Roman 
Catholic‖ and ―Protestant‖ patterns of organization, has a twofold effect.50  On the one 
hand, I intend my reference to distinctively ―Roman Catholic‖ and ―Protestant‖ 
paradigms in precisely Kuhn‘s sense of a set of basic assumptions determining the field 
of inquiry.  And within each of these paradigms, so understood, I offer two definitive 
Platonic ―images‖ of that paradigm within which to apprehend it.  Such examples are 
intended to represent the most definitive contemporary articulations of and engagements 
with the question of this unity within the paradigm.  In the Roman Catholic, the figures 
are Henri de Lubac and Karl Rahner, and in the Protestant, these figures are Friedrich 
Schleiermacher and Karl Barth.  On the other hand, I wish these paradigms to be 
understood as manifestations of a more fundamental truth, which each manifest and have 
a share.  In this way, I hope to open up a way for conversation that transcends the 
otherwise confessional impasses upon which dialogue falters.   
When this matter is confined to these confessional differences, the question of the 
union of creation and grace is reduced to a matter of tracing out the dissonance between 
two different ways of organizing the field of data.  The result is that one paradigm is 
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always judged according to its failure to correspond to the presuppositions of the other.  
Most commonly, this entails an advocate of the Roman Catholic paradigm accusing an 
adherent to the Protestant perspective of deploying a dialectic that violates the 
metaphysical assumptions upon which the Roman Catholic position is based.  And this 
claim is made in spite of the fact that the Protestant dialectic is specifically formulated on 
quite different assumptions than the Roman Catholic.  Or, conversely, an advocate of the 
Protestant paradigm accuses an adherent of the Roman Catholic position of subordinating 
revelation to a more general metaphysics, based on natural reason.  And this is done in 
spite of the fact that the Roman Catholic position insists that its metaphysics is nothing 
more than an elaboration of the truths disclosed by revelation.  Genuine dialogue does not 
take place in such circumstances.  But, as I hope, when the questions that animate each 
paradigm are resituated in terms of doctrine—and more specifically in terms of the unity 
of two distinct doctrines—then how it is that each approach is a particular manifestation 
of a more fundamental and commonly shared set of assumptions can be seen with greater 
clarity.   
By staging this conversation as I have in this dissertation, I am also attempting to 
evoke recognition of an aporia between the two.  I intend this term ―aporia‖ to refer here 
in the classical Socratic sense (in contrast to the Derridian interpolation).
51
  That is, I am 
concerned to show that, in each instance, what is taken as definitive for the question at 
hand is, in fact, only a particular instance—in Plato‘s terms, doxa rather than episteme.52  
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As such, at just the moment this impasse is encountered, just as Socrates instructs Meno, 
we are obliged to press forward to greater understanding.
53
  The procedure is not to 
identify the harmony of the two approaches, nor is it to attempt to reveal the conceptual 
content that is apprehensible from out of the opposition of the two approaches.  On the 
contrary, the procedure is to show how the two ―paradigms‖ are themselves instances, 
images, of a ―pattern‖ or ―design‖ that is much more fundamental to each.    
 I show three things with this procedure.  First, with reference to a given 
paradigm, I illuminate the nature of the dispute in question by lifting out the assumptions 
that guide that paradigm.  Thus, clarity will be gained on the issues that divide and unite 
Lubac and Rahner, as well as Barth and Schleiermacher.  Second, I isolate the ways in 
which the representative thinkers‘ attempts to unite creation and grace in that paradigm 
are at odds with key assumptions of that paradigm.  Finally, I note that this paradigmatic 
incoherence results because a key paradigmatic assumption has not only been excluded, 
but actually displaced into the opposite paradigm.  In each case, this mutual 
determination is the result of the failure to perceive the central insight of the doctrines in 
question.  Because of this, my archaeological investigation is oriented not toward 
isolating the object generated by this discursive failure, but toward bringing into relief the 
presuppositions of the doctrines to which each paradigmatic discourse is failing to attend.   
   
Summary of the Argument 
At just this point, discussion of method begins to overlap directly with the 
concerns of my argument.  Because my argument may appear circuitous, I feel obliged to 
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note that my claim is quite simple and direct: the history of Western theology‘s grappling 
with the doctrines of creation and grace is oriented by the unique status of the will as 
distinct from the intellect and desire, and ordered toward the positive, ethical affirmation 
of otherness.  I further argue that it is only with a clear apprehension of the nature of this 
distinction and its irreducible orientation to the positive affirmation of otherness that the 
unity of creation and grace can be coherently thought and thus the conversation should be 
reconstructed in this light.   
I advance this argument in four distinct phases.  The first analyzes the Roman 
Catholic paradigm of uniting creation and grace, and the contemporary debates occurring 
within that it.  The second analyzes the Protestant paradigm and the contemporary 
debates within it.  The third traces each of these paradigms and their attendant problems 
to the divergent metaphysical and relational trajectories developed in Augustine‘s 
doctrines of creation and grace, respectively.  Finally, the fourth phase draws the various 
elements from the two paradigms together in a manner that harmonizes them and avoids 
the previous mistakes engendered by the failure to recognize the significance of the 
category of otherness for each doctrine.  As my analysis in each of these phases develops 
archaeologically and is ordered according to the paradigms, it will be helpful to identify 
and discuss in some detail two overarching themes that structure the whole of my 
investigation, present at each stage of the argument.  These are the problem of the will 
and that of ontology.    
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The Problem of the Will 
The problem of the will is the centerpiece of the dissertation.  In dealing with this 
matter, my concerns are focused on lifting out the significance for the Western 
understanding of creation and grace of distinguishing the role of the will from the 
intellect and desire.
54
  In this regard, my reflections are directly influenced by a series of 
thinkers beginning with Artur Landgraf and Odo Lottin, in the early twentieth century.  I 
follow their work as interpreted and applied by Bernard Lonergan, and I have been 
particularly influenced by J. Patout Burns, who notes Lonergan‘s influence.55  In addition 
to these thinkers, I understand my claims on the will to stand in continuity with a number 
of developments in the history of classical philosophy.  The most important of these is the 
work of Albrecht Dihle, which has been criticized and elaborated upon by Charles Kahn.  
Richard Sorabji has recently made even further elaboration on Dihle‘s original claim, and 
James Wetzel‘s analysis should be read in continuity with each of these developments.  
Other than Wetzel, whose thesis is quite nuanced, each of these thinkers contends that 
Augustine is responsible for first formulating a notion of the will, as distinct from the 
intellect and desire.
56
  I do not intend my own analysis to contribute to the conversations 
among these scholars by taking a specific position on the questions that concerns them.  
Rather, I have sought merely to agree with the basic assumptions they share, which pivot 
around the significance of Augustine, even as they differ on the details.  However, what 
Landgraf and Lottin contribute to this discussion that the others do not is the intimate 
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connection of the complete formulation of the will by Aquinas in the thirteenth century in 
connection with the solution to the dogmatic problem of the theology of grace.  This is a 
development beyond but in continuity with Augustine.   
I bring this scholarship to bear on my discussion of the two paradigms throughout 
the dissertation.  In both the discussion of the metaphysics of the nature/supernatural 
paradigm as well as in that of the ontology of the sin/grace paradigm, my concern is to 
note the doctrinal consequences that result from failing to relate the will to the intellect 
and desire in the manner achieved by Aquinas.  In this regard, I note that when Aquinas‘ 
insight is not retained—or, as is the case with Augustine, not yet recognized—two ways 
of invoking the will inevitably emerge.  The first retains a largely Platonic theory of the 
will as the soul‘s capacity for free self-determination in relationship to knowledge.  This 
way of thinking of the will is consistent with the parable of the chariot in The Phaedrus 
and of the body in The Republic.
57
  The problems related to this concept of the will are 
discussed in Chapters Two and Four, but it will suffice here to note that this approach 
stumbles on its inability to account for the fact that knowledge of the good does not imply 
the capacity to perform it.  Though this notion is intimately related to the problem of 
akrasia, this problem is different in relation to the theological question of creation and 
grace.  Akrasia was widely recognized in the ancient world as a problem regarding why 
the good that is known is not performed, being important for Plato, Aristotle, and 
Augustine.  Yet, as Chapter Two shows, Aquinas was able to recognize that the intellect 
could have as its object a good that exceeded the natural capacities of the will to produce.  
In this regard, Aquinas elaborates upon the work of Augustine, who centuries earlier had 
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begun to expand the discussion of the nature of the will well beyond the classical 
engagement with akrasia.  Indeed, this very distinction became the basis for the 
natural/supernatural distinction that has become characteristic of the ―Roman Catholic‖ 
paradigm.   
Just as the first misunderstanding of the will is characteristic of the Roman 
Catholic pattern of thought, so the second, as the obverse of the first, is characteristic of 
Protestant thought.  Where the problem of the first lay with the assumption that 
knowledge was coextensive with capacity, the problem with the second lay with the 
assumption that desire itself has an infinite capacity for self-determination.  In this case, 
the intellect does not direct an active self-determination, but rather determines an 
otherwise formally empty potentiality.  The difference is best captured by pointing to the 
difference between Plato and Descartes.
58
  Where Plato saw the intellect as the charioteer 
guiding an obedient horse of virtue and an unruly horse of sensuous desires (and thus the 
will as an essentially intellectual operation), Descartes understood the will as an 
essentially irrational capacity for infinite self-determination that must be properly 
specified by the intellectual apprehension of truth.
59
  The problems related to this 
approach are discussed in Chapters Three and Four.  Once again, the problem here is an 
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inadequate account of the will, and pivots specifically around the failure to recognize and 
acknowledge the will‘s proper operational limits.  But, beyond this, this particular way o 
framing the question of the will puts its status as an intellectual affection into relief in a 
marked way.  Again, it is the metaphysical analysis of Aquinas that is most important 
here.   
In the case of each paradigm, the dominant understanding of the will is shown to 
generate a specific set of confusions that result in the failure to achieve a genuine unity of 
creation and grace.  Chapter Four as a whole argues that this is due to an impasse 
between the metaphysics of Augustine‘s theology of creation and the content of his 
mature theology of grace.  This chapter shows that Augustine‘s metaphysics of creation 
sets the stage for a distinct conception of the will, and that his mature theology of grace 
elaborates upon the meaning of the will as a discretely social, relational, and intentional 
operation.  Nonetheless, I show that Augustine was unable to draw the metaphysical and 
relational dimensions of this analysis together coherently.  Chapter Five shows how it is 
that Aquinas successfully resolves the metaphysical difficulties posed by Augustine‘s 
insights only to obviate the specific relational dimension of Augustine‘s mature theology 
of grace.  These dimensions were then reasserted by Luther, specifically as a critique of 
the speculative metaphysics of Scholasticism, in his doctrine of justification by faith 
alone.  But, yet again, Luther himself fails to recognize the real force of these insights as 
his conception of Christ as the form of faith is specifically conceived in ontological terms 
such that this social dimension of grace is thought in terms of a ―principle‖ of being.  The 
active, intentional and ethical dimension of Augustine‘s thoughts on these matters is once 
again occluded, even as the priority of the affective dimension is conceived in decidedly 
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relational rather than metaphysical terms.  This observation leads directly to the second 
major theme guiding the study, the question of the appropriate reference for the category 
of Being.  
 
The Question of Appropriate Reference to Being 
My treatment of the will is directly related to a discussion of the category of 
―being.‖  I argue that how the will is conceived in each of the paradigms is directly 
coordinate with the way the category of being is used in the that paradigm.  In the Roman 
Catholic paradigm, where the will tends to be reduced to the intellect, being is thought in 
terms of a speculative metaphysics.  And in the Protestant paradigm, where the will is 
conceived of in terms of the specification of desire, being is thought in terms of the 
category of encounter, where interpersonal relation is given priority over metaphysics.  
The burden of my argument is to show that a distinct conception of the will also makes 
possible a reference to the category of being that is irreducible to either what I call the 
―metaphysical ontology‖ of the Roman Catholic paradigm or the ―ontology of encounter‖ 
of the Protestant paradigm.  Such reference would not understand that union, first, in 
terms of an overarching ontology in which the identity and difference of creation and 
grace is mediated, but rather as the manifestation of the reality of the acts of creation and 
grace.  This argument differs from the traditional metaphysical understanding of the act 
of existence (esse) only in how it conceives of the relationship of the ethical reality of 
being.  My explication of this particular reference to Being in given in Chapter Six.  
Throughout the dissertation, I use the term ―ontology‖ to designate that use of 
reason that seeks to apprehend the most basic truth of reality in and through the 
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representations of discursive thought.
60
  I insist that there is a distinction to be made 
between this ―ontological‖ use of reason and simply the thoughtful and responsible 
engagement with the question of Being.  Indeed, as I am suggesting with my claim that 
the proper union of creation and grace can yield an appropriate reference to the category 
of being, I do not think ontological reasoning itself is adequate to the reality of the 
actuality of being.  However, making the case for this claim involves three important 
claims.   
First, I reject Heidegger‘s Destruktion of the history of Western philosophy in 
which the question of the Being of Being is uncovered from beneath centuries of 
―metaphysical‖ occlusion.  As Heidegger noted, this metaphysical trajectory of Western 
thought begins with Plato‘s doctrine of the forms, which sought some stable point of 
reference within Being, and ended with Nietzsche‘s metaphysics of the will, in which the 
Platonic gesture is realized (and affirmed) as sheer self-assertion.  There is much to take 
issue with in this narrative, but my claim here is simply that Heidegger has misidentified 
the problem.  I follow Levinas, on this point, noting that Heidegger‘s own ontology does 
not escape the problems he has identified with metaphysics, but has rather only revealed 
the more fundamental problem of the category of ―being‖ as a ―neutral‖ and ―indifferent‖ 
discourse of ―totality.‖61  As Edith Wyschogrod has argued, this critique of Heidegger set 
Levinas on the path of distinguishing metaphysics, as a discursive reflection on the whole 
of reality, from ontology, as the discursive representation of its truth in terms of ―being.‖  
Instead, Levinas sought to formulate an ―ethical metaphysics‖ in which the Platonic 
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priority of the good is maintained over every ontological representation.
62
  My own 
distinction of the appropriate reference to the question of being stands in continuity with 
this search for an ethical metaphysics, even as it departs from Levinas in refusing to 
understand being as necessarily violent (i.e., ontological).  Nonetheless, I insist that an 
appropriately ethical account of being cannot be confused with the claim that being itself 
is personal.  As my critique of the Protestant paradigm of an ontology of encounter 
argues, I do not believe the ethical reality of being can be accounted for at all in 
ontological terms.  For reasons given in the conclusion, I believe only the doctrine of 
creatio ex nihilo, together with its correlative conception of grace, adequately presents a 
metaphysics of the irreducibly ethical reality of being, and that this metaphysics 
absolutely resists reduction to ontological representation.   
Second, this distinction of ontology from an ethical metaphysics, as well as my 
argument that the unity of the doctrines of creation and grace entails a non-ontological 
reference to being, is further advanced by demonstrating that the attempts to produce an 
ontological union of the doctrines always involves prioritizing of identity, intellection, 
and participation in that account.
63
  Once again inspired by Levinas, I argue that this is 
problematic, principally, because it disallows any account of otherness except in terms of 
a ―difference‖ that is simply a modality of identity.64  This privileging of identity is, 
simultaneously, bound up with an intellectualism in which reality is understood to be 
apprehended only by way of abstraction from and reduction to a common participation in 
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being.
65
  Though this point is inseparable from the claim that ontology is a ―neutral‖ and 
―indifferent‖ discourse of ―totality,‖ it is not the same.  As Chapters Four and Five show, 
what is principally at stake is the fact that the demands of the doctrines of creation and 
grace cannot be met in these terms of identity, intellection, and participation.  Whenever 
the unity of creation and grace is sought in these terms, one of the doctrines must be 
accounted for wholly in terms of the other.         
Finally, I argue that the inability to avoid the reduction of these doctrines is due to 
the fact that ontology proceeds according to a logic of negative determination that is 
fundamentally at odds with the central affirmations of the doctrines of creation and grace.  
Because ontology must think unity according to a scheme of identity, intellect, and 
participation, reality is necessarily understood in terms of becoming (i.e., fieri) or 
production (i.e., factum) rather than creation.  To conceive reality as a product is to claim 
that it only receives its determination through a dialectical negation in which identity is 
always the negation of difference and difference the negation of identity.  This procedure 
is identical to that formulated in Hegel‘s Logic, and, as Chapter Four argues, the 
metaphysics of creatio ex nihilo is explicitly developed in order to contest the form of 
that logic as overtly and unavoidably Gnostic.            
In making this claim, I am elaborating upon an observation made by Bernard 
Lonergan in a footnote in Verbum.  Lonergan ties this notion of production to Scotus‘ 
theory of intellection, which categorically rejects the affective dimension of the first act 
of potency in favor of an immediate spontaneity.
66
  The significance of this point for 
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Lonergan‘s work is far reaching, stretching back to his account of the basic flaw in the 
late-Scholastic de Auxiliis controversy, and forward into the flaw of Arianism.
67
  I have 
developed the point here, however, in relationship to ontological discourse itself, and 
recognize in it a basic assumption of all Christian doctrine, the deviation from which can 
be identifiably designated as heretical.
68
  But my concern is to show the continuity 
between confusion as to the proper reference to the will and this ontology of production.   
Indeed, if reality is conceived in such a way that its determinate content is always 
only produced through a negative relation to actuality, then this is directly related to the 
question of the distinction of the will from the intellect and desire.  As I noted in the 
previous section, the Platonic trajectory of thought, which sees the will as an aspect of the 
self-determination of the intellect, must ground that self-determination in a spontaneous 
motion (i.e., fieri) by which an intellectually apprehended ideal is produced in reality.  
Because that ideal is not taken as actual and real apart from that production, but only a 
formal possibility, the realization of the ideal must proceed according to negative 
determination in which its otherwise empty formality is negated and thereby realized.  
Such a notion lies at the heart of both Neoplatonic and Manichean metaphysics.  In the 
Scotist trajectory of thought, where the will is understood as an infinite spontaneous 
potentiality that is merely specified by the intellect, the operation is exactly the same.  I 
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trace out the consequences of this association in Chapter Five, and throughout I am 
laying the groundwork for an altogether different conception of being that is not 
grounded in the dialectical oppositions that result from a confused notion of the will.  
That different conception is programmatically sketched in Chapter Six.   
 
Chapter Summary 
Having specified the dominant themes of the dissertation and their guiding 
function within it, I now offer a brief summary of the stages of the argument.  The 
concerns laid out in this Introduction are taken up in Chapter Two in an exposition and 
analysis of the Roman Catholic paradigm of nature/supernatural for uniting creation and 
grace.  The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the origins and purpose of the paradigm, 
situating the Lubac/Rahner dispute in relationship to it, and to bring evaded aspects of 
that paradigm to bear on that dispute.  The hope is that this chapter will advance the 
discussion surrounding that debate and further clarify the significance of the claims made 
in the Roman Catholic approach to uniting creation and grace.   
This chapter opens with a discussion of the Scholastic origins of the paradigm, 
and the centrality of the work of Thomas Aquinas as interpreted by Landgraf and 
Lonergan.  It is here that the importance of the will as a distinct faculty first appears in 
relationship to Philip the Chancellor‘s recognition of a distinction between natural and 
acquired habits.  It is on the basis of this distinction that the will is first recognized as 
having a distinct ―nature,‖ apart from both intellection and desire.  And it is upon this 
distinction of the will from the intellect and desire that Aquinas can further resolve two 
problems.  The first was the problem of the freedom of the will as received from 
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Augustine.  A distinct, natural operation for the will could specify how it was that the will 
could be absolutely determined with regard to the origin and goal, but be free with 
respect to the choice of the means to fulfill that goal.  This was only possible inasmuch as 
the will was genuinely distinct from the intellect and desire.  Second, this idea 
simultaneously resolved the relationship between the gratuity of creation and the gratuity 
of grace, which medieval theology had no clear way of distinguishing. A distinct idea of 
the nature of the will resolved this problem by specifying those actions that a given 
nature could acquire by means of its own voluntary activity.  Thus, the difference 
between the gratuity of creation and the gratuity of grace was that between those actions 
occurring naturally and which could be naturally acquired, and those actions that were 
supernatural in the sense of exceeding the potential operations of a given nature to even 
acquire.  
This history of this approach is then brought to bear on the dispute between Henri 
de Lubac and Karl Rahner.  The analysis is oriented toward showing the manner in which 
the two thinkers are divided from one another according to their assessments of the 
proper division between the natural and the supernatural.  It is noted that both thinkers are 
motivated by the desire to overcome what they perceive to be the sharp division of the 
supernatural from the natural in post-Vatican I Neo-Scholasticism by appealing instead to 
a natural desire for the supernatural.  Each is seeking a more humanist, personalist, and 
organicist vision in contrast to what they understand to be the overly rationalist 
approaches of Neoscholasticism.  They differ only over whether the distinction should be 
made as a transcendental distinction of ideas (Rahner) or as a concrete determination of 
existence (Lubac.)  It is shown that, insofar as both thinkers seek to articulate what I call 
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a metaphysical ontology in which to unite creation and redemption according to the 
speculative dynamism of the intellect, they are not to be too sharply distinguished.  But it 
is this very dynamism of union that leads them to revert to the pre-Scholastic position in 
which the will is conflated, in Platonic fashion, with the fundamental operations of the 
intellect.  In this way the distinction Aquinas was able to maintain by having clear 
distinction of intellect and will is lost, and grace essentially collapsed back into creation.   
Chapter Three takes up the question of the Protestant paradigm for uniting 
creation and grace.  This paradigm, it is noted, is formulated explicitly as a critique of the 
speculative intellectual structure of the Roman Catholic paradigm as correlative with a 
structure of negative determination and sinful self-preservation.  In contrast to this, the 
Protestant paradigm does not seek to articulate a distinction within an already constituted 
unity, but to start with the concrete experience of division.  It is within such division that 
redemption comes to disclose the unity of truth that the speculative intellect can only 
supply as a mode of self-assertion.  The supposition here is that of dogmatic, intratextual 
reflection, rather than speculative metaphysics.  The dogmatic categories deployed are 
those of election, sin, and grace.  The world of experience is not then the naturally graced 
world experienced by Lubac and Rahner, but a world conditioned by a dialectical shuttle 
between sin and grace, where the Christian knows herself as simul justus et peccator. 
Election, however, expresses God‘s a priori determination of her on which all her 
attempts of self-determination are finally thwarted.  It is only in the rupture of this self-
determination that the truth of her existence is disclosed through the event of encounter 
with the revelation of the electing God.   
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Within this paradigm, the two most important theological forms of uniting 
creation and grace are those of Schleiermacher and Barth, and their differences parallel in 
their own paradigm the differences between Lubac and Rahner.  Much as Lubac insisted 
on the priority of the concrete experience of grace rather than the theoretical 
differentiation, Barth insisted that the only possibility of knowing the world as the 
creation of God was on the basis of the prior encounter with Jesus Christ, in whom alone 
creation and grace where united.  This was formulated in contrast to Schleiermacher 
whose position is like Rahner‘s in his insistence that creation is itself is a theoretical 
extrapolation of the experience of the world as refracted through the event of the 
encounter of redemption.  The differences here are as minimal as those between Lubac 
and Rahner in that both thinkers rely not on a metaphysical ontology to mediate the unity 
of creation and grace, but on an ontology of encounter in which the truth of being is 
disclosed as relational only in the encounter with Christ.  But it is at this very moment of 
relational disclosure that the metaphysics of the Roman Catholic position is shown to be 
necessary, for both Schleiermacher and Barth presuppose the indeterminacy of the will.  
This assumption causes them not to privilege the intellect in the Platonic manner of 
Lubac and Rahner, but in a distinctively Scotist manner in which the intellect specifies 
the self-determination of an otherwise infinite spontaneity.  The result is the obverse of 
the problems attending the contemporary attempts to unite creation and grace according 
to the Roman Catholic paradigm.  What had been achieved in terms of the priority of 
relation, which the Roman Catholic perspective could not achieve, had come once again 
at the expense of the will, which made the distinction of doctrines possible.   The result is 
not the collapse of grace into creation, but creation into grace.   
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Chapter Four traces the origin of this conflict in Western Christianity back to its 
origin in the work of Augustine.  There, it is noted that Augustine formulates a grammar 
for the doctrine of creation against the Manichees in which he shows the necessary 
interrelationship between divine sovereignty, goodness, will, and divine immutability.  In 
this model, grace is understood in terms largely consonant with nature, and free will is 
understood in the strictly Platonic terms of self-determination.  This is the model 
recovered by both Lubac and Rahner.  Subsequently, however, Augustine begins to 
develop his theology of grace independently of the doctrine of creation.  He does this 
upon his reading of Paul at the request of Simplician.  This leads Augustine through a 
series of developments that unfold the logic of encounter and relation, which culminates 
in his recognition that grace must precede self-determination and absolutely condition its 
operation.  When he finally returns to the question of creation again in his Literal 
Commentary on Genesis, he finds himself unable to articulate the new insights of his 
mature theology of grace in terms consonant with his prior grammar for creation.  The 
difficulty resides in the absence of a discrete conception of the will.  He had begun to 
formulate this idea with his doctrine of creation, but he had been unable to articulate the 
nature of its distinction from the intellect and desire.  In the absence of this notion, he can 
only speak of God‘s being as an absolute act of self-determination.  Such an act must 
stand in competition with the finite will, if both are conceived in terms of self-
determination.  The result is a double-bind in which the goodness of creation is 
compromised by sacrificing the divine sovereignty to which it is indelibly tied, or the 
freedom of creation is lost altogether to an absolute divine sovereignty, but this appears 
to compromise created goodness as it renders God responsible for evil.  The result is that 
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Augustine bequeaths to medieval Christianity the apparently incoherent position that the 
will is free and absolutely determined; he was incapable of drawing these two paradigms, 
the metaphysical and the relational, together into a singular, unified whole.   
In Chapter Five, we come full circle by returning to the metaphysical position of 
Aquinas, which resolved this conflict in Augustine.  I note here the importance not 
simply of Aquinas‘s doctrine of the will, which has already been discussed, but assert that 
this insight is intimately bound to his understanding of the act of existence, which can 
resolve the difficulties in Augustine‘s reflections.  However, I note how this resolution, 
once more, comes at the expense of the relational dimension of Augustine‘s mature 
theology of grace.  It is here that Luther‘s doctrine of justification, taken up as an 
elaboration upon Aquinas‘s insight into the affective dimension of the will, is shown to 
be a necessary supplement, which in Luther‘s own formulation also sets the stage for the 
problems of the ontology of encounter.  Yet having come at just this point to the source 
of the conflict as before, we can now readily see that the resolution of the conflict lies 
with the recognition of the integral aspect of the will in the act of existence, whereby the 
unity of God‘s being is shown to perfectly correspond to the constitution of and fidelity 
to the world as God‘s other.   
Chapter Six concludes my argument by showing how, with these various elements 
in place, the unity of creation and grace can be reformulated in terms consonant with the 
demands of each paradigm, but without the assumptions that result in their conflict.  This 
chapter specifies the programmatic outline for what this reformulation should entail, 
arguing that human agency can be understood as a cooperation with God‘s creative act of 
positively affirming the very constitution of otherness itself.  Such cooperation is 
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grounded in and determined by God‘s prior action, and is genuinely creative insofar as it 
is carried out in cooperation with the orientation of the divine life in creation.   Included 
here is a schematic outline for how such action can be conceived and recognized as 
harmoniously related to the understanding of Being that has been developed.     
 
The Purpose of the Inquiry 
Beyond these introductory concerns, I would like to specify my motivations for 
undertaking this study.  The basic organizational scheme for my analyasis was originally 
suggested by the intriguing remarks of David Tracy in his ―Afterword: A Reflection on 
Mystics: Presence and Aporia‖ to the collection, Mystics: Presence and Aporia.69  There, 
he stated that work yet needed to be done on the Augustinian origins of the 
―nature/grace‖ and ―sin/grace‖ approaches of Roman Catholic and Protestant thinking, 
respectively.  This remark gave me a framework to structure what was then my growing 
suspicion that the problem of the unity of creation and grace sits at the heart of systematic 
theological inquiry.  The results of this study have only served to change that suspicion 
into conviction, and left me with a deep and abiding admiration of the Transcendental 
Thomists, the Dominicans of Saulchoir, and the Jesuits of Lyon-Fourviere who are 
responsible for reviving this question in twentieth-century theology.  It is their great gift 
to the universal church.  However, that their insights were and remain stunted in both 
their articulation and in their reception is my point of departure and my guiding concern.  
I am most certainly committed to carrying forward their work to repristinate this 
theological theme.   
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 Michael Kessler and Christian Sheppard, Mystics: Presence and Aporia (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2003), 239-44. 
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From this perspective, I am confident that, though the conclusions of my analysis 
may appear somewhat novel, their foundation is, in fact, ancient.  Though perhaps not 
always obvious, I am consciously writing within the mystical tradition of ascetic 
theology, and particularly that of the Wesenmystik.
70
  But I also draw spiritual inspiration 
directly from figures like the Caroline Divines, in addition to the academic theologians 
cited in this work.  Of particular inspiration is Richard Hooker, whose ferocious 
commitment to the exceedingly concrete demands of charity is far too often mistaken, 
especially in our own time, as an expression of facile compromise.  Readings of Hooker 
like John Henry Newman‘s, whose notion of a via media makes his predecessor seem too 
ameliorating, cannot obscure the unbending character of Hooker‘s resolve to force 
confrontation with the reality of the command to love.  In many ways the precursor to 
what Hans Frei once called a ―generous orthodoxy,‖ Hooker seems to have perceived and 
articulated the concrete ethical obligations inherent in this idea.  I offer this dissertation in 
solidarity with his vision, and do so at a time when that commitment is not, sadly, en 
vogue.  But my commitment to this uncompromising resolve is the inspiration for this 
work. I give Hooker the final word on my intentions:  
Far more comfort it were for us (so small is the joy we take in these strifes) to labour 
under the same yoke, as men that look for the same eternal reward of their labours, to be 
joined with you in bands of indissoluble love and amity, to live as if our persons being 
many our souls were but one, rather than in much dismembered sort to spend our few and 
wretched days in a tedious prosecuting of wearisome contentions: the end whereof, if 
they have not some speedy end, will be heavy even on both sides…But our trust in the 
Almighty is, that with us contentions are now at their highest float, and that the day will 
come (for what cause of despair is there?) when the passions of former enmity being 
allayed, we shall with ten times redoubled tokens of our unfeignedly reconciled love, 
shew ourselves each toward other the same which Joseph and the brethren of Joseph were 
at the time of their interview in Egypt.  Our comfortable expectation and most thirsty 
desire whereof what man soever amongst you shall any way help to satisfy…the 
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blessings of the God of peace, both in this world and the world to come, be upon him 
more than the stars of the firmament in number.
71
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 Richard Hooker, Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, ed. John Keble, 3 vols., vol. 1, The Works of the 
Learned and Judicious Divine, Mr. Richard Hooker with an Account of His Life and Death by Isaar Walton 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1885), 194-96 [3-4]. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
NATURE AND THE SUPERNATURAL: A ROMAN CATHOLIC 
PARADIGM 
 
Introduction 
This chapter begins my analysis of the two predominant patterns of uniting 
creation and redemption in Western Christian theology.  My topic here is the largely 
Roman Catholic paradigm of ―nature and the supernatural.‖  I have three goals in my 
analysis.  First, after a brief survey of the landscape regarding the meaning, development, 
and use of the terms ―nature‖ and the ―supernatural,‖ I will look closely at the two most 
influential twentieth-century interpreters of this paradigm, Henri de Lubac and Karl 
Rahner.  Although these two thinkers could hardly be said to represent the full scope of 
the nature/supernatural paradigm, their different approaches are representative of 
contemporary Roman Catholic attempts to unite creation and grace according to this 
standard.  My goal is not simply to rehearse the differences of their opinions.  Rather, as 
regards my second goal, the purpose is to lift out their common assumptions.  As I will 
show, these pivot around the attempt to unite the theologies of creation and redemption 
according to the perspective of metaphysical ontology, as well as an ambiguous 
invocation of human freedom and the will.  The precise meanings of each of these claims 
will become clear as the analysis proceeds.  I will conclude the chapter with a critique of 
these assumptions, emphasizing their inability to ground the unity sought.       
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Nature, the Supernatural, and the Natural Desire to See God 
Nature loves to hide. 
 
—Heraclitus
1
 
 
 
Henri de Lubac‘s study, Surnaturel, is famous for reconstructing the history of the 
decline of the meaning of the term ―supernatural‖ in Christian theology.  He was 
especially keen to point to the ways this category ceased to designate what joined God 
and the world, and came to designate what separated them.  Many of the details of 
Lubac‘s argument will be discussed below.  But, my present concerns lie more with 
specifying the rationale for positing this category at all, especially as it was understood to 
solve very particular theological problems inherited from patristic theology.  In this 
regard, it is the work of Artur Landgraf, especially as interpreted and appropriated by 
Bernard Lonergan, who has made the most important – though far too overlooked – 
contribution to our understanding of this.
2
  As Lonergan notes, the history of the idea of 
the supernatural begins with the vindication of Augustine against Pelagius at the synods 
                                                 
1
 Pierre Hadot, The Veil of Isis: An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature, trans. Michael Chase 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).  Hadot begins his work with a reflection on the 
mysterious quality of this quote from Heraclitus.   
2
 All but one of the relevant articles by Landgraf were collected, often with significant revisions in 
Artur Michael Landgraf, Dogmengeschichte Der Frühscholastik, Band I (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 
1952).   The following supplies the original journal citations for the articles, followed by the 
Dogmengeschischte page numbers in brackets.  See also, by Landgraf, Artur Michael Landgraf, 
"Grundlagen Für Ein Verständnis Der Bußlehre Der Früh- Und Hochscholastik," Zeitschrift für katholische 
Theologie  51 (1927): 161-94.  Artur Michael Landgraf, "Die Erkenntnis Der Heiligmachenden Gnade in 
Der Frühscholastik," Scholastik 3 (1928): 28-64 [202-14]. Artur Michael Landgraf, "Studien Zur 
Erkenntnis Des Übernatürlichen in Der Frühscholastik," Scholastik 4 (1929): 1-37, 189-220, 352-89 [141-
201].  Artur Michael Landgraf, "Die Erkenntnis Der Helfenden Gnade in Der Frühscholastik," Zeitschrift 
für katholische Theologie 55 (1931): 177-238, 407-37, 562-91 [51-140]. And Lonergan, Grace and 
Freedom, 1-20, 162-92.  Additionally, the work of Odo Lottin is equally significant as the questions pertain 
to the question of human liberty.  See Odo Lottin, "Les Definitions Du Libre Arbitre Au Douzième Siècle," 
Revue Thomiste 10 (1927): 104-20, 214-30.  Odo Lottin, "La Théorie Du Libre Arbitre Pendant Le Premier 
Tiers Du Xiiie Siècle," Revue Thomiste 10 (1927): 350-82. Odo Lottin, "Le Traité Du Libre Arbitre Depuis 
Le Chancelier Phillipe Jusqu‘à Saint Thomas D‘aquin," Revue Thomiste 10 (1927).  Odo Lottin, "Liberté 
Humaine Et Motion Divine," Recherches de théologie ancienne et médieévale 7 (1935): 52-69, 156-73. 
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of Carthage (412, 416, and 418 CE), and with the second Council of Orange‘s (529 CE) 
sanctioning of his positions on original sin, the necessity of grace, the vitiation of the 
will, and the prior operation of grace in faith, justification, and merit.  Together, these 
affirmations established the Western church‘s dogma on grace, but supplied no 
speculative paradigm as to how these various affirmations cohered.  As Lonergan put it:   
To know and unequivocally state the doctrine of grace is one thing; it is quite another to 
ask what precisely is grace, whether it is one or many, if many, what are its parts and 
their correlation, what is its reconciliation with liberty, what is the nature of its necessity.  
These speculative issues St. Augustine did not offer to treat, and it is a question without 
meaning to ask his position on them.
3
 
 
As we will see in Chapter Four, it is not completely accurate to say that Augustine did not 
offer to treat such questions.  But, it is correct to recognize that his missteps on this 
matter were the result of his inability to make more than a formal division between the 
doctrines of creation and grace.
4
  And, in his wake, theologians up to the early medieval 
period would continue to think of grace as a kind of ‗moment‘ of God‘s one act of 
creating and sustaining.
5
  ―The difficulty,‖ Lonergan says, ―was to explain why 
everything was not grace; after all, what is there that is not a free gift of God?‖6  The 
category of the supernatural was the culmination of the various attempts to wrestle with 
this issue, and it offered a very specific, very metaphysical, way of conceptualizing a 
solution.    
 However, the problem was not solely related to an inability to separate creation 
from grace.  It was also related to the theology of sin.  Just as theologians of early 
scholasticism had difficulty distinguishing between the gifts of creation and grace, they 
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Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 44-45.  Quoted from Stebbins, The Divine Initiative, 68. 
4
 Landgraf, "Studien Zur Erkenntnis Des Übernatürlichen in Der Frühscholastik," 14-15 and n. 1 [150-
51].  
5
 Ibid., 41.  Stebbins, The Divine Initiative, 69-74. 
6
 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 15. 
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also struggled to abstract the goodness of human nature in itself from its corruption by 
sin.
7
  A similar problem appears in the Protestant paradigm of ―sin and grace,‖ which will 
be discussed in the following chapter.  Yet, the concerns of early scholasticism were not 
the same.  Attempting to be faithful to Augustine‘s teachings on grace, early scholastics 
could see no way of connecting his insistence on the extent of sin‘s corruption of 
humanity with his understanding of the soul‘s intrinsic desire for union with God.8  They 
could only understand that orientation in terms of God‘s overcoming of sin in the work of 
redemption and justification.  Once again, the problem here was metaphysical, namely, 
that of distinguishing the reality of the world from its appearance to the empirical 
observation of a theologically-informed mind.
9
   
The major advance beyond this occurred, Landgraf and Lonergan assert, in the 
twelfth century
10
 when Philip the Chancellor solidified the legitimacy of ―a line of 
reference termed nature.‖11  He did so by recognizing a division between a ―purely 
natural appetite‖ (appetitus pure naturalis) and an ―appetite that follows knowledge‖ 
(appetitus sequens cognitionem.)
12
  The former conceived of nature in terms of the Stoic 
idea of the reflexive impulse that creatures exhibit to preserve themselves in a specified 
order.  This differentiated between self-preservation in the world and the moral problem 
of the in curvitas se of sin.
13
  The latter pointed to the desire elicited by a conceptual 
apprehension of the good that a thing is in itself – pursuing it not for the gratification or 
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 Landgraf, ―Das Übernaturliche,‖ 374 n. 3, 352-89 [194, 183-201] 
8
 Stebbins, The Divine Initiative, 70-71. 
9
Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 181-91..  See Stebbins, The Divine Initiative, 67-78. 
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 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom.17. See Stebbins, The Divine Initiative, 71-72. 
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Lonergan, Grace and Freedom., 14-20.  ―Das Übernaturliche,‖ 214, 374, 377, 381-84 [180, 194, 197, 
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 See ―Das Übernaturlich,‖ 381-82.  See Stebbins, The Divine Initiative, 78. 
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 See Landgraf, ―Das Übernaturlich,‖ 374 [194], and Lonergan, 185.  On the Stoic origins of this idea, 
see Dieter Henrich, "The Basic Structure of Modern Philosophy," Cultural Hermeneutics 22 (1974): 1-18.     
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preservation of the self, but simply for its own sake.
14
  It is this latter desire that is subject 
to being ‗curved in upon itself‘ inasmuch as it can fail, as cupiditas, to transcend natural 
limitations.  The metaphysical category ―nature‖ was the common differential between 
creation, sin, and grace.  This gave rise to the designation ―nature and grace‖ as a way of 
relating creation and redemption: nature being that which stipulates the creature‘s role in 
the order of creation, and grace being that which both heals a wounded world and 
produces transcendent desires. 
This claim immediately pointed to a further distinction between a ―natural‖ act 
and one that was ―supernatural.‖  According to Philip, every cognitional desire conforms 
to the mode of knowledge that elicited it.
15
  There is a difference between a desire for 
God produced by knowledge attained by the light of natural reason, and a desire for God 
elicited by God‘s self-communication in the work of redemption.  The first is delimited 
by natural capacities, while the second can produce a charitable desire that exceeds them.  
Both can be said to find their fulfillment in God, but there is an ―entitative disproportion‖ 
between them.
16
  Only the second arises out of and leads to participation in God‘s life.17  
The ―supernatural,‖ then, designated the quality of the creature‘s act (i.e., habits) 
according to its capacities and in relation to this goal.  Grace was the divine gift that 
enabled the attainment of that goal.
18
  It is in this sense that Aquinas will speak of grace 
―perfecting‖ nature by producing supernatural habit.19 
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 Landgraf, ―Das Übernaturlich,‖ 381-82 [197-99.]  See Stebbins, The Divine Initiative, 78-79..   
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 Ibid.  
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 Stebbins, The Divine Initiative, 79. 
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 This points to the distinction between uncreated and created grace, which will be important in our 
discussion of Rahner below.  That is, uncreated grace is participation in God‘s own life, while created grace 
effects an entitative transformation of the creature that makes possible this participation.  
18
 It was specified according to its effects as healing (sanans), elevating (elevans), habitual and actual.  
Both actual and habitual graces must have an operative (in which God alone is working) and cooperative 
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In summary, the nature/supernatural paradigm is rooted in the categories of 
traditional metaphysics.  It conceives the unity of the orders of creation and redemption 
according to a twofold distinction.  The first differentiates between the network of 
operations that make up what a creature is as a participant in the world order (i.e., nature) 
and that creature‘s reception of and participation in an operation not proper to itself or 
that order (i.e., grace.)  This idea of a ‗proper‘ operation tied to a ‗nature‘ underscores the 
sense in which grace is not necessary for the creature to maintain its place in the world.  
The second distinction points out that, despite not adhering to the nature in itself, grace is 
internal to the creature in that it enables it to act in ways that exceed its natural capacities.   
Since the notion of the supernatural arose by analysis of a distinct form of desire 
elicited by a distinct form of knowledge, and was further formulated in terms consonant 
with this emphasis, it is important to recognize that it is the intellect that is understood to 
mediate between these two disproportionate orders.
20
  And it is precisely on this point 
regarding the status and role of the intellect that the many difficulties in the twentieth-
century interpretation of the nature/supernatural paradigm come into view, particularly as 
reflected in the work of Henri de Lubac and Karl Rahner.  This point will become clearer 
in the following section.  Presently, I will continue my discussion of this paradigm in 
conversation with each of these thinkers in the following two subsections.      
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Henri de Lubac  
The longing that surges forth from this ―depth‖ of the soul is a longing ―born of a lack,‖ 
and not arising from the ―beginnings of possession.‖ 
 
—Henri de Lubac21  
 
For Aquinas, the nature of intellection is to pursue an understanding of the cause 
of things.  This is its natural appetite, and it is not the result of a habit it has learned.  
Because of this, Aquinas claims, the intellect can only be satisfied by apprehending the 
absolute cause of all things, which implicitly orients it to the beatific vision.  Two 
passages in his work are representative of this.  The first is taken from Summa Contra 
Gentiles:  
…every intellect naturally desires the vision of the divine substance, but natural desire 
cannot be incapable of fulfillment.  Therefore, any created intellect whatever can attain to 
the vision of the divine substance, and the inferiority of its nature is no impediment.
22
 
 
The second is from the Summa Theologiae:  
For as the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest function, which is 
the operation of his intellect; if we suppose that the created intellect could never see God 
it would either never attain to beatitude, or its beatitude would consist in something else 
beside God; which is opposed to faith.  For the ultimate perfection of the rational creature 
is to be found in that which is the principle of its being; since a thing is perfect so far as it 
attains to its principle... For there resides in every man a natural desire to know the cause 
of any effect which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect of the 
rational creature could not reach so far as the first cause of things, the natural desire 
would remain void.   
Hence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence of God.
23
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These passages mark the most important way in which Aquinas appropriated Philip the 
Chancellor‘s designation of ―natural appetite.‖  He uses it to point to the intellect‘s 
natural desire for God (desiderium naturale videndi Deum) as the mediating term 
between the two distinct orders of nature and grace, thereby establishing an intrinsic 
connection between the two.  But, despite this, he insists that the desire itself is 
inefficacious without the acquired habit elicited by the second form of desire that follows 
from knowledge.  Since the divine essence exceeds finite limits, the intellect is only 
proportionate to receive such knowledge, not produce it.  It is his ability to hold these two 
elements of desire and limitation together that enable Aquinas to speak both of the 
intellect‘s natural orientation to God, as well as its inefficacy for reaching that goal.   
Henri de Lubac makes this natural desire the centerpiece of his discussion of 
nature and the supernatural.  Yet, in doing so, he simultaneously levies a critique of 
virtually the whole of post-Tridentine Roman Catholic theology, especially as practiced 
in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.
24
  He claimes that the Neo-
Scholasticism of the period had, despite its explicit opposition to modern rationalism, 
allowed the spirit of modernity to insinuate itself into its theology.  His article, ―Internal 
                                                 
24
 These components were discussed in more detail in the previous chapter, but the reader should 
consult McCool, Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 1-36.  His discussion of the background for 
nineteenth-century Roman Catholic theology, together with the combined influence of Dei Filius and 
Aeterni Patris for Neo-Scholasticism, is invaluable for properly understanding what Lubac was rejecting 
and affirming in the theology of his day.  This is especially significant with regard to his attitude to 
modernity, as will be shown below.  Stephen Duffy also makes significant points concerning Lubac‘s 
critique of post-Tridentine Roman Catholic theology.  See Stephen J. Duffy, The Dynamics of Grace: 
Perspectives in Theological Anthropology (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1993), 50-84.  See also the 
discussion in Duffy, The Dynamics of Grace: Perspectives in Theological Anthropology.  My reading of 
Lubac is informed by both these texts.   
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Causes of the Weakening and Disappearance of the Sacred‖ (1942), captures the impulse 
behind this assessment rather well.
25
  A particularly important passage reads:    
If our people of France – and by that I do not mean only what are termed the working 
classes, or the masses – have lost in so large a proportion the sense of the Sacred, is it not 
first of all because we have not known how to maintain it in them, to protect it against 
other influences?  Much more, is it not because we have more or less lost this sense 
ourselves?  For the demarcation here is not absolutely to be made between ―believers‖ 
and ―unbelievers‖ in the common sense of those words. This ―frightful lack of the 
sacred‖ in which Péguy saw the mark of our modern world (at times with an excess in 
expressions that is in keeping with the laws of prophetic language) also prevails within 
the ―believing‖ and ―practicing‖ world, within the ecclesiastical world as well.26 
 
This pathos is characteristic of Lubac‘s thought in general.27  He sees secular modernity 
as the perverse expression of the natural desire for God, which ecclesiastical leaders have 
failed to properly ―maintain.‖28  It is the ―wholly modern‖ notion of ―a duality going so 
far as to be a kind of separation between nature and the supernatural‖ that he believes has 
led to the absence of the sacred and opened the door to modern secularism.
29
  According 
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 The specific elements of that project, such as the Sources Chrétiens, and the volumes on medieval 
exegesis ought to be seen as his attempt to cultivate a renewed sense of these lost elements.  See Henri de 
Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, Ressourcement (Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans, 1998).  The French is 
Henri de Lubac, Exégèse Médiévale; Les Quatre Sens De L'écriture, Théologie (Paris: Aubier, 1959). 
26
 Henri de Lubac, Theology in History, trans. Anne Englund Nash (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
1996), 224-25.  The French is Henri de Lubac, Théologie Dans L’histoire Ii: Questiones Disputes Et 
Résistance Au Nazisme (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1990).       
27
 Reflected in Henri de Lubac, The Drama of Atheistic Humanism (New York,: Sheed & Ward, 1950). 
The French is Henri de Lubac, Le Drame De L'humanisme Athée, Œuvres Complètes (Paris: Editions du 
Cerf, 1998).Another translation is Henri de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, trans. Edith M. Riley, 
Anne Englund Nash, and Mark Sebanc (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995.)  This should be linked to 
McCool‘s analysis of Romantic French Traditionalism in McCool, Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth 
Century, 37-58.  Together, these elements help us to see why his critics often accused Lubac and his allies 
of ―modernism,‖ even despite his shared distaste for modernity.  In this respect, as I will argue below, 
Lubac‘s is a more ―radical‖ conservative reaction inasmuch as it represents a rejection of modernity tout 
court.  Lubac significantly expands the traditionalist critique of rationalism to show how theologians 
themselves were at least partially responsible.  On this point, see Joseph A. Komonchak, "The 
Enlightenment and the Construction of Roman Catholicism," Annual of the Catholic Commission on 
Intellectual and Cultural Affairs  (1985): 31-59.   
28
 See also Lubac, Theology in History, 224-34.  There, Lubac notes that ecclesiastical leadership is 
culpable for this as well.  This is also, in part, the argument of The Drama of Atheist Humanism.   
29
 Ibid., 230. Lubac is in essential agreement with Neo-Scholasticism in claiming that rationalism is to 
blame for the alienation of religion and spirituality from modern culture.  He makes this clear in his essay, 
in which he isolates four such causes, each of which is due to a fundamental theological failure.  They are 
the contrast between secular knowledge and religious instruction, the fact that post-Reformation Roman 
Catholic theology was defined by its opposition to heresies and errors, the separation of nature from the 
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to him, whereas the supernatural had originally referred, in the ways specified above, to a 
perfection of nature, it came be thought of as a merely extrinsic addition (superadditum) 
to an otherwise self-sufficient and ―pure‖ nature.     
This idea of a ―pure nature,‖ he insists, is a complete fabrication and a distortion 
of the theological tradition.  His targets are the inheritors of the Thomist commentators, 
Cajetan and Suarez, who disallowed the notion of a natural ―desire‖ for the beatific 
vision.  Their claim was that the creature only possessed a passive ―obediential potency‖ 
(potentia obedientialis), not a dynamic orientation.  This perspective was in keeping with 
the Aristotelian maxim, ―nature does nothing in vain,‖ which they insisted required all 
natural desires to have corresponding natural teloi.
30
  If a desire for what is supernatural 
were to arise, it would be because grace had actualized the obediential potency, elevating 
the creature above its natural capacities.  Thus, claimed Lubac, was born a ―purely‖ 
natural frame of reference that betrays the true teaching of Thomas. 
De Lubac notes several times in his memoirs that his opposition to this 
interpretation was inspired by Maurice Blondel, Joseph Maréchal, and Pierre Rousselot.
31
  
                                                                                                                                                 
supernatural, and the predominance of a rationalistic spirit in ecclesial and broader culture.  Henri de 
Lubac, Mémoire Sur L'occasion De Mes Écrits, ed. Georges Chantraine and Fabienne Clinquart, Œuvres 
Complètes (Paris: Cerf, 2006), 188-89. 
30
 Aristotle, Politics 1253a8.  The context is the discussion of nature.   
31
 See Henri de Lubac, At the Service of the Church: Henri De Lubac Reflects on the Circumstances 
That Occasioned His Writings, trans. Anne Elizabeth Englund (San Francisco: Communio Books, 1993), 
18-21, 35, 64-65.  Henceforth cited as At the Service.  The French is Lubac, Mémoire Sur L'occasion De 
Mes Écrits.  Also see Bruno Forte, "Nature and Grace in Henri De Lubac: From Surnaturel to Le Mystère 
Du Surnaturel," Communio 23, no. 4 (1996).  Forte notes the significance of Antonio Russo, Henri De 
Lubac: Teologia E Dogma Nella Storia. L’influsso Di Blondel (Rome: Studium, 1990).  See also Henri de 
Lubac, Theological Fragments (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), 377-404.  The French is Henri de 
Lubac, Théologies D'occasion (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1984).  Lubac was exposed to the conversations 
surrounding their work as a student in the 1920‘s and 1930‘s.  As I will argue below, Lubac learned from 
these three (especially Rousselot and Maréchal) to emphasize a theological a priori in human intellection 
and the dynamism of subjectivity.  This anthropological emphasis is his framework for conceiving the 
coincidence of human nature and the supernatural as the imago Dei.  But, beyond this, Blondel‘s ―method 
of immanence‖ was clearly important in helping him to seize upon the importance of concrete, historical 
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They taught him to recognize a dynamic thrust toward transcendence in human beings 
that only God could fulfill – a dynamism that Maréchal and Rousselot linked directly to 
the above passages from Aquinas.
32
  After exposure to the conversations surrounding 
their work, Lubac began to make his own historical contributions in the mid-1930‘s when 
he published a series of articles on the origin, meaning, and development of the idea of 
the supernatural and the natural desire for God.
33
  These were eventually collected and 
modified in 1946, with the addition of a preface and conclusion, as the now-famous 
Surnaturel.
34
  The great stir that this volume caused was not primarily related to the 
content of the essays, but rather, as Bernard Lonergan has observed, to its concluding 
reflection, ―Exigence Divine et Désir Naturel [Divine Demand and Natural Desire],‖ in 
which Lubac offered his own theological interpretation of the meaning of his historical 
work.
35
   
This brief, eleven-page reflection is written in a baroque style that was evocative 
of his claims regarding the paradoxical constitution of human nature, and which most 
likely increased the confusion surrounding the piece.
36
  He asserts that, simply by virtue 
                                                                                                                                                 
human being in Henri de Lubac, Surnaturel: Études Historiques (Paris: Aubier, 1946).   Henceforth cited as 
S.   
32
 See Joseph A. Komonchak, "Theology and Culture at Mid-Century: The Example of Henri De 
Lubac," Theological Studies 51, no. 4 (1990): 579-602. 
33
 These essays are, chronologically: Henri de Lubac, "Apologetic Et Théologie," Nouvelle Revue 
Théologique 57 (1930): 361-78.  Henri de Lubac, "Deux Augustiniens Fourvoyés: Baius Et Jansenius," 
Recherches des Science Religieuse 21 (1931): 422-33, 513-40.  Henri de Lubac, "Remarques Sur L‘histoire 
Du Mot ‗Surnaturel'," Nouvelle Revue Théologique 61 (1934): 350-70.  It is significant to note that Lubac 
only mentions the prior publication of the first three chapters on Baius and Jansenius in his memoirs.  See 
Lubac, At the Service, 35-36.  See also Komonchak, "Theology and Culture at Mid-Century," 579-81. 
34
The conclusion occurs at Lubac, S, 483-94.   
35
 Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Phenomenology and Logic: The Boston College Lectures on Mathematical 
Logic and Existentialism, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Philip McShane, vol. 18, Collected Works of Bernard 
Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 350.  I am indebted to Dr. Paul DeHart for calling 
this passage to my attention.  
36
 Lubac appears to have recognized this.  Three years later he published the independent essay, ―La 
mystère du Surnaturel,‖ which he says was ―not a repetition or refinement, but a complement to the book.‖  
For this reference, see Henri de Lubac, The Splendour of the Church, Denus Books (Glen Rock, N.J.,: 
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of being intelligent, the human spirit ―demands‖ [exigence] union with God, but in such a 
way that it ―requires‖ [exigence] grace to fulfill that demand.  Spiritual nature, he says, 
exists simply as openness to transcendence, and the natural desire for the vision of God is 
its expression: ―Before thus loving God, and in order to be capable of loving God, it [the 
spirit] desires.‖37  That desire is not ―like that of an animal for its prey‖; it is ―the desire 
for a gift,‖ for the ―free communication and gratuity of a personal Being.‖38  As such, the 
wistful dreamings of a velleity or the unactualized possibility of a potentia obedientialis 
are not adequate explanations of this drive.  Citing Nicholas of Cusa, in contrast, he states 
that the desire for the vision is ―the most absolute of all desires‖; it is ―necessarily‖ and 
―absolutely‖ willed.39  This is, he says, the traditional interpretation of the meaning of the 
imago Dei in patristic theology and Aquinas.   
Of particular importance in the conclusion is his anticipation that he will be 
charged with compromising the gratuity of grace.  The ―monster of exigence,‖ he 
responds, was simply a ―phantom of the imagination‖ – not worthy of the attention 
lavished on it.  It is a problem arising from an incomplete understanding of the doctrine 
of creation, which alone makes clear that the creature has no rights before God.
40
  Grace 
is ―demanded‖ only inasmuch as this desire is the natural expression of a spiritual 
creature.  He elaborates on the point:  
If this desire demands, in the sense that we have said, to be filled, it is already Godself 
that is at its source, as ―anonymous.‖  Natural desire for the supernatural: it is the 
permanent action of God in us which created our nature, as the grace is in us as the 
permanent action of God which created the moral order.  The order of ―nature‖ and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Paulist Press, 1963), 62.  The essay, ―The Mystery of the Supernatural,‖ contains none of the paradoxical 
language of Surnaturel, but makes its argument quite clearly.  It is collected in Lubac, Theology in History, 
281-316. 
37
 ―Avant donc d‘aimer Dieu, et pour pouvoir l‘aimer, il desire‖ (Lubac, S, 483.) 
38
Ibid.   
39
 Ibid., 490.   
40
 Ibid., 485.   
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order of ―morality,‖ these two orders contain every condition – the one essential and 
necessary, the other personal and free – proper to our attending to our supernatural end, 
and both are contained at the interior of the same world, of a unique world, which we can 
even call, although it contains some completely natural elements, a supernatural world.
41
  
 
The fear of a natural exigence for grace, then, arises only from an essentially 
anthropocentric viewpoint.
42
  It sees the matter as something we demand of God, rather 
than something God demands of us.  De Lubac maintains that ―from the point of view of 
God,‖ we can claim grace as something we ―require‖ not because it ―pleases us,‖ but 
because God has created us such that ―we cannot not will it‖ [nous l’exigeons parce que 
nous ne pouvons pas ne pas le vouloir.]
43
  It is the natural expression of humanity‘s 
obligation to God, and this is ―exactly the inverse of what it [exigence] was first imagined 
as being.‖44 Here, ―beatitude is service, vision is adoration, freedom is dependence, 
possession is ecstasy.‖45   
                                                 
41
 On peut raisonner de meme au sujet du désir de voir Dieu.  Si ce désir exige, au sense que nous 
avons dit, d‘être comblé, c‘est que déjà Dieu meme est à sa source, bien qu‘encore <<anonyme>>.  Désir 
naturel du surnaturel: c‘est en nous l‘action permanente du Dieu qui crée notre nature, comme la grace est 
en nous l‘action permanente du Dieu qui crée l‘ordre moral.  Ordre de la <<nature>> et ordre de la 
<<moralité>>, ces deux orders condtiennent toutes les conditions – les unes essentielles et nécesires, les 
autres personnelles et libres, – propres à nous faire atteindre notre fin surnaturelle, et tous deux sont 
continues à l‘intérieur d‘un meme monde, d‘un monde unique, qu‘on peut appeler pour cela meme, 
quoiqu‘il continenne des elements tout naturels, monde surnaturel (Ibid., 487.) 
42
Ibid., 490 and 92.  The quote refers to Maréchal‘s statement that God is known implicitly in every act 
of knowing, placing him also here in agreement with Rahner on this point.  See See Henri de Lubac, De La 
Connaissance De Dieu, 2e. éd., augmentée. ed. (Paris: Editions du Témoignage Chrétien, 1948).  This is 
repeated in its expanded version, Henri de Lubac, Georges Chantraine, and Emmanuel Tourpe, Sur Les 
Chemins De Dieu, Œuvres Complètes / Henri De Lubac ; (Paris: Cerf, 2006), 44-45 and 273 n.1.  This is 
what Lubac means when he invokes the patristic tradition in order to link the natural desire for God directly 
to the fact that human beings are the image of God in salvation history.  It is clear that Lubac‘s thinking at 
this point remains tied to Maréchal‘s transcendental analysis of the dynamism of human intellection.  He 
has simply made the very important move here of associating this desire directly with the idea of the image 
of God in patristic theology as a way of attempting to pry the notion loose from the restrictions placed on it 
by Aristotelian Thomism, linking it to an account of salvation history. On this point, see the discussion at 
Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Henri De Lubac: An Overview (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
1991).      
43
 Lubac, S, 490. 
44
 Ibid. 
45
 Ibid., 492. 
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This argument certainly did not dispel the fears of his detractors.  Instead, it 
sparked fierce debate in Roman Catholic journals.
46
  These conflicts eventually 
culminated in the issuance of Humani Generis in 1950 by Pius XII, which insisted that 
the gratuity of grace could not be compromised.
47
  Duffy has noted, following Rahner, 
the question that what Lubac singlehandedly placed at the forefront of the debate over the 
meaning of nature and the supernatural was whether it was ―still possible to conceive of 
grace as unexacted if the theologian presupposes an unconditional reference to grace, and 
if grace is so constitutive of historical humanity‘s makeup that it is unthinkable without 
it.‖48  De Lubac‘s purpose in the conclusion to Surnaturel was to show that humanity did 
not have a rightful claim over grace.  However, in making his case, he had overlooked the 
importance of showing how this was not tantamount to asserting that grace is coextensive 
with creation, or that intelligent human nature must necessarily possess a supernatural 
orientation.
49
  To his detractors, it appeared that Lubac was suggesting that God could not 
create an intellectual creature without bestowing upon it a supernatural end, and in such a 
way that this creature possessed by  nature all that was required to respond to God‘s offer 
of grace.
50
  
                                                 
46
 This was particularly the case in that these claims were made explicit by Reginald Garrigou-
Lagrange in his now famous essay, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, "La Nouvelle Théologie Où Va-T-Elle?," 
Angelicum 23 (1946): 126-45. 
47
 See Stephen J. Duffy, The Graced Horizon: Nature and Grace in Modern Catholic Thought 
(Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1992), 59-65. The reader should also consult the discussion of Rahner 
in Duffy, The Dynamics of Grace: Perspectives in Theological Anthropology.    
48
 Duffy, The Graced Horizon, 62.  See also Karl Rahner, "Concerning the Relationship between 
Nature and Grace," in Theological Investigations V. 1: God, Christ, Mary, Grace, ed. Cornelius Ernst (New 
York: Crossroads, 1983), 304.  Henceforth, references to the different volumes of Rahner‘s Theological 
Investigations will be abbreviated as TI, followed by the volume in Roman numerals and page number.   
49
 See Duffy, The Graced Horizon, 59-65. 
50
 This later point will be the subject of my critique of both Lubac and Rahner: namely, their attempt to 
evade the necessity of an entitative transformation of human being prior to the acceptance of the offer of 
grace.    
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The nineteen intervening years between the publication of Surnaturel (1946) and 
Augustinisme et théologie moderne and Le mystère du surnaturel (1965) show that Lubac 
significantly refined the details of his position on just these points.
51
  Nonetheless, the 
differences between the proposals should not be overemphasized.
52
  In fact, it is striking 
the degree to which Lubac‘s basic position is not altered despite presenting it in a 
considerably different mode.  Guy Mansini‘s summary of the basic theses of Lubac‘s 
position on the supernatural is quite helpful for seeing this.
53
   Mansini notes three 
distinct but interrelated claims regarding the supernatural that appear across Lubac‘s 
writings on the subject. The first is that the natural desire for the beatific vision is the 
proper category within which to unite the orders of redemption and creation.  As he 
states, for Lubac, the desire mediates between ―philosophical and theological 
anthropology, between reason and revelation, knowledge and faith, between philosophy 
and theology generally.‖54  And he emphasizes that Lubac insists that this is only 
recognizable from a theological perspective.
55
  The second is that, beyond its mediatory 
role between distinct orders, the natural desire to see God displays the truth that human 
beings, as they actually exist, are ordered to no other end than the supernatural vision of 
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 I have already noted the important essay, ―La mystère du surnatural,‖ which appeared in 1949; but, 
the most important are the publication of: Henri de Lubac, Augustinianism and Modern Theology, trans. 
Lancelot Capel Sheppard (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 2000).  The French is Henri de 
Lubac, Augustinisme Et Théologie Moderne, Théologie ([Paris]: Aubier, 1965).  And Lubac, Mystery.  The 
French is Lubac, Le Mystère Du Surnaturel. 
52
 John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri De Lubac and the Debate Concerning the 
Supernatural (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005).  Milbank significantly misinterprets both the history of 
the events of Lubac‘s biography, as well as the nature of the argument of the conclusion of Surnaturel.  The 
irony of this lies with the fact that Lubac‘s earlier argument is more closely tied to transcendental Thomism 
– a school of thinking for which Milbank has been anything but supportive in print.  
53
 Guy Mansini O.S.B., "Henri De Lubac, the Natural Desire to See God, and Pure Nature," 
Gregorianum 83, no. 1 (2002): 89-109. 
54
 Ibid.  
55
 Ibid.: 91. This kind of claim is what will attract von Balthasar to Lubac, against Rahner, whom he 
thinks treats the desire as anthropologically recognizable.  
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God.  For Lubac, this is the most important claim, and he believes it to be logically 
grounded in the prior point.  Because the desire for union with God is what mediates 
between the orders of creation and redemption, it is human beings as we actually 
encounter them – in history, as the benefactors of God‘s work of redemption and 
recipients of God‘s self-revelation – that specifies their nature.  His final assertion, 
offered in light of both claims, is that this desire must therefore be expressed, solely on 
the basis of what has been revealed in salvation history, as an unconditional orientation 
toward God as the proper goal of human nature, understood in such a way that the 
gratuity of grace is not compromised.   
Each of these elements is present in both the earlier and later accounts.  It is his 
treatment of what is entailed in advancing the third which changes.  And this is no minor 
point since it is here that he most clearly displays his fidelity to Humani Generis.
56
 Yet, it 
is imperative to recognize that he does so not by retracting, but intensifying his earlier 
position.  What is significant is how he does this.  Upon close reading of the arguments, it 
is as if Lubac is asserting that his only error in Surnaturel was in relying on too abstract 
and formalized an account of human nature, rather than the factuality of concrete human 
beings as participants in salvation history.
57
  That is, he was too imprecise in his 
application of the second premise.  Because the only human nature we know is one that 
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 For discussion of the impact of Humani Generis on Lubac‘s argument see Ibid.  See slso the 
discussion in Duffy, The Dynamics of Grace: Perspectives in Theological Anthropology, 59-65. 
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 See Lubac, Mystery, 54-56 [80-83]   This marks an attempt to move away from the 
transcendentalized analysis of the human person in the earlier work.  The critique of Rahner becomes, as it 
were, an unstated critique of his own earlier position.  As McCool notes in relationship to Rahner, the 
tendency to associate the dynamism of human being with the natural desire for God was a result of the 
combined influence of Maréchalian and Augustinian themes.  This, indeed, appears to be the case with the 
early Lubac, who subsequently altered those assumptions after his engagement with Rahner and the 
issuance of Humani Generis.  See Gerald A. McCool, The Theology of Karl Rahner (Albany, NY: Magi 
Books, 1961), 14.  Note also Lubac‘s claims regarding the knowledge of the desire only in light of 
revelation in chapter 11 (207-221 [257-272.])   
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has been historically called to union with God, we must insist that human fulfillment lies 
in this alone.
58
   
The implications of this are quite radical.  It shifts Lubac‘s claims from an 
anthropological to an ontological register, such that human being is no longer analyzed 
strictly as imago Dei, but as ontologically constituted as ―called‖ by God.59  Lubac makes 
this point on theological grounds, rather than, as before, on the basis of a general 
anthropology; but, in doing so, he makes an explicitly ontological point.
60
  It puts into 
relief the ontological implications of the claim that revelation reveals the desire for God 
to be constitutive of human nature.
61
  This is less related to a phenomenological analysis 
of anthropology and is more about what the doctrine of creation displays concerning the 
truth regarding the ontological constitution of human being as ―called‖ by God.    
This does not mean that God‘s act of creation requires bestowing a supernatural 
end on a spiritual creature.  Lubac is only arguing that the history of salvation shows that 
the desire for God coincides with human nature itself.  He does this according to a 
twofold blessing.
62
  Creation itself is a gratuity because God is not compelled to do it.  
But, even upon acting to create, God is not obliged to endow any part of that creature, 
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 Mansini‘s summary brings out that the most important aspects of Mystery is that its fundamental 
claims about the natural desire to see God are not significantly different than Surnaturel.  What has 
changed is that, after Humani Generis, Lubac no longer held that an intellectual creature could only be 
understood to have a supernatural end.  Indeed, Mansini notes, along with Knasas (see below), that the 
more nuanced position of Mystery appears to be not that there could not have been an intellectual creature 
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 See Lubac, Mystery, 62, 183 [90, 227-28].  
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 Ibid., 82-82 [113-14]. 
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 See his argument for the rejection of essential and existential orders (Ibid., 64-67 [92-96].) 
62
Ibid., 76-77 [106-08].  He also refers to a ―twofold call inscribed by God in the very make-up of 
these creatures…‖ (Lubac, Mystery, 130 [68].) 
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including an intellectual creature, with a supernatural destiny.
63
  However, if God does 
both, then the two must be inextricably conjoined.
64
  Lubac thus isolates three moments 
of that manifestation: the creation of the world, the calling of the spiritual creature, and 
the offer of the means to fulfill that call.
65
  All of history is the unfolding of this call as 
God‘s providence.66  However, he is insistent that the responsibility for actualizing the 
call lies with the freedom of human beings to accept or reject God‘s offer.67 
De Lubac consistently maintained, throughout his career, that the most 
appropriate way to unite the orders of creation and redemption was to emphasize the 
natural desire for the vision of God as the mediating term between them.  His later work 
proposes a more coherent account of his early claim that the most intelligible way to 
conceive this unity is to emphasize the coincidence of God‘s acts of creating and calling 
in historical human nature.  This means moving away from an abstract analysis of human 
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 Lubac, Mystery, 62 , 72 [90,103]. 
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 Ibid., 64-67 [92-96]. 
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 Ibid., 80-81 [112-13].  
66
 See Ibid., 119-39 [55-77]. 
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 On this point, it is imperative that the reader recognize the distinction that Lubac draws, in both his 
early and late work, between ―nature‖ as the ontological principle of necessity within which God‘s call is 
expressed, and ―morality‖ as the domain of freedom within which the offer of grace is received and 
accepted.  As he says in Ibid., 183 [227-28].: ―Though one cannot reduce everything to the clarity of a 
simple vision free of all mystery, one can at least advance dialectically to the harmony which lies beyond 
the apparent opposition.  And this will be easier if, taking the notion of God‘s transcendence with total 
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though the second is governed by the first: as though God were bound by his own call once uttered, and 
could not then recall his offer.  The offer of grace expresses, in the sphere of moral liberty, the same act of 
divine loving kindness that the call to the supernatural expresses in the ontological sphere.  Thus there is 
nothing in the former to diminish beforehand in any way the gratuitousness of the latter.  Neither is exterior 
to the other, and therefore neither comes before the other.  There is always the same unique sovereign 
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subjectivity, and emphasizing the concrete experience of salvation in history.  Lubac is 
insistent that this approach is capable of overcoming the residue of rationalism that clings 
to post-Tridentine theology, thereby opening the door to a renewed sense of the sacred 
for modern culture.  This movement away from transcendental analysis of the human 
subject is very different from the expression of the same impulse in Karl Rahner, to 
whom I now turn my attention.   
 
Karl Rahner 
God desires to communicate himself, to lavish his love.  This is the first and last 
consideration of his actual plans, and, therefore, of his actual world. 
 
—Karl Rahner68 
 
When Karl Rahner‘s Geist in Welt appeared in 1939, the text marked his entrance 
into the same theological conversations concerning post-Kantian Thomism that had 
sparked the production of the essays that eventually became Lubac‘s Surnaturel.  
Rhaner‘s Hörer des Wortes (1941) also contained material relevant to those discussions, 
yet he offered no formal position on the relationship of nature and the supernatural until 
1950.  In the midst of the controversy over Surnaturel, and after the appearance of 
Humani Generis, Rahner wrote the article ―Ein Weg zur Bestimmung des Verhältnisses 
von Natur und Grade,‖ which showed him to be deeply sympathetic to the position 
associated with Lubac, but also established a considerable distance between them.
69
  That 
difference would fall precisely on the question of the viability of an approach that 
privileged a transcendental analysis of human subjectivity.   
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Rahner‘s approach, as laid out in this article, is often interpreted as a mediating 
position between Neo-Scholasticism and Lubac.  This is far too simplistic an account of 
the complex relationship of ideas unfolding during the period.  Karen Kilby has done 
much to question the viability of von Balthasar‘s charge that, in Geist in Welt and Hörers 
des Wortes, Rahner set himself ineluctably down the path of foundationalism.
70
  As 
evidence of this, she points to striking inconsistencies in his earlier and later thought, as 
well his own contention to have never deployed a specific ―method‖ in theological 
reflection.  Though Kilby‘s arguments are largely convincing, it is important to insist that 
the arguments of Geist in Welt and Hörers des Wortes are essential to Rahner‘s 
understanding of nature and the supernatural.  For this reason, it is necessary to have a 
grasp of his argument.   
Geist in Welt is presented as a commentary on Summa Theologiae I.84.7 
addressing the question of whether the intellect can know anything through concepts 
without depending on empirical data from the senses.  Such a question situates the work 
squarely in the trajectory of transcendental Thomism as it had taken shape after 
Maréchal, which means that Rahner‘s concern is, principally, to offer a response to Kant 
as to how we can know the transcendent if all knowledge begins with the data from the 
senses.
71
  In order to do this, he establishes a framework within which to discuss how a 
knowing subject comes to apprehend Being.  He argues that, since sensual perception is 
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receptive,
72
 all subjective knowledge begins with an experience of material reality as 
‗other‘ to that subject.73  This fundamental receptivity, he says, is what Aquinas means 
when he speaks of ―conversion to the phantasm,‖ and this means that every engagement 
with the world starts with self-abandonment, an away-from-self-with-the-other (Weg-
von-sich-beim-andern-Sein.)
74
  It is because of this self-abandonment that we are capable 
of relating to ourselves as knowers.  That is, it is because we return from our self-
abandonment only to recognize ourselves as present to ourselves that knowledge of the 
world is a real possibility.
75
  For this reason, Rahner insists that all knowledge is 
grounded in an a priori self-transcendence wherein the self is tensed, hovering (Schwebe) 
between matter and spirit, marking it as ―spirit in the world.‖76   
In pressing toward the immediate grasp of Being, however, Rahner develops a 
Heideggerian gloss
77
 on Aquinas‘ claim regarding the natural desire to know by 
interpreting it as the basic orientation to ask the question of the significance of 
existence.
78
  This questioning begins in the moment of self-abandonment, but is 
coextensive with the subject‘s self-presence in experiencing the world.  As a result, 
Rahner insists that Being and knowing converge at precisely this moment of abstraction 
where the self knows itself as a knower.  It is here that self can be recognized as identical 
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with yet different from the world.
79
  It is because of this co-originary status of being and 
knowing that we must also speak of a ―preapprehension of Being‖ (Vorgriff auf esse.)80 
The preapprehension of Being is vital to Rahner‘s discussion of nature and the 
supernatural.  This is because Rahner argues that every act of knowing involves a 
simultaneous thrust toward Absolute Being.
81
  His point is exactly the same as that made 
by Aquinas regarding the perfection of the intellect.  It is the fullness of Absolute Being 
as it is displayed in the relativity of finite beings that the intellect seeks to attain.  No 
―purely‖ finite object is adequate to human questioning.  Otherwise, the self-presence 
attained in the moment of abstraction would be enough.
82
  With this, Rahner shows, 
against Kant, that reason cannot be restricted to finite objects, while also demonstrating 
against Heidegger that the ontological difference is not confined to its manifestation in 
Dasein.
83
  All knowledge is fundamentally a drive toward the reception of the Absolute.  
In an interesting moment of simultaneous convergence and divergence from Lubac, 
Rahner insists that this is the appropriate way to understand the potentia obedentialis: the 
human being is pure receptivity to absolute Being‘s self-communication.84   
Rahner‘s key difference from Lubac is that he did not believe the latter‘s position 
could ultimately preserve the gratuity of grace.  Rahner did not wish to dispute that we 
experience human nature as ordered toward a supernatural end.  But he did not think the 
problem of the gratuity of grace had been adequately conceived if it was understood as 
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constitutive of human nature.
85
  The result was not so much a union of creation and grace, 
but their conflation.
86
  Rahner‘s point was that, even though the only human nature we 
experience is always already presented with the offer of grace, this cannot be interpreted 
to mean that grace is a constitutive aspect of it.  Nature must, instead, be a ―remainder 
concept‖ (Restbegriff), which is only available when the orientation to God is bracketed 
from consideration.
87
 
Rahner‘s point here is made against Lubac‘s early writings in which the 
anthropological analysis of the imago dei appeared to collapse grace into nature.  Yet, it 
holds, in the main, for the later writings as well inasmuch as Lubac‘s ontological 
reduction of subjectivity means that there can be no historical separation of God‘s act of 
creating and bestowal of the call.  By contrast, Rahner claims that only a transcendental 
analysis of human subjectivity is capable of preserving the difference between creation 
and grace while simultaneously linking nature to the supernatural.  The problem here is 
with the way Lubac wants to see the natural desire for God to be an essential component 
of human nature, even if it is shown to be gratuitous in itself.   
In order to properly grasp what this means for Rahner, it is necessary to 
appreciate his attempt to conceive the supernatural in terms of a transcendental a priori, 
as opposed to a an a posteriori transformation within human nature.  He does this by 
attempting to overcome the Neo-Scholastic separation of nature and the supernatural by 
prioritizing the supernatural rather than so-called ―pure‖ nature.88  What he is concerned 
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to retain from Neo-Scholasticism is what he took to be its proper emphasis on the gratuity 
of grace.  Yet his concern is to show that this can be done without making a complete 
separation between nature and the supernatural.  The key to this, he says, is to reconsider 
the relationship between habitual grace and the supernatural.  ―Habitual‖ grace is the 
name Scholastic theology gives to the accidental and created transformation the creature 
undergoes prior to coming to share in the divine life.
89
  In the terms of Philip the 
Chancellor, it refers not to a desire for charity that was natural to human beings, but to an 
acquired knowledge – in this case, a supernatural habit, which has been immediately 
infused by God.
90
   Rahner critiques this idea under the more general term of ―created,‖ 
as opposed to ―uncreated,‖ grace, taking issue with the notion that grace must effect (i.e., 
creates) an accidental, qualitative alteration of human nature before one can receive a 
share in the divine life.     
Rahner argues in the essay ―Zur scholastischen Begrifflichkeit der 
ungeschaffenen Gnade‖ that this way of conceiving the matter is not faithful to the 
biblical witness.
91
  The writings of the New Testament, especially Acts and the Pauline 
epistles, consistently speak of the reception of the gift of the Holy Spirit preceding any 
alteration of human life.  For Rahner, this attests to the fact that grace is nothing less than 
the bestowal of Godself.  There is no need to posit a change in the human being prior to 
the reception of God‘s gift of Godself.  This has the effect of reversing the priority of 
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uncreated and created graces.  God‘s gracious self-bestowal to the world always precedes 
and generates any transformation of the creature that follows from its presence.  This also 
means that God‘s self-communication is neither punctuated nor exceptional, as Neo-
Scholasticism tended to view it.  Rather, God‘s self-communication is universal, a 
constitutive element of human experience.  
It is important to recognize that, in developing his own account of grace as 
constitutive of human existence, Rahner distinguishes between the ontological qualities 
of humanity and its existential experience.
92
  De Lubac developed in his later work an 
ontological account of the essence of human nature as gratuitously oriented to seeing 
God.  By contrast, Rahner holds to a transcendental analysis in which the essence of 
human nature is abstracted from its existential structures, in such a way that grace is not a 
necessary element.  A ―pure‖ human nature is, then, a ―remainder concept‖ 
(Restbegriff.)
93
  One must presuppose ‗nature‘ as that upon which grace is bestowed.  
Yet, in the concrete, historical experience of humanity, grace is everywhere displayed.  In 
fact, there is no actual human experience in which grace is absent.   This leads Rahner to 
use Heidegger‘s language to speak of God‘s presence in grace as an integral, but non-
essential determination of human being, a ―supernatural existential‖ (das übernaturliche 
Existential.)
94
  By this he means that grace is always communicated along with all human 
experience, but cannot because of that be considered an ontological (or essential) aspect 
of humanity.
95
  Elsewhere, in a similar vein, he speaks of the experience of God‘s self-
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communication (uncreated grace) as a ―quasi-formal cause‖ of human nature.  It is not 
that grace and creation are one and the same: in fact, they are transcendentally separable.  
It is only that they are always given together, side by side, in human experience.  And this 
is precisely why it is so important to retain ―pure nature‖ as a remainder concept.  
Otherwise, the two categories would collapse into one another.     
 
A Metaphysical Ontology 
It will be helpful here to recall that both Lubac‘s and Rahner‘s positions are, 
despite their important differences, illustrative of attempts to unite the doctrines of 
creation and grace according to the paradigm of nature and the supernatural.  As I stated 
above, I am not taking these two positions as exhaustive of the nature/supernatural 
paradigm as a whole, but only of contemporary attempts to unite these two doctrines 
within that paradigm.  A brief recounting of their differences here will set the stage for a 
closer analysis.       
Lubac and Rahner differ in their assessments of the final value of transcendental 
analysis.  As we have seen, Lubac‘s position moves from one that is more indebted to an 
abstract analysis of the dynamic orientation of the human being, which he interprets in 
line with the traditional understanding of the imago Dei, to a position more strictly tied to 
theology.  In doing so, he does not leave transcendental analysis behind so much as 
transfer its register from anthropology to ontology.  This allows him to distinguish, 
within the doctrine of creation itself, a twofold gratuity according to the act of creating 
and the bestowal of a supernatural end.  Conversely, while Rahner can hardly be said to 
eschew ontology, his position is more intimately tied to the anthropological perspective 
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that Lubac later abandoned.  From this perspective, he is able to distinguish creation and 
grace according to a transcendental analysis of the structures of human experience in 
which God‘s gift of Godself to the creature functions as something like what he calls 
―quasi-formal causality.‖96  Like Lubac, the two are differentiated ‗moments‘ in one 
single divine act of ontological creativity.  For Rahner, the natural desire to see God is a 
constitutive aspect of the existential structure of human being.  There is no human 
experience that does not include this element, even though it is possible in transcendental 
analysis to distinguish the creature‘s nature from its existential structure.  The difference 
is that, by linking the desire directly to the doctrine of creation, Lubac makes the desire 
for God an ontological determination of the creature.  For Rahner, by contrast, 
consideration of the ontological constitution of the creature is the real abstraction; what is 
concretely actual is the natural desire for God in all experience, which prioritizes the 
concrete actuality of human life as it is lived and experienced in its fundamental 
orientation to God.   
According to Rahner, this is the reason that Lubac cannot finally achieve a real 
distinction between the orders of creation and grace.  If the natural desire for God is 
considered an ontological determination of human being in the way Lubac has conceived 
it, and not simply a factual reality of the structure of human experience, then there is no 
way to affirm the unexactedness of grace.
97
  Lubac wants to insist that the logical 
distinction between the act of creating and the inscription of an end can preserve this.  In 
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both the early and later texts, Lubac points to the fact that a proper understanding of the 
doctrine of creation would be theocentric, rather than anthropocentric, such that the 
creature‘s desire for God would be understood to be an expression of its obligation to 
God, and not its demand or rights before God.
98
  He offers this argument to show how it 
would be conceivable that human nature could have been created differently.  It is 
difficult to see how Rahner‘s early assessment of Lubac – namely, that he de facto 
collapsed grace into creation – is wrong, especially in light of Lubac‘s later defense of 
himself in The Mystery of the Supernatural and his incorporation there of a of ―elevation‖ 
in the providential distribution of grace within time.
99
     
By contrast, Rahner wants to insist that the only appropriate way to overcome a 
sharp separation between nature and the supernatural is to understand their union as 
occurring within the existential structure of human being.  Human nature is itself nothing 
more than a transcendental category of reason, abstracted from the concrete actuality of 
human existence as graced.  This allows Rahner to say that the human essence is not 
ontologically determined to desire God of necessity, but does in fact experience itself as 
so called.  Thus, grace is an fact of human experience, but not an ontological constituent 
of humanity.  Rahner plainly insists that the coherence of doctrinal theology requires 
maintaining transcendental analysis.  In doing so, he is resisting Lubac‘s desire to move 
seamlessly from the theology of creation to an ontological vision.   
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My concerns here are less with the differences between these positions, than with 
how understanding these differences can help us to see what these two positions share in 
their appropriation of the nature/supernatural paradigm.  I propose to show that they share 
two assumptions regarding the role of the category of Being and the will that finally unite 
them beyond these differences.  Together, these assumptions reveal that the unity of 
creation and grace within the nature/supernatural paradigm must be conceived in terms of 
a metaphysical ontology.   By ―metaphysical ontology‖ I mean a pattern of thought that 
seeks to give an account of the whole of reality, and to isolate what is ultimately real, in 
terms consonant with the philosophical category of Being.  Inasmuch as the 
nature/supernatural paradigm is rooted in the categories of traditional metaphysics, this 
should come as no surprise.  It would be helpful here to recall, as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, that ‗ontology‘ as it is used here designates a pattern of thinking that 
not only emphasizes Being, but interprets reality such that identity, intellection, and 
participation are granted priority.  Thus, a metaphysical ontology attempts to provide an 
account of the whole of reality, as well as what is ultimately real, according to such 
terms.  In what follows, I will treat each of these characteristics in turn, focusing on their 
roles in the work of Lubac and Rahner as they attempt to unite creation and grace 
according to the terms of nature and the supernatural.   
In that it is the most general, it will be appropriate to take up the question of 
Being first.  My previous analysis of Lubac and Rahner has underscored the role of Being 
in their respective positions, especially as they are divided according to whether the 
desire for the vision of God is best thought as an ontological or simply a factually reality 
of intellectual experience.  It is important, though, to recognize the manner in which 
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Being plays a central role for both thinkers according as a matter of privileging notions of 
identity and participation.  I have already noted that Lubac‘s position displays a tendency 
to essentialize the natural desire for the supernatural.  Not only does this paradoxically 
make creation, grace, and the desire for God different expressions of one ontological 
reality, but it also reduces the desiring human subject to its most general characteristic, 
namely, participation in Being.
100
 
As Levinas is so keen to remind us, ontology is fundamentally a grasping after the 
perception of essences (esse, ousia) as the most basic and necessary structures of beings 
(esse, ousia) in their manifestation.
101
  In this way, ontology seeks to express the origin 
(archè) of the object in its most universal sense, thus accounting for difference in terms 
of identity and singularity in terms of participation.  This is what Lubac does by effecting 
an ontological reduction of subjectivity through the theology of creation: he isolates the 
origin of the desire for God in an ontological ground that identifies the desire with the 
human essence, thus revealing that he unites creation and grace by way of the third term, 
Being, within which the two are identical.  ―Being‖ mediates the terms subject, world, 
creation, grace, and desire so as to render them different manifestations of a single divine 
act.  Together, these mark the convergence of emphasis on identity and participation. 
The same can be said of Rahner, though in slightly different terms.  He explicitly 
refuses to consider the natural desire for God an essential characteristic of human being, 
preferring to emphasize the existential dimension of the desire.  By preserving the 
centrality of subjectivity, Rahner can develop a transcendental analysis that understands 
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creation as the act by which God gives self-presence and freedom to what is different 
from God, and grace as the quasi-form of that act by which God gives Godself to that 
other.
102
  Despite not proposing an ontological reduction of the subject, Rahner‘s 
proposal does have very specific ontological consequences, specifically as this leads him 
to affirm the unity of knowing and being.
103
   
The most important moment in Rahner‘s account of subjective dynamism is the 
moment of knowledge, which occurs when the self that has been abandoned to its other 
(materiality) in conversion to the phantasm, returns to itself and simultaneously knows 
itself as present to itself and identical with its other.  This knowledge is possible because 
both self and other are perceived within their common share in Being.  As Rahner 
reminds us, since knowing and being are coincident, apprehension of the complete 
fullness of Being is the goal of every subject in its self-abandonment.  The first moment 
of receptive self-abnegation is simply the first step in a process of a complete self-
presence in the knowledge of the fullness of Being.  The dynamism of self-abnegation 
and return presupposes and demands a more fundamental, originary, and necessary 
identity between the self and other – one that is premised on their common participation 
in the mystery of Absolute Being.  This commonality is what lies behind Rahner‘s 
account of the a priori status of uncreated grace.  The fundamental identity-in-difference 
between the self and the other alone makes possible the claim that finite existence occurs 
as a participation in Absolute Being, which is the field of divine self-communication.   
This is what it means to say that Lubac and Rahner both require a metaphysical 
ontology to unite creation and grace.  Each offers an account of the whole of reality that 
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isolates Being as the most ultimate principle of reality, the final term of reference.  In 
each thinker, this has the effect of yielding a fundamental identity between the various 
terms that are to be related, and does so by way of their common participation in 
Absolute Being.  But, in order to show their privileging of intellection, I will need to 
discuss the more complex issue of their understanding of the role of the will.  Indeed, as 
we will see, intellection is the mode in which each thinker understands our conception of 
how we identify ourselves and participate in Being.  
For both Lubac and Rahner, the intellect is the primary and most distinguished 
aspect of human being.  Beginning with Surnaturel, Lubac was fond of invoking the 
double entendre of the French ―esprit,‖ which allowed him to conflate intelligence with 
spirit.
104
  This was consistent with his appeals to the patristic tradition and Thomas 
Aquinas to support his claim that the restlessness of the intellect displays the human 
being not simply as a spiritual being, but as a spiritual being with a supernatural destiny.  
And this same idea is in Rahner at the level of his insistence on the identity of being and 
knowing.  As the most primary aspect of human being, intellection coincides with 
freedom.  Because both link the desire for God to intellectual dynamism, and understand 
this to be ontologically constitutive of human being, they directly associate this 
dynamism with freedom.
105
  By freedom they mean a fundamental capacity for self-
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determination.  And, in both instances, this free capacity for self-determination expressed 
in this desire is what both mean by the will.   
This is less directly apparent in Lubac than in Rahner, who is more concerned 
with metaphysical precision.  Nonetheless, Lubac consistently makes the claim 
throughout his writings that the natural human desire for God marks the basic identity of 
intellect and will.  The dynamic orientation of the human spirit is always conceived as a 
matter principally of the will.  In Surnaturel, for example, he notes that the ontological 
confluence of necessity and morality in human desire points to just this coincidence, and 
he repeats this in Mystery of the Supernatural.
106
  He makes this more explicit in Pic de 
Mirendole, where he notes that the ontological freedom of human being is expressed in a 
desire that precedes the division between intellect and will, and is manifested differently 
in each.
107
  On other occasions, however, Lubac will speak of this desire itself as if it 
were the will.  As he says, the will wills God as final end because it ―cannot not will 
it.‖108  This association of the desire with the will is what lies behind Lubac‘s rejection of 
the desire as a velleity.  If the desire is essentially inscribed upon the creature, then the 
creature is not simply wishing, or wistfully dreaming, but actually willing to be united 
with God. 
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Rahner‘s position is quite similar, though much more precise.109  Rahner makes a 
distinction between the dynamism of human subjectivity and the natural desire for the 
vision of God.  This distinction is rooted in his refusal to ontologize the desire.  The 
dynamism of the subject, however, is an ontological determination, and he links it 
directly to human freedom.  What he rejects is the idea that human freedom has been 
vitiated by original sin.
110
  Instead, he develops a more existential concept of freedom as 
coincident with subjective dynamism.
111
  Freedom is a capacity to take up a positive or 
negative self-determination in relation to the ground and goal of existence.
112
  This power 
is rooted in the most basic existential affirmation that accompanies the dynamic openness 
to Being that inaugurates the pursuit of knowledge.
113
   
This ambiguous notion of the will as coincident with the élan of human nature is a 
basically Platonic account of the relationship between the intellect and the will.  Both 
accounts are oriented by a vague interchangeability between intellect, will, and desire.  
They conceive of the will as a kind of primordial desire (eros) expressed in the dynamic 
thrust of human beings to perceive the being of their world.  This is due to a tendency 
evident in both thinkers to correlate willing with the ontological freedom for self-
determination.
114
  Self-determination, as it is used here, is less about choosing between 
different actions, and more about a power to actualize desire.  But in presuming that 
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freedom co-arises with this desire, both thinkers assume that the intellectual apprehension 
of the goal of desire is sufficient to direct the will to its actualization.  Indeed, because 
there is no clear distinction between desire, intellect, and will, the object is thought to be 
attainable simply by virtue of its being desired. 
Here is where we encounter the most significant problem with both of these 
accounts of the unity of creation and grace.  Note that Lubac and Rahner both offer 
accounts of grace as ‗frontloaded‘ into creation.  Rahner does this by reversing the 
priority of created and uncreated grace, and Lubac does it by making the natural desire 
for God ontologically constitutive of concrete human being.  Both are seeking to reunite 
nature with the supernatural by ascribing to grace a kind of a priori status within nature 
such that it functions, to borrow Rahner‘s term, as the ―quasi-form‖ of creation.  But, in 
doing so, what each fails to account for is the fact that the original rationale for insisting 
on an entitative transformation of the human person prior to the production of a 
supernatural act was not the assumption that transcendence was somehow alien to nature; 
rather, it was the recognition that nature did not supply, simply by virtue of its status as 
created, all that was needed to effectively will the end.  Both thinkers have developed 
positions which (ingeniously) occlude the very problem that the concept of the 
supernatural was posited to solve.  In order to see how this is so, I will need to return to 
the history of the development of the supernatural discussed in the first section of this 
chapter.   
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The Nature of the Will and Its Transformation 
De Lubac was just mixed up on the point…. 
 
—Bernard Lonergan115 
 
As noted above, the idea of the supernatural developed as a way of explaining 
certain speculative problems that issued from the dogmatic acceptance of key elements of 
Augustine‘s mature theology of grace.  I noted that the idea developed as a way of 
explaining the difference between creation and grace, as well as the distinction between 
the essential goodness of human nature and its corruption by sin.  When Philip the 
Chancellor posited a distinction between what the creature wills by its nature and what 
the creature wills as a result an acquired knowledge and habit, theologians were then able 
to distinguish between what the goodness of the creature‘s natural orientation to self-
preservation and the corruption of its capacity to acquire and perform the supernatural act 
of charity.  This was important for revealing the fundamental disproportion between the 
good the will could do by its nature (i.e., self-preservation within a given order) and the 
supernatural good in which that nature finds its perfection (i.e., charity.)  And it is 
imperative to recognize that the later was not considered possible simply by virtue of the 
acquisition of revealed knowledge.  On the contrary, what Aquinas in particular came to 
recognize was that the realization of charity was itself the result of God‘s operation to 
infuse that habit into the person.     
This was not a problem of abstraction.  Rather, it was of the utmost of concrete 
practicality.  Consonant with Augustine, the point was being upheld that although the 
intellect may know and even desire God as the final Good to which it is ordered, this does 
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not mean that the creature is capable of effectively willing that end.  This is what Philip 
the Chancellor‘s insight was able to supply: namely, a way of conceiving the fact that the 
capacity to will the end results from the reception of that which does not reside in the 
nature as such.  And it is precisely this entitative alteration of the nature that both Rahner 
and Lubac‘s positions are designed to avoid.  Even granting the truth of their rejection of 
the scarcity of grace, and legitimacy of their attempts to effect a formal separation 
between creation, human nature, and grace, neither has adequately accounted for the fact 
that the idea of the supernatural was posited specifically as a way of preserving the notion 
that grace was not simply the created reception of that which is not proper to the nature 
itself.  It is always also the immanent actualization of a possibility for transcendence that 
is not already operative in the factuality of creation itself.  The reason for this failure is 
tied directly to the ambiguous notion of will and its freedom that the two adopted, and 
most specifically their inability to properly distinguish it from the intellect.   
As Lonergan has shown in detail, Aquinas developed his idea of the will by 
adopting Philip the Chancellor‘s distinction between natural and acquired appetite and 
combining it with his own rejection of Aristotle‘s assertion that the will is a purely 
passive potency determined solely by the intellect.
116
  Lonergan argues that Aquinas‘ 
encounter with Parisian Averroism led him to this conclusion by making him aware of 
the need to develop an account of the will‘s self-determination that did not compromise 
either its relation to the intellect or its ultimate dependence on God.
117
  As a result, 
Aquinas developed the first unambiguous designation of the will as a distinct faculty of 
the soul.  Rahner and Lubac attempt to overcome the division between nature and the 
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supernatural in a way that obviates this, effectively returning the problem to a set of 
assumptions prior to Aquinas.     
What Aquinas posited was a much more complex relation between intellect and 
will.  He argued that the function of the intellect in the production of an act of the will 
was limited to the specification of those objects that will function as goods for will‘s 
act.
118
  In this respect, the will is an intellectual appetite since it produces its act in 
relationship to those objects the intellect presents to it as good.  Willing itself, however, 
has two independent but interrelated causes.  There is the act of willing an end, which 
relates to the desirability of an object in itself, and the act of willing the means to that 
end, which is simply willing one object in order to attain another that is desirable in itself.  
Aquinas recognized that the will could naturally determine itself with regard to the means 
to an end, but that it was powerless to effect an operation that extended to its end.  This 
necessarily restricted the scope of the will‘s self-determination to its role in the 
established order of nature.  Its freedom was delimited by the range of actual goods it had 
within its immediate purview.  Augustine had recognized this fact, but associated it 
directly with the limited range of goods available to the sinful will.  But, Aquinas 
advanced beyond him, by noting both the limited goods available to the sinful will, as 
well as the natural limitations of willing itself.  With the aid of Philip‘s notion of 
supernatural habit, Aquinas was able to affirm that the will had a nature proper to itself, 
apart from but related to the intellect.  That nature was inherently free with regard to its 
role in the natural order, but it was a priori incapable of moving itself toward that end 
that leads to its salvation.   
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A purely objective, a priori bestowal of grace, such as we find in both Rahner and 
de Lubac, is then really beside the point.  Chapter four will show how this confusion is 
the result of a misunderstanding of the logic of Augustine‘s theology of grace, especially 
as it develops over time.  For now, it is sufficient simply to note that, for both Augustine 
and Aquinas, a recognition of the full gratuity of grace required affirmation of an 
‗internal‘ divine motion of the will, not simply for the natural trajectory of the will in its 
orientation toward God, but in actually moving it to will the good that God is in Godself, 
and precisely in a way that is proportionate to God in Godself.  Both of these latter 
operations exceed the natural operation of the human will, and thus require the bestowal 
of a divine assistance reaching to the very heart of the creature.  This was the reason 
Aquinas divided grace into actual and habitual forms, and ascribed an operative and 
cooperative component to each.
119
  Actual grace referred to the created bestowal of the 
conditions necessary for the acquisition of supernatural habit, and habitual grace to the 
process of that acquisition.  In each, God alone first operates (operative grace) to produce 
human cooperation (cooperative grace.)  In their haste to evade the punctualism and 
scarcity of the Neo-Scholastic interpretation of this account of grace, both Lubac and 
Rahner overlooked the necessity that Aquinas clearly ascribed to actualizing and 
elevating effects of grace, especially as these emphasized the priority of the interior 
operation of God over the creature‘s own freedom for self-determination.  Instead, they 
developed accounts in which all that was needed for the creature‘s turn to God was 
already supplied in and with (even if transcendentally distinguished from) the gift of 
existence itself.     
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In light of this history, it is important to note that ―pure nature‖ as both thinkers 
invoke it is simply a fiction – not only of their Neo-Scholastic adversaries, but of 
nouvelle théologie and transcendental Thomism as well.  The point is not about an 
experience of ‗nature‘ apart from the offer of grace.  What is at issue is the necessary 
distinction between the offer of grace and its reception.  The debate over the natural 
desire for the beatific vision in Roman Catholic theology in the twentieth century is a 
series of different ways of confusing the offer of grace with its reception.  As we have left 
to show, this confusion marks out the limitations of the nature/supernatural paradigm for 
uniting the doctrines of creation and grace.  By way of conclusion, I will show how this is 
so by looking at the ways of accounting for the grammar of creation and grace according 
to this paradigm, noting specifically the limitations of remaining within the perspective of 
metaphysical ontology.   
 
Uniting Creation and Grace in a Metaphysical Ontology 
 This chapter has been devoted to clarifying the origins of the metaphysical 
categories of nature and the supernatural as they function in relationship to the doctrine of 
grace and creation.  The centrality of the category of the will as a faculty responsible for a 
set of operations distinct from intellection and desire was shown to be decisive not only 
for the resolution of the apparent impasse between the freedom and rectitude of the will, 
but for the distinction between the gratuity of God‘s act of creation and the gratuity of 
redeeming grace itself.  Importantly, this category of the will is the result of decidedly 
metaphysical analysis.  In claiming this is the result of metaphysical reasoning, I mean 
that the recognition of the reality of an operation called ―the will‖ is a genuine insight 
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into reality, which, upon its apprehension, resolved theoretical difficulties that preceded it 
and, upon its subsequent misapprehension (as Lonergan shows in the de Auxiliis 
controversy), were lost.  The fact of this metaphysical resolution in Aquinas is as 
important for my investigation as is this loss, which I will return to in the following 
chapter in my discussion of Luther. 
These resolutions are important when attempting to assess the disputes within 
contemporary Roman Catholic theology concerning the proper union of creation and 
grace.  De Lubac is a particularly important example in this regard, since his attempt to 
return to a largely Patristic frame of reference, is consistent with what I referred to in the 
Introduction as the attempt to achieve an ontological reduction of human subjectivity. I 
have shown in more detail in this chapter just how this is the case with reference to the 
complete rejection of Rahner‘s transcendental analysis.  As I have noted throughout, 
however, this reduction has the effect of generating a return—in harmony, in this case, 
with his preference for Patristic sources—to the Platonic theory of the soul and its 
understanding of the will as the intellect‘s self-determination.  As Lubac himself 
recognized and defended himself against in Augustinianism and Modern Theology, this 
project can appear to be an attempt to evade developments in Scholastic theology.  It is 
for this reason that he fought so vigorously to show the continuity of his understanding 
with that of Thomist thought, including Scotus.  The present chapter has shown, however, 
that Lubac was wrong to see this, along with his Neo-Scholastic opponents, as essentially 
as a distinction regarding the distinction of the natural and the supernatural orders, rather 
than principally about the proper distinction and union of the doctrines of creation and 
grace, and, within the nature/supernatural paradigm of that distinction, as a matter of the 
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will.  Indeed, the whole of Lubac‘s project pivots around the achievement of just such a 
reduction of the will to the intellect.  As should presently be clear, however, this 
reduction effectively renders the distinction between nature and the supernatural 
incoherent.   
Karl Rahner correctly recognized this problem very early on in Lubac‘s writings.  
As noted in the introduction, the difference between Rahner and Lubac on this point, 
ultimately pertains to the willingness of the former to acknowledge a certain necessary 
and integral role for the subjective human agent in the perception of truth and the 
acquisition of understanding.  It is for this reason, and on this basis, that Rahner would 
insist on maintaining a conceptual distinction between the ―natural‖ possibility of 
experiencing grace and the actual, ―supernatural‖ experience of grace as grace.  In this 
sense, Rahner recognized that a proper analysis of the dynamism of human intellection 
entails a reference to human subjectivity and a level of transcendental analysis that 
requires the distinction of nature from the supernatural, rather than dissolving them, as 
Lubac had first argued in Surnaturel.  Indeed, as I have claimed here, it is best to 
understand Lubac‘s later, ontological repetition of this theme as the more radical position, 
as it completely abandons the transcendental analysis of subjective intellection precisely 
in an effort to resists Rahner‘s proposal.   
In Rahner, however, as we have seen, where this analysis entails the preservation 
of a transcendental distinction between nature and the supernatural, it does not link that 
distinction to the will.  Rather, he understands these terms as factual realities of human 
experience that are an otherwise ontological reality of unity between creation and grace.  
De Lubac is right not only to resist this way of formulating the distinction on the grounds 
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that it makes no helpful contribution to our engagement with the divine reality itself, but 
merely preserve a purely theoretical hypothesis when what is needed is clearer 
recognition of the natural orientation of the whole of reality to God.  And, on Lubac‘s 
Platonic assumptions, this is correct, for Rahner ultimately comes to the same conclusion 
as Lubac on this matter.  Rahner insists on rejecting the Augustinian understanding of 
freedom and conceiving of finite human freedom in wholly ontological terms of self-
determination.  In this respect, Rahner himself has no clear basis for maintaining the 
distinction between nature and the supernatural as an actual metaphysical characterization 
of reality because it is a mere abstract designation of dogma.   
In both cases, the dispute in question pivots on the Platonic understanding of the 
will, which is so central to the two thinkers‘ projects.  Rejection of the distinction of the 
will from the intellect and desire is integral, in each thinker, to the dynamic articulation 
of the human person toward God.  Yet, it is that very distinction that makes the gratuity 
of grace thinkable at all for the Roman Catholic paradigm.  Thus, the no intelligible 
distinction of grace from creation can be made that is not purely transcendental.  The 
transcendental attribution is not so much objectionable because of its incoherence, but 
because it literally implies, as Lubac himself recognized and argued in The Mystery of the 
Supernatural, a denial of the reality of grace that is not always already given in being.
120
  
What we find, then, is that the nature/supernatural distinction is grounded, just as 
Lonergan had argued following Landgraf and Lottin, in the clear designation the category 
of the will from the intellect and desire.  And yet, the contemporary discussion 
surrounding this issues has tended to be formulated in terms of a dynamic intellectualism 
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that overlooks these origins.  The result is that the nature/supernatural paradigm itself, as 
Milbank has recently argued, is untenable—and this results in the collapsing of any 
coherent relation of the doctrines of creation and grace.  It is this insight that is most 
important for my own analysis in the dissertation of the necessary orientation of a 
metaphysical ontology to privileging identity.  For, once again, the difficulty is 
encountered at just the point that account must be made for the appearance of the new in 
terms consonant with but conceptually distinguishable in reality from the given.   
Despite this problem, Lubac and Rahner were both absolutely correct to refuse the 
patterns of thought characteristic of Neo-Scholastics, such as Garrigou-Lagrange.  It is 
clear that there attempts to overcome the positions propounded by Neo-Scholasticism are 
bound up with a desire not simply to overcome the division between nature and the 
supernatural, but to resist the kind of impersonal and rationalistic metaphysics 
characteristic of such positions.  Their attempt to conceive of the freedom of the will in 
these Platonic terms was clearly a mark of a largely humanistic attempt to resist the 
overarching objectivity pursued by the regnant Scholasticism of the post-Vatican I 
Roman catholic church.  This element is much more pronounced in Rahner, who 
explicitly links his understanding of freedom and his doctrine of grace to a metaphysical 
personslism set in opposition to distinction between created and uncreated grace.  The 
difficulty we have been tracing throughout this chapter would appear, then, to involve the 
demand, on the one hand, to affirm a metaphysics that reduces occludes the personal 
dimension of grace, but which is essential to the coherent articulation of the will that 
distinguishes creation from grace, or to deny the metaphysics that supports this 
understanding of the will and its concomitant distinction of creation and grace in favor of 
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a personlist understanding of grace.  The resolution of this difficulty cannot be 
formulated in terms of the present paradigm, and will require looking in more detail at the 
Protestant response, and specifically the doctrine of justification by faith as articulated by 
Martin Luther.
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CHAPTER III 
 
SIN AND GRACE: A PROTESTANT PARADIGM 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter continues the analysis begun in the previous chapter of the two 
dominant patterns of conceiving the union of creation and grace.  My focus here, 
however, is the Protestant paradigm of ―sin and grace.‖  The first section is devoted to 
specifying what it means to say that the Protestant pattern of thinking about creation and 
grace is characterized by a sin/grace paradigm.  This will provide a context for the second 
section, which will discuss two thinkers, Friedrich Schleiermacher and Karl Barth, who I 
will hold up as representative of the attempt to think the union of creation and redemption 
according to this paradigm.  As with the previous chapter, this choice of figures should 
not be taken as a claim that Schleiermacher and Barth are spokespersons for Protestant 
theology in general, but only that their treatments of creation and redemption are 
representative examples of the union of these doctrines according to the pattern of 
Protestant theology.  This account will supply the ground, in the second section, for a 
comparative analysis of both accounts, which will be oriented toward demonstrating how 
the sin/grace paradigm shares the nature/supernatural paradigm‘s prioritizing of ontology 
as the locus for that union.  They differ, however, in that Protestant thinking emphasizes 
the dynamism of the divine act such that categories of ―event,‖ ―encounter,‖ and ―person‖ 
are foregrounded.  As regards the question of the will, I note that this approach adopts a 
largely voluntarist (particularly Scotist) shape, which conceives of the will not in terms of 
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an intellectual appetite, but rather an infinite potency.  I conclude the chapter with a 
critique of the adequacy of these assumptions to the task of uniting creation and 
redemption.     
 
Justification, Election, and Covenant 
The primary difficulty of comparing Protestant thinking on the unity of creation 
and grace to the Roman Catholic approach is specifying the nature of the relation 
between the two as concerns this question.
1
  Generally, the two are treated either as 
different ‗things‘ (as with apples and oranges) or different types of the same thing (as 
with different breeds of apples).  Yet the approach I have adopted here, in choosing to 
focus on their way of uniting creation and grace, is more akin to comparing the products 
of different sources (as when simply examining fruit seeds).  That specific task is much 
more complex than may appear at first glance.  Doing so responsibly involves not only 
specifying the distinguishing marks of the object being considered—namely, the discrete 
―Protestant‖ way of uniting creation and grace—but also the disclosure of its basic 
differences from the Roman Catholic example, while simultaneously keeping their 
fundamental commonality in view.
2
  And yet, as the history of the relationship between 
the Protestant and Roman Catholic confession attests, it is just this commonality and this 
difference that is not so easily demarcated.   
This difficulty is due to three main factors.  The first is the ambiguity of the 
designation ―Protestant‖ as a discrete identity.  The temptation is to follow von Harnack 
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on this point and yield to the temptation to isolate some essential and uniquely 
Protestant‖ kernel beneath the changing, historical husk of Christian doctrine.3  But, as 
Troeltsch rightly underscored in Protestantism and Progress, no such essential identity 
exists.
4
  ―Protestantism‖ itself, he notes, as an interpretation of the Christian faith, is a 
reification of a set of diverse cultural, political, and theological concerns only coming 
into clear view in the sixteenth century, and representing the basic fragmentation of 
European culture.  This fact alone makes the offering of an historical development, like 
that presented in the previous chapter, an impossible task, for there is no such stable point 
of reference even for its most distinguishing characteristic.  Nonetheless, this very 
ambiguity regarding the specification of ―Protestantism‖ is important.  As Paul Tillich 
famously argued, inasmuch as Protestantism has shifted from ―a political into a religious 
concept,‖ a ―Protestant element in Protestantism‖ can be isolated, a ―Protestant principle‖ 
that advances according to a kind of negative dialectic:  
Protestantism has a principle that stands beyond all its realizations.  It is the critical and 
dynamic source of all Protestant realizations, but it is not identical with any of them…On 
the other hand, it can appear in all of them; it is a living, moving, restless power in them; 
and this is what it is supposed to be in a special way in historical Protestantism. The 
Protestant principle…contains the divine and human protests against any absolute claim 
made for a relative reality…is the judge of every religious and cultural reality, including 
the religion and culture which calls itself ―Protestant.‖5 
 
This kind of approach marks Protestant thought and identity as inherently dynamic, 
fundamentally resistant to the kind of metaphysical reasoning that marks the 
nature/supernatural paradigm.  Yet while this orientation stands out as a distinguishing 
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characteristic, alone it is insufficient, in its negativity, to sustain something that purports 
to be as definitive as a ―Protestant paradigm.‖  Something more discretely positive must 
be brought into view.    
John Howard Yoder offers an important, but not widely recognized, corrective to 
this point.
6
  Moving beyond Troeltsch and Tillich to the basic affirmation that drives this 
restless dynamism, Yoder emphasized the element of faithfulness to the Word of God as 
a basic receptivity to reinvigoration, correction, and guidance.
7
  This emphasis on 
faithfulness is significant to Yoder precisely because of its dynamic orientation.  But 
what he has in mind here is not merely a kind of processional constitution of an absent 
content or the gradual historical unfolding of an otherwise purely formal content.  Rather, 
he is lifting out the importance of an orientation toward the faithful reception of the Word 
of God by a specific people in a distinct time and concrete place.  In this regard, he 
refuses a more abstract analysis of the Protestant gesture in order to insist that the specific 
shape and consequences of such reception cannot be predetermined for the simple reason 
that, if faith defines identity, it is as a positivity one undergoes and receives, rather than 
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produces and establishes.  What Yoder intends here is to eradicate any merely negative 
determination of the content of Christian faith, and to uphold its fundamental positivity.
8
  
When so conceived, the positivity of Protestant thinking is directly opposed to the kind of 
negativity envisioned by Troeltsch and Tillich as the distinctive mark of ―Protestant‖ 
thinking.
9
   
What is at work here is more than the application of a metaphysical ―principle‖ in 
that it amounts to a distinct logic or order, a ―grammar.‖  That is, the concern is much 
less to articulate the basis of the unity of the whole of reality, than to isolate the 
framework within which a set of complex, interrelated concepts disclose and retain their 
meaning.
10
   The concern is summarized as a resolute insistence on—and radical 
application of—the absolute priority of God‘s initiative in the positive determination of 
the creature and its world.  This positivity is important for how it reverses the negative 
emphasis of Troeltsch and Tillich, which presupposes a fundamentally competitive 
relation to the divine priority.  I say this is a ‗grammatical‘ point because it is most 
basically both dogmatic and formal, giving rise to a characteristically synchronic account 
                                                 
8
 By negative determination, I have in mind Spinoza‘s procedure in the Ethics in which the singularity 
of the one substance achieves determination only through the relation of contrast.  See the discussion at 
Andrew Bowie, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy: An Introduction (New York: Routledge, 
1993), 19-29, 63, 71, 86, 103, 55-59. 
9
 Perhaps most especially, as Barth indicates, against those such as Troeltsch and Tillich who affirm it 
in this fashion.  See the reference to Troeltsch in Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/1: Doctrine of 
Reconciliation, 386-87.  All citations from the Church Dogmatics are taken from Karl Barth, Church 
Dogmatics, trans. Geoffrey William Bromiley and Thomas Forsyth Torrance, 14 vols. (Edinburgh: T. & T. 
Clark, 1936-1977).  Henceforth cited as ―CD,‖ followed by appropriate volume, part, and page number. 
10
 For a good example of this, see Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or 
Empowerment.  Tanner there adapts George Lindbeck‘s notion of the grammatical structure of Christian 
doctrine.  The present discussion is implicitly reliant on Lindbeck‘s claim, which implies that his arguments 
are more properly at home in the Protestant scheme.  See George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: 
Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984).  This is especially 
true in light of the comment regarding the commonality between Hooker, Yoder, and Behr above.   The 
question of the relationship between this grammar and reality is a live one that I do not intend to take up, 
though my observations throughout the dissertation regarding the metaphysics of the Protestant approach 
point in a suggestive direction.   
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of the parameters and content of the unity of creation and redemption, which are 
correlatively understood to be governed by an uncompromising commitment to the 
absolute priority of God as the lens through which to view the entire theological 
enterprise.
11
  This synchronic account of doctrine, rooted in the absolute priority of God, 
is the source of the Reformation axiom that the proper knowledge of God and humanity 
are mutually correlative, that the truth of each is only disclosed when humanity is rightly 
related to God.  Protestant theologians are all united in insisting that this right relation is 
faith alone, and thus the formality of this synchronic point of departure is already an 
iteration of the relationship between the doctrines of creation and grace in nuce.
12
     
This more grammatical approach to the questions posed by these doctrines is in a 
fundamental tension with the metaphysical approach outlined in the previous chapter, and 
thereby results in a pattern of thought that is quite distinct from the Roman Catholic 
paradigm.  Gerhard Ebeling has made this point well with reference to Luther‘s 
relationship to Scholasticism.  Noting why Luther‘s thought is not ―based upon…[a] 
fundamental continuity between nature and grace,‖ Ebeling states:13    
Certainly, Luther‘s view is not adequately represented by the mere negation of the 
hierarchical Thomist relationship between nature and grace.  The difference which is 
unquestionably present clearly does not lie only in a different definition of the 
relationship between nature and grace, for it cannot be understood within the same 
conceptual scheme.  The difficulty lies in the fact that the difference goes very much 
                                                 
11
 A synchronic account should be contrasted here with the otherwise diachronic approach of the 
Roman Catholic paradigm.  This use is an application of the diachronic/synchronic distinction made in 
Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 97-120.  That discussion shuld also be compared to his discussion of the 
―Saying and the Said‖ in Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, 5-9 and 37-51.  The reader should also consult 
the discussion of the diachronic and synchronic accounts of grace in Duffy, The Graced Horizon, 29. 
12
 This is an important point because the Protestant position is often interpreted, even by its advocates, 
as advancing a claim tantamount to the absolute corruption of post-lapsarian nature, with the tendency to 
interpret Protestant thought as retaining an inherently ―necessary‖ and ―tragic‖ moment.  But, as will 
emerge over the course of this investigation, the general logic of the Protestant position stands in contrast to 
this very notion.   
13
 The Finnish interpretation is famously opposed to this interpretation of Luther‘s position, calling 
attention to his ―ontological‖ advocacy of deification.  See the discussion in Chapter Five.   
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deeper than this.  It is the basic concepts, or more precisely the fundamental questions 
they pose, which are different.
14
 
 
Where a metaphysical approach is concerned with developing conceptual knowledge of 
the whole of reality, the Protestant emphasis on dogmatics asks first after the character, 
shape, and quality of the God/world relation as disclosed in the revelatory encounter of 
redemption.
15
  The most traditional pattern of Christian theology, running from creation 
to sin to redemption, is retained, but is not explicated metaphysically; rather, it is 
―intratextually‖ narrated according to the Biblical themes of God‘s acts of election, 
justification, and covenant.
16
  The result is an emphasis on ‗personal‘ and ‗relational‘ 
themes over ―substantialist‖ categories.17  This thinking begins from the standpoint of 
faith and proceeds according to the various affirmations generated from clusters of 
                                                 
14
 Gerhard Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction to His Thought, trans. R. A. Wilson (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1970), 143. 
15
 See the discussion of these differences specifically in terms of theological anthropology in Robert P. 
Scharlemann, Thomas Aquinas and John Gerhard (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), 10-12 
(especially n. 14). Scharlemann distinguishes between Aquinas‘s ―formal-objectivist‖ and Gerhard‘s 
―dialectical-personalist‖ patterns of thinking, respectively.  His categories have influenced both my 
designation of paradigms and my interpretation of them.  Scharlemann‘s way of formulating these 
questions has also (along with David Tracy, as mentioned in the introduction) helped to frame the 
perspective on the issues adopted in this dissertation as a whole.   
The reader should also note that I am using the notion of ―dialectic,‖ as both a description of the 
Protestant paradigm and specifically of Schleiermacher, in a way that presupposes Julia Lamm‘s distinction 
between ―dialogical-dialectic‖ and ―speculative-dialectic‖ in Lamm, "Reading Plato's Dialectics," 1-25.  
Lamm‘s work is instructive on numerous fronts, and this distinction has shaped the understanding of 
dialogue that infroms the whole of this work.  I mention this in relation to Scharlemann because Lamm‘s 
distinction troubles the idea of too fine a distinction between a ―formal-objectivist‖ and ―dialectical-
personalist‖ approach.  As I am using Lamm‘s distinction here, in connection specifically with Luther and 
Schleiermacher, the rejection of a ―formal-objectivist‖ approach is coextensive with a rejection of 
―speculative-dialectic.‖  This introduces a nuance into Scharlemann‘s categories.  Further rationale for this 
association is given in the discussion of Luther that opens the subsection on Schleiermacher. 
16
 See Michael Root, "Schleiermacher as Innovator and Inheritor: God, Dependence, and Election," 
Scottish Journal of Theology 43, no. 1 (1990): 97-98. 
17
 Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction, 156.  This is a consistent theme in the work of Emil Brunner.  See 
especially Emil Brunner, The Divine-Human Encounter (London: S.C.M. Press, 1944), Emil Brunner, 
Truth as Encounter, A new ed. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1964), Brunner, The Divine Imperative, 
82-139, Emil Brunner and Olive Wyon, Revelation and Reason; the Christian Doctrine of Faith and 
Knowledge (Philadelphia,: The Westminster Press, 1946), 362-74.  The first two of these are especially 
important for this study, and my formulation here of the characteristics of the Protestant paradigm.   
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scriptural concepts (e.g., sin, election, gospel, and law) and the patterns of relation 
between them (e.g., law/gospel and spirit/letter.)
18
     
The doctrinal formulation that most fully expresses the relational quality of this 
redemptive encounter is ―justification by faith,‖ which is grounded in Luther‘s rejection 
of the appropriateness of the Scholastic caritas soteriology and its dependence on 
Aristotelian habitus to capture the Biblical teaching on justification.
19
  This requires 
Luther to insist on maintaining a distinction between ―person‖ and ―work‖ that, as 
Ebeling notes, conceives personhood not ―on the basis of its potentialities and its 
activities,‖ but first according to that ―passivity that constitutes man‘s being, as his 
existence as a creature, as his relations to God and his standing in the sight of God.‖20  
Grace, then, is not thought as a principle or basis of correspondence between a 
potentiality and its actualization, but as the initiation of a new relation with God.
21
  This 
basic difference is captured in the fact that Luther insists that grace entails a ―substantial‖ 
rather than ―accidental‖ transformation of the creature‘s nature.22  Luther insists that the 
relation between God and the creature must be essential and definitive, and that a right 
relation always entails the absolute priority of God.  The important point of note is that, 
                                                 
18
 See Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction., which structures the treatment of Luther‘s theology according 
to such contrasts: ―philosophy and theology,‖ ―the letter and the spirit,‖ ―the law and the gospel,‖ etc.  As I 
am using the term, ―dialectic‖ (see n. 15 above) denotes contrast as opposed to conflict or contradiction.     
19
See Brunner, The Divine Imperative, 68-81. See also the discussion of Luther that opens the 
subsection on Schleiermacher below.  On caritas and habitus, see Steven Ozment, "Luther and the Late 
Middle Ages: The Formation of Reformation Thought," in Transition and Revolution: Problems and Issues 
of European Renaissance and Reformation History, ed. Robert M. Kingdon (Minneapolis: Burgess 
Publishing Company, 1974), 109-29. 
20
 Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction, 157. 
21
 Note that this is not necessarily an ―individual‖ relation in the now pejorative sense.   
22
 This empahsis on the ―substantial‖ consequences of this relation lies at the root of the Finnish 
emphasis on the role of theosis in Luther, and is explicitly developed in opposition to the more ―ethical‖ 
and non-metaphysical reading of Luther developed by thinkers like Ebeling.  This reading will be discussed 
in Chapter Five, but here it will suffice to note that I am in essential agreement with the Finnish 
interpretation, but believe they have overlooked an important element of the more ethical reading of Neo-
Protestantism, and have too hastily repudiated it.  My reason for this are adumbrated in this chapter and 
developed in full in Chapter Five.   
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because it is essential and definitive, the relation cannot be identified as the final term of 
the creature‘s activity, but must rather be its presupposition.  Sin, then, cannot be a matter 
of corrupt capacities and limited choices, but is first and foremost a broken bond that 
conditions all subsequent performance.
23
   
What is captured here regarding relation in justification, however, is rooted in the 
decree of election and has its fulfillment in covenant.
24
  Both election and covenant are 
relationally conceived, arising from the Deuteronomist history of Israel and Paul‘s 
development of that trope, each of which emphasize the distinctive priority of God‘s 
intention, ordination, and choice in the execution of redemption.
25
  This is seen in the 
designation of Abraham as the father of Israel, the Exodus from Egypt, and in the 
reception of the Promised Land.  Protestant theology has consistently followed Romans 
9-11 to reiterate the absoluteness of God‘s prerogative regarding those to be justified.26  
And ―covenant‖ names the goal, the purpose, the intention of election that is actualized in 
justification, and specifically in terms of a relation.  In this regard, election can be 
thought as the efficient cause of an effect for which covenant is the final.  Yet, both 
                                                 
23
 In this way, despite Yoder‘s disinclination to follow Luther on justification, the same logic is 
repeated in Yoder‘s emphasis on the positivity implied by fidelity. 
24
 On this theme, especially as set in opposition to speculative thought and elaborated in relation to 
speculative thought, see Brunner, Truth as Encounter, 142-45. 
25
 See George E.  Mendenhall and Gary A. Herion, "Covenant," in Anchor Bible dictionary, ed. David 
Noel Freedman (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 1179-202.  
26
 The difference between the Lutheran and Reformed confessions must be noted here.  I have chosen 
to use the category of ―election‖ here, which plays less of a prominent role in Lutheran theology than in 
Reformed.  Nonetheless, it remains an important category inasmuch as it is tied to Luther‘s early theology 
and his appeal to Deus absconditus and the hidden decree of God in his dispute with Erasmus.  The general 
invocation of the category here should be interpreted as comprehensively inclusive of both claims.  The 
same must also be said of the category of ―covenant,‖ which is also more prominently invoked in Reformed 
theology.  Once again, the same notion is a key element of Lutheran theology in that it is developed in 
various places, most particularly the matrimonial imagery of The Freedom of a Christian. For the 
importance of the category of covenant for Luther, as well as an important discussion of the relationship of 
his use of the term to Augustine, see the discussion of Luther in Peter A. Lillback, The Binding of God: 
Calvin's Role in the Development of Covenant Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001), 58-80. 
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categories are conceived according to the personal and relational orientation disclosed in 
justification by faith, as its form.   
This synchronic mode of reasoning according to the cluster of doctrines election, 
justification, and covenant provides the categorical scheme for the existential emphasis of 
the sin/grace paradigm.
27
  Instead of adopting an approach conceived in terms of the 
corruption (sin) and transcendence (grace, the supernatural) of nature, this paradigm 
understands the creation/grace relation according to what is disclosed regarding election 
and covenant in the revelatory event and the experience of justification.  Dynamic 
relation takes priority here over metaphysics in that dogmatics regulates the meaning of 
the terms and the apprehension of reality.  Sin is thought as the violation of the 
covenantal relation to which election is ordered, and grace is the manifestation of God‘s 
continued fidelity in spite of this violation.   
The priority of dogmatic categories and this emphasis on redemption creates a 
unique set of concerns in thinking through the unity of creation and redemption, which is 
distinct from—though not necessarily opposed to—the Roman Catholic paradigm.  The 
difficulty in relating the two is, in part, due to the manner in which the synchronic mode 
of dogmatic reasoning is deployed to open out onto a diachronic priority of God in every 
God/world relation.
28
  In the Roman Catholic paradigm, a diachronic movement of 
creation, fall, and redemption opens out onto a synchronic conception of grace‘s unity 
with creation. Yet, in the Protestant paradigm, sin and grace stands at the beginning in a 
synchronic relation within the order of redemption that opens out onto a diachronic order 
of creation.  The difficulty this poses for uniting the doctrines lies not with specifying 
                                                 
27
 Brunner, The Divine Imperative, 17-67. 
28
 See n. 11 on p. 98.   
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how grace is distinguished from creation, but with how creation is distinguished from 
grace.  And it is precisely at this point regarding the proper differentiation of the doctrine 
of creation from that of grace that many of the most pressing difficulties in the Protestant 
treatment of these issues come into view.  This is especially the case insofar as the 
approaches of Friedrich Schleiermacher and Karl Barth are genuinely representative of 
the Protestant attempt to think through the unity of the two doctrines.  Presently, I will 
continue my discussion of this paradigm in conversation with each thinker in the 
following subsections.  
     
 Friedrich Schleiermacher 
The world is the totality of antitheses; the deity is the real negation of all antitheses 
 
—Friedrich Schleiermacher29 
 
In contrast to Aquinas, for Luther, the intellect‘s natural appetite to know does not 
designate the primary anthropological truth.  Rather, Luther wants to emphasize its 
gluttony.  He does not do this to disparage reason as such, but to make a precise point 
about the limitations of intellectual apprehension as it is related to the natural capacities 
of the will.  This can be clearly seen from the following theses taken from the early 
Disputation Against Scholastic Theology (1517):  
5. It is false to state that man‘s inclination is free to choose between either of two 
opposites.  Indeed the inclination is not free, but captive.  This is said in opposition to 
common opinion.   
6. It is false to state that the will can by nature conform to correct precept.  This is said in 
opposition to Scotus and Gabriel.   
7. As a matter of fact, without the grace of God the will produces an act that is perferse 
and evil.   
                                                 
29
Quoted from John E. Thiel, God and World in Schleiermacher's Dialektik and Glaubenslehre: 
Criticism and the Methodology of Dogmatics (Bern: P. Lang, 1981), 150. 
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10. One must concede that the will is not free to strive toward whatever is declared good.  
This in opposition to Scotus and Gabriel. 
11. Nor is it able to will or not to will whatever is prescribed… 
20.  An act of friendship [with God] is done, not according to nature, but according to 
prevenient grace.  This in opposition to Gabriel… 
29.  The best and infallible preparation for grace and the sole disposition toward grace is 
the eternal election and predestination of God. 
30.  On the part of man, however, nothing precedes grace except indisposition and even 
rebellion against grace.
30
 
 
Luther‘s argument here is not referring simply to a corrupt, sinful human nature, but to 
the acts of human nature as conceived in relation to God.
31
  The will, he says, is always 
bound in its operations (i.e., captive) to a prior divine initiative, which he links explicitly 
to the doctrines of election and predestination, to which acts of self-determination can 
have only a negative relation when considered apart from its prior relation to God‘s 
promise in the covenant.
32
  Importantly, Luther stands in continuity with the Roman 
Catholic tradition as discussed in the close of the previous chapter when he claims that an 
unaided will cannot even conform to the ―right dictate (of reason).‖33  And yet, Luther 
makes an important step beyond Aquinas here by linking the limitations of the will‘s 
                                                 
30
 Quoted from Martin Luther, Martin Luther's Basic Theological Writings, ed. Timothy F. Lull 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989).  A similar selection is given from Ozment in Lillback, The Binding of 
God, 64.  
31
 See theses 8 and 9: ―8.  It does not, however, follow that the will is by nature evil, that is, essentially 
evil, as the Manicheans maintain.  9. It is nevertheless innately and inevitably evil and corrupt.‖  Luther is 
not simply saying here that the nature is not evil, but as sinful it is innately evil and corrupt.  Rather, as 
thesis 7 shows, his concern is to underscore how the will only performs the good by God‘s grace.  This is a 
point not about the nature of the will, but about its limitations as self-determining.  Apart from a proper 
relation to the God to whom it is ultimately captive, the will‘s self-determination is only an expression of 
self-preservation and gratification (see Theses 15 and 21), which is never positive but only negative, and 
therefore not free.  This reading is further supported by Thesis 15 of the Heidelburg Disputation, written 
the following year: ―Nor could free will remain in a state of innocence, much less do good, in an active 
capacity, but only in its passive capacity.‖  This is an important extension of the analysis of the operation of 
willing that concluded the previous chapter.  That Luther perhaps too simplistically correlates self-
preservation and gratification with evil and perversion, at least in the earlier Disputation on Scholastic 
Theology, is another matter.  That he clarified this by the time of the Heidelburg Disputation is clear by 
Thesis 16: ―The person who believes that he can obtain grace by doing what is in him adds sin to sin so that 
he becomes doubly guilty.‖ 
32
 See Lillback, The Binding of God, 58-80. 
33
 In this respect, Luther‘s argument represents an important (and largely unrecognized) recovery of 
Aquinas‘ teaching on the matter in the midst of a late-Scholasticism entirely confused on the point. 
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freedom directly to the operations of the intellect in general and by not simply associating 
them with the presence or absence of the sanctifying love for God.
34
  As he continues, 
explicitly connecting Aristotelian eudaemonism to a critique of speculative dialectical 
reasoning:  
38.  There is no moral virtue without pride or sorrow, that is, without sin. 
39.  We are not masters of our actions, from beginning to end, but servants.  This in 
opposition to the philosophers. 
40.  We do not become righteous by doing righteous deeds but, having been made 
righteous, we do righteous deeds.  This in opposition to the philosophers. 
41.  Virtually the entire Ethics of Aristotle is the worst enemy of grace.  This in 
opposition to the Scholastics… 
46.  In vain does one fashion a logic of faith, a substitution brought about without regard 
for limit and measure.  This in opposition to the new dialecticians… 
54.  For an act to be meritorious, either the presence of grace is sufficient or its presence 
means nothing.  This in opposition to Gabriel.
35
 
 
 
In agreement with Aquinas on the insufficiency of the will, Luther here nonetheless still 
rejects the notion that an infused habit is sufficient.  Whether understood (after Aquinas) 
as a rational appetite or (after Scotus) as an indifferent power, Luther is insisting that the 
Scholastic analysis of the will remains flawed insofar as it associates the perfection of 
self-determination with the realization of an essentially formal goal.
36
  This manner of 
conceiving the will‘s operations remains essentially sinful, according to Luther, because 
it is premised on a negative relation between the purely formal possibility of virtue and 
its reality.  This point deserves some elaboration.
37
     
                                                 
34
 A distinction here must be drawn between the capacity of the intellect to receive rather than produce 
knowledge of God, and the capacity of the will to actively produce only self-assertion.  In this regard, it is 
important that Luther‘s claim here is made against Scotus and Gabriel, each of whom develop a notion of 
the will‘s agency as fundamentally ―indifferent‖ with regard to reason and ―productive‖ with regard to its 
own self-movement.  The difference is precisely that of whether first act is viewed as active or passive.  See 
Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, 39 n. 126. 
35
While the previous selection of theses from the Disputation Against Scholastic Theology was taken 
from Ozment, this selection is quoted from Luther, Martin Luther's Basic Theological Writings. 
36
 As will be noted below, this goal is specified by the intellect.  The difference in how this is the case 
between Aquinas‘ and Scotus‘ positions will be discussed below.   
37
 The discussion of the will in Aquinas confirms that he does not wish to dispute this point.  See 
Chapter Five. 
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For Luther, the idea that righteousness is attained through habituation into the 
production of virtuous acts is both metaphysically flawed and theologically dangerous.  
What it establishes is essentially a metaphysics of sin.  The link here is to Aristotelian 
eudaemonism and a transgressive ―logic of faith‖ that proceeds ―without regard for limit 
and measure.‖ If an essential good specified by the intellect as its formal object receives 
determinate existential content (i.e., reality) only through the will that seeks to attain it, 
then the relationship between the two is viciously negative.  The actualization of the ideal 
occurs because of the negation of its formality, and can only be negatively perpetuated by 
a further ideational negation that advances that relative achievement, which culminates 
when a complete correspondence of ideality and reality is produced (i.e., justification.)  
Righteousness, then, can only be thought as a production on the condition of its denial, 
which is rooted in the will‘s desire for possession, which is the very pattern of intellection 
as conceived in speculative metaphysics.  His point is simply that the goal must be 
presupposed as the basis of the process: ―For an act to be meritorious, either the presence 
of grace is sufficient or its presence means nothing‖; and ―the singular disposition for 
grace is the eternal election…of God.‖   
The union of creation and grace in the sin/grace paradigm is premised on this 
fundamental insight.  The question that is raised is aptly captured by Michael Root: 
―What must divine election be like if certain Reformation assertions are true about the 
incapacity of the self for salvation and the total confidence of the Christian may place in 
God?‖38  Luther‘s critique of sinful willing and speculative intellection is captured in the 
                                                 
38
 Root, "Schleiermacher as Innovator and Inheritor," 109.  Cited from Matthias Gockel, Barth and 
Schleiermacher on the Doctrine of Election: A Systematic-Theological Comparison (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 18. 
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second conditional clause of that sentence, which is presupposed by the Protestant 
paradigm as a whole.  Root rightly notes, however, that what is in question here is the 
nature of election.  And some account of the unity of nature and grace lies at the heart of 
whatever answer is given.       
It is in relationship to this question that Schleiermacher‘s work is so important for 
my analysis.  Much like Rahner‘s work, Schleiermacher‘s theological claims emerge in 
deep continuity with his broader philosophical commitments.
39
 In this regard, his 
Dialectic is of paramount importance for framing the discussion of general human 
religiousness in the introduction to The Christian Faith.
40
  Most important here is the 
manner in which those philosophical commitments forestall the possibility of any so-
called ―foundational‖ interpretation.41  As Manfred Frank notes, ―strictly speaking, 
Schleiermacher does not have a metaphysics, if by this is meant a foundational 
philosophical doctrine.‖42  This marks the fundamental continuity of his Dialectic project 
                                                 
39
 My interpretation of the relationship of Schleiermacher‘s doctrine of election to his doctrines of sin, 
absolute dependence, and ecclesiology, as discussed in this chapter, is indebted to  Gockel, Barth and 
Schleiermacher on the Doctrine of Election, 16-103.  His work to lift out that architecture in 
Schleiermacher, as well as to relate Schleiermacher to Barth, is convincing and  pressupsed throughout my 
discussion of these matters in this chapter.  For further information on Gockel‘s infleunce see n. 46 below.   
40
 Schleiermacher is a notoriously controversial figure in theology, with a number of disparate and 
conflicting interpretations of his work.  This fact is only further complicated by the fact that the Dialectic is 
widely recognized as integral to the interpretation of his work, and yet the relationship between the 
different texts of Schleiermacher‘s Dialectic is complex and intricate, and no definitive edition exists.  I 
have, thus, relied on the English Edition of the 1811 lectures on the Dialectic for my discussion here: 
Friedrich Schleiermacher, Dialectic, or, the Art of Doing Philosophy: A Study Edition of the 1811 Notes, 
trans. Terrence N. Tice (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1996). Henceforth, this text will be cited as Dialectic, 
followed by page numbers.  I have also relied, throughout, on several important interpreters of 
Schleiermacher.  My reading of the relationship between the Dialectic and the Introduction to The 
Christian Faith is thoroughly indebted to the work in Thiel, God and World.  My overarching interpretation 
of the Dialectic is guided by by Jack Forstman, A Romantic Triangle: Schleiermacher and Early German 
Romanticism (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1977), Manfred Frank, "Metaphysical Foundations: A Look 
at Schleiermacher's Dialectic," in The Cambridge Companion to Friedrich Schleiermacher, ed. Jacqueline 
Mariña (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Thandeka, The Embodied Self: Friedrich 
Schleiermacher's Solution to Kant's Problem of the Empirical Self (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), Thiel, 
God and World. 
41
 On this point, see Frank, "Metaphysical Foundations: A Look at Schleiermacher's Dialectic." 
42
 See Lamm, "Reading Plato's Dialectics."and n. 15 above. 
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with Luther‘s critique of speculative dialectics.  As Frank continues, Schleiermacher 
rejects that ―metaphysics could grasp the highest object of the human mind, or that it 
could exhaustively deal with the essential matter of the human spirit.‖43  As Thiel has 
argued in detail, the overlap between the philosophical approach of the Dialectic and 
introduction to The Christian Faith is best understood of as a matter of thinking 
properly
44
 about what it means to know as one is on the way to knowledge.
45
  The 
Dialectic specifies how we should properly think about God, the world, and ourselves on 
the way to knowledge about them, and the Introduction to The Christian Faith brings 
these rules to bear on the dogmatic task.
46
  Though an exhaustive account is here 
impossible, I wish to lift out the interwoven themes between the texts that shed light on 
Schleiermacher‘s doctrine of election, specifically as a way of uniting creation and grace. 
Schleiermacher‘s basic division of thought in the Dialectic is between the mind‘s 
―organic function,‖ which corresponds to its reception of sense impressions (objects), and 
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Frank, "Metaphysical Foundations: A Look at Schleiermacher's Dialectic," 15. 
44
 My reading in this section on the role of proper thought in the Dialectic and its connection with the 
Introduction of The Christian Faith is indebted to Thiel, God and World.  His argument for this connection 
spans the whole of that work.  I have presupposed his argument throughout this section.  There is also a 
deep Platonic influence here that should be noted in connection with this point.  This connection is noted at 
Thiel, God and World, 14-16. Julia Lamm has made a similar point in Lamm, "Reading Plato's Dialectics," 
1-25. See also Julia A. Lamm, "The Art of Interpreting Plato," in The Cambridge Companion to Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, ed. Jacqueline Mariña (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 91-108.  On the 
point, see Schleiermacher, Dialectic, 1-11.  Thiel discusses the limits of speculation in the Dialectic at 
Thiel, God and World, 28-31.  Related to this point is the claim made by Thandeka that Schleiermacher‘s 
importance as the father of modern theology specifically with her claim that he ―solved the problem of the 
gap in Kant‘s theory of self‖ (Thandeka, The Embodied Self, 83.)  Schleiermacher‘s way of doing so, then, 
would not only be unique for what it preserves in terms of embodiment, but also for its consonance with 
Luther‘s critique of Scholasticism: namely, he does not seek to join ideality and reality in thought, but to 
disclose the unifying ground that is presupposed in yet always eludes thought.   
45
Schleiermacher, Dialectic, 1-11.  See Thiel, God and World, 14-17.   
46
 I have here read Thiel‘s work (see n. 44 above) on the connection between the Dialectic and The 
Christian Faith together with Gockel‘s analysis of Schleiermacher‘s architecture of election.  Also 
influential on the question of election has been the analysis of Schleiermacher‘s understanding of 
providence and grace in Dawn DeVries and Brian Gerrish, "Providence and Grace: Schleiermacher on 
Justification and Election," in The Cambridge Companion to Friedrich Schleiermacher, ed. Jacqueline 
Mariña (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 189-208. Equally influential is Brian A. Gerrish, 
"Nature and the Theater of Redemption: Schleiermacher on Christian Dogmatics and the Creation Story," 
Ex auditu 3 (1987): 120-36. 
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its ―intellectual function,‖ which corresponds to its active reasoning (subject).47  These 
two functions deal with reality and ideality, respectively.
48
  Both the organic and the 
intellectual functions compose the unity of the mind, and yet they are perpetually 
contrasted within thought, and especially thought about the mind itself.  Thought, for 
Schleiermacher, is a unique process in that it necessarily presupposes the unity of the 
mind and the world, but it only occurs as the result of a contrast between itself and the 
world.  That is, the unity that is presupposed by the mind and by which it knows its 
world, can only occur because of dialectical contrast.
49
  The result is that thought can 
never achieve any final correspondence between itself and its object—most especially 
when the object under consideration is the mind itself.  And yet, a corresponding unity 
between thought and its object is necessarily presupposed as the basis for thought.  His 
point is simply that this unity between thought and its object does not and cannot be 
attained by or in thought.  This claim regarding the fundamental correspondence of 
thought to reality and the impossible task of representing that correspondence in and to 
thought is integral to understanding the significance of his ―feeling of absolute 
dependence‖ and its relationship to the doctrine of election.50   
Thought is not only a matter of contrasts between the organic and intellectual 
functions of the mind.  Thought also forms concepts and advances judgments about the 
world in which it participates.  This concept of ―world‖ is misunderstood when it is 
considered in opposition to the mind in such a way as either to stand over against it or as 
that to which it must correspond.  Rather, Schleiermacher says, ―world‖ is that concept 
                                                 
47
 Schleiermacher, Dialectic, 19-21. 
48
 Ibid., 19-26. See Thiel, God and World, 20. 
49
 Schleiermacher, Dialectic, 19-26 and 51-52.  See Thandeka, The Embodied Self, 69. 
50
 See n. 44. 
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that most properly specifies the limit of all thought as determined by the organic 
function.
51
  Schleiermacher means to underscore that, precisely as a part of the world it 
represents, the thought ―world‖ can never achieve perfect correspondence to its object 
without ceasing the dialectical contrast that is thought.  ―World‖ is, then, the concept of 
―a totality made up of a plurality of specially relativized unities,‖52 where ―accordingly 
the world and all that is in it stands under the form of contrast.‖53  All contrasts are 
included because ―world‖ marks that limit of what the mind can think, while nonetheless 
denoting what rightly encompasses, conditions, and determines the mind itself.
54
 Or, as 
he puts the same idea in the 1822 lectures, ―…world = unity with the inclusion of all 
contrasts.‖55 
Standing at the other pole of ―world‖ is the concept of ―God.‖  Whereas ―world‖ 
marks the limit of what the mind can think with regard to its organic function, ―God‖ 
marks the limit of all thought in relation to the intellectual function.  What 
Schleiermacher has in mind here is the notion of ―pure reason,‖ apart from the organic 
function, which is no more a possibility for the mind than is a ‗thought‘ that is pure 
sensation.  Just as thought ceases at the point where it is coincides rather than contrasts 
with sensation, so is it also at the point where it coincides rather than contrasts with 
reason.  ―God‖ is that concept in which the ―sphere of identity between‖56 all contrasts is 
posited in thought as the ―ideal germ of thinking,‖ which ―lacks the form of contrast.‖57  
                                                 
51
 Schleiermacher, Dialectic, 43. 
52
 Ibid., 64. 
53
 Ibid., 43. 
54
Ibid., 24-25, espeically n. 34.   
55
 Quotation taken from Thandeka, The Embodied Self, 114. 
56
 Schleiermacher, Dialectic, 64. 
57
 Ibid., 65. 
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Or, as he once again put it more succinctly in the 1822 lectures, ―God = unity with the 
exclusion of all contrasts.‖58  
In this way, ―God‖ and ―world‖ are transcendental categories of thought, which 
are necessary and constitutive of all thought.  Both serve to delineate what exists prior to 
the subject/object distinction that gives rise to thought.
59
  This assertion means that any 
thought of the world (as the totality of being, including all contrasts, and marking the 
objective limit of thought) must simultaneously include the concept of God (as the 
totality of being, excluding all contrasts, and marking the subjective limit of thought) and 
in such a way that God is not thinkable without reference to the world or the world 
without God.
60
  The world limits thought as the origin of the union of thought and being, 
and God limits thought, not as the contrast to the world, but as the non aliud that is 
totaliter aliter
61
--that is, the Source of both the world and thought.
62
  In this way, 
Schleiermacher‘s Dialectic is in continuity with Luther‘s objection to Scholastic 
speculative metaphysics in that he marks out a proper designation of God, in thought, but 
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 Thandeka, The Embodied Self, 114. 
59
 See Schleiermacher, Dialectic, 39-41. 
60
 Ibid., 33-41. 
61
 This way of framing the matter is indebted to Gerhard Spiegler, The Eternal Covenant: 
Schleiermacher's Experiment in Cultural Theology, Makers of Modern Theology (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1967).  Spiegler‘s claim that Schleiermacher‘s exemption of God from relativity leads to the 
anthropological interpretation of his theology is bizarre, since Spiegler‘s assertion appears to be grounded 
in an Hegelian conception of the Idea in dialectic that Schleiermacher is explicitly working against (186-
92).  Furthermore, his claim overlooks the important role of the Redeemer in the inauguration of the 
Christian content of the feeling of absolute dependence.  As the conclusion of this chapter suggests, 
however, Schleiermacher certainly did not see this insight through to its proper conclusion – and had he 
done so, much of Spiegler‘s concerns would have been more directly answered.   
62
 Thiel notes that the 1828 lectures on Dialectic achieve clarity on the God/world relation that is 
absent from the previous accounts when he arrives at the formula: ―The world is not without God, God is 
not without the world‖ [Die Welt nicht ohne Gott, Gott nicht ohne die Welt] in which ―both ideas are not 
the same‖ [Beide Ideen sind nicht dasselbe]  (Thiel, God and World, 159.)   Thiel refers to this formula as a 
―cautelen‖ and argues that it is ―a noetic correlation of God and world [that] is a philosophical construct 
that defines the nature of proper thinking itself.‖  (160.)  These claims support his thesis that dogmatics, for 
Schleiermacher, is the articulation of the content of Gefühl within thought, specifically in terms of the 
regulative function exercised by a proper correlation of God and world in thought.  His argument is 
convincing and has influenced my reading.     
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which proceeds according to the non-speculative designation of thought‘s own limit.  In 
this way, Schleiermacher is consistent with Luther‘s critique of ―theologies of glory.‖63     
This co-determination of thought by God and the world is directly related to the 
meaning of the phrase ―feeling of absolute dependence‖ (das schlechthinnige 
Abhängigkeitsgefühl) as used in the Introduction to The Christian Faith.
64
  When 
sensibility and reason are dialectically contrasted in thought, what lies outside the proper 
purview of thought is represented within thought as the concepts, ―world‖ and ―God.‖  
But when the world of thought is expressed in the world lying outside its proper purview, 
then the proper category, within thought, is not concepts but judgments.  Judgment marks 
the point at which thought leaves off and willing begins.  As Thandeka has 
convincingly
65
 argued in relation to this point, this means that Schleiermacher 
understands the self as the unrepresentable point of embodied transition between intellect 
and will, where thought leaves off and willing begins.  This point marks the basic, 
presupposed unity between thought and being, which can be experienced in feeling, but 
not properly thought or willed.  It is an immediate awareness of union with world, and is 
                                                 
63
 See n. 44 above.  Indeed, it should be noted that he does so in a way precisely in line with what 
David Burrell has argued are the proper implications of Aquinas‘ doctrine of analogy (see David B. Burrell, 
Analogy and Philosophical Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973). and David B. Burrell, 
Aquinas: God and Action (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979).)  This would suggest not 
only that Luther‘s critique of Scholasticism and its consequences represent a return to and elaboration on 
Aquinas‘ teaching regarding the will, but that that critique is already contained within Aquinas himself.  
See also Denys Turner, Faith, Reason, and the Existence of God (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2004). 
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Both Thandeka and Thiel make this claim.  See Thandeka, The Embodied Self, 83-110, Thiel, God 
and World, 97-141.  
65
 Mariña takes issues with Thandeka‘s account of Schleiermacher‘s ―embodied‖ rather than 
transcendental subject.  See Jacqueline Mariña, Transformation of the Self in the Thought of Friedrich 
Schleiermacher (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 180 n. 29.  Mariña argues that 
Schleiermacher‘s recognition of immediate self consciousness implies that the self cannot be reduced to its 
embodiment, but retains a necessarily transcendental element.  She further suggests that this does not mean, 
even for Kant, a ―loss‖ of the embodied self.  While Mariña‘s point is well taken, it is not at all clear to me 
that this contradicts Thandeka‘s argument regarding Schleiermacher, though it clearly contradicts her 
premise regarding Kant.   
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therefore without an object.  Thought and will both cease here as they coincide directly 
with the world.
66
  But, simultaneously, this site is the origin of that free spontaneity of 
will by which the agent determines itself in relation to the world.  Thandeka calls this, 
following Dieter Henrich, that irreducible ―subject-less‖ awareness,67 wherein the 
immediate reciprocity of mind and matter is disclosed, and which is the basis for the 
spontaneity of subjective freedom.
68
  With no object or subject, this awareness is neither 
conceptual nor judicious, but only the feeling [Gefühl] of one‘s relative dependence and 
freedom
69
  As it is the concept of limit that includes all relative contrasts, ―world‖ is the 
appropriate concept for the thought of this feeling as expressed in thought.  However, as 
there can be no absolute feeling of spontaneous freedom, the concept of God is the 
appropriate reference in thought for the feeling of absolute dependence that accompanies 
the feeling of relative dependence. ―God‖ is the appropriate concept because what is 
encountered here is that upon which one is always absolutely dependent as the co-
determinate of oneself and the world: the ―whence‖ of the feeling of absolute 
                                                 
66
 See  Thandeka, The Embodied Self, 83-110.  She notes that, in the 1831 lecture, Schleiermacher 
understands passive selfhood as that aspect in which: ―We are given back to or return to ourselves as that 
which is being received.‖  Her argument is that Schleiermacher is pointing to what remains of the self when 
neither thinking nor willing is occurring as their ―common border,‖ and that this is the necessary 
presupposition for Kant‘s philosophy, which he never sufficiently demonstrates, and without which 
thinking would be impossible.  It is the moment wherein the self experiences, or feels, itself in distinction 
from thought, and thus demarcates a genuine limit for thought that is not subject to Hegel‘s critique.  It also 
displays both the fact and priority of an awareness of embodied life.  She argues that this experience is the 
encounter with the very limit of thought, and precisely not as a thought.  My interpretation of the 
significance of the feeling of absolute dependence is indebted to her work on this point.     
67
 Ibid., 94-100.  The latter is Thandeka‘s alteration of Henrich‘s original term, ―subject-less knowing.‖  
She notes that she is coining the term is to preserve Schleiermacher‘s distinction between knowing and 
feeling. 
68
 Schleiermacher, Dialectic, 39-47. 
69
 See Thandeka, The Embodied Self, 97.  Thandeka notes that Schleiermacher is careful not to specify 
God here as the Source of this feeling, because this would give a conceptual determination to the feeling 
that would destroy it.   
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dependence.
70
  In this regard, God ‗appears‘ for Schleiermacher as the rupture of 
conscious, reflexive self-determination, because God dissolves all presumptions that the 
continuity of the self results from and corresponds to subjective activity.
71
  In this respect, 
Schleiermacher is not only in complete agreement with Luther regarding the limitations 
of speculative metaphysics, but does so for reasons consistent with his emphasis on 
God‘s absolute priority over the attempt of the self to establish itself through the 
dialectical contrasts of negative determination.  God appears, rather, as the rupture of 
subjective spontaneity.   
Philosophy can recognize this feeling and its conceptual significance for thought, 
as specified in the Dialectic.  What it cannot do is give that feeling determinate content.  
Dogmatics alone serves this purpose as it sets forth, in words, the mediate self-
consciousness of this immediate feeling of dependence as it is shaped, expressed, and 
nurtured by the corporate life of the Christian church.
72
  This tie to the Christian church is 
integral, as the feeling of absolute dependence only appears within thought as a 
determinate expression of thought, which is shaped by a discursive community‘s 
apprehension of God.  Jacqueline Mariña has stated it well in noting that, though the self 
is immediately aware of the unity of itself with the world in feeling, it only knows itself 
as expressed (willed) in the world, where that self can apprehend itself as one object 
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On codetermination: Schleiermacher, Dialectic, 39-47. See also Friedrich Schleiermacher, The 
Christian Faith, trans. H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart, 2 vols. (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), § 4.  
Henceforth cited as ―Christian Faith.‖  See also, Thandeka, The Embodied Self, 101.  On the ―whence‖ of 
feeling, see Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, § 4.3-4. 
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 See Thandeka, The Embodied Self, 94-110. 
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 As Thiel has noted, though, the proper thinking developed in the Dialectic continues to structure the 
formulation of the role of Gefühl in dogmatics.  Using the Dialectic as its guide for proper thought, 
Schleiermacher refers to the Christian church as the community that supplies discursive and intersubjective 
content to the otherwise immediate awareness of God-consciousness. See Thiel, God and World, 175. 
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among, to, and for others.
73
  Pious self-consciousness of one‘s absolute dependence only 
occurs with others who express, share, and mediate that feeling to one another 
corporately in a shared language and culture.   
This has particular significance for the division of The Christian Faith into two 
parts.
74
  The first treats the Christian self-consciousness of absolute dependence in its 
most general expression as a universal awareness of the God/world relationship shared by 
all human beings, and superiorly mediated by monotheistic religions.  Schleiermacher 
correlates this awareness with the doctrines of creation and providence, which likewise 
corresponds to the specification of the divine attributes, and a treatment of the original 
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 See Mariña, Transformation of the Self, 109-45.  I return to a discussion of this aspect of Mariña‘s 
work below.   
74
 This way of relating the two parts of The Christian Faith presupposes the work of Robert Sherman, 
The Shift to Modernity: Christ and the Doctrine of Creation in the Theologies of Schleiermacher and Barth 
(New York: T & T Clark International, 2005).  On the point, see Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §§30-31.  
Sherman notes that Schleiermacher designates three basic forms that dogmatic utterances can take.  These 
are those that describe human ―states of mind,‖ those that present conceptions of the divine attributes, and 
those that present expressions regarding the nature of the world.  The first form is the most fundamental 
form, and presupposed by the other two (§30.2.)  This fact is at work in the system, where the First Part 
describes the Christian religious self-consciousness in general, as it is considered apart from the antithesis 
of sin and grace, and the Second Part takes it up under that aspect, divided into the two aspects of sin and 
grace.  Thus, he notes that the system has nine distinct sections with the doctrines explicated in each being 
correlated with the others.  Sherman argues that this must be recognized in order to fully appreciate the 
interconnection between the treatments of doctrines.  As Sherman insists, this entails that Schleriermacher‘s 
doctrine of creation is only properly understodo in its relatinoship to all those propositions made throughout 
the system of the third form that relate to the nature and constitution of the world (Sherman, Shift to 
Modernity. 7.)  The same point is also made well by Richard R. Niebuhr, "Christ, Nature, and 
Consciousness: Reflections on Schleiermacher in the Light of Barth‘s Early Criticisms," in Barth and 
Schleiermacher: Beyond the Impasse?, ed. James O. Duke and Robert F. Streetman (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1988), 28.  In this regard, as he treats the doctrine of creation explicitly under the first form of human 
―states of mind‖ in the First Part (§§40-41), this has important consequences in that it shows that this 
doctrine is not, for Schleiermacher, based upon a general account of the human experience of the world (or 
consciousness), but is rather rooted in the immediate experience of the particular consciousness of sin and 
grace that was brought about by the Redeemer.  When this is further presented as under the general feeling 
of absolute dependence, it is because of the experience of the world that this redemption elicits that the 
Christian theologian extrapolates to claims about the nature of the world as a whole.  As Sherman has 
noted, this entire proceedure is explicitly Christological for Schleiermacher: ―it is guided toward Christ 
from the very outset, and…its content must…be influenced by Christ as well, because it its ‗genetic 
predisposition.‘‖ (Sherman, Shift to Modernity, 29.)  I have repeated this argument in some detail in this 
note because of its importance for my reading of the role of election its relationship what I call an 
―ontology of encounter‖ in Schleiermacher, and becuaes of the way such a reading contradicts many crass 
assumptions about Schleiermacher and his intricate and complex project.   
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perfection of the world.  Part two refracts the general awareness of absolute dependence 
as it is universally expressed in monotheistic religion into its more specific determination 
in the pious Christian self-consciousness, according to the experience of sin and grace.
75
  
This experience is the self-conscious form under which the feeling of absolute 
dependence appears for the Christian as it marks the transition from alienated (sinful) to 
regenerate (redeemed) consciousness.
76
  In keeping with the claim that God‘s appearance 
marks the rupture of subjective self-determining action, Schleiermacher notes that the 
Christian doctrine of sin is the expression of the awareness that all human alienation 
arises from that corporate life (i.e., the world) that is organized around and takes shape 
solely through the subjective self-determination of spontaneous human action.
77
  This 
awareness, however, is only possible because of the prior recognition of grace, which is 
the awareness of fellowship with God that arises solely through God‘s self-
communication in Jesus Christ and mediated in his community, the church.
78
  Sin and 
grace are thus always dialectically related to one another in pious Christian consciousness 
in much the way sensation and reason and world and God are for general human 
consciousness.  In fact, they arise as specific Christian determinations of just those 
                                                 
75
 See Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §§30-31. DeVries and Gerrish note that absolute dependence 
itself is a decidedly dogmatic category for Schleiermacher, and not a general structure. This fact is 
expressed, they say, in the original creedal designation of God as ―Pantocrator,‖ which Schleiermacher 
understands to more fully express absolute dependence than any other Christian formulation. The absolute 
priority of God in the world‘s preservation is correlative with the doctrine of providence, which 
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Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §36-41.  and DeVries and Gerrish, "Providence and Grace: 
Schleiermacher on Justification and Election," 190-91. 
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 See Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §63. 
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 Ibid., §§ 63,65-74, 81. 
78
 Ibid., §63. 
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elements of thought, specifically as the form under which humanity‘s universal and 
absolute dependence on God‘s activity is apprehended.79    
This framework is the proper context within which to situate Schleiermacher‘s 
doctrine of election so as see its significance for a study of the union of creation and 
redemption within a Protestant sin/grace paradigm.  Matthias Gockel‘s study remains the 
most important in-depth treatment on this significance, and his comparison of 
Schleiermacher and Barth has influenced my analysis in both this and the following 
sections.
80
  As Gockel notes, because the feeling of absolute dependence involves one‘s 
self-conscious unity with the total system of relative contrasts (i.e., world), God‘s 
creation and preservation of that world must necessarily be thought of as distinct from 
(i.e., excluding all contrasts) but correlative with (i.e., as the whence of those contrasts) 
the totality of historical and material being.
81
  In pious Christian awareness, however, 
these facts of existence are mediated by the corporate life of the Christian community and 
there apprehended in such a way that conscious fellowship with God is possible.  That 
fellowship is made possible by the work of the Redeemer, whose own perfect awareness 
of dependence on God makes actual an awareness of the whole of reality as the singular, 
unconditional, and self-communicating decree of election to the eternal fellowship with 
God that he enjoyed.
82
  Not only this, but history is the successive unfolding of that 
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 Ibid., §62-64. 
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 Gockel has not, however, discussed in detail the relationship of the Dialectic to the these questions.  
For this reason, I have read him together with Thiel (see n. 46 above.)  Particularly instructive is Gockel‘s 
note that Schleiermacher‘s discussion of creation and redemption in The Christian Faith is structured 
according to the argument of the 1819 essay, ―On the Doctrine of Election, especially in regard to the 
Aphorisms of Herr Dr. Bretschneider‖ (Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher on the Doctrine of Election, 16 
n.1.)   
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 Gockel‘s helpful phrase is ―the absolute causality of God is at once principally different from and 
equal in scope with the relative causality of the world‖ (Ibid., 99.)   
82
 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §§116-17, 20, 64.  See also Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher on 
the Doctrine of Election, 37-103. 
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decree, moving toward a complete manifestation of that fact, through the triumph of the 
church‘s mediation of the Kingdom of God.83   
Creation and redemption are here conceived as a single divine act or decree, 
which is oriented toward the fulfillment of the Kingdom of God, first entering the world 
in the God-man and mediated in history by the Christian church.
84
  Election is the 
Christian doctrine in which God‘s universal creation/preservation as apprehensible by 
general human consciousness is shown to coincide perfectly with the Christian church‘s 
mediation of the awareness of that rupture of sinful self-determination in the form of the 
grace that discloses the whole of reality as the theater of God‘s self-communication for 
the sake of fellowship with humanity.
85
  This claim involves the affirmation that, though 
dialectically contrasted in thought, what is revealed by God‘s justifying grace is the order 
of the entire universe toward complete fellowship with God.  Importantly, this unity is 
not apprehended by virtue of the dynamism of speculative intellection, but specifically 
according to its rupture by that which absolutely conditions and determines it in its very 
activity. For Schleiermacher, though this unity is a fact of reality, awareness of that fact is 
predicated on the prior disruption of spontaneous self-determination by its ground.  As a 
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 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, §§ 116 and 64-69.  See Gerrish, "Nature and the Theater of 
Redemption: Schleiermacher on Christian Dogmatics and the Creation Story," 196-216. 
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 As Gockel notes, because consciousness of this general truth of election is not itself generally 
apprehensible apart from its actualization in the life of the Redeemer, and only as mediated by the Christian 
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Schleiermacher on Christian Dogmatics and the Creation Story." 
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result, the unity that is achieved occurs insofar as creation is understood as a refracted 
dimension of the experience of the event of grace (i.e., justification), and not vice versa.    
 
Karl Barth 
But God Himself is the Son who is the basic truth of that which is other than God. As the 
Son of God this Other is God Himself. But God Himself becomes Another in the person 
of His Son. The existence of the world is not needed in order that there should be 
otherness for Him. Before all worlds, in His Son, He has otherness in Himself from 
eternity to eternity. But because this is so, the creation and preservation of the world, and 
relationship and fellowship with it, realized as they are in perfect freedom, without 
compulsion or necessity, do not signify an alien or contradictory expression of God's 
being, but a natural, the natural expression of it ad extra. The world is, because and as the 
Son of God is. 
 
—Karl Barth86 
 
Barth‘s thought is notoriously diffuse, even baroque.  This makes a 
comprehensive account of his ideas on creation and grace a matter of grasping his 
undergirding logic.  In this regard, his relationship to Schleiermacher is not incidental, 
since Barth‘s thinking matured in reaction against trends of Liberal Protestantism he 
associated directly with Schleiermacher.  Of particular importance to Barth was the 
perceived need to evade an anthropocentricism he detected in Schleiermacher‘s 
theological starting point.  Nonetheless, as we will see, the distance he places between 
himself and Schleiermacher also serves to shed light on a real proximity regarding the 
central dogmatic affirmations structuring their thought.
87
 This is particularly the case in 
relation to their appropriation of the central doctrines of justification, election, and 
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 CD III/1, 317.    
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 Demonstration of this proximity between Schleiermacher and Barth is the overaching thesis of 
Gockel‘s work.  Being convinced of his argument for the architecutre of Schleiermacher‘s doctrine, I am 
also convinced by his reading of Barth and particularly his account of the development of Barth‘s doctrine 
of election.  As with Schleiermacher, his work there, regarding the relationship between the two thinkers 
and the development of Barth‘s own position on election, is presupposed by my treatment of Barth here.  
The reader is directed to see Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher on the Doctrine of Election, 104-97.   
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covenant.  The place to begin with Barth, then, in discussing the relationship of these 
themes to this thought on the unity of creation and grace, is with his treatment of the 
interweaving of creation and covenant in Volume Three of the Church Dogmatics.  
There, Barth shows himself to be in close proximity to Schleiermacher, but in such a way 
that the distinction between them is most clearly brought into view.     
Barth opens CD III/1 with a discussion of the necessarily dogmatic character of 
the doctrine of creation, noting how it is distinct from scientific and philosophical 
knowledge.
88
  The affirmation of the world as God‘s creation, he insists, though no doubt 
a matter of reality,
89
 is strictly apprehensible as such only in faith.
90
  In keeping with the 
Protestant paradigm‘s insistence on the creature‘s proper relation to God‘s absolute 
priority, Barth notes that this reality is only apprehensible to faith because faith is the 
only proper relationship of the creature to the Creator.
91
  Most importantly, however, 
Barth notes that the apprehension of the reality of this relationship is not only a matter of 
faith, but is to be interpreted as such in strictly Christological terms.  Faith is not to be 
understood in Schleiermacher‘s terms—as he understood them—of the implicit 
religiosity of general human consciousness, but rather directly in relationship to 
scripture‘s witness to Jesus Christ as the self-communication of God‘s eternal Word.92  
Faith is not correlated to a general human feeling of dependence, but to Jesus Christ 
alone, in relationship to whom we have certain knowledge of the ontological reality of 
the world as God‘s creation.93  In this way, Barth insists from the beginning on the basic 
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correlation of creation and grace, which Schleiermacher only states at the end of his 
presentation.  Barth intends to make creation itself a manifestation and extension of the 
grace of redemption, specifically by noting, in the wake of Jesus Christ, that the world is 
brought into being and sustained by the Word of God.
94
 
This close correlation of faith and knowledge, redemption and creation, and the 
reversal of the traditional presentation of their relation, leads Barth directly to a treatment 
of the relationship of creation and covenant in his exegesis of Genesis 1-3.  Barth treats 
creation here as the first work in the history of the realization of the covenant and its 
fulfillment.  He designates that first work as the ―external basis‖ for the covenant and its 
realization, and the covenant itself as the ―internal basis‖ for the act of creating.  In 
making these claims, Barth is simply unfolding the logic of his position regarding the 
priority of faith in relation to Jesus Christ as the basis for the knowledge of the deepest 
truth of the world‘s reality.  Such knowledge cannot, he insists, be gleaned from any 
analysis of the world or human consciousness, but can only be brought to light by the 
history of the covenant fulfilled in the Jesus Christ.  The world, then, is brought into 
being specifically in order to be the stage upon which God will achieve the purpose of 
perfect fellowship with humanity.   
It is important to underscore not only the mutual and primal correlation of the two 
categories of creation and redemption in Barth‘s theological imagination here, but also 
his emphasis on the dynamic, historical, and material character of this relation.  Barth is 
unfolding an unmistakably Hegelian logic, which sets the stage for his overtly Hegelian 
structure of the subsequent volume IV.  This logic of the relation of covenant and 
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creation is Hegelian inasmuch as Barth is conceiving God‘s covenantal intention as the 
implicit, formal essence (an sich) that is to be historically unfolded in the material 
existence (für sich) of creation and eventually culminating in the arrival of the concrete 
universal (an und für sich) of the God-man, Jesus Christ, who as the sublation of the 
distinction between God and humanity, achieves genuine fellowship between them.
95
  
Barth is by no means consistent in his application of this logic, which stands in necessary 
tension with other integral components of his thought.  However, the significance of this 
point cannot be overlooked, since this orientation toward the dynamic logic of becoming 
that he draws from Hegel is specifically intended to stand in contrast to any approach—
such as Schleiermacher‘s emphasis on absolute dependence—that would construe 
creation as a ―general concept of a first cause or the final contingency of all things.‖96  In 
the excursus passage following this statement, for example, he explicitly links this idea to 
Schleiermacher‘s ―whence‖, and noting that ―a general conception of a common, 
supreme and final Whence of all things‖ will ―not suffice‖ as a statement of the Christian 
confession of ―an absolutely definite God—who is also recognized as the Lord and Ruler 
of that history—and of that world‘s dependence on that God.‖97  This orientation toward 
the distinct, concrete determination of God‘s being in Christ is an element he insists on as 
essential in The Humanity of God, and he would continue to uphold it as the framework 
for his treatment of the relationship between creation and reconciliation, from volumes III 
to IV.   
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Barth‘s purpose in adopting this approach, in the first instance, is to emphasize 
the historical character of the covenant as the dynamic unfolding of grace in creation.   It 
is this element, specifically, that he emphasizes in his discussion of the unique status of 
the Genesis accounts as a ―saga‖98 of the encounter of God and humanity.99  His exegesis 
of the first Genesis account of creation is specifically concerned, in this regard, to 
correspond to his claim that creation is the ―external basis of the covenant.‖100  Indeed, 
the saga unfolds as a vision of a world wholly dependent on the care of the creator, and 
absolutely directed by the creator‘s purposes: the world is the ―freely willed and executed 
positing of a reality distinct from God,‖ which is specifically a ―work of His love‖ in 
which God ―wills…to reveal and manifest it [love] in His is own co-existence with it 
[creation].‖101  In these ways, Barth intends to display the manner in which creation ―is 
the presupposition of the realization of the divine purpose of love in relation to the 
creature,‖102 and states explicitly that ―even the very existence and nature of the creature 
are the work of the grace of God.‖103  On this front, Barth makes a fundamental 
distinction between creation and the covenant—or the grace on which it is grounded—
even as he irreducibly unites them one to another.  In fact, in a statement that is virtually 
identical to Lubac‘s discussion of the twofold gratuity of creation, Barth declares: ―the 
existence and being of the one loved are not identical with the fact that it is loved.‖104 
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If an understanding of creation as the external basis of the covenant is concerned 
with the existence of the one God loves, then the consideration of the fact that the world 
is loved is concerned with the relationship of the covenant itself as the ―internal basis of 
creation.‖105  Barth correlates the second Genesis account of creation in relationship to 
this particular aspect of his doctrine of creation, understanding that account as ―the 
history of creation from the inside.‖106  To offer a history of creation ―from the inside,‖ 
for Barth, means to explicate reality in terms of its relationship to God‘s care and 
purpose, which alone gives them meaning—a meaning that is, once again, only 
apprehensible to the eyes of faith.  In terms of the second creation account, this means 
that the creature ―does not merely exist, but exists meaningfully,‖ with a ―purpose and 
plan and order.‖107  This is a purpose that is ―solely by reason and in accomplishment of 
the revelation of the glory of God‘s free love‖ of which the act of creating is the ―deed 
and event.‖108  In speaking of these purposes and linking them directly to their orientation 
to the grace of reconciliation, Barth boldly states that creation‘s ―nature is simply its 
equipment for grace…pure promise, expectation and prophecy of that which in His 
grace…God plans for man and will not delay to accomplish for his benefit,‖ which 
carries with it the consequence that the covenant cannot be understood as the external 
basis of creation, but only creation as the external basis for the covenant.
109
  The internal 
basis of creation is simply the fact that it is ―intrinsically determined as the exponent of 
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His glory…for the establishment and the history of the covenant…[and as] that which 
was to become God‘s partner in this history.‖110   
Barth‘s concerns in this regard are to express the different facets of God‘s 
affirmation of created reality.  He specifies these facets under the heading of the three 
categories of ―benefit,‖ ―actualization,‖ and ―justification.‖  Regarding the first, Barth 
notes that the truth of creation as benefit consists in the fact that it is, most fundamentally, 
an expression of the benevolence and beneficence of God‘s life.111  This is the case 
specifically because creation is to be thought of as advantage and profit for the creature, 
as it opens up the possibility of fellowship with the benefactor, God.  This notion of 
benefit also implies, in addition to the possibility of fellowship, a necessary distinction 
between God and the creature, which is also affirmed by God and perfectly coincides 
with what Barth means by actualization.
112
  The simultaneity of benefit and actualization 
also entails the fact of justification, which Barth insists must be thought of in terms of the 
actual constitution of the objective goodness of the creature in the actuality of its discrete 
existence.  All of these are different yet interconnected aspects of God‘s primordial ―Yes‖ 
to creation: what is a gracious and caring gift to the creature constitutes it as an actual and 
good reality alongside Godself.   
Like Schleiermacher, Barth is clearly concerned to conceive the unity of creation 
and redemption in terms of a single divine decree, preceding the act of creation and 
governing its development.  Creation is to be understood as the external expression of 
this decree.  From this standpoint, alongside Schleiermacher, Barth can be seen to be 
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working toward an affirmation of the basic theological truth of the Reformed doctrine of 
election and reprobation, while repudiating its more terrible implications.  Additionally, 
both thinkers‘ attempt to conceive the unity of creation and grace according to the terms 
of the Reformed doctrine of election means that the paradigm of sin/grace is the lens 
through which the doctrinal problem of unity is conceived.  Nonetheless, as Gockel 
documents, Barth‘s unique reworking of the logic of election, in CD II/2, is the 
framework within which to understand his treatment of the fulfillment of the covenant as 
the telos of the creation, his affirmation of the world‘s justification in the doctrine of 
creation.
113
   
While the covenant is the internal dynamic of which creation is the expression, 
election is the ground of that relation, and redemption is its mediation.  The important 
aspects of these two affirmations are worked out in CD II/2 and IV/1 and IV/2, 
respectively, each of which frames the treatment of creation in III/1 and III/2.
114
  As 
regards the significance of election for Barth, if we are to follow Gockel, at least after the 
time of the Göttingen Dogmatics, the doctrine is associated solely with the historical 
person of Jesus Christ.
115
  Whereas Schleiermacher advanced beyond traditional 
Reformed doctrine by thinking creation/preservation as the singular expression of God‘s 
one decree to fellowship, Barth insists on a more dynamic account and historical account 
of God‘s covenantal intentions.  As a result, he distinguished between election and 
creation as refracted dimensions not of nature or Christian consciousness, but of the 
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history of the advent, crucifixion, and resurrection of the man, Jesus Christ.  Like 
Schleiermacher, Barth insists that the doctrine of creation is not to be understood as an 
account of the world‘s origins, but as an account of the world‘s purpose: namely, 
election.  For Schleiermacher, it is the totality of the world and its history that displays 
this election.  In time, all of humanity is both elect and reprobate inasmuch as they 
become aware, through justifying grace brought by the Redeemer, of the sin/grace 
dialectic that conditions self-consciousness.  This is an election that is mediated to the 
entire world through the cultural and linguistic agency of the church, which mediates 
fellowship with the Redeemer.  But Barth is adamant that election refers to Jesus Christ 
alone as the mediator of God‘s self-determination to be the God of the covenant. In this 
sense, creation is the consequent expression of that divine determination, and election is 
the ground of that determination.  As Barth states in CD II/2, God determines in all 
eternity to be God as Jesus.  The important point in this regard is not primarily that this 
establishes the role of humanity in creation as God‘s covenant partner.  Much like the 
doctrine of creation itself, this is merely a secondary concern that is more fundamentally 
derived from God‘s primal election to be the God of the covenant as Jesus Christ, which 
is Barth‘s understanding of the expression of God‘s being as love.   
This importance of this for the sin/grace paradigm is most readily captured in 
relation to the doctrine of reconciliation worked out in CD IV/2.  As he deploys it here, 
the doctrine of election shows Barth firmly in the Reformed tradition of supralapsarian 
election and reprobation.  God‘s decision to be God as Jesus Christ occurs ontologically 
prior to any possibility of human merit, and is grounded in nothing more fundamental 
than the good pleasure of God‘s decree.  Here that the significance of Barth‘s Hegelian 
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logic becomes most pronounced in a version of Luther‘s ―wonderful exchange.‖  For 
what is conceived in the doctrine of creation as the realization of an essence in and 
through the world‘s existence is redoubled as God‘s basic self-relation in the person of 
Jesus in the doctrine of reconciliation.  In the person of Jesus, the essential nature of 
creation as ―equipment for grace‖ is manifested in the historical existence of this human 
being Jesus, who is the perfect actualization of that essence as covenant.   
Barth repeats this through a series of dialectical relations and reversals that 
converge around the person of Jesus.  As pertains to the covenantal essence of creation, 
Jesus is considered in his status as the divine Son of God under the heading, ―the Lord as 
servant,‖ which shows Jesus to be the obedient Son, journeying into the ―far country‖ of 
creation, to be the ―judge judged in our place,‖ whose obedience is vindicated in the 
―verdict of the Father‖ at the resurrection.  Barth interprets this obedience as the negation 
of the prideful disobedience of humanity, which actualizes ―real‖ humanity, and justifies 
it in him.  According to Barth, it is the historical fact of Jesus‘ obedience that is grace: the 
essential covenantal ground for which the world was created, and it is only in the light of 
that obedience that sin is truly apprehended and humanity justified as participants in the 
covenant.
116
   
In the second instance, the doctrine of reconciliation is related to the covenant of 
creation inasmuch as Jesus is considered in his status as the Son of Man: ―the Servant as 
Lord.‖  Barth presents Jesus here as the exalted Son, in his ―homecoming‖ to the Father, 
as the ―royal‖ human being, receiving the rightful place beside the Father.  Such 
exaltation overcomes the sloth that characterizes the misery of disobedient humanity, and 
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manifests the true freedom of the children of God in the sanctifying work that is the 
immediate and inseparable consequence of justification.  In this respect, grace is not only 
given as the obedience of the Son, but is likewise in the exaltation of humanity in history, 
in and through the gift of the Holy Spirit that establishes a Christian community.   
Barth thus conceives the unity of creation and grace according to a distinctly 
Hegelian punctuation of the logic of election, justification, and covenant.  He thinks 
creation as the first moment in the dynamic, historical unfolding of the covenant as the 
essential form of creaturely reality.  This ontological basis of reality, however, is only 
noetically disclosed in the person of Jesus Christ.  But Jesus is not merely the condition 
of possibility for such knowledge, as both the electing God and the elected individual, 
Jesus is the ontological coincidence of the covenantal essence in historical existence, and 
thereby serves the same function as the ―concrete universal‖ in Hegel.  God‘s eternal 
election to be God as Jesus Christ, which is simultaneously God‘s election of Jesus 
Christ, sets up justification as the mediating concept generated by the concrete universal 
(Jesus) that is the basis for the objective manifestation of the covenant in-and-for-itself.   
   
An Ontology of Encounter 
[In margin: The error in Schleiermacher's dogmatics] is that for him religiousness is 
always really a condition, it is; he represents everything in the sphere of being [Væren], 
Spinozian being. How it becomes [vorder] in the sense of coming to exist [blive til] and 
in the sense of being maintained does not really concern him...This is of minor concern to 
Schleiermacher. He treats religiousness in the sphere of being. 
 
—Kierkegaard117  
 
 
[Barth‘s] concern was not just epistemological; it was not just to exclude the attempt to 
know God on any other basis than that of the Word incarnate in history…Barring the 
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door to speculation was not an end in itself.  What was really at stake…was divine 
ontology. 
 
—Bruce McCormack118 
 
Both Schleiermacher and Barth have here developed their accounts of the unity of 
creation and grace according to the paradigm of sin and grace.  The reader should recall 
that this paradigm interprets the traditional Christian narrative of creation, sin, and 
redemption ―intratextually‖ rather than metaphysically, such that the categories of 
election, justification, and covenant are given precedence and punctuated in terms of 
relational dynamism.
119
  This has the effect of rendering the unity of creation and 
redemption less a matter of the transcendental status of reality in relation to God‘s act, 
and more a matter of the perception and reception of that act.  The purpose of this 
discussion has been to emphasize the continuity between these two positions, but a 
recounting their differences will be necessary to open that discussion.     
In both Schleiermacher and Barth, the decisive element in their deployment of the 
sin/grace scheme concerned the interpretation of the shape of divine election.  The 
differences between the two are not finally about the status of election as the category 
through which creaturehood is properly ascertained, but about its proper object and 
meaning.  As we have seen, for Schleiermacher election designates the most precise 
dogmatic determination of God‘s universal preservation—and our feeling of absolute 
dependence on it—as described in accordance with the God-consciousness received from 
the Redeemer, mediated in the fellowship of the Christian community, and experienced 
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within dialectical self-consciousness.‖120  Because God‘s preservation occurs prior to the 
subject/object division that constitutes self-consciousness, thought cannot itself supply 
(i.e., produce) knowledge of the content of this reality without, by means of a purely 
negative determination, fundamentally reducing it to sin.  Rather, in keeping with the 
structure of absolute dependence, Schleiermacher insists that such knowledge results only 
where consciousness of fellowship with God arises as ―resting upon a communication 
from the Redeemer, which we call Grace.‖121  As thought, this knowledge is necessarily 
divided between the dialectical poles of sin and grace as these characterize the 
spontaneity and receptivity of thought as simultaneously alienated from God on the basis 
of its own activity, and yet nonetheless in fellowship with God because of what it 
receives from the Redeemer.  The most basic ontological truth is, then, known as not 
merely that of our absolute dependence on God‘s preservation, but that this one act of 
preservation is directed toward the arrival of perfect fellowship of God with humanity.
122
  
It is only because of our redemption that we know this.  And because the church is the 
site where this fellowship is both mediated and actualized, election is principally an 
ecclesiological doctrine, treated in terms of the origin of the church and the 
communication of the Holy Spirit.
123
  The union of creation and redemption, then, is 
achieved in the church where the fellowship of the Kingdom that God intends for the 
whole of reality is now realized.       
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For Barth, this way of framing matters makes it impossible for Schleiermacher to 
sustain anything more than a purely formal distinction between creation and redemption.  
Schleiermacher is clearly not guilty of Barth‘s charge that a general account of the feeling 
of absolute dependence controls the whole of his theology.  At least this does not mean 
what Barth interprets it to mean.  Nonetheless, Barth does correctly perceive that the 
transformation wrought by redemption is itself co-extensive with God‘s singular act of 
creation—and it is this to which Barth objects.  His problem lies with Schleiermacher‘s 
treatment of redemption as merely an elaboration upon and extension of the world‘s 
ontological integrity.  Barth‘s own position, however, shows that he is not stricto sensu 
opposed to this line of thought as long as it is framed such that the radical ontological 
implications of redemption are given their due.  The result is an equally paramount 
emphasis on election, but formulated such that Jesus himself is the ground and goal of the 
whole of reality, rather than its highest and most pristine exemplar.  The focus is no 
longer upon the ecclesial mediation of Jesus‘ perfect God-consciousness, but upon the 
ontological consequences of the reality of Jesus himself.  Consequently, because God 
determines to be Godself as Jesus for humanity, this election is the ground of all God‘s 
acts ad extra.  This makes his arrival, death, and resurrection the existential actualization 
of the covenantal essence of the whole of reality.  Creation and redemption are united 
here solely in his person. 
This also results in interesting comparison to the approaches of Lubac and 
Rahner.  In the main, Schleiermacher understands the relationship of creation to 
redemption in terms consistent with Rahner.  He differs from Rahner only in his 
uncompromising opposition to grounding that union in the dynamism of speculative 
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intellection, which, following Luther, he takes as the proper model of sin.  Barth‘s 
position is in this manner closer to Lubac.  Methodologically, he is consistent with Lubac 
in rejecting transcendental analysis in favor of a strictly theological starting point, and he 
develops a union of creation and grace that is based upon a formal and primordial 
distinction.  He differs from Lubac only in making God‘s decision for grace the basis of 
creation, rather than creation the basis for grace.     
As I argued in the previous chapter, my claim is that two common assumptions 
regarding the category of Being and the function of the will are decisive for this 
approach.  These assumptions serve to unite of creation and grace within an ontology of 
encounter.  By ―ontology of encounter‖ I mean a way of thinking that seeks to articulate 
ultimate reality on the basis of the concrete experience of the event of existence, and in 
terms consonant with the philosophical category of Being.  ―Ontology‖ here retains its 
designation as a pattern of thought that not only emphasizes the philosophical category of 
Being, but interprets reality such that identity, intellection, and participation are granted 
priority.  Thus, an ontology of encounter will seek to interpret the concrete experience of 
the event of existence accordingly.   In what follows, I will treat each of these 
characteristics in turn, focusing on their roles in the work of Schleiermacher and Barth. 
An ontology of encounter is distinguished from its metaphysical counterpart in 
that the meaning of the category of Being is established on the basis of the concrete 
experience of existence, rather than speculation.  Beginning with a general analysis of 
Being in abstraction from existence is judged inappropriate and deceptive in that the 
movement from the ideal to the real can never be finally achieved.  Rather, reflection on 
reality must start from the encounter with existence, recognizing that every attempt to 
134 
 
formulate an account of the whole in abstraction from this encounter—even when 
grounded in that encounter—has cancelled its regulative status.  This also pertains to the 
speculative move from the real to the ideal, which can only achieve an ideal union of the 
two at the expense of the regulative function of the real.  In this regard, it is important to 
recognize the significance of justification not only as the site of existential encounter, but 
specifically as the sole basis for a proper ontological identification.   
For both Schleiermacher and Barth, justification is that site.  In Schleiermacher, 
this is the case because, as genuine regeneration, justification marks ―the situation of the 
individual in his transition from the corporate life of sinfulness to a living fellowship with 
Christ.‖124  Since every form of self-knowledge is corporately mediated, the only manner 
in which self-consciousness stands ―looking at itself reflected in thought and finding a 
consciousness of God included there‖ is through the mediate ―common life‖ of the Holy 
Spirit that is the divine element communicated in the church.
125
  As the grouping of 
election and Holy Spirit in the doctrine of the church clarifies, knowledge of oneself as an 
elected beneficiary of God‘s good-pleasure is bestowed by the corporate life.  It is 
through the personal, relational encounter of that corporate life that one identifies oneself 
as a justified child of God.
126
  Similarly, though Barth significantly alters 
Schleiermacher‘s ecclesiological emphasis, he nonetheless understands justification in 
terms of relational encounter.  Indeed, for Barth, justification is the objective fact of 
human identity as disclosed by the man Jesus Christ alone.
127
  Identification as a justified 
child of God occurs on the basis of one‘s relation to Jesus alone: namely, whether in faith 
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one sees oneself in him.
128
 Ecclesial life, gathered by the Holy Spirit, is then the 
expression and consequence of the faithful encounter with the man, Jesus Christ, and not 
its basis.  Justification here is a category conceived by both thinkers in wholly personal 
and relational terms, and is deployed specifically as a mode of ontological identification.   
This identification, though, is also intellectualist in character. No ontological 
change is affected in a subject because one comes to have faith in Jesus.  On the contrary, 
for both Schleiermacher and Barth, in their different ways, human standing before God is 
objective and ontological because of its grounding in election.  Justification, however, 
marks the epistemic recognition of this truth, which for both is only available through 
faith.  In Schleiermacher, as shown, this is a matter of possessing consciousness of God 
as a determination of self-knowledge, which arises as a result of the active acceptance of 
one‘s absolute dependence as conditioning the whole of life (faith).129  For Barth, the 
structure exactly corresponds to this, only its proper object is Jesus Christ rather than the 
more general state of absolute dependence.  It is because of our response in faith to the 
person of Jesus Christ alone that we know the truth of our ontological identity.  In this 
regard, justification is that existential event of personal and relational encounter in which 
is provoked a corresponding response of faith, which properly identifies us by disclosing 
the ontological truth of our election.  Barth understands that truth as coincident with Jesus 
Christ, while Schleiermacher conceives it as coincident with the divine government of the 
world.  In both instances, this is a matter of the intellectual apprehension of the 
ontological fact of election.   
                                                 
128
 Ibid., 632.  The church has an important and integral role to play here to be sure, but it is understood 
as the gathering of the faithful, rather than the basis for faith.   
129
 Note this is not self-consciousness, but self-knowledge—i.e, the thought of the self, not awareness 
as such.   
136 
 
What is disclosed is not merely proper identification of oneself according to the 
cognitive apprehension of the ontological fact of election.  Each of these cohere as a 
common participation in the covenant.  Here the difference between Schleiermacher and 
Barth is principally that of language.  What Barth speaks of explicitly in terms of 
―covenant,‖ Schleiermacher invokes under the heading of ―fellowship.‖  The meaning is 
the same for both and carries the same connotation.  What is disclosed in the justifying 
encounter that provokes faith is knowledge of oneself as a participant in the 
fellowship/covenant decreed in the ontological fact of election.  In Schleiermacher, this is 
a matter of coming to apprehend oneself within the common life of the church as 
participating in the divine/human fellowship of the Kingdom of God toward which all of 
reality is ontologically ordered.  In Barth, this is a matter of apprehending oneself as a 
participant in the divine/human covenant realized in the event of Jesus Christ to whom all 
of reality is ontologically ordered.  
This pattern repeats the basic characteristics of ontology, as discussed by Levinas, 
which has guided our investigation thus far.  This is the notion that ontology is marked by 
a perception and designation of essences (esse, ousia) as the most basic and necessary 
structures of beings (ens, ousia) in their manifestation.  And, in doing so, ontology seeks 
to express the origin of the object in its most universal sense, thus rendering the 
apprehension of difference a function of identity, and singularity a variant of 
participation.  Although Schleiermacher works with a dialectical method that precludes 
the possibility of ever adequately representing the origin of an object of thought, he 
nonetheless develops an account of the origin of subjective consciousness in its 
dependence on an ontological ground (election), which in its cancellation of subjective 
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agency determines the self-identification of that subject (justification) through its 
participation in a particular form of corporate fellowship (covenant).  The ground, 
identity, and goal disclosed in the event of encounter, then, are shown as essentially 
united in Being as the mediation and manifestation of the single divine act of 
preservation.
130
  And since this truth is not apprehended on the basis of speculative 
intellection but of a socially mediated existential event, this marks the convergence of 
identity and intellection in the disclosure of the truth as participation.    
The same must be said of Barth, though in slightly different terms.  He explicitly 
refuses to reduce the unity of creation and grace to the singular act of preservation, 
wanting to insist instead on the radical ontological consequences that follow from his 
understanding of Jesus Christ as the electing God and the elected human being.  By 
emphasizing the singularity of the human being Jesus, Barth opts instead to develop a 
more Hegelian understanding of the concrete universal.  As a result, he develops an 
account of the origin of existence in its dependence on an ontological ground (election), 
which is determines the identity of human beings (justification) through their 
participation in his fellowship with God by way of his common humanity (covenant).  
The ground, identity, and goal disclosed in the encounter is shown here as essentially 
united in Being as mediated and manifested in the singular person of Jesus of Nazareth.  
And since this truth is also not speculatively apprehended but arises from the event of 
faith in Jesus Christ, this also marks the convergence of identity and intellection in the 
disclosure of the truth of participation. This is because, when Jesus is acknowledged in 
faith such that the truth of one‘s ontological identity is subjectively appropriated, Jesus 
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Christ is simultaneously disclosed as the universal mediator of the covenantal essence 
historically unfolding in existence.
131
     
This is what it means to say that both Schleiermacher and Barth unite creation and 
redemption according to an ontology of encounter.  Each develops an account of the 
personal, relational encounter, cohering with, mediated by, and manifested in Being, as 
disclosive of the final essence of reality.  The fundamental identity of this reality is 
intellectually apprehended by way of proper participation (i.e., faith) in the event of 
relational encounter that is the final term of reference for all reality.  This has the effect of 
yielding an identity between the two terms that are related, and does so with reference to 
Being as their common term.   
Whereas the intellect was the primary and most distinguished aspect of human 
being in the nature/supernatural paradigm, participation holds that place in the sin/grace 
paradigm, and does so specifically in terms of personal relation.  This is most clearly the 
case for Schleiermacher inasmuch as intersubjective ecclesial relations mark the site 
wherein knowledge of one‘s place in God‘s eternal decree is received and actively 
appropriated.
132
  In Barth this relational emphasis is perhaps more clearly pronounced 
inasmuch as both the ordo cognoscendi and the ordo essendi are singularly personal in 
that their content is the man Jesus alone.  What is rejected in this pattern of thought is any 
immediate identity of knowing and being.  This distinction is consistent with the post-
Kantian force of each thinker.  Each insists that all knowledge is grounded in thought, 
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which requires representational mediation for the apprehension of its object.  Each insists, 
in keeping with the dialectical distinction between subject and object that is the condition 
of thought, that knowledge is only coincident with being provided a proper participatory 
relation precedes that cognitive division.  In other words, thought arises out of and 
reflects a network of relations that precede it, and only adequately correspond to that 
network when rightly aligned with it as always already a participant in it.   
This distinction between knowledge and being, as we have seen, nonetheless 
retains an important relationship with intellection as related to the matter of freedom.  
That relationship is not the same as discussed in the previous chapter, where, as the most 
proper aspect of humanity, the dynamism of the intellect was understood as coincident 
with freedom as the basis for the capacity for self-determination.  On the contrary, though 
a similar relation is at work here, because Schleiermacher and Barth understand 
intellection as determined by its participation in a relation that precedes its execution, 
freedom is not to be associated with the capacity to follow thought, but rather with that 
unobjectifiable aspect of the mind that is the condition of possibility for thought.
133
  
Freedom arises out of what evades objectification, even to itself.  Rather than simply 
conceiving freedom as a capacity for self-determination in relation to a good designated 
by the intellect, this approach takes shape as a more primal indeterminacy.  Once again, 
as with the previous chapter, the nature of this capacity for self-determination must be 
understood in relation to what both thinkers mean by the will.   
This can most readily be seen in Schleiermacher‘s Dialectic.  As noted above, 
Schleiermacher understands thought to arise out of the mutual determination of the 
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organic (objective) and intellectual (subjective) functions of the embodied human being, 
and thinks of those functions as equally active and passive according to the perspective 
from which they are viewed.  While the intellectual function is most properly a 
spontaneous will-to-know, such willing is purely potential unless activated by 
sensibility.
134
  Likewise, the presentations supplied by the activity of the organic function 
are mere chaos without the conceptual ordering supplied by the spontaneous activity of 
the intellectual function.
135
   When considered in itself, apart from organic determination, 
thought is most fundamentally a spontaneous will-to-thought, wholly unaffected by 
being.  This is not thought, but rather its active ground.  Insofar as it is unaffected, this 
will-to-know is wholly indeterminate and cannot act apart from the determination 
supplied by sensibility.
136
 
Schleiermacher has two distinct notions of will here.  Similar to Scotus‘ pure self-
moving potency, he thinks of the sheer capacity of the will in terms of a radical 
indifference associated with the unobjectifiable spontaneous impulse of subjective 
thought.
137
  Yet, in recognizing this spontaneity as purely formal,
138
 Schleiermacher 
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develops a concomitant notion wholly consonant with Aquinas‘ position of intellectual 
appetite.
139
  Jacqueline Mariña has argued convincingly that these two positions are 
finally irreconcilable.
140
  The point for Schleiermacher, however, according to Mariña, is 
that each is irreducibly a matter of individuality insofar as they are tied to subjectivity.
141
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 The difficulty in Schleiermacher‘s vision, with regard to the larger argument I am developing in this 
dissertation, is that, though he has made a real advance over the modern understanding of freedom he has 
received from late-Scholasticism, he has not successfully broken with it.  He continues to be linked with an 
understanding of the spontaneity of the self that is ultimately Scotist in origin, and does not recognize the 
passivity of the first act of form.  Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, 39 n. 126.   
142 
 
Spontaneous subjectivity arises directly from the immediate dependence of the self on 
God, even as it arises from and is delimited by the world of contrasts to which it is 
necessarily bound.  The subject, thus, exercises her freedom within those delimitations to 
actively contribute to the intersubjective social world of which she is part, and in which 
she is rendered an object of knowledge for herself.   While the spontaneity of self-
consciousness is immediate, self-determination, like self-knowledge, is mediate and 
intersubjective.
142
   
Barth‘s position is much less abstractly conceived, tied as it is directly to 
dogmatics.  The question of freedom is not principally an anthropological problem, 
except insofar as humanity is first understood as God‘s covenant partner.  Freedom can 
only be specified as the negation or affirmation of this most fundamental of relations.
143
  
Nonetheless, the anthropological vision Barth develops is one in which the human being 
                                                 
142
 Mariña, Transformation of the Self, 109-45.  As Mariña insists, intersubjective dialogue is the 
domain in which freedom is manifested for Schleiermacher, specifically as a subjective phenomenon, 
which is delimited by other subjects and therefore ethically determined.  She also notes that this is 
inseparable from the notion of individuality that is inseperable from the embodied particularity of the other.  
If the agent is solely a confluence of extrinsic, objective forces, this amounts to the absence of all agency 
(Mariña, Transformation of the Self, 136-37.)  Furthermore, she notes that individuality is central to 
Schleiermacher‘s account of freedom because it is through the individual that the divine activity is 
manifested in such a way as to be known, not conceptually, but ethically insofar as a free individual refracts 
the divine activity in her very ―limitations‖ (Mariña, Transformation of the Self, 138.)  I have found 
Mariña‘s analysis on this point in Schleiermacher particularly inspiring, which in combination with 
Lamm‘s analysis is of ―dialogical-dialectic‖ (see n. 15 above), have influenced aspects of my own 
constructive proposal in Chapter Six.  
143
 The kind of freedom of the will I am pointing to here does not stand in contradiction to John 
Webster‘s claim that Barth‘s understanding of freedom is essentialist, and therefore opposed to Sartre‘s. 
See John Webster, Barth's Ethics of Reconciliation (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), 224-25.  As Webster notes, Barth‘s position is like Luther‘s in that it implies that ―moral selfhood is 
derived from, and intimately bound to, a source external to the self, and that the severing of that bond leads 
to incalculable moral losses.‖ (225.)  The difference is, as I have pointed out, that this external relation is 
only epistemically ―external‖ for Barth, because it is ontological.  Jesus Christ is the ontological basis and 
ground of the covenant, epistemic acknowledgment of which makes possible the creature‘s act of genuine 
freedom.  Webster is right to insist that the model here is that of Augustinian-Calvinism, and that Barth is 
specifically working toward a vision opposed to the notion of the will‘s freedom conceived of as 
indifference, but it is an entirely different matter whether this coheres with his account of the creaturely 
response does not presuppose a Cartesian structure, if not ontology.  Luther is more complex on the matter, 
but retains the notion of a real ontological transformation grounded in an external encounter.   
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is ensnared by her own desires specifically insofar as she is unable to designate her 
properly liberating epistemic object.
144
  Second, this relationship is tied to Barth‘s 
discussion of the Word of God.  In what is clearly an account consonant with Lubac, 
Barth insists that the encounter with the Word of God is not a matter of an abstract 
capacity, which he links explicitly to a Cartesian dualism.
145
  Rather, the concern is with 
the concrete historical and material encounter with the reality of the event of the Word of 
God that alone gives knowledge of God.
146
  Such knowledge then becomes a 
―determination of the existence of the person who has the knowledge.‖147  In this way, as 
Mangina notes, no conceptual mediation of the event of encounter is possible apart from 
participation in it.
148
  Mangina argues that the self-determining freedom arising from this 
event is the very positive self-determination of the creature.
149
  This is what allows Barth 
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to speak of the reception of the Word in the event as a very concrete and ethical matter of 
obedience or disobedience.
150
  The fundamental orientation of the human being is only 
properly oriented by God once it is determined by the reception of the Word of God, 
which is an epistemically mediated determination of the ―whole man.‖151  These are 
likewise self-determinations precisely because they involve the mediating presentation of 
the proper object of determination to the basic human capacity for self-determination. In 
this respect, the fundamental assumption at work is Cartesian as opposed to Platonic.
152
  
The model is clearly that of undomesticated desires awaiting their proper intellectual 
determination. 
The key here is to recognize that this leads Barth and Schleiermacher to adopt 
precisely the same position as Lubac and Rahner with regard to the relationship of 
intellect and will, but for reasons that are precisely the obverse of their account.  I showed 
in the previous chapter that Lubac and Rahner work with an ambiguous Platonic notion 
of the will that allows for an imprecise conflation of will and intellect.  This presumed 
that the will was simply proportionate to will the attainment of the good properly 
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specified the intellect.  Schleiermacher and Barth, by contrast, operate with essentially 
Cartesian assumptions in which the intellect serves as the rational legislator for the will‘s 
otherwise infinite potentiality.
153
  Once this pure potentiality is properly determined by 
the intellect, the will is understood to be—as presumed infinite—proportionate to its 
operation.
154
  If the mistake of the previous paradigm was to assume that the will is 
capable of doing what the intellect specifies as its good, the mistake here is to assume, as 
Kant declares, that an ‗ought‘ implies a ‗can.‘  Each implies a correspondence between 
thought and action, but reverses the priority of the terms.  Intellection, just as before, 
mediates the production of the act in and through the representation.  
Here we encounter the most important problem with both of these accounts of the 
unity of creation and grace.  Note that neither thinker commits the error of the previous 
scheme, which effectively reduced grace to creation by rendering it, in different ways, an 
integral aspect of the created order.  Rather, Schleiermacher and Barth commit the 
opposite error, namely, that of reducing the doctrine of creation to a refracted dimension 
of the bestowal of grace.  Schleiermacher does this by rendering creation coextensive 
with the preservation and governance of the whole of reality as the expression of the 
eternal decree of God‘s election, which simply is the bestowal of grace.  Barth does this 
by understanding creation as the historical unfolding of the covenantal essence of God‘s 
decree to bless humanity in and as Jesus Christ.  Both are seeking to unite creation and 
grace according to God‘s primordial decree of election, which is the ground for the 
unfolding of the entire world order as the recipient of the grace of God‘s offer of 
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redemption and fellowship.  Much as with the previous chapter, the two have merely 
occluded the problem.  What both thinkers have overlooked is the theological 
problematic for which God‘s decree of election is the response is not merely that of an 
inability to properly identify and thereby know the ontological status of the world.  On 
the contrary, precisely by emphasizing the participatory (i.e., personal, relational) aspect 
of reality that precedes the intellectual identification of essences, the doctrine of election 
designated the means whereby an individual was enabled not simply to know, but to will 
her redemption.  Once again, the problem is an evasion of the importance of grace as a 
stimulus for the will to act beyond its capacity.    
   
The Nature of the Will, Dialectics, and Redemption 
In the opening of the discussion of Schleiermacher above, I noted that Luther‘s 
early critique of Scholastic theology centers on a rejection of traditional caritas 
soteriology as coupled with Aristotelian habitus.  I noted that this was due to two distinct 
but intimately interwoven concerns regarding the Scholastic understanding of the will 
and the intellect. Specifically, Luther rejected the will‘s unaided capacity to perform the 
good and linked that inability to speculative dialectics.  In this respect, Luther‘s assertion 
should be understood as both a return to Aquinas in the midst of late-Scholasticism and a 
very important advance beyond him in the analysis of willing.  For what Luther 
discovered most clearly was the irreducibly relational character of the will in its 
operation, even as it functions as an intellectual appetite.  The proper ordering of the will 
is not simply a matter of the presence or absence of a grace, conceived as either a formal 
or material aspect of being, but as a decidedly qualitative character of relation.  Such 
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emphasis on the limits of the will and its relational aspect has important implications for 
the post-Kantian context of both Schleiermacher‘s and Barth‘s work.   
As Jacqueline Mariña has shown in detail, recovery of aspects of Luther‘s initial 
insight became central to Schleiermacher‘s early critique of Kantian practical reason.155  
His concern is to reconcile the contradiction in Kant‘s intellectualist account of moral 
law: namely, how a purely intellectual principle could serve as motive for the will if the 
basis for performance was the transcendental freedom of the subject.  As motive the 
moral law must affect desire through sensation, and yet as rational it must result from 
subjective spontaneity.
156
  Mariña shows that Schleiermacher‘s initial attempts to develop 
a compatibalism fail precisely insofar as they reveal the irreducible significance of the 
individual in all moral action.
157
   That discovery was of enormous significance for 
Schleiermacher precisely because of what it revealed about the inability of a universalist 
reason to account for the ―higher existence‖ of moral individuality.158  As morality is 
inextricably bound to individuality, it cannot lie solely within the province of reason, 
with free transcendental subjectivity, as Kant had thought.  This does not mean, however, 
that rational universal morality is vitiated.  Rather, it points to individuality as a ―higher 
existence‖ in which the transcendental self stands in immediate relation to the infinite and 
eternal ground of all existents, individuating persons precisely in their limitations.
159
  The 
point here is twofold.  On the one hand, the self is individuated by her limitations in that, 
though she is immediately aware of herself, she only knows herself in the world of 
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objects.  On the other hand, this is important because she stands in the world as an 
irreducibly unique expression of the divine decree—an irreducible singularity in which 
that decree becomes knowable to herself and others.
160
 
This sheds immense light on the corporate dimension of both sin and grace for 
Schleiermacher, since insofar as the self emerges in a world that refracts human 
alienation it does not properly know itself as an expression of God‘s self-
communication.
161
 Attendance to the universal, then, is for Schleiermacher inseparable 
from the individual precisely because the infinite is only properly refracted in the 
specificity of the individual.
162
  This involves the necessary recognition, in Mariña‘s 
words, of the ―perspectival character of all knowledge and of individual apprehensions of 
the world‖ the acknowledgment of which serves as the basis upon which all ―true moral 
development is possible.‖163  This is love, according to Schleiermacher: individuals 
reflecting not their own spontaneous desires in contrastive opposition to one another, but 
rather the infinite ground on which they are absolutely dependent as their common share. 
This aspect of Schleiermacher‘s thought also illuminates on the nature of Barth‘s 
concerns with his project.  For it would appear that Schleiermacher has here invoked a 
purely formal ontological structure that, despite his claims for the unique role of Jesus as 
the Redeemer, is at least in principle accessible apart from him and of which Jesus 
himself is but a particular example.  Barth is surely correct to oppose this, and to do so on 
Schleiermacher‘s own terms.  For, if the refracted dimension of the universal divine 
decree is inaccessible apart from individuality, and if consciousness of that fact is, as 
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 Ibid., 139. 
161
 DeVries and Gerrish, "Providence and Grace: Schleiermacher on Justification and Election," 189-
207. 
162
 See Mariña, Transformation of the Self, 140-41. 
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Schleiermacher declares, wholly due to the Redeemer, then the content of the universal 
decree must be Jesus Christ himself.
164
  What is more, it is only within and because of 
our recognition of the absolute individuality (i.e., Lordship) of Jesus that the universal 
and irreducible significance of every individual is reflected. 
  The difficulty here is that Barth‘s opposition to Schleiermacher runs so deep that 
it blinds him to the importance of this point in Schleiermacher.
165
  Had he seen it, he 
could have avoided many of his more exaggerated indictments of Schleiermacher and 
natural theology, and been able to more clearly isolate their shortcomings.  But the 
problem is more complex even than this.  Barth‘s own preoccupation with securing 
knowledge of God led him to interpret his own best insight into the singular importance 
of Jesus Christ in terms of the universality of Hegelian conceptual mediation (i.e., the 
concrete universal.)
166
  In doing so, Barth adopts a speculative dialectics that is an 
effective reversion from his Reformation heritage in that it renders him vulnerable to at 
least part of Luther‘s critique.167  Barth appears never to have recognized or appreciated 
                                                 
164
 See Kerr, Christ, History, and Apocalyptic: The Politics of Christian Mission.  My own ideas on 
this point have developed in conversation with him, but are also indebted to my reading of Luther‘s 
discussion of the interrelationship between works, kenosis, and service of the neighbor in On Two Kinds of 
Righteousness (particularly his epigraph, which is Philipians 2:6.)  See Luther, Martin Luther's Basic 
Theological Writings, 155. 
165
 This is significant precisely because Schleiermacher‘s approach exactly corresponds to 
Bonhoeffer‘s thesis in Sanctorum Communio.  Bonhoeffer himself, as well as Protestant liberal theology at 
the time, appears to have been unaware of this fact.  Perhaps the difficulties lay with the complexities of 
Schleiermacher‘s analysis of self-consciousness, which Barth does not show clear evidence of ever clearly 
apprehending.     
166
 This way of framing Barth‘s discussion of Jesus in terms of a ―concrete universal‖ is indebted to 
Kerr, Christ, History, and Apocalyptic: The Politics of Christian Mission, 86-87.  This is the opposite 
opinion as that drawn by McCormack, Orthodox and Modern: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth., 187.   
167
 And, interestingly enough, this would appear to make him guilty of ―natural theology.‖   
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the extent to which Schleiermacher‘s project preserved the Lutheran insight into the 
limits of human knowing, which the dialectical method was meant to put into relief.
168
 
The difficulty that arises here for both thinkers is tied to their incomplete 
appropriation of Luther‘s expansion of the analysis of the will.  As we have seen, 
Schleiermacher‘s basic understanding of the will, tied as it is to the unobjectifiability of 
individual subjectivity, is correlative with Scotus‘ appeal to indifference.  The will, for 
Schleiermacher, is then an infinite potentiality that must be determinately specified and 
directed by the intellect.  What Schleiermacher corrects in Scotus by recognizing that this 
potentiality is purely formal and empty (rather than as a power of self-motion) is 
incomplete in that he continues to view this in terms of spontaneity.
169
  This leads him to 
assume that, following proper specification of its object by the intellect, the will is always 
already poised simply to will the attainment of that object.  This same assumption is 
responsible for his claim that what is disclosed is a more general ontological structure in 
which the will is simply rendered transparent.  The same is true of Barth, and not in such 
remarkably different terms as is often thought.  Indeed, Barth repeats this very structure, 
only conceives Jesus Christ as both the epistemic object and the ontological essence.  The 
result is, as Kerr has shown, a formulation wholly consonant with Hegel‘s ―concrete 
universal.‖170  The importance of this comes most fully into view when it is recalled that 
Hegel‘s project was conceived as the elevation of Cartesian subjectivity to the level of 
substance.  The problem is, then, that each has failed to attend adequately to Luther‘s 
                                                 
168
 Barth always had an uneasy alliance with this aspect of his Protestant heritage.  Even Romans I, 
which appears content merely to designate God as the ―absence‖ of God, still operates according to an 
essentially Hegelian formula – one that returns later, as I have pointed out here, in his doctrine of creation, 
and, as widely recognized, in his Christology.   
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 See Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, 39 n. 126. 
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151 
 
critique of Scholastic theology, thereby repeating its failures.  Schleiermacher, in fact, 
preserves more of that heritage in that he insists on retaining a non-speculative dialectical 
structure for thought, but continue to presume that the a willing capable of following 
―whatever is prescribed.‖  Barth, by contrast, is guilty of both—and this precisely 
because of his Hegelianism.  Each thinker fails, then, to do what Luther could, which was 
to retain (or recover) the full significance of Aquinas‘ insight into the natural limitations 
of the will.   
As I will show in the following chapters, the answer to this difficulty will lie in 
bringing Barth‘s insight into the singular uniqueness of Jesus to bear upon 
Schleiermacher‘s insights into what Lamm has designated as Schleiermacher‘s 
necessarily ―dialogical-dialectic‖ structure of thought, while retaining the Aquinas-Luther 
insight into the limitations of the will.  As should be now coming into relief, this is 
hindered by the tendency to render the best of these insights in terms of a fundamental 
ontology.  The answer to this, as I will argue in Chapters Five and Six, is to come fully to 
grips with the genuinely ethical implications of these three insights in Aquinas, 
Schleiermacher, and Barth: namely, affirming the ethical structure of Being in a manner 
irreducible to ontology, yet in conjunction with the metaphysics of the will.  Before this 
argument is advanced, however, I shall have to investigate Augustine‘s work in some 
detail.  It is he who stands as the source of these different trajectories of thought, both the 
deadlock and the resolution.      
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CHAPTER IV 
  
THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF A PROBLEMATIC: THE ROLE OF 
AUGUSTINE 
 
Introduction 
This chapter marks the turning point in the dissertation.  The previous two 
chapters have isolated the primary paradigms in Christian theology for uniting creation 
and grace.  The first, the Roman Catholic paradigm of nature and the supernatural, 
conceives that unity according to the contours of a metaphysical ontology in which the 
whole of reality is represented in accordance with the priority of identity, intellection, and 
participation that characterizes the philosophical category of Being. The Roman Catholic 
paradigm understands Being principally as the final and most complete term to which the 
dynamism of speculative intellection is oriented.  The drive to know is the distinguishing 
mark of humanity as the image of God.  Upon Aquinas‘ conception, the will is integral to 
this structure in that, as an intellectual appetite, it is the faculty whereby a good is 
attained.  Thus, just as the intellect requires revelation to apprehend God beyond its 
natural capacities, so does the will require the infused habit of charity whereby to attain 
God as its good.    
The second, the Protestant paradigm of sin and grace, is also ontological in 
precisely this sense, but eschews the speculative approach to Being, favoring instead the 
category of encounter as alone adequate to the essence of reality.  Under the Protestant 
model, where speculative intellection is taken as ontologically exemplary, it follows a 
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logic that is not only metaphysically flawed in its orientation toward a conceptually 
mediated union of the ideal and the real, but is as such coincident with the formal 
mechanics of sin.  The unity of the ideal and the real cannot be attained, it asserts, but 
rather must be presupposed.  Being is therefore only first encountered in an event that 
disrupts the negative structure of determination by which speculative intellection 
proceeds, and on that basis alone discloses its absolute priority over all thought.  This 
critique shares with Aquinas an account of the will as limited in its capacity to follow the 
intellect and in his assertion of the need for divine aid, but elaborates on that account to 
show how the will‘s act of self-determination, when considered apart from the divine 
initiative, is fundamentally sinful in its seeking after fulfillment in and through that 
determination.  This claim is then linked directly to and used to indict the account of 
reality yielded by speculative metaphysics.     
I have not only been tracing the differences between these two paradigms, but 
have sought to illuminate the vexed relationships of different accounts of those 
paradigms.  Henri de Lubac and Karl Rahner are representative of the nature/supernatural 
paradigm, both of whom understand the dynamism of the speculative intellect as a unique 
manifestation of the implicit presence of grace in creation, propelling toward its goal of 
union with God.  De Lubac maintains an essentially ontological interpretation of this 
dynamism, insisting on its intrinsic relationship to creation.  Rahner, by contrast, 
understands grace as transcendental distinction within the one created order wherein all 
of experience is concretely graced.  Both interpretations are woven around an ambiguous 
Platonic notion of the will that obviates Aquinas‘ insight regarding its impotence.  On 
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this account, both fail ultimately to achieve, much less maintain, a real distinction 
between grace and creation.   
In the case of the sin/grace paradigm, Friedrich Schleiermacher and Karl Barth 
are representative.  Both maintain the characteristically Protestant critique of speculative 
intellection, and do so such that divine election alone is the basis for the union of creation 
and grace.  Schleiermacher paved the way for this account by reinterpreting the 
traditional Reformed doctrine as a single decree of divine self-communication coincident 
with God‘s preservation of finite existence.  Barth also developed a single decree, but 
insisted that it pertained solely to Jesus Christ, and through him to existence as a whole.  
The former understands the whole of existence as ordered toward the triumph of the 
Kingdom of God in and through the Church, and the latter toward the arrival of Jesus 
Christ.  Both accounts are united in their adherence to a Scotist account of the will, which 
is merely the obverse of the Platonic notion of the Roman Catholic paradigm.  There will 
is here thought of as an infinite power that receives its definite specification by the 
intellect.  Premised as it is on an inversion of the ontological account of creation and 
grace in the nature/supernatural model, the sin/grace model here commits the opposite 
mistake of conflating creation with grace.   
In this chapter I reach the bedrock strata of my archaeology.  Chapters Two and 
Three have uncovered the interwoven concerns of will and ontology in the dominant 
accounts of the unity of creation and grace.  Together, these chapters show an inner 
tension between a theological vision that would unite these two doctrines in terms of a 
―metaphysical ontology‖ and that of an ―ontology of encounter.‖  What the former 
achieves with regard to a unified vision is bought at the expense of a coherent account of 
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grace, and what the latter corrects in this regard ultimately renders creation merely a 
refracted abstraction from the experience of grace.  I have focused on the will in these 
two chapters since it is around this category that these problems come most clearly into 
view.  This chapter is devoted to showing how these two paradigms and their attendant 
difficulties arise out of the work of Augustine as he struggles to articulate the nature of 
the will in relation to his attempt to uphold the categories of metaphysics and encounter.     
My argument is straightforward.  I will carry each of the analyses of will and 
ontology forward by situating the tension between the two paradigms and the conflicts 
within them in relation to a broader conflict of the Christian imagination regarding the 
relationship between knowledge and ethics, the true and the good.
1
  I argue that this is a 
conflict that comes to light first in Augustine, whose writings mark the inauguration of 
these two distinct and antagonistic ontological visions within the Western Christian 
theological imagination, the one founded on the priority of the intellect and the other on 
that of the act.
2
  I argue that the lineaments for both paradigms are not only present in his 
body of work as it unfolds over the course of his career, but arise specifically out of his 
own unsuccessful attempts to achieve a comprehensive union of his doctrines of creation 
and grace, despite establishing the definite Western accounts of each.  Bringing this to 
light will involve close attention to the Augustine‘s genetic development.3  In his critique 
                                                 
1
 Note that, although this concern plays out as an occlusion of ethics by ontology, this conflict concerns 
the nature of the relationship between truth and goodness.   
2
 I am not suggesting that Augustine is responsible for the trouble caused by the difference between 
being and act, and the one and the many in Christian thought.  These are much more ancient philosophical 
problems.  My argument is simply that Augustine develops both characteristic patterns of thought in his 
body of work, and never being able to solve them himself, bequeathed the conflict to Western Christian 
theology.    
3
 This stands in conflict with Michael Hanby‘s suggestion that the divergences in Augustine‘s thought 
are best conceived according to the ontology in which they most properly cohere—that ontology being 
given, according to him, in The Trinity.  Aside from the obvious point that The Trinity is itself not a 
coherent work, this is to overlook the importance for interpretation that that Augustine‘s development 
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of Manichean metaphysics, Augustine establishes a grammar for the theology of creation 
in which the relationship between divine sovereignty, goodness, and the will (understood 
as free self determination) are mutual and irreducible. Of decisive importance here is that 
Augustine‘s ambiguous, Platonic conception of the will requires him to conceive the 
divine simplicity, upon which this irreducibility is based, as an immutable self-presence 
achieved through absolute self-determination.  This position becomes problematic when 
developments in his understanding of election force him to revise his idea of finite self-
determination in order to sustain his understanding of divine immutability.  He never 
successfully retrieves the elegant grammatical convergence of sovereignty, goodness, 
will, and creation of the earlier position.  Instead, two irreconcilable paths are opened: 
one ordered to the metaphysical concerns of the early position and the other to the taking 
its orientation by the focus on encounter characteristic of the theology of grace.  These 
are the Roman Catholic and Protestant paradigms in nuce, respectively.     
Throughout my analysis of this development, I am concomitantly noting that 
Augustine is engaged in a struggle to ―invent‖4 the notion of the will as a faculty distinct 
from the intellect and desire, and which is ordered to the good specifically.
5
  It is the 
absence of a clear concept of the will and his implicit reliance on the ambiguous notion of 
                                                                                                                                                 
represents.  It is a mistake to presume to draw Augustine‘s thought into a coherent approach, as Hanby 
does, and espeically without attending to the problems he encountered in his genetic development.  See 
Michael Hanby, Augustine and Modernity, Radical Orthodoxy Series (New York: Routledge, 2003).  This 
also applies to the argument in Carol Harrison, Rethinking Augustine's Early Theology: An Argument for 
Continuity (New York: Oxford University, 2006). 
4
 James Wetzel, Augustine and the Limits of Virtue (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 3. 
5
 In this regard, I follow Dihle, Kahn, Sorabji, and to an extent Wetzel.  See Albrecht Dihle, The 
Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity, Sather Classical Lectures ; (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1982).  Charles Kahn, "Discovering the Will: From Aristotle to Aquinas," in The Question Of "Eclecticism" 
: Studies in Later Greek Philosophy, ed. John M. Dillon and A. A. Long (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1988), 234-59.  Richard Sorabji, "The Concept of the Will from Plato to Maximus the 
Confessor," in The Will in Human Action: From Antiquity to the Present Day, ed. Thomas Pink and M. W. 
F. Stone (New York: Routledge, 2004).  Wetzel, Augustine and the Limits of Virtue. 
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self-determination that is responsible, I argue, for opening up a double bind between 
sustaining God‘s immutability on the one hand, and human freedom on the other.  In this 
regard, Augustine functions as something of a ―pure test case‖ in which the recognize the 
conflict between the two paradigms as a dispute over the two facets necessary for a 
complete notion of the will: namely, a formal distinction from the intellect and desire, 
and a specification of its content as ordered to the good.  This claim will provide the 
groundwork for a constructive argument for further specifying the nature of the later in 
the following chapter.            
 
The Grammar of Augustine’s Theology of Creation 
Never mistake motion for action. 
 
—Ernest Hemingway to Ava Gardener 
 
Creatio ex nihilo: Sovereignty, Goodness, and Immutability 
Gerhard May has shown that the basic outline for the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo 
first fully appeared in the work of Basilides in the second century, where it arose as a 
direct result of his attempt to unite the highest god of Gnosticism with the sovereign God 
of the Hebrews.
6
  Basilides‘ primary concern was to articulate the basis for understanding 
the ―world-seed‖ as resulting from a single divine act.7  The resulting synthesis of 
Hellenistic metaphysics and Hebraic history would subsequently shape the unfolding of 
that doctrine a generation later in Irenaeus, Tatian, and Tertullian.
8
  But it was 
                                                 
6
 See Gerhard May, Creatio Ex Nihilo: The Doctrine of 'Creation out of Nothing' in Early Christian 
Thought, trans. A. S. Worrall (New York: T & T Clark, 2004), 62-84 and 179-80.  
7
 Ibid., 68, 71-73, and 179-80.   
8
 Ibid., 148-78. 
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specifically Augustine who realized the full implications of this affirmation, drawing 
together its various influences into a single whole.   
Those implications are brought most fully to view in his early anti-Manichean 
writings.  By framing his argument against them as a rejection of dualism, Augustine 
develops the idea of creatio ex nihilo well beyond Basilides, whose concern—in terms 
largely consistent with Gnosticism—was to isolate the first and supreme principle of 
reality.
9
  Yet, although Augustine‘s rejection of dualism would become an integral focus 
of the Western tradition‘s appropriation of his argument, it is his rationale for that 
conclusion that is most important for my analysis.
10
  Principally, I am concerned with the 
roles played by the attributes of sovereignty and goodness, and specifically their often 
unrecognized convertibility in his argument.
11
  Together, sovereignty and goodness 
establish a grammar for creatio ex nihilo that would remain determinative throughout 
Augustine‘s body of theological work. 
The most important and well-known aspect of that grammar is its contestation of 
any notion of an essentially evil materiality. Manichean metaphysics insisted that matter 
was to be contrasted with God, who was immutable and therefore to be distinguished 
from the corruptions and sufferings inherent to mutable materiality.  Because the soul had 
fallen away from God and become ensnared in this matter, salvation lay in deliverance 
from corruption and a return to God.
12
  In making his case against this view, Augustine 
                                                 
9
 Ibid., 74-76. 
10
 Indeed, Valentinian Gnosticism appears to have rejected two ultimate principles, while having no 
particular concern to reject the logic of dualism.  See Ibid., 85-117.   
11
 See the discusion in Harrison, Rethinking Augustine's Early Theology, 74-114.  Harrison does not 
use the language of sovereignty, but of absolute dependence.  She deftly draws out the connection between 
the two, however.   
12
 Manichaeism understood the soul to be an originally divine element trapped now in an evil 
materiality.  See Against Fortunatus 19-22.   
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seeks to exploit their understanding of immutability.
13
  His debate with Fortunatus shows 
this most clearly.  Probing as to why God needed to delimit the contrary nature of 
materiality, Augustine asks whether the Manichean assumption was that God was subject 
to injury.  Upon Fortunatus‘ response that this is impossible, Augustine argues that this 
requires that there be no contrary nature at all, lest God be pressed by necessity and 
mutable.
14
  Two ultimate principles would be mutually and reflectively conditioned by 
one another, in just the negative sense discussed in the previous chapter.  Matter, then, 
cannot be essentially evil because consistent understanding of God‘s immutability 
requires that nothing stand in absolute opposition to God.    
This implies a convertible relationship between sovereignty and goodness, as it 
points directly to creatio ex nihilo.
15
  If some ―unrestrained‖ domain of existence is 
affirmed in opposition to God, the problem is not only that this domain must be thought 
to ‗move‘ or affect an immutable God, but that this domain of existence is likewise 
unconditioned by God, lying somehow outside divine influence.
16
  Consequently, God 
                                                 
13
While I depart from his interpretation in many important ways, my discussion of the relationship 
between sovereignty, goodness, the will, and creation out of nothing owes much to the reading given in 
Rowan Williams, "Creation," in Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. O.S.A Allan D. 
Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 251-54.  See also n. 16 below.   
14
 See Against Fortunatus, 23-47.   
15
 See On the Catholic Way of Life and the Manichean Way of Life, 2.3, 5, 7; Two Souls, 1-3; Against 
Fortunatus,23-47; The Nature of the Good, I.1-3, 6, 12, 18-19; Confessions V.20-21, VII.17-27. 
16
 See Williams, "Creation," 251-52.  As mentioned in n. 13, I am indebted to Williams for first 
alerting me to the close interconnection of sovereignty, goodness, agency, and creatio ex nihilo in 
Augustine‘s thought.  However, it is on this point that I depart from him most sharply in my interpretation.  
Williams interprets Augustine‘s early discussion of ―formlessness‖ during the anti-Manichean period 
(particularly in On Faith and the Creed 2.2 [393 CE]) as anticipating the position of the Literal 
Commentary on Genesis by making a distinction between that whose ―mode of existence is one of potential 
for structured reality‖ and that whose mode is the ―realization of structures‖ (252).  This distinction allows 
Williams to interpret creatio ex nihilo of the early period in continuity with the Literal Commentary as ―the 
setting in being of a living system destined to grow toward beauty and order, even if this beauty and order 
is not at any given moment fully apparent‖ (ibid).  Williams thus sees a convergence with Augustine‘s 
doctrine of predestination on this front, but nonetheless allows, through the mediating quality of the 
rationes seminales (discussed below), that ―creation is completed simultaneously…and yet there is a real 
history of interaction between creator and creation‖ (ibid).  Closer attention to the development of 
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must be understood as conditioning the entirety of existence—that is, to be its sovereign.  
No aspect of God‘s governance stands opposed to finite existents because all that is 
mutable stands in absolute dependence upon this single creative act.
17
  It is this latter 
affirmation that is the basis for Augustine‘s contention that mutable, material reality is 
good in itself.  This is a goodness that is ascribed not merely by virtue of existence, but 
which extends precisely to that reality in its mutability.
18
  Though it is not a perfect 
realization of goodness, materiality is nonetheless a relative manifestation of its 
absoluteness.
19
  It is not juxtaposed to the unchangeable, but rather grounded in and 
governed by it.
20
  Evil is then not only non-existent in that it has no positive ontological 
status, but all of reality is actually good by virtue of being conditioned by God.
21
  
Augustine‘s argument entails that there can be no affirmation of finite goodness that is 
not grounded in God‘s sovereignty, just as the affirmation of God‘s sovereignty is 
                                                                                                                                                 
Augustine‘s mature theology of grace calls this interpretation into question in that the development 
involves an increasing emphasis on the absolute priority of the divine initiative in the ordering of created 
reality.  This is necessary to account for the interior, operative grace on the will that develops after the 
Donatist controversy (ca. 411.)  Whatever truth there may be to this invocation of a ―living system,‖ it is 
markedly different between the two periods—and in such a way that a real ―history of interaction between 
creator and creation‖ may be affirmed but is not coherently conceived.  This is a particularly important 
point to underscore because this very distinction between ―potential for structured reality‖ is precisely the 
notion of materiality in Plotinus that Augustine‘s creatio ex nihilo is refuting.  Absence of form and 
indeterminacy both amount to the same thing in that both are negatively determined.  As pure potentiality 
for determination, Plotinian matter is yet tantamount to Manichean matter. 
17
 In this sense, it is somewhat ironic that Schleiermacher‘s reason for refusing creatio ex nihilo 
corresponds here to Augustine‘s affirmation of it.   
18
 See Confessions VII.16-21.  
19
 Where the Plotinian structure saw a proportionate increase in goodness the further one ascended up 
the hierarchy in the direction of the One, Augustine was able to conceive of a mutable creation that was 
good as such, by virtue simply of its existence.  See On the Nature of the Good, I.5-12.  
20
 See On the Nature of the Good, I.5-12; Teaching Christianity I.34-35; On Genesis: A Refutation of 
the Manichees, I.32; Literal Commentary on Genesis, VIII.31-32; The Trinity VIII.5, XI.8 
21
 Soliloquies I.2; On the Catholic Way of Life, II.4; The Two Souls, 8, 12; Against Fortunatas, 18-21; 
Conf. VII.18-19; On Genesis: A Refutation of the Manichees, II.43. 
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coincident with God‘s absolute goodness.22  Any deviation from this correlation, 
Augustine recognizes, is fundamentally premised on Manichean assumptions.
23
   
On the whole, this point marks a development of the Plotinian rejection of 
Gnostic dualism.
24
  But, Augustine significantly develops its implications in placing such 
a prominent emphasis on the sovereignty of God‘s agency as it is connected with the act 
of creating out of nothing.  In developing this line of thought, Augustine is in part 
working out the Hebraic influence Basilides brought to bear upon the Hellenistic 
emanationist scheme inherited from Plato.
25
  For, while Plotinian emanationism could 
conceive the omnipresence of the One so as to have an equally comprehensive vision of 
the divine influence on finite reality, it lacked any account of the agential governance at 
the inception of reality that Augustine recognizes as essential to creatio ex nihilo.
26
  
Sovereignty demands that nothing at all precedes or is presupposed by God‘s creative 
agency, and it is only such an account that is sufficient to secure the goodness of material 
reality.
27
  Even the most positive anti-dualism of Plotinus failed to achieve this.
28
  Indeed, 
as Augustine notes, by placing an absolutely formless matter at the end of the series of 
descending emanations, Plotinus had inadvertently posited a dialectical opposite for the 
One—some formless ―thing‖ at the furthest oppositional remove from divinity.29  
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 See On Free Choice II.41-46, III.76 and The Trinity, VIII.5 
23
 See On Genesis, I.32.   
24
 See Bourke, Will in Western Thought, 193-97. 
25
 See May, Creatio Ex Nihilo.  On the role of sovereignty in Augustine‘s argument, see On Free 
Choice II.41-46, III.76.  Particular attention must be paid to the role of justice in this argument.  That the 
references to order, number, and justice should be read as pertaining to the divine providence over reality is 
clear in On Order 1.1.1-2 and especially On the Nature of the Good, I.5-12. 
26
 This emphasis on agency was integral to the Hebrew notion of sovereignty—especially with its 
covenantal history from the Exodus forward.  On this in relationship to Basilides, see Ibid., 62-84.     
27
 See On Genesis II.43.   
28
 See On Genesis, I.4, 6-11.   Confessions VII.16-27 and XII.6-16.   
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 See On the Nature of the Good, 3-5 and 18; Confessions XII.1-6; On Genesis, I.10-12; Literal 
Commentary, I.2, 9, 28-30, V.12-16.   In equating formlessness and nothingness, Augustine discovered the 
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Augustine recognizes that such ―formlessness‖ is finally indistinguishable from 
―nothing‖ in that both signify absolute unintelligibility.30  This convertibility of ―nothing‖ 
and ―formlessness‖ mirrors the convertibility of sovereignty and goodness established in 
the doctrine of creation.  Form is not ‗imposed‘ upon a distinct and otherwise 
indeterminate materiality, but rather the two must arise together in immediate dependence 
on God‘s rational intentional and creative (sovereign and good) agency.31  God positively 
determines reality through the sovereign influence that is itself the establishment and 
upholding of the world in goodness.  Connections between sovereignty, goodness, and 
creatio ex nihilo are related not merely by the intellect (as in Plotinus), but in and through 
a discrete act of volition (creating.)  
I focus on this specific emphasis on volition and its development over the course 
of Augustine‘s writings in the following subsection, and develop it further throughout the 
chapter.  Presently, it is important to briefly underscore the important role played by 
immutability in this grammar.  As Augustine‘s argument develops by exploiting the 
Manichean understanding of immutability, virtually the entirety of his argument unfolds 
an elaboration upon this point as the baseline for the divine simplicity.
32
  The contrast 
that governs the grammatical interrelation of sovereignty, goodness, and creatio ex nihilo 
is that of a relative, contingent mode of existence grounded in the absolute simplicity of 
                                                                                                                                                 
grammar of a position that did not presuppose or grant—even implicitly, as did Neoplatonism—any 
positivity to a negative principle as the basis for worldly determination.  Instead, he sees this more clearly 
than any of his predecessors, Christian or otherwise.  See n. 16.     
30
 See Williams, "Creation," 252. 
31
 This link to volitional intent is made explicit in On Genesis, I.4.  See also Literal Commentary, I.29.  
This ‗arising together‘ marks the clear break with not only Manichaeism but Neoplatonic philosophy as 
well.  In connection with this point regarding this ‗arising together,‘ I should also note that this implies a 
certain necessary Aristotelianism as inherent in the Augustinian elaboration of the logic of creatio ex 
nihilo.  Although this claim is not overtly integral to my argument here, it is implied by the following 
discussion of the difficulties Augustine encounters as a result of his Platonic understanding of the will and 
motion.   
32
 This is most easily seen from Against Fortunatus, 19-47.   
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God.  Such contrast is consistent throughout Augustine‘s body of work, from early works 
such as On Order to the later City of God.  He consistently advances the Platonic position 
that the cosmos is most coherently conceived as a harmonious blending of living and 
non-living, and spiritual and material beings,
33
 and his development of this argument 
against Manichean metaphysics shows him to be committed to the notion that finite and 
mutable reality participates in the immutable perfection of its Source.
34
  Such an 
assumption is characteristic of Platonisms in general, but in his doctrine of creation 
Augustine developes the idea in a unique way by incorporating the idea of discrete divine 
agency in creating.
35
  Separate consideration of Augustine‘s understanding of the will is 
thus integral.      
 
The Will 
In addition to the locating rational volition at the origin of the world, the 
Manichean polemics show Augustine isolating the human will—or more precisely, free 
choice (libero arbitrio)—as the proper locus for evil.  This marks an important turning 
point not only for the history of the Western theology, but for Augustine‘s own thinking.  
For the idea of the will becomes the focal point of Augustine‘s thought henceforth.  
Because so much of his dispute with Manichaeism pivots on the affirmation of divine 
immutability and the insubstantiality of evil, the character of volition was decisive.  
                                                 
33
 See especially, True Religion, 59-79.  A particularly instructive discussion of this point was Donald 
X. Burt, Augustine's World: An Introduction to His Speculative Philosophy (Lanham: University Press of 
America, 1996), 201-24. 
34
 See as examples, On Music VI.1, Confessions VII.18-19, X; and, City of God XI.22.  See also Pierre 
Hadot, Plotinus, or, the Simplicity of Vision, trans. Michael Chase (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1993). See also Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation, and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Early 
Middle Ages (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 29-31. 
35
 For the relationship of this idea to Basilides, see May, Creatio Ex Nihilo, 80-81.   
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Augustine himself states in the Confessions that this one point was pivotal in his 
conversion to Christianity, allowing him to recognize that the inconsistency and 
variability of matter is not a sign of its essential evil.
36
  Though the role of volition in 
God‘s creating the world and in human evil was decisive for his break with Manichaeism, 
it involved a more complex relationship to Neoplatonism.  Creatio ex nihilo significantly 
transformed his understanding of Neoplatonic ontology, but did not result in absolute 
breach.
37
  In Book X of the Confessions, for example, Augustine unmistakably conceives 
his account of volition in Neoplatonic terms when he interprets the disordered 
intentionality (intentio) of sin as directed toward distended (distentio) material reality 
rather than God.
38
  Degrees of perfection continue to shape his metaphysics, even as the 
emphasis is no longer placed the ―formlessness‖ of materiality, but rather on its 
incoherence as a proper intentional object for intellectual (spiritual) creatures.
39
  
Intentionality is thus the primary means of union with God.
40
  This is because, in 
creating, governing, and ordering the world, God intends human beings to be ordered to 
God as their singular goal.
41
  As the orienting of desire, this intentionality is an act of the 
will.
42
  Indeed, as Bourke has noted, these ideas essentially repeat the discussion of 
willing in Ennead VI, wherein Plotinus analyzes the means by which desire is redirected 
from materiality to the One.
43
   
                                                 
36
 See Confessions VII.1-7, 13-22.   
37
 Robert Crouse, "Paucis Mutatis Verbis: Saint Augustine's Platonism," in Augustine and His Critics, 
ed. Robert Dodaro and George Lawless (New York: Routledge, 2000), 37-50.   
38
 See Confessions, X (especially, 18); see also XI.20, 26, 27; XII.9, 12, 23.   
39
 See Confessions, X.18-19.   
40
 See Confessions, X. 
41
 Compare Lubac, Augustinianism and Modern Theology.  
42
 See Confessions VII.16-24.   
43
 My discussion of the will in Plotinus, and his influence on Augustine, is indebted to Bourke, Will in 
Western Thought, 80-81 and 193-97.  
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The importance of volitional intent cannot be overemphasized in regard to the 
shape of Augustine‘s theology.44  First appearing in relatively early writings like On Free 
Choice and elaborated on in Confessions, volitional intentionality became a hallmark of 
Augustine‘s thought.  Book VII of Confessions notes its metaphysical importance for 
helping him overcome a materialist view of divinity,
45
 and the same principle was 
elaborated upon in the anti-Donatist writings in relation to the social significance of a 
sacrament, where the use (usus) of a thing (res) signifies the reality intended by the 
participants.
46
  Intentionality is integral to his treatments of baptism and the real presence 
in the eucharist insofar as these are significations of the bounds of charity that unite 
believers to one another and to Christ.
47
  In The Trinity, volitional intention (intentio 
voluntatis) is discussed as that discrete operation of the mind that unites the diverse 
elements of experience by directing them toward a particular good end.
48
       
James Wetzel has noted that Augustine‘s initial concern in invoking the will as 
the locus of evil in his argument for creatio ex nihilo is to link the objective goodness of 
the world directly to divine agency through providence.
49
  Wetzel points specifically to a 
passage in On Two Souls:  ―[In the Manichean system] there is no judgment on the basis 
of merits and no providence, and the world is governed—or rather not governed—by 
                                                 
44
 See the discussion of intention and its relationship to the Donatist controversy in Burns, The 
Development of Augustine's Doctrine of Operative Grace, 59-63. 
45
 See Confessions VII.1-7 and 21-27.     
46
 This discussion first appears in Teaching Christianity, I-II.5, ca. 396 CE; it is elaborated upon, 
however, in De Baptismo I.8-9.  See the discussion in Burns, The Development of Augustine's Doctrine of 
Operative Grace, 66-71.   
47
 Teaching Christianity, III.13.  See also the discussions in J. Patout Burns, "The Eucharist as the 
Foundation of Christian Unity in North African Theology," Augustinian Studies 31, no. 1 (2001): 1-23.;  
(??); and J. Patout Burns, "Establishing Unity in Diversity," Perspectives in Religious Studies 32, no. 4 
(2005): 381-99. 
48
 See The Trinity, XI.7, 15 and XIV.5 
49
 See Wetzel, Augustine and the Limits of Virtue, 90. 
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chance rather than by reason.  Governance, after all, should not be attributed to chance.‖50  
Sovereignty and goodness are here not simply logical corollaries of divine simplicity, but 
are the expression of an intentional agency.  This emphasis reaches beyond that of merely 
maintaining the ontological coherence and harmony of the contingent components of 
reality, and establishes a constitutively ethical character to the universe in and through 
that governance.  Developments in his theology of grace caused by the Donatist 
controversy ultimately bring the social implications of this ethical emphasis into relief.
51
  
His concern is to note that the world is not merely rightly ordered, but dynamically 
directed to the attainment of the good.   
In addition to Wetzel, Albrecht Dihle, Charles Kahn, and Richard Sorabji have 
each argued convincingly in this regard (though offering slightly different rationales) that 
Augustine is responsible for effectively inventing the notion of the will in distinction 
from both desire and the intellect.
52
  None of these thinkers believes Augustine succeeded 
at formulating a clear concept of the will; but, each affirms that, in Wetzel‘s words, 
Augustine was the first to link reality to ―a clearly delineated concept of the voluntary,‖ 
which pivots on a distinction between ―what happens by nature and what happens by 
will.‖53  Sorabji writes, what is unique in this is not a discrete idea, but how he uses a set 
                                                 
50
 The Two Souls, 17.  Quotation is taken from Augustine, The Manichean Debate, ed. Boniface 
Ramsey, trans. Roland Teske S.J., 50 vols., The Works of Saint Augustine (Hyde Park, NY: New City 
Press, 2006).  
51
 These are the elements reflected in the treatment of sacrament previously discussed. These 
developments will be discussed in the following section.  This claim is consistent with Burns‘ argument 
that sociality was of chief importance in Augustine‘s development of an operative grace during the Donatist 
controversy, most specifically as regards his setting aside of the prior stricture against coercion.  See Burns, 
The Development of Augustine's Doctrine of Operative Grace, 53-88. 
52
 See n. 5 above.  Wetzel is a unique voice in the discussion represented by Dihle, Kahn, and Sorabji.  
He has a nuanced account of this difference, arguing that the will is still for Augustine essentially a matter 
of desire.  See Wetzel, Augustine and the Limits of Virtue, 7-10. 
53
  Ibid., 90. 
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of concepts inherited from others.
54
  Augustine makes it effectively impossible for 
Western thought to any longer presume a simple or direct correspondence of nature to 
volition.  And this insight is directly tied to his avowal of a personal, creative, agential 
God.  Indeed, for Augustine, the world simply is the manifestation of an intentional, 
personal, and ethical justice, to which the human will must actively conform.
55
   
In making this distinction of volition from nature, Augustine understands willing 
primarily as a capacity to determine desire in accordance with intellectual apprehension.
56
  
This is most clearly shown in his response to the Manichees in On Two Souls, where he 
defines the will as ―a movement of the soul, with nothing forcing it either not to lose 
something or to acquire something.‖57  This early definition of the will emphasizes the 
non-coerced aspect of this movement of self-determination.  In this definition, despite a 
distinction between volition and nature, Augustine does not yet possess a clear distinction 
of the will from desire and intellection.  The will is simply the free self-motion of the soul 
in accordance with both appetite and knowledge.  This is an essentially Platonic notion of 
the soul.
58
  For, as Risto Saarinen notes, despite this insight into the difference of volition 
from nature, Augustine continues to conflate willing and intellection
59
 such that ―actions 
                                                 
54
 See Sorabji, "The Concept of the Will from Plato to Maximus the Confessor," 6-28. 
55
 This is one of the moments at which Augustine appears at his closest to Stoicism and its idea of the 
justice of natural law.  With this notion of personal volition, however, Augustine departs significantly from 
them.    
56
 See Plato, Phaedrus, 245-46c, where the soul is designated as self-moving, perpetually in motion, 
and therefore immortal. 
57
The Two Souls, 14.  Quotation is taken from Augustine, The Manichean Debate. 
58
 See On Free Choice I.8-15.  Sorabji, "The Concept of the Will from Plato to Maximus the 
Confessor," 9. 
59
 Throughout this chapter I refer to this concept of the will as self-determination as ―Platonic.‖  I only 
intend by this the suggestion that this idea begins with Plato‘s notion of the soul as that which ―moves 
itself.‖  I acknowledge that Augustine‘s use of the term owes much to Stoic ideas, which were largely 
mediated through Neoplatonism.  For a discussion of this connection, see Wetzel, Augustine and the Limits 
of Virtue, 10-12 and 68-76. 
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performed against better judgment are explained in terms of ignorance.‖60  Yet, as the 
next section will explore in more detail, as he exploits this distinction of nature from will 
in his reading of Paul, Augustine soon recognizes a further separation of the will from the 
intellect.
61
  Ignorance is not sufficient to explain the kind of self-conflict Augustine saw 
in Romans 7 and recounted of himself in Confessions VIII.
62
  In this analysis, Augustine 
effectively distinguishes the knowledge of truth from good performance in a manner that 
requires greater differentiation of the will from the intellect in their associations with the 
good and the true, respectively.
63
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 Risto Saarinen, Weakness of the Will in Medieval Thought: From Augustine to Buridan, Studien Und 
Texte Zur Geistesgeschichte Des Mittelalters (New York: E.J. Brill, 1994), 22. 
61
 This initially appeared to Augustine in the form of a conflict within the self between what is desired 
and the capacity to achieve it.  Yet, as James Wetzel argues, the context for Augustine‘s discussion is a 
treatment of habit.  Wetzel suggests that the self does not fail to will the newly recognized good because of 
a deficiency in the willing, but because of its having been habitually shaped according to a different good.  
This is not so much a conflict within the self as a differentiation between the perception and execution of 
competing goods.  See Wetzel, Augustine and the Limits of Virtue.  This marks recognition of the 
difference between the intellectual apprehension of the good and its performance by the will, which takes 
Augustine beyond Stoicism in that it involves not merely their differentiation of willing from desire, but the 
further distinction of the will from the intellect, which sets the stage for Aquinas‘ development as discussed 
in Chapter One. 
62
 This problematic only comes most fully into view once Augustine begins wrestling with Paul, 
particularly Romans 7-11.  This is discussed in more detail below.   
63
 Note the discussion of the good and the will in Trinity VIII.5.  There Augustine notes that ―the good 
the soul turns to in order to be good is the good from which it gets its being soul at all. This is whent eh will 
accords with nature to perfect the soul in good, when the will turns in love toward that good by which the 
soul is what it does not forfeit being, even if the will turns away again…So the will can forfeit what the will 
can obtain; the soul was already there to will to turn toward that from which it was, but it was not already 
there to will to be before it was.‖  That he moves, directly after this statement, to a discussion of the 
relationship of this love to the truth, in VIII.6-8, is significant in this regard in that it points to his difficulty 
in separating the respective objects of intellect and will.  In fact, as he says in VIII.10, true love is simply 
―cleaving to the truth,‖ but this truth itself is defined as to ―love his brother, and to love that love,‖  which 
simply is God (VIII.12-14.)  This point should be viewed as well in combination with IX.12, in which 
Augustine insists that nothing is properly willed that is not ―previously uttered as a word in his heart,‖ as an 
―interior word.‖  He further associates the will with that which directs the mind‘s attention in X.12 (and 
XI.7), and then further asserts, in X.13, that the will is present for us to ―use‖ or ―enjoy‖ things.  In this 
regard, it points to the mind‘s particular use and enjoyment of itself, and is meant to be a way of redirecting 
the mind away from ―sensible‖ things and toward the apprehension of truth within itself (X.11, XI.7).  The 
will is further noted as a certain ―repose‖ in things that are ―delighted in for their own sakes‖ (X.13).  It is 
in each of these elements that Augustine has recognized but not yet understood how it is that the will as 
distinct from the intellect is ordered toward the good in connection with the true.  The increased moral and 
ethical orientation to the will is also clearly recognizable in XI.7-8.  All ―wishes are straight, and all the 
ones linked with them too, if the one to which they are all referred is good; but if that is bend then they are 
all bent.  And thus a sequence of straight wishes or wills is a ladder for those who would climb to 
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  Nonetheless, after that insight, he consistently moved toward directly associating 
the will with the good (though he never succeeded in formulating a distinct concept of the 
will).  For example, by the time of writing his Retractions, a clear shift has occurred.  
Reiterating his earlier definition of the will from On Two Souls, he emphasizes the 
distinctly ethical
64
 force of a disordered will in connection with his prior emphasis on 
uncoerced self-determination.
65
  Defective willing was now defined not as a free choice 
for a mutable over the immutable good (as in On Free Choice) or as an actual failure to 
will completely (as in Confessions), but as ―the will to retain or to acquire what justice 
forbids and from which one is free to hold back.‖66  In the interval between Confessions 
and Retractions, Augustine ceases thinking in terms of complete correspondence in self-
determination between a desired and known good, and begins to emphasize the dictates 
of justice that precede and condition that very self-determination.
67
  And, as I have 
shown, Augustine understands these obligations to justice to be sustained and decreed by 
                                                                                                                                                 
happiness, to be negotiated by definite steps; but a skein of bend and twisted wishes or wills is a rope to 
bind anyone who acts so…‖ (XI.10).  Quotations are taken from Augustine, The Trinity, ed. Boniface 
Ramsey, trans. Edmund Hill, 50 vols., The Works of Saint Augustine (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 
1991). 
64
 I am distinguishing moral and ethical in terms of their common philosophical differentiation 
between deontological obligation and teleological orientation, respectively. 
65
 The cause of this, as will be shown below, is intimately bound up with his increasingly more 
sophisticated theology of grace.  It is significant that he defines sin as ―the will to retain or to acquire what 
justice forbids and from which one is free to hold back‖ (Retractions I.15.4).  Quotation taken from 
Augustine, The Manichean Debate.  My argument is not that Augustine once held a particular 
understanding of the will that he subsequently replaced with another.  But, that certain elements in his 
notion of willing were later put into relief and came guide that understanding.  
66
 Retractions, I.15.4.  Quotation is taken from Ibid.  As this is the first appearance of the term ‗justice‘ 
in this chapter, I should here note that this emphasis, characteristic of Augustine‘s later writings on 
freedom, is important precisely for its connection with agency, sovereignty, goodness, and personal 
divinity.  Whereas his earlier writings emphasize, in Neoplatonic fashion, the metaphysical significance of 
order, his later writings will focus on ―justice,‖ which was traditionally understood as a political, civic, and 
ethical virtue in Plato‘s Republic and Aristotle‘s Politics.  It is true that Augustine tends to conflate 
metaphysical order with the exercise of justice.  The distinction should be noted, however, as its 
recognition is important to the argument of this chapter.   
67
 The discussion of the interconnectedness of goodness, use, enjoyment, love of God, and love of 
neighbor in Teaching Christianity I.3-9, 20-44.   
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divine volition in creation and providence.
68
  Thus, although Augustine never ceases 
thinking of the will as self-determination, he now only considers this capacity ―free‖ and 
truly coincident with its object on the basis of the rectitude of its relation to the justice 
that precedes and conditions it.
69
  This is an explicitly ethical development both insofar as 
it conceives of the will as ordered toward the exercise and attainment of the good and 
insofar as that good is socially conceived, being grounded in the divine will and shared 
among human beings.     
It is just here that a deep tension surfaces in Augustine‘s thought regarding this 
capacity for self-determination and this later emphasis on moral rectitude.  This tension 
lies at the heart of the incommensurability between metaphysics and encounter being 
investigated in this chapter.  Indeed, Augustine‘s metaphysical critique of dualism 
grounds the objective value of creation and its corruption in the spontaneous self-
determination of God and humanity, respectively.
70
  This is an elegant solution as long as 
this capacity for self-determination is naturally in-determinate.  But as he comes to 
                                                 
68
 The question of justice conceived in relation to these questions of the freedom of the will first fully 
appears in the discussion of Esau and Jacob, in relation to Romans 9:10-11, in To Simplician, I.2.16-17.  
Also important is the association of the highest justice with the positive willing of God, in juxtaposition to 
the negative allowing of evil, at II.1.4.  Justice is traditionally understood in Hellenistic philosophy as an 
ethical virtue directly associated with political interrelations.  With this turn to election, Augustine is 
beginning to conceive the God/world relation in these terms in a much more pronounced way.  This 
development should be understood as a direct corollary on the greater emphasis on the voluntary and the 
personal that occurs at this time, which was also due to his emphasis on the will and creatio ex nihilo.   
69
 The clearest case of this is perhaps the discussion of the pride that preceded the performance of the 
first sin in the lately composed City of God, XIV.11-14.  Particularly important is the statement: ―The 
choice of the will, then, is genuinely free only when it is not subservient to faults and sins.  God gave it that 
true freedom, and now that it has been lost, through its own fault, it can be restored only by him who had 
the power to give it at the beginning‖ (XIV.11).  All quotations of this text are taken from Augustine, City 
of God, trans. Henry Scowcroft Bettenson (New York: Penguin Books, 1984). 
70
 The priority of justice is displayed most prominently in his writings against Julian, particularly the 
Unfinished Answer to Julian, I.37: ―If God is the origin of justice, as you [Julian] say why do you not admit 
that justice if given to human beings by God?  Why do you want justice to be the choice of the human will 
rather than the gift of God?‖  Quotation from Augustine, Answer to the Pelagians Iv, ed. Boniface Ramsey, 
trans. Roland Teske S.J., 50 vols., The Works of Saint Augustine (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 
1999).See also I.45-47, 79-80, 127, 133.   
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discriminate volitional from natural acts more precisely, as well as to differentiate willing 
from knowing, Augustine is forced to admit a personal, agential, and ethical relation as 
the horizon of all spontaneity and determining its character.
71
  The difficulty, then, is how 
to preserve the freedom of the will as the basis for the insubstantiality of evil in his 
grammar of creation.  On one hand was his metaphysical vision in which willing is a 
natural capacity for self-determination
72
 in relation to the justice by which God orders 
creation to the good.
73
  On the other hand is his increased separation of volition from both 
nature and intellect in which the ethical character of that justice is accentuated in 
accordance with an affective obligation that determines it.
74
  On this latter model, an act 
is free only as it is rightly related to the obligations that precede it, and not because of its 
spontaneity.  These two commitments are not easily harmonized.  The significance of this 
tension for Augustine‘s grammar of creation can be most clearly perceived in relation to 
the question of immutability.   
 
Divine Immutability 
Immutability is ultimately decisive for the coherence of Augustine‘s grammar of 
creation.  When isolated, the question it raises is whether his grammar of sovereignty, 
goodness, and the will can be coherently sustained within the confines of Platonic 
                                                 
71
 The problem is precisely the same as that Mariña notes Schleiermacher discovered in his reflections 
on Kant: namely, how a purely intellectual principle could serve as a motive for the will if the basis for the 
performance must be the transcendental freedom of the subject.  See the discussion of this point in Chapter 
Three. 
72
 See for example, On Free Choice, I.8-15.  The model for this approach is no doubt the discussion of 
justice in Plato‘s Republic, II-V.   
73
 See The Nature of the Good, 9 
74
 See City of God, XIV.12: ―But God‘s instructions demanded obedience, and obedience is in a way 
the mother and guardian of all the other virtues in a rational creature, seeing that the rational creation has 
been so made that it is to man‘s advantage to be in subjection to God, and it is calamitous for him to act 
according to his own will, and not obey the will of his Creator.‖   
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metaphysics.  The answer to that question turns on Augustine‘s complex relationship to 
the emanationist tradition.
75
  For, while he successfully breaks with dualism and 
emanationism, understanding each as variants of one another, Augustine gives no 
evidence of having understood the degree to which creation ex nihilo breaks with the 
latter.   
This is no doubt due, at least in part, to the fact that the notion of volition 
Augustine adapted from Ennead VI includes a very similar understanding of the 
relationship of sovereignty to goodness.  As Bourke has noted, Plotinus understands the 
One as radically ―diffusive of itself and thus constitutive of at least one aspect of the 
many things of this universe.‖76 This diffusion would develop into an account of 
participation in Pseudo-Dionysius and Aquinas.
77
  This differs from emanation, however, 
Bourke continues, in that the One is not ―an agent of the process of world-making,‖ but 
―an exemplary cause, and not the only one, in the process.‖78  For Augustine, the world is 
the object of a unique act of God‘s will, which in Plotinus is simply the effulgence of the 
One‘s willing of itself, its absolute self-determination.  The difference is well captured in 
comparing two passages.   
The first, from Ennead VI, elaborates the diffusive nature of this self-
determination:   
                                                 
75
 For the distinction between emanation and participation, see Oliva Blanchette, The Perfection of the 
Universe According to Aquinas: A Teleological Cosmology (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1992), 128-40. 
76
 See Bourke, Will in Western Thought, 193. 
77
 Oliva Blanchette echoes an important distinction between traditions of emanation and traditions of 
participation, as the latter implies a recognition of the difference between Being and beings that is 
characteristic of thinkers such as Aquinas, and is therefore more consonant with creatio ex nihilo.  See 
Blanchette, The Perfection of the Universe, 128-40.  I acknowledge the difference, but have chosen to unite 
the terms for this study in order to emphasize their reliance upon an economy of identity in rendering 
difference conceivable.   
78
 Ibid.  
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In the One, power (dynamis) is not open to contraries; it is an irresistible and immovable 
force, which is the greatest possible…Who could change it, since it is generated from the 
divine will, and is His will (boulesin ousan) itself?...Will was, then, in His essence; in 
fact, it (boulesis) is nothing other than His essence. ..He is entirely will; there is nothing 
in Him that does not will.
79
 
 
This account is largely consistent with Augustine‘s understanding of 
immutability.  Plotinus here rejects, in principle, any dialectical contrast to the One on 
grounds that its ―power‖ [dynamis] determines all that follows from it.  The importance 
of the passage lies with the fact that the absence of contrast, the absoluteness of the One, 
is here understood in terms of the perfection of the One‘s ―self-making,‖ the 
correspondence of ideality and reality in its self-determination.  The context of the 
passage, which is concerned with the matter of finite volition, shows that every finite 
self-determination partakes of this primordial self-constitution.
80
  ―All was will…There is 
then nothing before that will: God and will were primally identical.‖   
This passage should be compared with the account of immutable self-
determination in Augustine‘s The Catholic Way of Life and the Manichean Way of Life:     
For that exists in the highest sense of the word which continues always the same, which 
is throughout like itself, which cannot be corrupted or changed, which is not subject to 
time, which admits no variation in its present as compared to its former condition.  This is 
existence in its true sense.  For in this signification of the word existence there is implied 
a nature which is self-contained, and which continues immutably.  Such things can be 
said only of God, to whom there is nothing contrary…For the contrary of existence is 
non-existence (emphasis added.)
81
 
                                                 
79
 Ennead VI.8.21.  Quotation, including Greek, is taken from Bourke, Will in Western Thought, 195.  
80
 The reader should note the coincidence between this account and the negative determination at work 
in Descartes, Spinoza, and Hegel.  There is a sense here in which Plotinus is the necessary precursor to 
Hegel insofar as each understand the development of the world to be a necessary consequence of the 
Absolute‘s reflexive self-knowledge and constitution.  Augustine, by contrast, insists that the world arises 
as the result of the gratuitous act of an agency. 
81
 Harrison cites this passage to illustrate Augustine‘s appreciation for God as Being-itself, yet 
overlooks the significance of Augustine‘s emphasis on immutability throughout.  See Harrison, Rethinking 
Augustine's Early Theology, 90-91.  For further demonstration of this point, see Confessions, VIII.1 and 
Teaching Christianity, I.8.8.  See also Sorabji, Time, Creation, and the Continuum, 239.  This recognition 
that the ―contrary of existence is non-existence‖ is what Gilson specified as the realization of the 
ontological difference in Augustine, which sets him on a path distinct from Plotinus.  See Etienne Gilson, 
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This passage is unique in its emphasis on existence rather than will, which reflects 
Augustine‘s insight into the convertibility of nothingness and formlessness.  Augustine 
here transcends Plotinian monism on one level only to persists in thinking of simplicity as 
the ―immutably‖ continuing ―self-contained‖ state with ―no variation in its present as 
compared to…former condition.‖82  The contrast is that Augustine is conceiving 
perfection according to the self-correspondence aspired to at the end of a process of 
becoming—that is, as a motion—and has yet to formulate with precision what Aquinas 
knows as an act of existence (esse.)
83
   
It is the metaphysical structure of becoming that Augustine correctly recognizes 
as an irreducible, reflective dualism even in Plotinus.  And yet, this residue of becoming 
in his account of simplicity internally fractures his grammar of creation, establishing the 
conditions upon which an internal conflict can emerge.  On the one hand, Augustine 
eradicates with creatio ex nihilo any notion that the world is a consequential derivative of 
a reflective act of divine self-determination.
84
  Creatio ex nihilo avows instead that the 
world is the result of God‘s unique and gratuitous act to constitute a reality distinct from 
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Godself, existing not in dialectical contrast to but in dynamic relation with God.
85
  On the 
other hand, by continuing to think of God‘s will in its sovereignty and goodness as an 
immutable self-presence attained through absolute self-determination—that is, as a 
perfected becoming—an aspect of the previous metaphysics remains embedded.  The 
result is an uneasy synthesis, at the level of willing, of Manichean dualism and Plotinian 
monism that turns the inner necessity of that metaphysical structure toward an extrinsic 
reality.
86
  As long as Augustine continues to think of finite self-determination, as in texts 
like On Free Choice, as a natural intellectual capacity, this tension is obscured.  But as he 
gains further insight into the primarily affective dimension of willing, as discussed above, 
this conflict comes more sharply into view.  His unexamined Plotinian assumptions give 
his early position the semblance of a non-competitive relation, which more exact analysis 
of the mechanism of willing shows as premised on competing spontaneities.  Insofar as 
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immutability is understood as absolute self-determination, divine simplicity can only be 
preserved by suppressing finite self-determination in deference to the infinite.   
Yet this is not the entire story.  Augustine‘s grammar of creation successfully 
formulates the world‘s ‗otherness‘ to God in a manner irreducible to the mere 
‗difference‘ according to which ―matter‖ is conceived in both Manichean and Plotinian 
metaphysics.  God‘s act of creating is God‘s affirmative constitution of a reality with a 
discrete and intrinsic integrity.  As a unique object of the divine will, the world is good in 
itself—indeed, only is itself—because of its absolute dependence on God‘s governance.87  
It is this ‗otherness‘ that is compromised by the ambiguity of the notion of willing 
Augustine is only just beginning to articulate.  With no other basis for relating God than 
this dialectic of identity and difference, Augustine is incapable of articulating a non-
competitive relation between finite and infinite wills.  As I have suggested, that conflict 
only comes into view as Augustine gains greater specificity regarding the nature of the 
will in distinction from the intellect; but that specificity will not emerge from his 
grammar of creation, but only in conjunction with his mature theology of grace.  In that 
context, greater emphasis on the ethical orientation of the will slowly emerges as an 
alternative to this spontaneity.   
The following two sections are devoted to analyzing how this tension in the 
grammar of creation engenders the nature/supernatural and sin/grace paradigms.  As 
discussed so far, that grammar is consistent with my description of metaphysical 
ontology.  In fact, it is just this schematic that is advanced by Lubac and Rahner as 
outlined in Chapter Two.  I will mark these similarities in more detail below.  Presently, I 
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will focus on Augustine‘s mature theology of grace to shed light on the interpretation of 
this grammar that results in the ontology of encounter and within which the ethical 
interpretation of the will emerges.  I return, in the section immediately following this 
account, to discuss the role of metaphysical ontology in Augustine‘s thought, noting 
especially the difficulties this poses.     
 
An Ontology of Encounter: The Event of Grace 
You are my choice, and only by your gift can I please either your or myself. 
 
—Augustine88 
 
 
Augustine‘s ideas about the relationship between freedom and grace have been 
from the beginning an almost perpetual concern for philosophers, theologians, and 
historians.  It is then surprising that so little attention has been devoted to how those ideas 
intersect with, influence, and were influenced by his theology of creation.  This is 
especially puzzling considering that the celebrated link he establishes early in his career 
between evil and free choice (liberum arbitrium) is propounded specifically within his 
argument for creatio ex nihilo.
89
  This is understandable given that after the rereading of 
Paul sparked by questions posed by the bishop Simplician (396 CE)
90
 and subsequent 
entanglement in the Donatist controvery, Augustine increasingly founds his earlier notion 
of freedom questioned by a more sophisticated theology of grace that he continues to 
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reformulate to the end of his life.
91
  And yet, while this is true, it is equally apparent that 
writings after 396 CE show a persistent concern to reformulate certain questions raised 
by his early theology of creation, especially as these questions intersect with its 
grammatical structure.  This is particularly the case in that the late works, Literal 
Commentary on Genesis (401-414 CE) and City of God (413-427 CE), contain his most 
sophisticated speculative reflections on creation, show the clear influence of the 
conceptual transformation wrought by his mature theology of grace.
92
       
It will be helpful for the reader to recall my use of ontology in general, as well as 
my specific definition of the ontology of encounter.  I understand ontology to be a 
discourse oriented toward the specification of the essence of things in their manifestation 
so as to privilege the categories of identity, intellection, and participation in that 
specification.  A specific ontology of encounter is a form of this discourse in which the 
most essential aspect of reality is understood to be disclosed only in a concrete event of 
encounter within actuality, and never in abstraction from it.  An ontology of encounter is 
fundamentally opposed to any metaphysical system that would presume to achieve a final 
ordering of the whole of reality, or which would seek to mediate the essence of reality in 
conceptual abstraction apart from an irreducible event of encounter.  In this section, I will 
note the ways that this discourse, which is largely constitutive of the Protestant paradigm 
for uniting creation and grace, is operative in Augustine‘s thought as his theology of 
grace develops over time. In making this connection to the Protestant paradigm, 
throughout I will note the correspondence of these themes to Schleiermacher and Barth. 
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Thus far my discussion of Augustine has focused on the grammar of Augustine‘s 
theology of creation, arising as it does out of a distinctively metaphysical approach.  
Despite this emphasis, Augustine‘s thought takes on an increasingly prominent reliance 
on categories of ―encounter,‖ ―relation,‖ and ―event‖ that stand in tension with 
metaphysics as an account of the whole, mirroring the Protestant paradigm.  Though 
these elements are bound up with the themes of sovereignty, goodness, the will, and 
immutability that constitute the grammar of his theology of creation, my claim is not that 
these developments are implicit in that grammar.  Rather, in those reflections, he 
develops these four grammatical themes in unanticipated ways that conflict with the prior 
metaphysical orientation.  That conflict can be put into relief by briefly rehearsing the 
development of Augustine‘s theology of grace.   
 I have noted throughout that Augustine‘s adherence to notions of self-
determination and free choice (liberum arbitrium) are the result of his Platonism.  J. 
Patout Burns provides a helpful outline for how themes of Platonic spiritualism directly 
influenced Augustine‘s earliest theology of grace.  Where willing means self-
determination and free choice for Augustine, grace meant primarily assistance in the 
production of good performance.  This overarching model here is intellectual 
illuminationism in which the divine Word communicates to the mind the principles that 
govern the cosmos to the mind, thereby orienting the human soul intrinsically toward 
God.
93
  Thus when it is turned away from God, the intellect is darkened and lacks the 
moral insight necessary to unite the diverse (distentio) elements of existence and perform 
the good.       
                                                 
93
 The connection to Lubac should be clear and the version of Augustinianism he advocated.  This is 
also the kind of vision developed by Rahner.   
180 
 
Burns further notes that this approach is consistent with a distinct interpretation of 
salvation history.  God‘s dealings with Israel and the church are the developmental 
overcoming of patterns of individual and social sin that result from this ignorance.  In 
calling Israel, giving the Law, and sending the prophets, God reestablished knowledge of 
the Good and creating a people committed to its performance, which founds its 
fulfillment in the arrival of Christ and the church.  Jesus gives complete and final 
knowledge of God, which is alone capable of counteracting the passions; and, his 
continued presence in the church gives the requisite assistance in good performance, 
while his incarnation and resurrection give assurance of triumph over the consequence of 
mortality.     
Augustine adheres to Platonic spiritualism and this account of salvation history to 
the time of his composing his letter To Simplician in which his close reading of Paul 
leads to a very different interpretation.  To Simplician shows two important realizations.  
First, it marks his recognition that the tradition of Platonic spiritualism, and especially its 
account of self-determination and free choice, theoretically allows that the performance 
of good works and the avoidance of divine punishment are possibilities apart from Christ 
and outside of the church.
94
  This stands in direct contradiction to Paul‘s statements that 
all human beings are declared to be condemned in sin and sharing in the guilt of Adam.
95
  
He now realizes that all proper knowledge and good performance are available solely on 
the basis of prior divine assistance.
96
  Where the account of self-determination he adopted 
from Plotinus‘ reflections in Ennead VI puts the process of intentional volition at the 
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forefront of his thinking, it is his reading of Paul in Roman 7 that deepens his analysis of 
that process.
97
  As the famous garden incident in the Confessions dramatizes, Augustine 
now focuses his attention on the internal conflict within the will in its attempt to perform 
the good, and its gracious transformation in the reception of grace.
98
     
This new analysis focused on Paul‘s reading of the Law in which Adam‘s 
punishment and guilt are original, shared by all human beings.  In this condition, there is 
no knowledge of the good and no possibility of performing it.
99
  All acts of self-
determination are flawed and the only choices available are sinful.
100
  Upon the giving of 
the Law, proper knowledge of the good is restored and the path to righteousness is 
revealed.
101
  Yet alongside this disclosure is revealed the insufficiency of the will to 
correspond to Law‘s demands, which reach beyond any capacity for self-
determination.
102
  The final revelation of the Gospel, however, discloses the futility of 
this condition when Christ grants forgiveness for these failures and offers the gift of the 
Holy Spirit, who moves the will to love above all and the neighbor as oneself.
103
  
Henceforth, Augustine will insist that it is only appropriate to speak of the freedom of the 
will in this latter context, since everywhere prior to this condition, it is bound by sin.        
It was in his analysis of this internal conflict between the will for the good and the 
inability to achieve its performance that Augustine most keenly confronts the distinction 
of the will from the intellect.  For, if the acquisition of knowledge does not directly 
translate to good performance, this can only be because of the failure of some process 
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that is intimately related to but distinct from the intellect.  This failure further implies a 
basic differentiation of the will from desire inasmuch as it occurs between the desire for 
the good and the limits of self-determination in relation to it.
104
  The passage from the 
Retractions that treats his original definition of the will in On Two Souls shows his 
recognition of this distinction from both intellect and desire, as well as his inability to 
arrive at greater conceptual precision than that of designating the will as a form of 
desire.
105
  On these points, Augustine has advanced beyond his previous understanding of 
the will as free, self-determining choice in further specifying goodness as the proper 
object of the will.  He notes a difference between implicitly desiring an object as a good, 
explicitly apprehending the truth of its goodness, and explicitly willing that object in its 
goodness.
106
  It is the uniqueness and significance of the latter moment I am highlighting 
on in this study. 
A comparison and contrast with Aquinas will help to bring an important point to 
light regarding these developments in Augustine‘s thought.  As regards their theologies 
of grace, both Augustine and Aquinas distinguish knowledge of the good and good 
performance.  For Augustine the differential between the two is a mark of sin because 
failure in self-correspondence results from the conflict and diffusion, rather than the 
harmony and order, of the self with its desires.  For Aquinas, by contrast, this differential 
primarily delimits the nature and freedom of the will as distinct from the intellect, and is 
                                                 
104
 This claim should be distinguished from Wetzel‘s argument, and should be compared with 
Retractions I.15.3-4.    
105
 The passage from Retractions is I.15.3-4.   
106
 Despite Wetzel‘s brilliant rereading of the Augustinian will as coextensive with desire, he fails to 
recognize this fundamental point that the issue at stake is not only that of a virtuous correspondence or the 
habitual vice that prevents its attainment as an objective good.  Augustine is also investigating what it 
means to will the good for itself alone, which though involving desire, intellect, and virtue is pointing 
toward a unique operation.   
183 
 
only secondarily qualified as sinful.  Nonetheless, the two understand righteousness in 
terms of a perfect self-correspondence of reality and ideality.  This is the task of the Holy 
Spirit for Augustine, who heals the fractured self by arousing the self to charity, which 
alone can rejoining these disparate functions in union with God and other Christians.  
Aquinas‘ ability further to distinguish the natural from the sinful in this differential 
allows him to understand the infusion of the habit of charity as the supernatural 
perfection and elevation of an essentially good, and concretely disordered structure, of 
reflective self-determination.  It is in this sense that Aquinas, as discussed in Chapter 
Two, can be said to resolve the difficulties Augustine bequeathed to medieval theology: 
namely, that of completing the differentiation of the natural from the volitional, and 
thereby specifying the relationship of freedom and morality.  Aquinas thereby succeeds at 
specifying the will as the function of affirming the goodness of an object and seeking its 
enjoyment.     
Because of the elegance of Aquinas solution (when it has been rightly 
understood), the Protestant position on grace is often conceived as a reversion to the 
earlier Augustinian problematic.
107
  However, the relational and social emphasis to which 
Augustine links the doctrine of election in resolving this inner conflict points also toward 
the Protestant emphasis on encounter and away from the metaphysical application 
adopted by Aquinas.  Even as Augustine upholds an idea of perfection as the 
correspondence of the ideal with the real (or the actualization of every potentiality), he 
also intimates that all is not well with those premises.  For Augustine is not only resisting 
the idea of salvific merit and the conflation of the natural and volitional; he 
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simultaneously perceives that freedom as self-determination is reducible to self-
preservation, which effectively precludes the kind of gratuitous relation charity demands.  
Indeed, the social and relational force of his arguments for intentional charity against the 
Donatists, which are concomitant with the development of his most mature position on 
election and operative grace, suggest just this connection.
108
  He consistently indicts the 
Donatist emphasis on ritual purity and ecclesiastical continence on just this point of 
elevating self-preservation at the expense of the very charity of intention that unites 
Christians to Christ and one another.
109
  Here, the very structure of willing that Aquinas 
has properly delimited as ―natural‖ is one in which the will‘s order toward the good is an 
expression of the creature‘s impulse to sustain itself in the face of what would otherwise 
dissolve it.  Every willing of a good—be it health, friendship, even (and perhaps 
especially) salvation—is naturally an expression of the desire for self-preservation, and is 
only perfected in the supernatural operation of charity.  Though not eradicating this 
orientation toward complete self-correspondence in his account of salvation, Augustine 
prioritizes the social and relational context of intentional encounter wherein this 
correspondence occurs in a way incompatible with self-perpetuation.  The problem 
confronted here is the same as that encountered in Neoplatonic emanation: free self-
determination requires an implicit negative principle over against which to complete 
itself.  Just as emanation precludes the affirmation of difference at work in the doctrine of 
creation, so a self-determining will reduces the encounter with God and the neighbor to a 
negative moment of self-constitution.  As he more clearly perceives its distinction from 
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the intellect and desire in his mature theology of grace, he more clearly recognizes the 
extent to which willing is preceded by a relation to the good that always conditions the 
character of its self-determination, and the inherently relational character of this order to 
the good.
110
  What Aquinas conceives as the perfection of the natural desire for self-
preservation is for Augustine a perversion of its proper orientation to the good, which is 
only coincident with its goal insofar as it acts charitably.   
This is the sense that Augustine anticipates Luther‘s rejection of the speculative 
dialectic on which the Scholastic account of justification is based.  Each thinker perceives 
a fundamental incompatibility between a will ordered toward self-preservation and the 
command to charity, and recognizes that this implies the fulfillment of the command 
prior to the performance.  This point is consonant with Luther‘s insistence that ―for an act 
to be meritorious, either the presence of grace is sufficient or its presence means 
nothing.‖  This represents an important elaboration of Aquinas‘ emphasis on the infusion 
of the habitual grace of charity in recognizing that a relation to the good precedes the 
will‘s performance and determines its ethical orientation.  For what is at issue here is the 
consistent emphasis on the priority of act over motion.  Luther is more consistent in his 
application of this point in that he realized it implied that redemption was not the 
reflective movement of oneself to perfect correspondence to a goal, but of being properly 
related to that goal prior to any self-determination.  Augustine‘s recognition of this 
relational priority over spontaneous self-determination anticipates this insight, and yet 
retains the basis for that system in its continued understanding of willing as spontaneous 
self-determination.  Luther‘s continuity with Augustine on this item points to the way in 
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which the Protestant position is not a reversion, as noted in the previous chapter, but a 
genuine advance on Aquinas‘ terms.  In fact, Luther recovers and develops an integral 
and occluded element of Augustine‘s analysis.   
The account of election as it treated in Romans 7-9 is integral to that continuity.
111
  
Augustine understands the priority of God‘s action in terms of this divine election.  Yet 
his greatest difficulty lies in coming to terms with the relationship between election and 
his commitment to the will as self-determination.  This is most apparent in the account of 
election that develops from To Simplician to the works following the Donatist 
controversy.
112
  His overarching concern in the letter To Simplician is to interpret election 
as a call from God that is perfectly suited to the disposition of the recipient by 
orchestrating the circumstances under which the call is given and received, and thus 
belongs more properly to the Platonic emphases of the anti-Manichean period.
113
  His 
concern is to synthesize his recognition of the necessity of the priority of the divine 
election with his commitment to Platonic self-determination.  Yet, after the Dontatist 
controversy and continuing through the Pelagian disputes, Augustine acknowledges that 
his emphasis on self-determination conflicts with Paul.
114
  Thereafter, he ascribes the 
entirety of redemption to God alone.  From the giving of the call to its acceptance and on 
to perseverance—each is determined solely by God‘s eternal election.115 
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The accounts of sovereignty and goodness at work in his grammar of creation 
yield a clearer perception of volitional agency than was previous available in either his 
own thought or his most important predecessor, Plotinus.  His rejection of dualism is 
intimately bound to ethics in that the goodness of the created order is inexorably linked to 
the divine agency.  The shift in his thinking away from an emphasis on self-determination 
and toward rectitude shows this ethical aspect of his thought taking on greater 
prominence as his theology of grace matures.  The greater emphasis on election shows a 
pattern of thinking emerging in his mature theology of grace—as is reflected most 
prominently in the narrative whole of the Confessions, and most lucidly in the ―tollo, 
lege‖ episode—in which it is transformative existential encounter that discloses the 
world‘s order and one‘s place in it.116  In his theology of grace, Augustine‘s concern is 
much less with a Neoplatonic metaphysical order within which the will is rightly 
―ordered‖ in relation to the whole, and more with describing the event in which God‘s 
summons determines the whole of one‘s life, thereby disclosing God‘s sovereignty.      
This emphasis is consistent with the sin/grace paradigm.  Though Augustine does 
not think of justification in Luther‘s terms, the elements of election and covenant are 
present in his account.  Such emphases are important because the pattern of thought they 
represent, as is evidenced from the above account of salvation history, marks a move 
away from diachronic ordering of redemption in which the temporal movement of 
creation, fall, and redemption is synchronically ordered within a union of creation and 
grace.  Instead, he begins with a synchronic experience of redemption in which is 
disclosed the realities of sin and grace, out of which opens up an emphasis on the 
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absolutely diachronic priority of God in every temporal event—that is, that every event 
has its origin in God.  Viewing the world through the lens of election, rather than merely 
―nature,‖ accounts for this shift.  The emphasis on dynamic relation that the category of 
election brings is reflected in an increase stress on justice and rectitude as matters of the 
proper volitional intention of an action.  These elements also entail a more dogmatic or 
―intratextual‖ thrust such that, by the time of his writing the City of God, he is reading the 
story of the world through the lens of election and redemption, rather than Neoplatonic 
metaphysics.  In this respect, Augustine opens the door to understanding creation as a 
refracted dimension of redemption in the manner characteristic the sin/grace paradigm.  
Indeed, each of its basic components has its origin here, and is not recognizable prior to 
Augustine's mature theology of grace, and specifically his interpretation of Romans 7 and 
9.   
More importantly for our purposes is the need to see how Augustine‘s logic is tied 
to the origins of the ontology of encounter.  As we saw in the previous discussion of 
Schleiermacher and Barth, the decisive element in that ontology is the role played by 
divine election.  As with Schleiermacher, Augustine‘s mature theology of grace casts the 
relationship between creation and redemption in a decidedly dialectical mode of contrast 
between sin and grace.
117
  Sin here is one‘s inability to affirm or attain anything but what 
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is produced through reflective self-determination, while grace is the opening of that self 
to what is distinct from by the divine operation that determines it.  This determination is 
election, and the justifying encounter discloses this to be the reality of the world.  This 
encounter is ontological insofar as it manifests the most primal truth of one‘s identity as 
absolutely subject to God through one‘s participation in election.  The intellectualist 
aspect of this pertains most strictly to the overarching ordering of the cosmos according 
to the divine providence and election.
118
  This particular inflection of these three 
categories of identity, intellection, and participation only appear in Augustine‘s thinking 
after his mature theology of grace.  In each case, however, Augustine‘s development is 
strictly related to the rupture of the metaphysical orientation by grace in that the proper 
perspective on the whole can never be attained apart from and as a direct extension of the 
event of encounter with Christ that discloses the fundamental truth of reality.  His 
argument here is that any metaphysical account formulated on any basis presumably 
more fundamental than the event of incarnation fails to be properly determined by that 
event.  Such is the importance of the increased emphasis on election and predestination in 
his work.   
Though it is true that Augustine‘s thought undergoes a dramatic shift following 
his reading of Paul, the speculative metaphysical component of his thought persists.  For, 
the tension between the metaphysical affirmations that structures his grammar of creation 
and the emphasis on encounter that arises in his mature theology of grace persist to the 
end.  Indeed, it is this very tension that sparks the medieval reflections discussed in 
                                                                                                                                                 
however, sparked this introspective trajectory in thought about self-consciousness even as it laid the 
groundwork for its overcoming. 
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 See City of God V.8-11; XI-XII, XIV.26-28.  This is the reason he insists throughout his writings 
that the Neoplatonists possessed everything they needed except the incarnation, but this meant they 
mediated only death (see Confessions, VII.27.) 
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Chapter Two.  In this respect, the persistence of metaphysics is coextensive with his 
continued emphasis on self-determination as his predominant paradigm for the will.  We 
must now turn our attention to those persistent elements as they are reflected in his later 
mediations on creation, which bear the marks of having been shaped by his mature 
theology of grace.  I address his broader metaphysical ontology in the following section.   
 
A Metaphysical Ontology: A Speculative Theology of Creation 
As I turn to address the role of a metaphysical ontology in Augustine‘s later 
thought, it will be helpful to review my use of that term as well.  As I am using phrase, 
―metaphysical ontology‖ refers to a particular kind of ontological discourse, which is 
ordered toward formulating a systematic account of the whole of reality in terms 
consonant with the philosophical category of being.  ―Ontology‖ here continues to 
designate the discursive specification of the essence of things according to the categories 
of identity, intellection, and participation.  My present discussion of metaphysical 
ontology is distinct from that carried out in the first section in that the concern here is to 
discuss how this pattern of thought persists despite the transformation inaugurated by his 
mature theology of creation.  In what follows, I am concerned to show how Augustine 
attempts to develop his theology of grace into a speculative metaphysics of creation 
consonant with the grammar established in the Manichean polemics.  Special concern 
will be paid to the specific ways this constitutes a metaphysical ontology and the impasse 
that results for the attempt to draw the elements of encounter into this frame.  Throughout 
the discussion, attention will be paid to convergences with the approaches of Lubac and 
Rahner.     
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The issue of metaphysical ontology is bound up in Augustine‘s thought with the 
demand to formulate some account of the world in light of his affirmation of creatio ex 
nihilo.  It was not enough simply to disrupt Manichean discourse; he was also obliged to 
offer a more satisfactory metaphysics based on that account.  That he worked out this 
metaphysics over the course of three major (one unfinished) commentaries on Genesis 
speaks both to the seriousness with which he took that task and the magnitude of its 
demands.  Ironically, however, it is vital that, at precisely the juncture Augustine rejected 
Hellenistic cosmogony in favor of a more Hebraic theology, he simultaneously relied on 
the Platonic category of form (eidos) to develop his speculative vision.  It is here that his 
thought returns to a decidedly metaphysical orientation.  On just this point, the full 
significance of his emphasis on immutability comes most sharply into relief.     
 I emphasized the grammar of Augustine‘s theology of creation as pivoting on an 
affirmation of the world‘s inherent goodness as predicated on the universality of God‘s 
rational intentional agency.  It is this emphasis on volition that secures an element of 
objective value in the created order of the world, which points toward a notion of justice 
as the proper ontological order of reality, as well as the ethical affirmation of that reality 
as such.  The latter is emphasized more after 396 CE, and corresponds to a greater 
recognition of the will‘s distinction from the intellect.  I have already anticipated the 
conflict resulting from these two approaches to the will, but it is just here that this 
conflict becomes most apparent as Augustine seeks to develop a speculative theology of 
creation that is consistent with both his mature theology of grace and his original 
grammar of creation.   The difficulty he encounters is, as we will see, inseparable from 
the fact that he continues to understand the divine agency as an immutable self-presence 
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established through absolute self-determination.  The problems this poses for him occur 
on two fronts. 
First, the new position on grace appears to fracture the intimate relationship 
between sovereignty and immutability.  It has become absolutely clear that the entirety of 
redemption is a divine work in which the acceptance, willing, and attainment of salvation 
is God‘s work.  The new emphasis on encounter involves the disruption of the continuity 
of creation, grace, and the will in that grace interrupted the tragic structure of self-
determination.  Ironically, where this clarifies the logic of God‘s sovereignty, it also 
compromises an aspect of God‘s immutability by suggesting that God reacts to fallen 
creatures rather than governing absolutely.  This is problematic because, as Augustine 
makes clear in his debate with Fortunatus, to think of God reacting to evil is to think of 
God as conditioned by it. 
A second problem runs in tandem with this.  Once he understands creatio ex 
nihilo as a discrete volitional act, directed away from Godself and toward an other, 
Augustine no longer has the theoretical resources that would allow a distinction of the 
bestowal of grace from absolute necessity.
119
  This is the deep irony that runs through 
Augustine‘s account of creatio ex nihilo.  As I noted in the previous section, creatio ex 
nihilo marks the first thought of a genuine otherness, God‘s affirmative constitution of 
and relationship with that what is genuinely distinct from Godself.  In this respect, by 
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 See City of God V.8-11, where Augustine includes free acts of the will within the natural order of 
causes, ―which is,‖ he says, ―for God, fixed, and is contained in his foreknowledge, since human acts of 
will are the causes of human activities.  Therefore he who had prescience of the causes of all events 
certainly could not be ignorant of our decisions, which he foreknows as the causes of our actions.‖  He then 
goes on to associate this directly with a form of necessity, in chapter 10, if ―we define ‗necessity‘ in the 
sense implied when we say that it is necessary a thing should be thus, or should happen thus,‖ concluding 
that he sees ―no reason to fear that this would rob us of free will.‖  This discussion of necessity should be 
read in combination with the discussion of creation of angels and men in XXII.1-2.   
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making the world rather than Godself the object of the divine will, Augustine breaks 
radically with the form of divine necessity implied in Plotinus One.
120
  Yet, 
simultaneously, insofar as he thinks of the will as absolute self-determination, the 
preservation of divine immutability entailed that every contingent particularity of the 
world must be determined by God‘s self-determination.  What is regained here for divine 
immutability, in response the first problematic regarding sovereignty above, is bought at 
the expense of free human agency.  Eventually, in his strongest anti-Pelagian position on 
predestination, Augustine appears to adopt a position that eradicates divine goodness by 
eradicating the conditions necessary for human culpability regarding sin, even seeming to 
grant positivity to the negative moment in God‘s eternal decree.121  The hinge of 
immutability that linked sovereignty, goodness, will, and creation has been compromised 
at the level of his understanding of immutability.  Augustine, thus, faces a conflict 
between the demands of his mature theology of grace and the stipulations of his grammar 
of creation.   
This is why it is ironic that he resolves this dilemma by returning to a Platonic 
notion of form that had been present in his earliest of theological reflections, even as he 
now recast this idea in light of the developments in his theology of grace.  The category 
of form allows him to develop an account for how an immutable sovereign agency 
exercises its influence over mutable particulars.  And once Augustine‘s doctrine of 
creation situations these forms in the divine mind, he can then speak of their created 
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 See Ennead VI.8 for the appropriate example in Plotinus.  Rist argues against this interpretation of 
Plotinus (Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, 66-83.) 
121
 See for example City of God, XI.33-XII.5.  It is imperative to recognize that the culprit here is not 
his notion of sovereignty, but his understanding of willing in the exercise of that sovereignty.  Augustine 
will insist that this does not render God the efficient cause of evil, but a positive role of this negation is 
affirmed.  A theory of reprobation seems thus ineluctable.  See Burns, The Development of Augustine's 
Doctrine of Operative Grace, 175-78. 
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actualization as an expression of their participation in and direct dependence upon their 
creator.
122
  This is a significant transformation of the concept of form in that it allows him 
to conceive God‘s governance as the originary establishment of the world‘s potentialities 
and the delimitation of a range of the whole of its given actualities, and to link that 
governance directly to the divine knowledge.
123
   
Temporality is integral to that development.  As with Book X of the Confessions, 
time is the immanent horizon within which the formal potentialities of the whole of the 
distended (distentio) world order are actualized.
124
  It is the milieu in which formal 
potentialities are actualized across the duration of the entire cosmic order, and it is linked 
to form by the mediating role of the rationes seminales.
125
   Recalling both the Stoic idea 
of the logoi spermatikoi and perhaps Basilides‘ notion of the ―world-seed,‖ the rationes 
are the immanent ―seeds‖ of the Divine Ideas within creation.  They are inscribed into its 
fabric from the beginning.   As with Basilides, Augustine maintains that ―the whole 
cosmic process develops according to the original plan of God,‖ and the rationes 
effectively are the immanent means for God‘s governance, present in reality from the 
outset and determining the last detail.
126
  This is exacted according to the three criteria of 
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 See Confessions VII.17; De Trinitate VII.12.  The order and goodness of the Origin that is reflected 
in creation applies only to the whole, and is only relatively perceptible from the perspective of a given part 
of the whole.  This relativity is essential to Augustine‘s account of creation, and is intimately tied to his 
understanding of finitude‘s direct association with temporality.  On the dynamic, temporal qualities of 
creation see Williams, "Creation."251-54.  His appropriation of the category of Form allowed Augustine to 
conceive the goodness of the created order on the analogy of a piece of music wherein the composite of 
different finite potencies and acts express creation as it exists eternally in the Divine Mind in much the way 
the collective notes come together as the symphony envisioned by its composer.  On this point, see Robert 
J. O'Connell, Art and the Christian Intelligence in St. Augustine (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1978), 50-90.      
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 See Literal Commentary on Genesis, VI.10.17, VI.11.18-19.  See also, Williams, "Creation.", 252.    
124
 See Confessions, XI.    
125
 Although the idea is Stoic in origin, Augustine most likely received the notion from Plotinus. See 
Enneads, II.1 and III.1.7.   
126
 See May, Creatio Ex Nihilo., 70-73.   
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measure, number, and weight, which accounts for immanent self-directed growth, 
development, and decay of material reality.  There is a convergence of goodness and 
sovereignty here in that form, time, and the rationes account for the order of the whole of 
finite reality and as established directly by God.  As a result, Augustine can say that God 
created everything at once, and in such a way that the divine simplicity was not 
compromised in the form of absolute immutable self-determination.
127
  In this sense, the 
rationes mark the immanent modality by which God‘s election is realized.   
Importantly, neither the appeal to the Divine Ideas nor the category of rationes 
seminales appears in Augustine‘s doctrine of creation before the Literal Commentary.128  
Prior to this, Augustine is content merely to insist that form and matter arose together ex 
nihilo, and does not appear to believe that an affirmation of providence requires an 
immediate agency governing particulars.  This situates a strong notion of gubernatorial 
providence after the development of his mature theology of grace around 396 CE, and 
supports the argument that this development is the result of the practical and pastoral 
challenges he encountered after becoming embroiled in the Donatist controversy.
129
  If 
this is not the case, it is difficult to see how the level of providential control that 
Augustine affirms would have ever been necessary—or have even occurred to him—if 
not preceded by his recognition of the necessity for an interior operation of God‘s grace 
upon the human will.  We should regard these developments as his attempt to offer some 
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 See Literal Commentary on Genesis, 5.23.45 (see also Williams, "Creation."252.)  
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 A possible exception to this claim could be made by pointing to his comments in Eighty-Three 
Different Questions, 46.  The matter in question regarding this passage must be decided by the date of the 
production of question 46.  While I am inclined to date it after Augustine‘s wrestling with the Pauline 
material as this is expressed in Ad Simplician on the basis of the present argument, I can only direct the 
reader to the discussion of dating in Augustine, Eighty-Three Different Questions, trans. David L. Mosher 
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1977), 1-34.   
129
 See Burns, The Development of Augustine's Doctrine of Operative Grace, 53-88. 
196 
 
account for his new theology of grace, and most specifically the interior operation of God 
upon the will.  As such, these developments in his doctrine of creation stand as evidence 
of the broader impact his theology of grace had on his speculative theological reflections 
as a whole.
130
     
Also, while I have stressed the impact creatio ex nihilo in leading Augustine away 
from Hellenistic cosmogony (and Neoplatonism specifically), this appeal to ontological 
participation in the forms is the most important aspect of his thought where a Platonic 
residue continues to guide his thinking.  Although Augustine significantly transforms his 
Hellenistic inheritance by introducing an idea of agency into it and by arguing that 
created reality arose from nothing, he never completely abandons the emphasis on 
participation that becomes prominent with the return to the forms in the Literal 
Commentary.  Indeed, participation is throughout invaluable in allowing him to hold 
immutability together with that the goodness of reality.  It is the dual force of the 
appropriation of the rationes and the situating of the forms in the Divine Mind that 
accomplishes this.  Whereas creatio ex nihilo had sharply marks the world as the object 
of the divine intention, the rationes are capable of preserving the immanent participation 
in the Divine Ideas that likewise preserve the continuum of the relationship between the 
two.    It is, then, not accidental that Augustine develops so strong an account of 
providence when working out his later doctrine of creation in light of his mature theology 
of grace.
131
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 Against Hanby, this would include The Trinity.  See the argument in Hanby, Augustine and 
Modernity. 
131
 The tenets for a coherent doctrine of creation alone, even one governed by the logic of 
immutability, would not have yielded this result.  Likewise, it is not until the production of The Literal 
Commentary on Genesis that we begin to see the impact of his mature theology of grace on his vision of the 
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Here the significance of immutability is most pronounced.  Given the fact that it is 
Augustine‘s Neoplatonism that is so often appealed to in the attempt to soften the blow of 
his later theology, we must not overlook the significance of this.  Once he has tied the 
affirmation of a contingent creation‘s inherent goodness both to the providential ordering 
and control of God‘s free sovereign will, and conceived that action of ordering according 
to creation‘s participation in the Divine Ideas actualized by means of the rationes 
seminales, an affirmation of ontological necessity is unavoidable.  Pace Carol Harrison, 
then, we must note that this level of necessity is demanded, not primarily because of a 
misplaced distinction between interior and exterior grace on the part of some interpreters, 
but because the participatory schematic of his early position determines this interpretation 
of the mature theology of grace.  Augustine simply cannot imagine a domain of finite 
existence, possessing its own operational integrity and agency, which is not essentially in 
competition with God for control of the world.  Having reworked his metaphysical vision 
in this light, it is Augustine‘s implicit reliance on an emanationist metaphysical scheme in 
working out his mature theology of grace that will, then, appear to be responsible for 
leading him to his most severe of conclusions.  The practical result is that the internal 
necessity Augustine uncovered in Manichean and Neoplatonic metaphysics is turned 
outward onto the world, resulting in a genuine ontological necessity.   
These developments intersect with his notion of the will in important ways.  On 
the whole, whereas the theology of grace had led him to an increasingly strong emphasis 
on the ethical aspect of the will and its exercise, the fact that he understands the divine 
simplicity in terms of immutable self-determination is decisive here for this conclusion of 
                                                                                                                                                 
whole of reality.  Moreover, the metaphysical speculations of The City of God, written even later in the 
midst of the Pelagian controversy, bear out this claim. 
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ontological necessity.  Indeed, from the beginning of his reflection on the theology of 
creation, a strong agential component was integral, allowing him to link the goodness of 
creation directly to the exercise of divine sovereignty.  No difficulty arises on this front as 
long as this goodness is tied simply to the execution or failure of finite self-determination 
in relation to the good.  But once that very capacity is understood to be determined by 
God‘s absolute self-determination, an implicit competition between the two is set up that 
can only be decided in God‘s favor.  The result is an ontological necessity that is directly 
tied to the return to the metaphysical emphasis of his thought.  Uniquely, however, this 
necessity follows from his invocation of participation in the forms as the transcendent 
ideas realized in and through the providential unfolding of the rationes as the media of 
election.
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This speculative elaboration of the theology of creation in light of the mature 
theology of grace remains consistent with the contours of the nature/supernatural 
paradigm.  On the whole, this is true insofar as this speculative approach is grounded in 
the categories of traditional metaphysics, particularly the Platonic categories of form and 
participation, each of which are mediated by notion of rationes seminales.  But more 
importantly, what we find here is the attempt to articulate an account of the whole of 
reality.  In this respect, the synchronic perspective on the creation/grace relationship that 
develops from his reflections on election is recast once more in terms of a diachronic 
metaphysics and a discrete account of salvation history.  This attempt to return to a 
diachronic pattern of relating creation and redemption reveals the fundamental conflict 
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 This aspect of Augustine‘s thought ties him to Heidegger‘s charge of ontotheology.  However, it is 
important to note that his recognition of the ontological difference, noted above, shows the degree to which 
he advances beyond it. 
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between the two ontologies.  Whereas the ontology of encounter tends  to reduce creation 
to a refracted dimension of redemption because of its emphasis on election, the 
metaphysical ontology tends to reduce redemption to an aspect of the established created 
order.  This is the case in the early model in which natural self-determination was the 
conditional basis for both evil and redemption.  In the later model, this is recapitulated in 
such a way that the divine decree is inscribed into reality from the outset as it unfolds 
over time.  In many important respects, Augustine‘s schematic is the inversion of 
Schleiermacher‘s account of election.  Instead of creation being understood as an abstract 
application of the event of redemption to the whole of reality, the whole is here 
understood as metaphysically ordered toward the manifestation of election.
133
  Augustine 
has, thus, succeeded in reducing the insights gained into the existential and social 
dimension of grace to a metaphysical account that once again cannot sustain a distinction 
between grace and creation.   
 
Conclusion: Augustine’s Dual Ontologies 
Reality limits my boundlessness from outside, and this outside is no more intellectually 
conceivable but only believable. 
 
—Dietrich Bonhoeffer134 
 
A reiteration of my argument is in order.  Augustine‘s early theology of creation 
establishes a grammar of creatio ex nihilo that persists throughout his writings.  That 
grammar is characterized, first, by the convertibility of the divine attributes of 
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 The difference here can be said to be that of seeing election as a formal (Schleiermacher) and an 
efficient (Augustine) cause.   
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 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, "Concerning the Christian Idea of God," The Journal of Religion 12, no. 2 
(1932): 193., 177-85.   
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sovereignty and goodness, which mutually establish the goodness of finite materiality.  
No absolute evil materiality (as in Manichaeism) or formless potentiality (as in 
Neoplatonism) precedes or accompanies God‘s creative act of determination.  Second, 
this affirmation of sovereignty and goodness also involves avowing a unique creative act 
of the will.  Creation is thus the result of a rational volitional act that is distinct from the 
divine nature.  Finally, these are bound together by a notion of God‘s immutable self-
presence understood as absolute self-determination.  This idea of self-determination, 
then, serves as the basis for finite human self-determination (liberum arbitrium), which 
grounds his moral rather than ontological definition of evil.  On each of these fronts, 
Augustine‘s thought is representative of metaphysical ontology in its attempt to establish 
an account of the whole of reality in terms of the categories of identity, intellect, and 
participation.  This position is, in its overarching details, essentially that of Lubac‘s and 
Rahner‘s.     
Augustine elaborates upon this grammar even as, after 396 CE, he commences the 
development of his mature theology of grace, which will most significantly alter that 
grammar.  His close reading of Paul in To Simplician leads him to focus his attention on 
his previously unexamined notions of grace, recognizing his previous position to involve 
a notion of merit explicitly rejected by Paul.  This leads Augustine to develop a doctrine 
of election the turning point of which is recognition of the need for God to operate 
directly within the will to affect its response.  This entails significant revision of his 
previous account of the will as self-determination.  He now has to account for the priority 
of affectivity over spontaneity in the will‘s operation, which involves an even greater 
distinction from intellection and desire, as well to incorporate a greater ethical and 
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relational emphasis that emerges in the Donatist controversy.  A free will is now less a 
matter of self-determination, and more a matter of willing rightly.  Grace is now clearly 
perceived as an event distinct from—and even discontinuous with—creation, and was 
correlated with a deeply relational insight into charity.  Each of these points is consistent 
with the ontology of encounter.   
A conflict comes into view here in his grammar of creation.  On the one hand, the 
distinction of grace from creation implies that God is reacting to human sinfulness, which 
compromises his understanding of God‘s immutable self-determination.  On the other 
hand, preserving God‘s immutability on these terms eradicates the contingency of human 
self-determination, which compromises his argument for the moral origin of evil.  The 
culprit here is the persistence of his Neoplatonic understanding of divine simplicity as an 
immutable self-presence of absolute self-determination.   
Augustine attempts to account for these difficulties in his later theology of 
creation, as in the Literal Commentary on Genesis and the City of God.  In doing so, he 
attempts to reframe these dynamic elements of event, relation, and encounter in terms of 
metaphysical ontology.  This involves a reformulation of the Platonic category of form, 
which allows him to account most fully for identity, intellect, and participation most 
completely.  In this light, God‘s determination of reality occurs through the mediation of 
the divine ideas to the world by the rationes seminales implanted at the inception of the 
world, governing scope of reality as it unfolds over time.  While this preserves a 
metaphysical account of justice as the ordering of the whole of reality, the result is an 
ontological necessity in which God‘s immutable self-determination must determine every 
override the contingency of every finite act of self-determination.   
202 
 
We find here a strange return to the consequences of the earlier position in which 
creation and grace are theoretically indistinguishable, and which Aquinas‘ formulation of 
the nature/supernatural paradigm would prove so important.  For grace is not simply a 
category pointing to the contingency of God‘s act of redemption, but likewise a 
fundamental distinction from nature as such.  In this sense, it is, as noted above with 
reference to Wetzel, tied to the distinction of natural and volitional occurrences.  Yet, it is 
just this distinction that is occluded in the later creation account.  Because the 
metaphysical perspective is ordered toward supplying an account of the whole, and must 
now include the divine election, the contingency of finite volition is eradicated (even if 
finite willing remains), and once again collapsed into the natural.   
Nonetheless, the distinction between nature and volition has been made, as has the 
difference between creation and grace.  Each of these differences are captured in the 
existential and relational emphases of the ontology of encounter that continue to impinge 
on the later account, and which are widely recognized as there being compromised.  In 
this sense, Augustine establishes the conditions of possibility for a metaphysical 
reduction of the existential and social emphases of the ontology of encounter, upon which 
Aquinas will build.  But insofar as Augustine‘s vision remained authoritative for Western 
Christianity, these two incommensurable ontologies remained.  When, as discussed in 
Chapter Two, Aquinas resolves these difficulties in Augustine‘s metaphysics, he does so 
in a manner that effectively perfects the metaphysical approach, at the expense of 
eliminating the existential and relational dimension of grace.  In this respect, these 
elements simply awaited reactivation in Luther‘s work.  What is more, those elements 
were intimately attached to an aspect of the content of will‘s orientation—one might 
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equally say, it‘s final cause—to the good that had been neglected by Aquinas‘ 
preoccupation with settling the issue of its form.  That issue pertains to the relationship, 
already noted above, of the will‘s orientation to the good and the affirmation of otherness, 
which first arose in Augustine‘s theology of creation and was implicitly elaborated upon 
in the reliance on charity in his mature theology of grace.  This is the topic of the 
following chapter.    
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CHAPTER V 
   
A CONTINUED IMPASSE 
 
Introduction 
The previous three chapters have traced out and revealed an incommensurability 
between two different schemes for uniting creation and grace.  The last chapter showed 
how these two schemes, the one metaphysical, and the other relational, developed out of 
two discrete trajectories in Augustine‘s theology.  The Roman Catholic and the Protestant 
schemes, each develop one of these trajectories, and neither successfully draws the two 
into harmony.  The final section of the last chapter also showed how Augustine‘s later 
theology of creation reduced the social dimension of his mature theology of grace to its 
constitutive metaphysical elements.  I concluded that this was due to an insufficient 
account of the nature of the will as oriented toward the good, which Chapter Two had 
shown Aquinas effectively supplied and Luther elaborated.  This chapter will focus, 
specifically, on this aspect of the study.   
In this chapter, I will draw the pieces of this argument together by revisiting the 
function of the will as understood by Thomas Aquinas.  Though repeating certain aspects 
of Chapter Two, my concern is different here in that I focus on his development of the 
metaphysical orientation of the will toward the good.  My intent is to show that Aquinas‘ 
analysis stumbles at the very social and relational elements emphasized by the Protestant 
perspective, unable to account fully for those elements.  I also intend to analyze how it is 
that Luther‘s objections to scholastic speculation serve as a necessary transformation of 
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Aquinas‘ metaphysics, and one that returns these concerns of sociality to their rightful 
place.  In showing this, I refer directly to the important work of the Finnish interpretation 
of Luther, which helps to show how Luther‘s work must be understood as directly 
responding to the problem of negative determination that persists in Aquinas‘ account. 
That same Finnish interpretation, inadvertently, also lifts out where Luther himself goes 
wrong.  As the Finnish interpretation makes clear, Luther‘s recuperation of the social 
dimension of grace, nonetheless, runs aground at precise the same difficulty when he 
frames his most important advances in distinctively ontological terms.   
In contrast to this, I argue that what is needed is a metaphysical account of the 
relationship of the will and intellect, as drawn from Aquinas, which can resolve the issues 
that Augustine‘s mature theology of grace causes for his grammar of creation.  But this 
metaphysics must also be able to account for the critique of the Scholastic position as 
developed by Luther, yet without his own ontological reduction.  This analysis sets the 
stage for my own programmatic reformulation in the conclusion.      
 
Nature and the Supernatural: Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Will 
The imperfect is always for something more perfect: therefore, just as matter is for form, 
so also form, which is first act, is for its operation, which is second act; and so operation 
is the end of a created thing. 
 
 —Thomas Aquinas1   
 
 
                                                 
1
 Thomas Aquinas, ST I.105.5.  This discussion on the mechanics of the will, as well as the Latin, in 
Aquinas is throughout dependent on the analyses in David M. Gallagher, "The Will and Its Acts (Ia Iiae, 
Qq. 6-17)," in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press, 2002), Eberhard Schockenhoff, "The Theological Virtue of Charity (Iia Iiae, Qq. 23-46)," in The 
Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), Daniel 
Westberg, Right Practical Reason: Aristotle, Action, and Prudence in Aquinas (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), Daniel Westberg, "Good and Evil in Human Acts (Ia Iiae, Qq 18-21)," in The 
Ethics of Thomas Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002). 
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The focus of Chapter Two was the importance of the role of the will in Aquinas‘ 
account of grace.
2
  I showed that both Lubac and Rahner sought the union of creation and 
grace in terms that occluded the centrality of the will, which was essential to Aquinas‘ 
development of the speculative metaphysics of the Roman Catholic scheme.  They 
reverted to the Platonic account of the will that Aquinas‘ thought overcame and which 
had been integral to that scheme.  The most important mistake of that scheme had been 
the assumption that the performance of the good was principally a matter of right 
knowledge.  Only by recognizing the will as distinct from the intellect and desire could 
the conflicts be resolved in the theology of grace inherited from Augustine.  What 
remains to be seen is how what is achieved regarding the metaphysics of the will comes 
at the expense of Augustine‘s emphasis on the social dimension of the will‘s rectitude.  
Closer analysis of the mechanics of his account of the will is thus in order.      
According to Aquinas‘ treatment in Summa Theologiae I-II.10, the will is to be 
distinguished from nature in that it is the source of all voluntary and contingent activity.  
As he notes, ―the will is distinguished from nature as one kind of cause from another; for 
some things happen naturally and some are done voluntarily‖;3 and the will‘s ―movement 
remains contingent and not necessary, except in those to which it is moved naturally.‖4  
He thus develops the line of argument inherited from Augustine, which sought to 
distinguish voluntary and contingent action from natural operations as such.  On this 
                                                 
2
 I follow Lonergan‘s argument regarding the development of Aquinas‘ thought on the will.  This takes 
ST I-II as the most complete expression of a development beginning with his Commentary on the 
Sentences.  I do not here enter into the debates concerning this development.  For a contrary opinion, see 
Terry J. Tekippe, Lonergan and Thomas on the Will: An Essay in Interpretation (Lanham, Md.: University 
Press of America, 1993).  See also the response, J. Michael Stebbins, "What Did Lonergan Really Say 
About Aquinas' Theory of the Will?," Method: Jornal of Lonergan Studies 12 (1994). 
3
 See ST I-II 10.1.1 ad 
4
 See ST I-II.10.4 
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basis, Aquinas understands the will as an appetite (appetitus)
5
 insofar as it is both ordered 
toward a desire, the power by which the desire arises, and also the basis for free choice 
(liberum arbitrium.)
6
  The will is thus a principle of self-determination in much the way 
Augustine understood it, but is specifically designated as that set of operations by which 
the good is attained in actuality.  Where Aquinas developed beyond Augustine was in 
recognizing not only the distinction of the will from desire and intellect, but in realizing 
that the will is itself an ―intellectual appetite.‖7  It was this recognition that allowed him 
to properly differentiate willing from intellect without succumbing to the Platonic or 
Scotist confusions on the matter.   
The designation ―intellectual appetite‖ means the will is moved to action first by 
an object apprehended by the intellect as a good.
8
  The formal cause of the will‘s act is 
not the goodness of the thing itself, but the universal good that transcends the material 
expression of that which is intellectually apprehended.
9
  This universality is central to 
Aquinas‘ account, as the will is ordered not simply by the desire for a particular good, as 
is the case in non-intellectual creatures, but by desire for Good per se.  This Good can 
only be intellectually—that is, not sensibly—apprehended.10  Such apprehension 
actualizes the will‘s capacity to will the Good, which corresponds to the proper 
transcendental ordering of the natural cosmological hierarchy: first of the universe as a 
                                                 
5
 See ST I.80.1, I.82.1 This understanding of appetite as desire and the power by which desire arises is 
from Gallagher, "The Will and Its Acts (Ia Iiae, Qq. 6-17)," 86 n. 5. 
6
 See ST I.83.3-4.  ST I.83.2 is of special concern for noting that free-will is to be understood 
specifically as a ―power‖ and not simply as a habit or a power and a habit, and I.83.3 further specificies that 
this power is ―appetitive.‖   
7
 See ST  I.59.1 and I.80.1-2, I.82.3-4, I.83.2-4.    
8
 As Lonergan insists, it is the first (formal) act of the intellect that moves the will to its action, and is 
passive.  The self-determining choice of the will cannot move itself to will God for God‘s sake, as this end 
exceeds its natural capacity. 
9
 See ST I.82.4, I-II.8.1, I-II.10.2-4. 
10
 See ST I-II.9.1-2 (this should not be taken to mean that the sensible appetite does not move the 
intellect, only that sensation itself does not) and II-II.24.1.     
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whole, then the preservation of the species, and finally to the individual.
11
  To will the 
Good as such is to will the order of universality in which that Good is finitely manifested.  
Upon apprehending these goods properly, the will is to will them in that proper order, 
giving more love to those things of higher value, beginning with the most universal and 
descending to the most singular.  Aquinas inherited this understanding of the ordo 
caritatis from Augustine.
12
   
  Aquinas insists that love (amor) is the most basic relationship between the will 
and the Good.  The affection aroused by apprehension of the good gives rise to desire 
(desiderium) for it, and this desire is love (amor.)
13
   It is desire because the apprehended 
good is not yet attained and enjoyed (delectatio/gaudium.)  That desire is for a 
correspondence between its own activity and the ordered totality of creation, to know 
itself, as an individual, to be ordered rightly in relation to its species and the universe as a 
whole.   Every appetite—natural, sensible, or rational—is an expression of love in that 
what is desired is this harmonious correspondence.
14
  But the will is unique amongst 
these faculties in that, as an intellectual appetite, it alone desires good for its own sake, 
desires to intellectually apprehend itself as harmoniously participating in the 
metaphysical order of the whole.   
                                                 
11
 See ST I.60.5.3 ad and I-II.109.3.  See Gallagher, "The Will and Its Acts (Ia Iiae, Qq. 6-17)," 72. 
12
 See ST  II-II.26.  This should be supplemented with the discussion at I.60.5.3 ad and I-II.109.3.  My 
discussion of the significance of the ordo caritatis in this chapter is indebted to Sammeli Juntunen, "Luther 
and Metaphysics: What Is the Structure of Being According to Luther?," in Union with Christ: The New 
Finnish Interpretation of Luther, ed. Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1998).  The reader should also consult Juntunen, Der Begriff Des Nichts.  The most comprehensive analysis 
and history of the concept is given at Raunio, Summe Des Christlichen Lebens: Die "Goldene Regel" Als 
Gesetz Der Liebe in Der Theologie Martin Luthers Von 1510-1527, 56-124. 
13
See ST  I-II.26.2  See also, ―Every agent acts for an end…Now the end is the good desired and loved 
by each one.  Wherefore it is evident that every agent, whatever it is, does every action from love of some 
kind‖ (I-II.28.6.) 
14
 See ST I-II.28.6.  See Gallagher, "The Will and Its Acts (Ia Iiae, Qq. 6-17)," 84-85. 
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The rational love manifested in the will is a ―dilection‖ (dilectio15), a unique 
arrangement of concupiscence (amor concupiscentiae) and friendship (amor amicitiae).
16
  
Gallagher notes that an important critique of egoism emerges here in Aquinas precisely 
as related to issues of relational and existential concerns.
17
  As appetitive, the will 
expresses desire as a self-regarding good.  What is desired is the attainment of an object 
(concupiscence), but this object is always desired for the sake of a person (friendship).
18
  
On this point, Aquinas quotes Aristotle, from Rhetoric 3.4, that ―to love is to wish good 
to someone.‖19  Friendship is thus the more basic of the two, since every good object is 
only willed for a person.
20
  Friendship is also most comprehensive since only persons are 
willed for their own sakes and not as a means for some other object or as something to be 
possessed, like knowledge.
21
  All the more, every non-personal good is willed for the 
sake of attaining some good for a person.
22
   
However, Aquinas importantly does not conclude from this that friendship 
implies the priority of loving persons other than ourselves.  Indeed, the opposite is largely 
the case: every good object is willed as a good primarily for oneself.
23
  Even beatitude is 
an expression of friendship as fundamental self-love.
24
  What Aquinas is affirming, 
however, is an account of how we rationally determine the right persons to love, the 
proper hierarchical ordering, and the proper goods for them—in and the willing of those 
                                                 
15
 See ST I-II.26.3.  Not delectatio, which is the enjoymet of a good attained.  See Gallagher, Ibid., 84. 
16
 See ST I-II.26.4.  See Gallagher, Ibid. See also ST I.60.3.   
17
 See Gallagher, Ibid., 85. 
18
 Ibid., 84-85. 
19
See ST  I-II.26.4.   
20
 See ST I-II.26.4 
21
 See ST I.60.3.  Gallagher notes an important connection with Kant here.  See Gallagher, "The Will 
and Its Acts (Ia Iiae, Qq. 6-17)," 85. 
22
 See ST I-II.26.4 and I-II.73.9.  Gallagher notes that Aquinas understnds love of friendship to include 
love of concupiscence, and cites In div. nom., chapter 4, lect. 9, n. 405.  See Gallagher, Ibid., 84 n. 43. 
23
 See ST I.60.3.  See Gallagher, Ibid., 84. 
24
 See ST I.60.3. 
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goods in their proper order, which is the mark of his understanding of ethical activity in 
accordance with the ordo caritatis.
25
   
An interesting perspective emerges here in his account.  Because every human 
wills the universal Good principally as a form of friendship arising from self-love, and 
the goal of that willing is the Good itself, the will cannot itself produce an act capable of 
attaining that Good.  And this is due, principally, to the fact that the nature of the will is 
fundamentally oriented toward self-preservation.  What Aquinas is pointing to is the 
peculiar situation in which the universal good is the concupiscent object of the will, but in 
such a manner that the orientation toward personal fulfillment is overturned by the 
friendship one shares with God.
26
  This is a situation in which the personal good is 
fulfilled, but not with reference to onself but God‘s own good alone.27  The natural 
operations of the will, then, have the consequence of subsuming and instrumentalizing 
the universal good to its own end of self-preservation.
28
  A habit of charity is infused 
precisely in order to elevate the will above its natural self-regard so that its created 
perfection is achieved in and through the ecstatic and harmonious coincidence of its own 
activity with the whole of the cosmic order of which it is a part.
29
  As carried out by a 
free yet finite creature, this act is decidedly super-natural precisely because it lies beyond 
                                                 
25
 See ST II-II.26   
26
 Gallagher, "The Will and Its Acts (Ia Iiae, Qq. 6-17)," 84-85. 
27
 As we will see, whether Aquinas can fulfill this will be the concern adopted by Luther.   
28
 Aquinas explicitly notes that every act aims at the universal good, and not simply at the fulfillment 
of itself.  But, what is in question here is the sense in which the unviersal good is willed directly, for its 
own sake, as the expression of one‘s friendship with God and not for oneself (in the sense of including 
oneself in the universal).  See ST I.60.5, I-II.28.2-3, I-II.109. 3. 1,ST  II-II.180.1.  On this point, see 
Gallagher, "The Will and Its Acts (Ia Iiae, Qq. 6-17)," 72.   
29
 This good is not impersonal, nor is it directed at the cosmos as such.  On the contrary, the good of 
the universe as a whole, including as it does the totality of all persons, is itself only a good among goods, 
not the Good per se.  But, moreover, the ecstatic good that is actualized here is personal because it is the 
universal Good that is Godself, whose greater comprehensiveness includes oneself, one‘s neighbor, and 
God.  See ST I-II.28.3 and II.II.180.1.   
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its own natural capacities, and is carried out in concert with the divine operation, with 
friendship as its mode.  Friendship with another always involves assuming her good as 
the good I desire for myself, as the enjoyment (delectatio/gaudium) of my friends‘ 
attainment of virtue.
30
  Yet friendship with God involves enjoying the Good per se, which 
is the good that God wills, as our own perfection.  This claim means that we love God for 
Godself and will the order of the world, and our place within it, as it is willed by God.  
The Good that is God‘s essence is manifested in the reality of the cosmos as a whole, in 
its various refracted and complex dimensions and relationships.  Our proper good, then, 
lies in our being properly related, in and through our own agency, to this divine order.
31
  
Aquinas‘ treatments of predestination, providence, and fate are to be understood in 
precisely this same sense, and are absolutely integral and irreducible elements of his 
vision.
32
  Because of this union, a hierarchical metaphysical ordering of relationships is 
strictly reinforced and required for the vision.   
Aquinas‘ concern is to articulate the transcendental ordering of the whole of 
reality to its perfection, and the human being‘s cooperative production of an act in 
harmony with that perfection.
33
  Oliva Blanchette‘s analysis of Aquinas‘ logic of 
perfection is important for this point as it highlights the extent to which Aquinas has 
moved beyond Augustine‘s notion of the immutable presence conceived as absolute self-
determination.
34
  In Augustine‘s grammar of creation, immutability was the category 
                                                 
30
 See ST I-II.28.1-2. Gallagher, "The Will and Its Acts (Ia Iiae, Qq. 6-17)," 85. 
31
 See ST I.60.5.3 ad, I.103, I-II.19.4,  II.II.23.2.   
32
 See ST I.23, I.103, I.116, I-II.109, I-II.112, II-II.58 
33
 See ST I-II.19.9-10 
34
 Oliva Blanchette, "The Logic of Perfection in Aquinas," in Thomas Aquinas and His Legacy, ed. 
David M. Gallagher, Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy (Washington, D.C.: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1994), 107-30.  This article in many ways represents the argument of his 
larger study, Blanchette, The Perfection of the Universe.  Referring to the Oxford English Dictionary, he 
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designating absolute perfection. Yet Aquinas very early recognized that perfection can 
only properly be understood as completion (factum esse) of that which is coming-to-be 
(fieri.)
35
  It was the application of this realization to the distinction between natural and 
acquired habits that led to both the distinction of intellect from will and nature from the 
supernatural.  Perfection is only the goal of a motion: ―the attainment of the fullness of its 
nature and power according to its species‖;36 it is the realization of the proper operation 
of the form of a thing.
37
  As Blanchette notes, the perfection of the universe is the 
harmonious totality of that which is the goal of the various motions making up the 
universe when considered as a whole.
38
  Aquinas speaks of the perfection of the universe 
as a whole as a relative manifestation of the Good per se.
39
  The degree to which the 
Good is expressed is directly proportionate to the differentiation internal to the 
functioning of a whole.
40
  The greater the difference, the greater the complexity there is, 
which means the greater capacity that the perfection of the whole has of reflecting and 
                                                                                                                                                 
notes that there are three dominant English definitions of ―perfection.‖  The first is ―to be fully 
accomplished, thoroughly versed and skilled in some activity.‖  The second, which is the one most 
commonly associated at present with God, is ―the state of complete excellence, free from any flaw or 
imperfect quality.‖  As discussed in the previous chapter, Augustine‘s understanding of the divine 
simplicity is a combination of the two, namely, a fully accomplished self-determinate excellence.  Yet, 
there is a third definition, which has become obsolete in English before the last century.  This definition 
implies the idea of something that is ―thoroughly made, formed, done, performed, carried out, 
accomplished.‖  This was the definition implied by Aquinas‘ word ―perfectum,‖ to which no reference to 
divinity was included.  I have relied on Blanchette‘s analysis throughout.   
35
 See ST  I.4.4.1 ad.  As Blanchette notes, the word is formed from the Latin facere or fieri, meaning 
―to be made‖ or ―to become.‖ See Blanchette, "The Logic of Perfection in Aquinas," 107-16. 
36
 Ibid., 110. 
37
 See the helpful discussion of Lonergan on actus perfecti and imperfecti in Stebbins, The Divine 
Initiative..  The form is therefore understood as the actus imperfecti of the thing, which is actualized in and 
through the act of thing that is more properly understood as the actus perfecti. This distinction is also noted 
in Blanchette, The Perfection of the Universe.  See also Blanchette, "The Logic of Perfection in Aquinas," 
107-16. 
38
 See Blanchette, "The Logic of Perfection in Aquinas," 116. 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 The reader is directed to the disucssion of the perfection of the universe at Ibid., 117-25. The idea is 
that a whole composed of differentiated parts, working in harmony, is a greater manifestation of the good 
than an undifferentiated whole. 
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manifesting the Goodness of its Source.  Blanchette uses the example of a lake to 
illustrate the point: a body of water exhibits a greater degree of continuity and stability 
than does an animal, but that stability comes at the cost of a decreased capacity to 
manifest the good of perfection.  And this greater degree of differentiation that yields a 
greater manifestation of the harmony of the good occurs at the cost of an increased 
probability of instability, entropy, and even disharmony at the level of individual parts.
41
  
For Aquinas, then, a greater differentiation corresponds to a greater capacity for 
perfection, which is itself a greater capacity for the Good.   
This insight is rooted in the unity of essence and existence that is the hallmark of 
Aquinas‘ understanding of Being (esse.)  God is not a being among beings, nor is God an 
agent among agents.  Rather, God is Being itself (ipsum esse), which involves no 
becoming.  In this sense, Augustine‘s problem is overcome when Aquinas recognizes that 
perfection does not properly designate an attribute of God at all.  God is the act of 
existence, not the grandest expression of completed motion.
42
  It is this very insight, first 
formulated ca. 1255 CE in De ente et essentia, that established the basis for the 
metaphysical differentiations that would prove so important for his distinction of will 
from intellect and supernatural from the natural.  In this light, perfection applies only 
properly to creatures; and, with specific regard to intellectual creatures, such perfection is 
acquired through volition.  This is because the will is an ―intellectual appetite‖ in which it 
is the abstract apprehension of the form of the Good that moves the will to attain the 
Good that perfects it.  As noted, this good is the goal of the will‘s operation.  Priority lies 
not only with the intellectual apprehension of the form, but with the recognition that this 
                                                 
41
 See Ibid., 118.  
42
 This is the basic Heideggerian misunderstanding as regards the category of ontotheology.   
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form is the hierarchically ordered expression of Godself.  The order of this hierarchy 
flows downward, first from the perfected order of the universe as a whole, then to the 
species, and finally to the individual.  The creature‘s friendship with God is, then, less a 
matter of willing this order per se, than it is of willing the reality of the ideal of the Good 
as expressed in that order, and precisely as it is abstractly apprehended by the intellect.  
This is similar to the Stoic notion of freedom fulfilled in the immanent harmony of the 
cosmos, but it is distinct in that the concupiscent object of the will‘s act is neither itself 
nor the cosmos as a whole, but Godself.  The creature finds her perfection not as a 
determined member of a universal order, but in friendship with God whose Goodness is 
manifested in that order.  Indeed, Aquinas insisted that, as naturally ordered toward self-
preservation, the will lacked the immanent form necessary to produce its own operative 
perfection.  In this way, the operation of the will in charity that marks the perfection of 
form cannot be produced by the will but must rather be received.  Aquinas‘ insight into 
the nature of the will, then, genuinely reveals that the natural operations of form only 
produce acts proportionate to that nature, while being capable of receiving operations that 
transcend its own productivity.  The important point of note here is that Aquinas 
recognizes, with his invocation of the operative aspect of actual and habitual grace, that 
the will‘s natural activity is only proportionate to produce acts that are expressions of its 
own orientation toward the good of its own self-preservation.  In order to produce an act 
that is not merely an expression of this self-preservation, the creature must receive the 
operation of charity, which transcends any given natural operation such that it can 
produce acts that are expressions of that charity.   
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What is received is the divine charity expressed in the cosmic order as 
intellectually apprehended and cooperatively willed as the creature‘s fulfillment—a 
charity that is neither naturally apprehensible by the intellect nor naturally possible of 
being willed.
43
  In this regard, the structure is the same as that which distinguishes the 
perfection of immutable self-determination from the act of existence.  When the intellect 
apprehends God as its concupiscent object, the will is moved to choose the means to 
attain that good as its perfection.  That this good is ecstatic in this manner is the substance 
of its designation as supernatural.        
It is on this point that the Platonic influence on Aquinas‘s ―alleged 
Aristotelianism‖ is most apparent.44  Indeed, what Aquinas is seeking here is in keeping 
not only with Aristotle‘s idea of actualized excellences, but the kind of ecstatic beatitude 
(eudaimonia) Plato envisions in the contemplation (theoria) of oneself as a manifestation 
of an ordered whole (to kalon).  The influence of Pseudo-Dionysius is perhaps most 
palpable in just such facets.  But Aquinas‘ Aristotelianism is present in such a manner as 
to transform the very Platonic elements of self-determination that caused Augustine to 
run aground.  His appeal to potency and act helps him to avoid these problems, precisely 
insofar as they allow him to perceive this fundamental priority of receptivity at the heart 
of all created natures and their perfection, which is itself premised on insight into God as 
the act of existence (esse.)  Importantly, this means that the offer, acceptance, and 
reception of grace pertain most properly not to the free human act of means to its end, but 
to the transcendental ordering of the whole of created being as such.  It is for this reason 
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 On this basis, one is justified in saying that the will is, in some sense, the only proper instance of a 
pure nature.   
44
 I advert here to the instructive phrasing and thesis of Mark D. Jordan, The Alleged Aristotelianism of 
Thomas Aquinas, Etienne Gilson Series (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1992). 
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that Aquinas is not only a predestinarian, but insists that providence is properly 
convertible with the idea of fate.
45
  This is no mere Stoicism, since genuine contingency 
is part of that world order as pertains to the means to the end.  But whether one receives 
the divine operation that actualizes the will‘s capacity for charity is finally a matter of 
God‘s providential governance of the whole.46  Friendship with God is here understood in 
terms of the union of wills, wherein the common good of the created order is willed by 
the creature in harmony with the divine will manifest in that order.
47
  This repeats the 
ordo caritatis in which God, as the highest and most universal, is to be the direct object 
of love and enjoyed for Godself alone, followed by the self at whom all actions are 
directed, and then the neighbor, who is loved together with both.
48
  It is God, as the most 
universal, that here encompasses both love of self and neighbor, while properly ordering 
them.   
It is just here that we can see how the extraordinary significance of Aquinas‘ 
accomplishment comes at the expense of the social dimension of Augustine‘s mature 
theology of grace.  This may not be immediately apparent, as the differentiations of 
multiplicity are integral to a greater manifestation of the good, which might seem to 
imply a deep continuity with sociality, especially as Aquinas conceives of these ideas in 
terms of love and friendship.  And with this notion, Aquinas has clearly resolved the 
metaphysical difficulties attendant to Augustine‘s grammar of creation in the wake of his 
mature theology of grace, yet his approach is consistent with Augustine‘s strategy in The 
Literal Commentary, where the social dimension of the justice and the rectitude of the 
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 See ST I.116.1 
46
 See ST I.23.1 and 5, I-II.109. 
47
 See ST I.28.1-3 
48
 See ST I.26 
217 
 
will is metaphysically inflected in terms of a cosmic ordo caritatis.  The real advance 
occurs in that the combined force of Aquinas‘ work on God‘s being, nature and the 
supernatural, and the will and the intellect is that human agency is no longer contrasted 
with divine agency.  But he is saying something even more fundamental: namely, that a 
non-competitive relationship of divine and human agency must be grounded in the 
affirmation of the absolute priority of the divine operation and initiative.  This point was 
quite clearly recovered in Lonergan‘s insistence on the significance of recognizing that 
the first act of form is passive (a pati), which I have emphasized throughout this study.  
Concupiscence as such is not the problem here.  Rather, the basic confusion arises from 
Aquinas‘ conception of the will in terms of self-preservation.  As such, the very 
realization of charity is undermined in the willing of it.  This was the very problem 
Augustine recognized in treating the relational component at the heart of the will, naming 
its right order to ―charity‖ and conceiving of it socially.  
The contemporary debates of the proper relationship of the natural to the 
supernatural in Roman Catholic theology represent the attempt to recover this social 
dimension of grace.  It is perhaps most evident in Henri de Lubac‘s largely organicist 
model for understanding the church, as represented principally in Catholicism.  The links 
of this theology to his political vision were also noted in chapter two, and this is also 
bound up with his appreciation of Teilhard de Chardin.
49
  This social dimension was first 
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 Maurice Blondel et al., Pierre Teilhard De Chardin. Maurice Blondel, Correspondence ([New 
York]: Herder and Herder, 1967), Henri de Lubac, L'éternel Féminin, Étude Sur Un Texte Du Père 
Teilhard De Chardin (Paris,: Aubier-Montaigne, 1968), Henri de Lubac, The Religion of Teilhard De 
Chardin (New York,: Desclee Co., 1967), Henri de Lubac, Teilhard De Chardin: The Man and His 
Meaning, [1st American ed. (New York,: Hawthorn Books, 1965), Henri de Lubac, La Prière Du Père 
Teilhard De Chardin, Le Signe (Paris,: A. Fayard, 1964), Henri de Lubac, La Pensée Religieuse Du Père 
Pierre Teilhard De Chardin ([Paris]: Aubier, 1962), Henri de Lubac, The Eternal Feminine; a Study on the 
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represented in Catholicism and reinforced by the study, Corpus Mysticum.
50
  
Comparatively, Rahner‘s account of the union of creation and grace is formulated 
explicitly in terms of personalism and set in opposition to substance metaphysics.   
In each case, as I have shown, the difficulty is that both thinkers recover this 
element by way of appeal to the very elements in Augustine that simultaneously 
generated the insight and precluded its overcoming: namely, the assumption of a self-
determining will that merely follows the intellect‘s designation of the good.  So as to 
prevent the metaphysical reduction of the human being to the hierarchical ordering of the 
whole of reality, Lubac and Rahner both invoked the self-determining capacity of the 
human being, reconceived in personalist terms.  This reconstruction had the ultimate 
effect of actually occluding the real problem, which is directly concerned with specifying 
how a supernatural good comes to be willed for its own sake at all.  In this respect, the 
contemporary debate in Roman Catholic theology over the proper relationship of nature 
to the supernatural is itself an implicit recognition of the problems inherent to Aquinas‘ 
solution.  To take Aquinas seriously on these points would be to erase just those 
ecclesiological and soteriological elements so dear to both Lubac‘s and Rahner‘s projects.  
It would also require retaining the more medieval shape of the Neo-Scholastic 
ecclesiology and certain aspects of its understanding of grace (albeit perhaps without 
natura pura.)  Emphasis on the social dimension, then, involved recovering the very 
                                                                                                                                                 
Poem by Teilhard De Chardin, Followed by Teilhard and the Problems of Today, [1st U.S. ed. (New York,: 
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category that Aquinas had to dissolve in order to achieve an effective solution to the 
problems posed by grace.  This emphasis set the issue down with one foot in the early 
Augustinian position on freedom and grace and the other in the mature position on 
sociality.  The resolution of the problems of the one side would involve invoking 
Aquinas‘ theory of the will which would dissolve the social dimension, and the 
affirmation of the social dimension apart from the Platonic metaphysics of the early 
Augustine led directly in to Protestant territory. Indeed, the difficulty that Luther will 
raise with this notion, as I will show in the following section, is whether it is appropriate 
to name it ―charity.‖  But my present concern is with the metaphysical issues bound up 
with that claim.  This difficulty was adumbrated in Chapter Three, where a dialectic of 
negative determination as the form under which the ideal is actualized was discussed.  It 
is this that we must now consider. 
  
Sin and Grace: The Social Dimension of Grace 
The end of the generation of a man is the human form; yet the end of the man is not his 
form, but through form it is fitting for him to act toward an end. 
 
 —Thomas Aquinas51 
 
 
This social dimension of the creation and grace relation that emerged in 
Augustine was decidedly recuperated in Luther and extended by the Protestant paradigm.  
Chapter Three argued that Luther‘s protest against late-Scholastic theology was 
registered against its neglect of the affective dimension of the will that had been essential 
to Aquinas.  Indeed, Luther‘s opposition to speculative logic in the Disputation on 
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  In II Physicorum, lect. 11, n. 242 quoted from Blanchette, "The Logic of Perfection in Aquinas," 
116..   
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Scholastic Theology is directed decisively at Scholastic theology‘s perpetuation of the 
structure of self-preservation, which Luther believes to be emblematic of rebellious 
humanity.  Luther clearly associates that structure with reliance on Aristotelian habitus to 
describe justification in terms of an act made possible by the presence of the accidental 
form of charity.  By insisting that ―grace alone is sufficient, or it means nothing,‖ Luther 
was not only advancing Aquinas‘ own teaching on the affective dimension of the will, 
but developing his insight specifically in terms of the social dimension of Augustine‘s 
theology of grace Aquinas left behind.
52
  As we will see, the most important problem 
with Luther‘s proposal is that it he links it specifically to the Augustinian-Lombardian 
position the rejection of which is integral to Aquinas‘ metaphysics of the will.  However, 
while this does become ultimately problematic for Luther, he does avoid much of this 
with his dialectic of sin and grace in which the self‘s structure of self-determination is 
ruptured as it is constantly confronted with the task of affirming, in faith, a gracious 
determination of its being that can only appear in thought under the form of this 
contrast.
53
  Indeed, the problem with the Scholastic notion of justification was that it 
understood justification in terms of the product of a motion,
54
 which thus linked it with 
the competitive vision that Aquinas‘s metaphysical advances had overcome.  This section 
will elaborate upon this point.       
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 See Simo Peura, "Christ as Favor and as Gift (Donum): The Challenge of Luther's Understanding of 
Justification," in Union with Christ: The New Finnish Interpretation of Luther, ed. Carl E. Braaten and 
Robert W. Jenson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 48-49.  He notes that Luther‘s  Commentary on 
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 This is exactly how Aquinas describes it in ST I-II.113.1.  There justification is described as the 
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movement is not itself the justification, as Aquinas notes, in ST I-II.113, but the perfection of the motion in 
the just act.  The significance of this distinction is the mark of the difference between Aquinas and Luther.   
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The most important insights in this regard have been supplied by those associated 
with the so-called ―Finnish‖ interpretation of Luther.55  Their work helps us to see the 
sense in which Luther‘s work is not too easily 7set in opposition to metaphysical 
questions, but should rather be understood as taking up a peculiar relationship to them.  
Central to Luther‘s critique, they claim, is the fundamentally social and relational 
component of Luther‘s work.56  Tuomo Mannermaa has argued this claim extensively, 
insisting that Luther scholarship has been overly influenced by nineteenth-century Neo-
Kantian interpreters, and especially the work of Hermann Lotze.  Such interpreters 
maintain the Kantian separation of phenomena from noumena, suggesting that the unity 
of God and believer in faith must only be a matter of individual assent to God‘s extrinsic 
decree.  The Finns insist, however, that Luther‘s thought is essentially realist in the same 
sense as Aquinas‘, operating according to the assumption that the formal being of the 
known object must be within the knower.  Knowledge of Christ is thus a real, ontological 
union in which the Christian partakes of Christ‘s divine nature by faith, receiving both his 
favor and his grace.
57
  This ontological realism is fundamentally Trinitarian: faith 
receives the very Word of the Father and thereby is drawn into God‘s Trinitarian life. 
The key distinction from Scholastic thought that Luther develops lies with the role 
he ascribes to faith in salvation.  Whereas Scholastic thought took charity as the form of 
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faith (fides charitate formata), Luther insisted that faith alone must be saving precisely 
because Christ himself is its form (fides Christi formata.)
58
  For the Scholastic model of 
justification, the acts of faith, hope, and good works supply substantial content, through 
the necessary cooperative second acts, for what is an otherwise purely formal ―charity.‖  
As the accidental form, charity is the ideal goal of the action that is realized in and 
through the theological acts of faith and hope, such that these acts can be said to ―merit‖ 
justification.
59
  Acts of faith and hope realize the ideal of charity.  Luther does not dispute 
that charity is saving, but rather insists that Jesus Christ alone is its form—with faith as 
the mode of receiving and responding to God‘s promise given in him.60  On his model, 
faith cannot be a realization of the form of charity
61
 as its created ideal, but rather the 
manifestation of its reality.  Faith is one‘s response to the encounter with that reality.  As 
such, for Luther, faith alone justifies because faith is the mode of union with Christ (unio 
cum Christi), who is its formal object, who does not require an additional perfection.
62
  
The paradigm of speculative metaphysics is here decisively replaced with one of personal 
encounter, thus retrieving the social and relational dimension of grace.      
It is the connection of this claim to a refusal of speculative metaphysics that has 
been so clearly misunderstood in the appropriation of Luther‘s work.  Despite the Finns‘ 
recovery of the centrality of theosis in Luther over against the otherwise narrow ethical 
paradigm of Neo-Protestantism, they do not adequately grasp how it is that Luther‘s 
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 See Reijo Työrinoja, "Opus Theologicum.  Luther and Medieval Theories of Action," Neue 
Zeitschrift Für Systematische Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 44, no. 2 (2002). 
59
See ST  I-II.114.1.  Importantly, ―merit‖ means something quite different for Aquinas than it does for 
Biel and other Late Medieval scholastics.  See Työrinoja, Ibid.  Nonetheless, the point remains the same 
according to my analysis.   
60
 See Mannermaa and Stjerna, Christ Present in Faith: Luther's View of Justification, 26-30. 
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 See ST I-II.62.4 
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 See Peura, "Christ as Favor and as Gift (Donum): The Challenge of Luther's Understanding of 
Justification," 53-56. 
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approach is set in opposition to speculative metaphysics.
63
  Luther‘s most astute 
interpreter on the question, Sammeli Juntunen, explicitly rejects the claim that Luther‘s 
thought is ―antimetaphysical and antiontological.‖64  His argument is levied against 
Ebeling and Joest, who insist on a merely ―personalist‖ interpretation of Luther, which 
seeks to obviate questions of being as ―corrupted questions.‖65  Juntunen insists that 
Luther is ―antimetaphysical‖ and more ―relational and existential‖ not because of a 
―refusal of the concept of being,‖ but because of ―a certain understanding of love, which 
is fundamental for his theology.‖66  It is this understanding of love that is central to the 
analysis being developed here.   
The decisive point is marked by Luther‘s distinction between God‘s love (amor 
dei) and human love (amor hominis), where Luther understands the latter—with 
Aquinas—as a natural and good expression of self-preservation.67  Luther states clearly 
that all natural human loves are directed toward the good, but in such a way that this good 
is sought self-interestedly.  This love is to be contrasted with God‘s.  Juntunen 
summarizes Luther‘s position on God‘s love:  
…God is in his essence a pure, giving love whose motive is not to get good for himself, 
but to give good to that which lacks it in itself.  God‘s love is creative; it never finds its 
object as something preexistent.  Rather it turns to that which is nothing and is in itself 
needy in order to creative it and make it existent and good through loving it.
68
 
 
 
                                                 
63
 This is perhaps what is most important about Eberhard Jüngel‘s insistence on the inappropriateness 
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All natural human loves are to be contrasted with God‘s love, not because they 
are opposed to it, but because they are finite.  This finitude involves creatures in a 
necessary orientation toward self-preservation.  The resulting love, Juntunen notes, is 
―egoistic.‖69  Such a claim is not tantamount, as is often claimed, to a version of 
Manichaeism or even a reversion to the early medieval problem of the relationship of sin 
and nature.  On the contrary, Luther‘s point is here perfectly coincident with Aquinas‘ 
analysis of the same phenomenon.  Neither Aquinas nor Luther thinks this impulse is 
evil,
70
 and both concur that operations beyond this natural orientation are only possible 
through participation in God‘s own life.  This affirmation is the basis of Luther‘s doctrine 
of theosis.  Yet, unlike Aquinas, Luther insists that participation in God‘s own life 
involves a transformation of the ordo caritatis scheme because love is primarily self-
bestowal.
71
   
Juntunen insists that this critique of speculative metaphysics does not itself entail 
that Luther would, as he takes Ebeling and Joest to mean, eliminate the concept of being 
(esse) from theology.  Rather, Juntunen suggests that Luther‘s distinction of esse naturae 
and esse gratiae is not between existential self-understandings, but rather intended to 
highlight the specifically affective (affectus) dimension of being.
72
  Both esse naturae 
and esse gratiae are expressions of the world‘s dependence on God as being through an-
other (ens per aliud.)  This disallows an overly actualistic interpretation of grace in terms 
of becoming in that it underscores the persistent internal continuity of the created 
                                                 
69
 Ibid. 
70
See  Ibid.  
71
 See Ibid., 134 n. 22.. 
72
 See Ibid., 137. 
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reception of being.
73
  Esse gratiae is not merely the existential perception of being as 
graced, but an actual transformation of naturae gratiae.  As Juntunen and the other 
Finnish interpreters recognize, what is at stake here is whether the transformation 
wrought by justification is a genuine, intrinsic ontological change or if it is merely 
epistemic and accidental.
74
   
Juntunen is certainly right that Ebeling has misunderstood the consequences of 
Luther‘s emphasis on the relational and dynamic aspects of being.  And he is all the more 
right to insist that this involves a clear affirmation of the intrinsic continuity of created 
existence.  Yet this does not necessarily mean that the critique of ontology is completely 
without merit.  This is the case, primarily, because Juntunen‘s interpretation of Luther is 
striking, on just this point, for the correlation it reveals with our earlier analysis of 
Schleiermacher and Barth.  As we saw in Chapter Three, by beginning with the concrete, 
historical, and existential conditions of existence, both Schleiermacher and Barth 
emphasize the dialectical contrast of sin and grace as inaugurated by the encounter with 
the Word of God in Christ.  This encounter discloses the ontological reality that grounds 
and determines that structure.  For Schleiermacher, the general human awareness of 
absolute dependence receives religious determination as divine creation/preservation, 
which is yet further determined within the Christian consciousness of sin and grace as the 
doctrine of election.  The whole of creation is ontologically ordered toward the 
actualization of the social reality of the Kingdom of God as mediated by the church.  
Barth, by contrast, insists on a stronger distinction between creation and redemption, 
tying election not to the church, but to the unanticipated appearance of Jesus Christ 
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himself as the subject and object of election.  Whereas for Schleiermacher the ontological 
secret of the world is the Kingdom of God, actualized in Jesus, for Barth this is only 
because Jesus Christ himself is the principle.       
The Finnish interpretation of Luther differs from this only by retrieving the 
element of theosis that was central to Luther‘s vision as the result of his metaphysical 
realism.  This is a realism that we noted in the discussion of Schleiermacher was nascent 
within his account but undeveloped.
75
  In the absence of this realism, Schleiermacher and 
Barth tend to develop their thought in terms more consonant with the actualistic and 
ethical model being critiqued by the Finns.  The result is a notion that by adopting a 
specific epistemic relation to Jesus Christ in faith one‘s existential awareness of the world 
is altered such that a genuine perception of the ontological truth of our being is disclosed.  
Jesus is that truth and the encounter with him discloses it.  For Schleiermacher the 
fundamental reality is the form of social existence that is the Kingdom of God, while for 
Barth is it the person of Jesus himself.  The Finn‘s, however, in contrast, return to Luther 
himself to recover the sense in which the reception of Christ is not merely an epistemic 
alteration of our relation to our being, but actually entails a change in being itself.  Our 
faith in Christ is our union with Christ (unio cum Christi), which entails that knowledge 
of Christ is possessing a share of him.  The realism on which this is based is important for 
displaying the sense in which Luther‘s recovery of the affective dimension of the will is 
not a nominalist or voluntarist variant, but is rather bound to the same structure of 
intellectual appetite envisioned by Aquinas.  This is an important corrective for 
understanding Luther‘s conception of the consequences of justification, but it is 
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predicated on the same basic ontological assumptions at work in Schleiermacher and 
Barth, thereby missing the real significance of Luther‘s embellishment of Aquinas.     
The Finnish interpretation fails to see the radical implications of this realism when 
they declare that claiming Christ as the form of faith (fides formata Christi) is tantamount 
to recognizing him as an ontological abstraction.  On the one hand, this is exactly what 
Luther does.  As Työrinoja rightly notes, Luther‘s insistence on Christ as the form of 
faith has the effect of rendering Christ the substantial form of the soul in the believer, as 
opposed to the merely accidental form of charity as advocated by Aquinas.  This is the 
ontological element the Finns emphasize, and it shows the extent to which genuine 
substantial transformation is affirmed by Luther.  Insofar as the context is an ontological 
realism, this shows the degree to which Luther can be said to be guilty of a kind of 
―Christomonism‖ in which the very acts of the human being are directly attributed to 
Jesus Christ.  However, what this interpretation achieves by way of correcting an overly 
ethical emphasis in Neo-Protestantism, comes at the cost of linking Luther‘s insights to 
the kind of speculative metaphysics he rejected in his critique of self-preservation.
76
  
Schleiermacher, Barth, and the Finns each rely on the assumption of a spontaneous self-
determination of the will that is precisely the obverse of Lubac and Rahner‘s Platonism.  
This interpretation of the will shares with Platonism the assumption that knowledge of 
the (form) of the Good is sufficient for its performance. Yet, in this form, as shown in 
Chapter Three, the assumption is that Jesus Christ provides the proper ontological 
specification for an otherwise infinite will.  Such is the structure of an ontology of 
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encounter.  It is not only the Scholastic view of justification that Luther rejects with his 
insistence that Jesus Christ is the form of faith, but this notion of action as well, which he 
believes is tied to a dialectic of negative determination.  In recuperating the social and 
relational dimension of grace, Luther is simultaneously deploying the Augustinian 
grammar of creation as corrected by Aquinas.  The result, however, in this framework is 
that Luther can point to the implicit identity between the Platonic and Scotist accounts of 
appetition in their presupposition of an essentially Manichean cosmology in that they 
proceed according to a purely formal spontaneity in the intellect that either follows from 
knowledge (Platonic) or is conceived as an infinite potentiality specified by the intellect 
(Scotist).  In each, the will acts only in juxtaposition to another standing over against it, 
functioning as its specification.  To insist on the ontological realism of Luther‘s doctrine 
of justification may affect a much stronger association with theosis, but it will not solve 
the most important difficulty with that position.  Rather, it reinforces that element of the 
ontology of encounter that renders the Protestant paradigm most problematic as a 
framework for uniting creation and grace.   
On the other hand, beyond this ontological element of Luther‘s account lies his 
own rejection of speculative metaphysics, which is equally clear.  It is the stakes of this 
rejection that have not been so readily recognized.  As noted in Chapter Three, those 
stakes are shown to be a rejection of the structure of negative determination.  In this way, 
Luther upholds the fundamental insight of Aquinas‘ metaphysical advances: 
understanding God as the act of existence, distinguishing the will from the intellect and 
desire, and distinguishing nature from the supernatural.  In this way, he insists on the 
coincidence of ideality and reality in an operation over against the scholastic conception 
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of justification, which would understand justification as a product of the soul‘s movement 
to perfection in justification.  Luther rightly recognizes in this a structure of negative 
determination in which the ideal of the action is purely formal apart from its realization in 
the act.   Insofar as Scholasticism conceived justification as the effect of this coincidence 
of divine operation and human cooperation, rather than its cause, it confuses the form 
(charity) with the act (faith), such that justification becomes a product, a becoming or 
coming-to-be (fieri), which is merited.  The conflict resides neither in Aquinas‘ 
metaphysics nor in his actual statements, which consistently note the simultaneity of the 
cause and the effect.  Aquinas even goes so far as to underscore that the difference is not 
temporal but formal between the various elements of justification.  Yet the crucial 
difference between Aquinas and Luther pivots on the role of the first act of form.  It is 
true that the first act of form, as passive, immediately corresponds to the production of 
the act once it is actuated.  But the difference between Aquinas and Luther pertains to 
whether it is the actuation of form or the production of the act that amounts to 
justification.  Aquinas clearly teaches that justification is the result of this motion, 
rendering it a perfection, and Luther clearly maintains that the actuation of the form alone 
qualifies as justifying.
77
  It is true that while Aquinas‘ metaphysics mitigates against this 
conclusion, his account of justification in terms of merit displays its presence, especially 
as he makes charity the principle of merit.
78
 And it is this reliance upon merit, especially 
as elaborated upon by his teacher Biel, that so provoked Luther‘s ire.   
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The problem here, as Luther will note in the same document, is the impropriety of 
Aristotle‘s theory of virtue for the discussion of God‘s work of justification.79   I do not 
think it wrong to suggest that Luther displays greater metaphysical acuity on this point 
than Aquinas.
80
  For, Luther correctly recognizes that the category of accidental form is 
premised, for Aquinas, on the acquisition of a distinct personal perfection, which, 
because it is not a formal potency of the human soul as such, can have only a negative 
relation in its ideality to the soul until it is realized by it.  That is, Aristotle‘s theory of 
virtue is premised on the perfection of certain excellences native to the human soul itself.  
Aquinas has deployed the same logic of perfection to describe justification, the gratuity 
of which is preserved through the infusion rather than acquisition of a habit of charity.  
By insisting that charity is an accidental form of the soul, however, charity is not a reality 
finding expression in the action but an ideal to be realized in and through the self-
determination of the action.  The relation between the ideal and the real here is negative 
in precisely the speculative and Hegelian sense.  Because the infused form is accidental 
rather than substantial, while charity may have an ideal reality, it is only realized when 
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appropriated and deployed for itself.  This understanding implicitly presumes that God‘s 
love is ineffectual in itself —an empty formality—and only becomes effective when this 
pure formality is negated through the self-determining act of appropriation, resulting in a 
sublation dubbed ―justification.‖81  Such is the reason justification must always be an 
expression of concupiscence for Aquinas—which he freely admits—whereby a certain 
excellence is attained in reality.  Indeed, Aquinas insists that the ordo caritatis requires 
not only a conceptual application of proper loves in order to be charitable, but also that 
self-love comes after God but before neighbor-love in the proper order.  This is a 
manifestation of the priority of concupiscence, but it is especially poignant insofar as the 
form is not substantial.  Were charity a substantial potency in the human soul, this 
determination would not be negative as it would be a prior reality for the agent, merely 
requiring the acquisition of the appropriate skills and habits wherein this reality of 
excellence would be manifest.  As an infused accidental habit, however, this reality has a 
purely ideal status in relation to the agent, requiring not merely the actualization of a 
potency but the realization of the ideal.
82
  As ideal, the form stands in a negative relation 
to the agent, whose action adopts a negative relation to that formal negativity, thereby 
realizing it. 
Luther, of course, rejects this vehemently precisely because he recognizes this 
moment of negativity, lying at the heart of the scholastic account of justification, to be an 
ironic denial of the reality and not only the efficacy of God‘s grace.  By linking 
justification to the will in this way, through human action, the Scholastic doctrine of 
                                                 
81
 This is not a point about the role of grace, to which Aquinas clearly grants priority; it is a point about 
the understanding of justification in relation to that grace.  Indeed, my entire point is that Aquinas theology 
of grace is radically incompatible with his understanding of justification and only becomes intelligible in 
Luther.   
82
 At this point and in just this way, Aquinas‘ metaphysics takes on an idealistic rather than realist cast.   
232 
 
justification set the question of salvation within the purview of the negative infinity of the 
will‘s potentiality for self-preservation.  The de facto result is not that the will is elevated 
to charity, but that charity is domesticated to a more expansive concupiscence, redefined 
as an expression of the self-preservation in harmony with the universal Good expressing 
itself in the common good of the cosmic whole.   
It is in this light that Luther‘s emphasis on grace and works should be understood, 
as he will link sin directly to this structure of concupiscence, calling it ―robbery‖ of 
God.
83
  For this reason, the common complaint that Luther‘s simul justus et peccator 
formula prevents real personal transformation is mistaken for a reason not commonly 
recognized.  Indeed, the claim itself amounts to its virtual opposite.  What Luther is 
protesting is the manner in which the Scholastic structure, which renders justification an 
effect of divine-human action, prevents it from having any meaningful sense in 
relationship to human action.
84
  The negative moment intrinsic to the realization of 
charity always sets itself up at a distance from it in order to render it one‘s own.  The 
relationship is not the positive one of potency and act or cooperation and operation 
(which is maintained in theology of grace), but the negative one of competitive self-
determination.  This is the reason Luther insists that the presence of grace alone is 
sufficient or it is (rendered) meaningless.
85
   
There is a certain sense in which it is true to insist that the divine operation 
corresponds immediately to the production of a human cooperation.  Yet, this claim is 
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only non-competitively conceived when it is understood, as the will stands in relation to 
the intellect for Aquinas, to be predicated on a prior passivity of form in relation to 
operation.
86
  When this is not the case, and justification is formulated in terms of merit, it 
is not in fact non-competitive simultaneity that is invoked, but an implicit competition 
and exchange.  It is not the manifestation of the reality of the ideal, but the realization 
(becoming) of the ideal in existence, which reduces God‘s act of justification to a finite 
production.  This implicitly sets the real in negative relation to the ideal, as the existential 
negation of the ideality of form that is its realization.  When charity is the form of faith 
this confusion of form and act is at work.  In keeping with the reduction of sociality to 
metaphysics that it here reflects, this reduces love to the structure of concupiscent self-
regard that is the natural operation of the will, and therefore repeats the structure of sin.
87
  
And in this respect it displays a residue of the competitive metaphysics of Augustine‘s 
notion of absolute self-determination.  Understood in this way, election is the eruption of 
love within the self, disrupting that circle.     
While Luther‘s account may be consistent with and even an elaboration upon 
traditional metaphysics, his claim is much more complex than this.  No ontological 
principle is finally appropriate to describe God‘s relationship to the world or the world‘s 
to God.  If love is the actuality of which faith and hope are the created expressions, 
precisely as the receptions of Jesus Christ, then faith and hope depend solely upon the 
divine initiative that is the basis for those acts.  As a result, it cannot be the act that is 
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saving, but rather the act expresses a proper relation to the prior divine operation. It is for 
this reason that Luther insists on a real theological transformation rather than mere 
adoption and deployment of philosophical categories such as classical Aristotelian action 
theory.
88
  No matter their great value, such categories are always given a new and fresh 
meaning as a result of the encounter with God in Jesus Christ, who is always most 
properly not the God of glory (who displays his wrath at the human refusal to receive him 
as he is) but of the cross (where his love of humanity is most clearly displayed.)  It is in 
the cross that metaphysics is overturned not as a denial, but as insufficient to address the 
fundamentally social and relational nature of God‘s self-disclosure.  Luther thus recovers 
this social dimension through his refusal to allow for a speculative reduction of the 
relation disclosed in the encounter with Christ.
89
  In this way, Luther represents an 
important elaboration upon and application of the very metaphysical insights deployed by 
Aquinas with regard to God‘s being, human freedom, and the nature/supernatural 
distinction.  That application serves, however, to empty metaphysics of its pretensions, 
recovering the centrality of the relational and social dimension and revealing that a 
speculative metaphysics cannot at all account for the concerns of that dimension.
90
  Most 
importantly, this means that Luther‘s way of formulating the social and relational 
dimension of grace recovered from Augustine stands in continuity with Aquinas work 
and the Scholastic tradition, while moving decidedly beyond them.   
 And yet, despite this important development, Luther‘s insights remain restricted.  
This restriction is connected directly to the element of ontological transformation the 
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Augustine‘s mature theology of grace. See The Heidelberg Disputation.   
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Finns rightly recognize in Luther‘s work, which has the effect of linking him to the 
difficulties inherent to the ontology of encounter.  As I have noted, Luther‘s concern to 
make Christ rather than charity the form of faith in an important and decisive 
corrective—as is his important recognition that this implies a substantial rather than 
accidental transformation of the creature.  His concern is to show that the encounter with 
Christ ontologically alters the will‘s order to self-preservation when it assumes the form 
of Christ as its own.
91
  In this way, Christ and his action become the principle and goal of 
human action, such that it becomes ontologically accurate to say that Christ himself acts 
in human action.  This difference significantly alters the more epistemological and 
existential emphasis of Schleiermacher‘s and Barth‘s ontologies of encounter, but 
nonetheless remains afflicted by the difficulties that plague this perspective.  Those 
difficulties concern the manner in which the encounter of Christ is taken as a disclosure 
of the most basic truth of being as relational.  In making this claim, Luther himself tends 
to rely upon a largely Alexandrian Christology, which sees Jesus as the manifestation of a 
more abstract and general reality of existence (Logos).
92
  This Christology is perhaps 
most evident in his Christmas sermon.  A legitimate ―Christomonism‖ here in this 
treatment of human action insofar as the operational integrity of created human action 
seems to be swallowed up by and overshadowed by Christ.  It is in this way that Luther, 
while not overtly reducing the doctrine of creation to grace, does often appear to suggest 
that creation itself is somehow flawed.   This suggestion establishes the basis upon which 
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those elements of the Protestant scheme for uniting creation and grace will be based, 
especially as those elements often appear to suggest that the goodness of the created order 
is somehow in question.  These elements have the effect of repeating, though in an 
altogether different register, the overarching determinism that plagues Augustine‘s later 
theology of creation.  
If this is the case, therefore, then we are in a position to draw the various pieces of 
our study together.  In order to do that, it will be important to take up again the thread of 
ontology, which I have been tracing throughout the investigation, putting into relief its 
significance for the question of the doctrinal unity of creation and grace.  This rehearsal 
and my programmatic account for a reconstruction will be the subject of the final chapter.   
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have isolated the two most important elements of the study thus 
far: Aquinas‘ metaphysics of the will and its attendant notion of the act of existence, and 
Luther‘s recuperation of the social and relational dimension of grace in his understanding 
of justification.  My concern has been to show how Aquinas‘ metaphysics of the will is 
bound up with a notion of the act of existence that resolves the difficulties Augustine 
encountered in trying to overcome his implicitly competitive account of the God-world 
relation.  But also to show, in connection with this, that the solution of these metaphysical 
difficulties comes, for Aquinas, at the price of a thoroughgoing reduction of the social 
and relational dimension of Augustine‘s mature theology of grace.  In this regard, 
Aquinas completes the project Augustine himself began in the Literal Commentary on 
Genesis.   
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It is on this specific point that I have been concerned to show how Luther‘s 
doctrine of justification is a development of Aquinas‘ best insights.  Luther‘s rejection of 
the claim that charity is the form of faith, and his insistence in the teaching on 
justification that Christ alone is that form, achieves a genuine continuity with Aquinas‘ 
metaphysics by insisting on the actuality and reality of God‘s operation in grace to a 
degree that is more consistent than Aquinas himself.  In addition, the doctrine of 
justification is able to recuperate the social and relational dimension of grace by linking it 
directly to the person of Jesus Christ himself as the object and form of grace.  And yet, at 
just this point, where Luther recognizes the human being‘s share in the divine life, he also 
adopts an explicitly ontological perspective that serves to take away with one hand what 
he has given with the other.  For, just as he has recuperated the social and relational 
dimension of grace by referring it specifically to the person of Jesus, he conceives this 
formal element of Christ‘s saving work in overtly ontological terms that evacuate the 
distinctiveness between Jesus and the individual.  The result is a kind of 
―Christomonism,‖ wherein the actions of the believer are the actions of Christ himself, 
and the genuine otherness of the relation is destroyed.  It is in this respect that Aquinas‘ 
appeal rejection of Lombard‘s direct association of grace with the presence of the Holy 
Spirit takes on an additional level of significance.  The impasse, therefore, continues.   
But from this perspective, we can also now recognize the lineaments of the way 
forward.  First, what is required is the metaphysical perceptive developed by Aquinas, 
which can account for the distinction of the will from intellect and desire, and which is 
correlated with an account of the act of existence.  Second, what is required is an account 
of the sociality of grace, as developed by Luther in his doctrine of justification, which is 
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able to preserve the metaphysical elements of Aquinas‘ vision.  But, third, that account of 
the sociality of grace must be formulated in such a way that the union of creation and 
grace can be conceived without the eradication of the elements necessary for maintaining 
the otherness necessary for relation and sociality.  The answer to this difficulty is to think 
that union without recourse to the identity that is integral to ontology.  The concluding 
chapter takes up this task.   
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECONSTRUCTION 
 
On the one hand, in their imperfection and temptation, believers will often seek refuge in 
dogmatic affirmation, escaping selfishly from the works of love and the risks of 
noncomformity involved in committing oneself to the presence of the one who make his 
lot not with the righteous but with the rejected of this world.  But they always know 
better, and their very lack of love of God and neighbor and their insistence that others 
agree with their own opinions, attitudes, and dispositions will indicate the uneasy and 
defensive way in which they hold their dogmatic affirmations. 
 
On the other hand, believers will, in their doubt, seek to escape the burden of factual 
affirmation by identifying response to Christ‘s presence with making the causes of the 
disinherited their own (often quite automatically.)  But their conscience is almost always 
uneasy because appeal to the presence of Christ in and to the neighbor is only one.  Apart 
from the factual affirmation of Christ‘s presence, the association of his particular image 
with one‘s sensitivity to humanity in oneself or others will seem a halfhearted or forced 
undertaking. 
 
But reference to the Spirit is the affirmation that the unique unity of Jesus Christ‘s 
identity and presence calls forth a similarly unique response.  It is a response, the unity of 
which is rendered only by the effective gift to us of the unity of Christ‘s identity and 
presence.  Reference to the Spirit or to the gift of the Spirit means that, concerning Jesus 
Christ and him alone, factual affirmation is completely one with faith and trust of the 
heart, with love of him, and love of the neighbors for whom he gave himself completely. 
 
—Hans Frei1 
 
 
Introduction 
It will be helpful to begin the concluding chapter by rehearsing the argument of 
the dissertation to this point.  In doing so, I will begin not with the problem of the union 
of creation and grace as I have framed the analysis so far, but with the root of the 
difficulty of which that problem is a manifestation. The following section will bring the 
study to a close by recounting that problem and its resolution in chronological order, 
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 Hans W. Frei, The Identity of Jesus Christ: The Hermeneutical Bases of Dogmatic Theology (Eugene, 
OR: Wipf and Stock, 1997), 188. 
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rather than according to the thematic framing adopted thus far.  The remainder of this 
chapter, then, should be read as a recapitulation of the themes of the dissertation as a 
whole, but turned toward the presentation of a resolution of their difficulties.  The 
presentation of this resolution is oriented toward showing the manner in which an 
appropriate treatment of the role of the will opens out onto a vision of Being and the role 
of the intellect that is not alien to the received tradition, but is nonetheless uniquely 
articulated from within it.  The resolution I offer is concerned with the active 
development and sustaining of the spiritual and mystical orientation of the mind.  This 
treatment is both cursory and programmatic. 
 
Recapitulation: A Chronological Presentation of the Analysis 
The problem I have uncovered begins with a set of interrelated issues in 
Augustine‘s theology which lie at the foundation of my investigation and which I claim 
are responsible for this conflict of paradigms.  I first bring these elements into view in 
Chapter Four, where I focus on the tension of Augustine‘s grammar of creatio ex nihilo 
and theology of grace.  The grammar of creation is treated first and notes the internal 
connection of divine immutability and human freedom that come together to constitute 
the Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo.  The notion of divine immutability at work 
here, which affirms God‘s sovereignty and goodness over the whole created order, is the 
basis for the affirmation of creatio ex nihilo and is worked out in direct contrast to 
Manichean dualism.  The concept of the will first takes on a prominent role here in 
Augustine‘s thinking, where it refers to God‘s voluntary creation of the world and the 
free human cooperation with God‘s purposes in that creation.  This notion of the will is 
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nascent and is conceived solely in terms of self-determination.  This grammar adds up to 
a metaphysical ontology in the sense used in the dissertation of a speculative articulation 
of the whole of reality.   
The first great weakness in the metaphysical expression of this grammar is 
disclosed once Augustine begins to work out his mature theology of grace, after his close 
reading of Paul in the letter To Simplician.  In this text, Augustine wrestles for the first 
time with the recognition that the relation of free will and grace in his grammar also 
implies a notion of obligation and reward that indebted God to the creature.  This raises 
important questions regarding his theology of grace because this implication violates the 
grammatical tenet of God‘s sovereignty, which is the basis for his rejection of dualism.  
Once this tenet is removed, the goodness of the created order is also compromised.  
However, to attempt to preserve divine sovereignty, and with it created goodness and the 
doctrine of creation, would require the diminution of created freedom, which is the 
cornerstone of Augustine‘s argument for the moral origin of evil against Manichaeism‘s 
dualism.  Augustine thus finds himself in a double bind.  
It is in response to this conflict that Augustine‘s doctrine of the will begins to 
mature alongside his theology of grace.  In light of these developments in his theology of 
grace, Augustine reconceives the notion of freedom in the social, relational, and ethical 
terms of justice, rather than metaphysics.  This is in keeping with his moral rather than 
ontological definition of evil, and perfectly coincides with his linking of this idea directly 
to the will.  Nonetheless, this more discretely ethical emphasis makes freedom more a 
matter of the rectitude of one‘s relationship to a prior determination, as opposed to a 
metaphysical expression of one‘s self-determination.  In fact, freedom becomes a matter 
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of how one‘s self-determination is related to this prior determination.  Grace is 
conceived, in this light, as an expression of the divine election, which enables the will to 
act in a manner precluded by its self-determination.  Augustine‘s theology of grace 
develops progressively in such a manner that it becomes clearer the degree to which 
God‘s action directly upon the will is necessary in order for this action to occur.  This 
insight is provoked especially by his meditations in the Confessions on the failure of the 
will to will what the intellect recognizes as its good.  This marks not only the site wherein 
the will emerges as distinct from desire and the intellect, but also illuminates the role of 
grace in moving the will to its act.  Ultimately, such a position is integral to his strong 
notions of election and predestination in his later, anti-Pelagian works.   
Despite the emphasis on the priority of grace over the will, the will‘s freedom as 
constituted by that grace, and a much more distinctly social and ethical expression of the 
will in distinction from the intellect and desire, Augustine never satisfactorily resolves 
the tension between the necessity of the will‘s determination by grace and the created 
freedom demanded by the grammar of his doctrine of creation.  Augustine‘s own attempt 
to resolve this tension in the Literal Commentary on Genesis shows the conflict between 
the metaphysical and social dimensions inscribed here.  The result is a metaphysical 
inflection of the social dimension of grace that results in a strongly deterministic 
interpretation, reminiscent of Stoicism, which completely reduces that dimension to the 
progressive unfolding of a predetermined form over the course of history.  As becomes 
clear in this commentary, the major metaphysical difficulty Augustine encounters, and 
which he cannot successfully transcend, is the notion that God‘s immutability must be 
conceived as an absolute self-determining motion.  As a result, divine and created 
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freedoms are implicitly in competition for control of the same immanent field.  In the 
wake of Augustine‘s mature theology of grace, human rather than divine freedom must 
be compromised. And this bequeaths to the West the problem of explaining how it is that 
the will is absolutely determined by the divine decree of election, and yet is necessarily 
free and responsible for its own actions.   
This is the problem that early Medieval Scholasticism addresses.  Unable to make 
any clear differentiation between natural gifts and redeeming gifts, early Scholastics are 
unable to distinguish between the grace of creation and the grace of redemption.  The first 
step in the direction of a solution to this is taken early in Aquinas‘ career in his text De 
Ente et essentia.  Here Aquinas develops the metaphysical insight into the nature of 
God‘s being as the act of existence (esse.)  This notion makes it possible to conceive of 
the ways in which God‘s voluntary actions do not occur on the same plane as human 
actions and are not in competition with them.  Augustine‘s tendency to think of God as a 
presence of absolute self-determination can be recognized by Aquinas as more 
characteristic of a factum or fieri, and is therefore inappropriate to designate the divine.  
God is not a perfect act of self-determination because God simply is, by essence, the act 
of existing.  This sets the stage for correcting Augustine‘s misunderstanding of the nature 
of divine immutability in relation to finite freedom.   
But it is only in the wake of Philip the Chancellor‘s distinction between a natural 
and an acquired habit that Thomas Aquinas can resolve the metaphysical issues 
bequeathed by Augustine to the West.  Aquinas is able to see, in light of this distinction, 
that certain actions happen within things by virtue of what they naturally are, while others 
occur because of some knowledge they have acquired.  This distinction allows Aquinas to 
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complete the articulation of the will that Augustine has begun insofar as he is then able to 
specify how it is that the will can have its own natural integrity of operation apart from 
the intellect.  Once the will has its own nature, he can further specify what operations the 
will does by nature and what operations are supernatural.  With both a clear notion of the 
will and of its supernatural operations, Aquinas can then resolve the Augustinian problem 
by noting how it is that certain operations occur naturally and are proportionate to natural 
ends, while other operations are supernatural, reaching beyond what the natural 
operations of the will can produce alone.  Thus, the rectitude of the natural operations is 
an important aspect of the proper exercise of freedom, but it does not account for it.  
Rather, freedom pertains to the nature of the will‘s operations and is specific to the choice 
of means to a particular end.  Freedom does not, however, pertain to either the origin or 
the end to which the will is directed, and does not entail a capacity for infinite self-
determination.  If the will is to operate supernaturally, it must receive the infusion of a 
supernatural habit (caritas).   The transcendental categories of nature and the supernatural 
become the basis for establishing the proper distinction between creation and grace, and 
also serve as their most proper union.   
With these two metaphysical corrections, Aquinas resolves the dilemma that 
plagued the Western doctrine of grace in the wake of Augustine.  And yet, it this 
resolution was only possible from within the metaphysical trajectory of Augustine‘s 
thought.  In fact, Aquinas‘ accomplishments are best viewed as a completion of 
Augustine‘s project in the Literal Commentary, wherein he achieved a partial but 
important metaphysical reduction of the social dimension of grace to the formal 
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categories of number, weight, and measure.  The result is the metaphysics of the ordo 
caritatis.    
Luther‘s work is best understood as standing in this trajectory of thought, but 
developing this social and relational dimension of the Augustinian heritage that had been 
occluded in the metaphysical legacy of Aquinas.
2
  Luther recuperates this legacy by 
explicitly downplaying the metaphysical notion of freedom, convceiving it instead in 
terms of moral rectitude.  In what can only be understood as an exploitation of the 
metaphysical definition of truth that he rejected, Luther famously notes against Erasmus 
that, if it is understood as self-determination, freedom of the will only properly applies to 
God.  To many, this aspect of Luther‘s thought gives the impression that he is merely 
returning the question of the will to the confused perspective of the later Augustine prior 
to Aquinas.
3
  Yet this is not accurate, as Luther‘s position is not a return to the ambiguous 
notion of the will in Augustine and early scholasticism, but rather makes use of Aquinas‘ 
achievement.  His discussion of the will marks a recovery of the social dimension of 
grace and the will as inherited from Augustine, but in a manner that presumes Aquinas‘ 
work.   
This fact is most apparent in Luther‘s analysis of the self-interest of the will.  
Aquinas‘ analysis clarified the extent to which all ethical action is taken up for the sake 
of the attainment of an object judged to be good for the agent.  Yet, though oriented 
toward the universal good, the will is not itself naturally capable of an act proportionate 
to that end as its action is always an expression of self-preservation.  Aquinas sought to 
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3
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overcome this by invoking an infused habit of charity in which the concupiscent object of 
the will is not merely oneself or the common good, but the Good itself, God.  Friendship 
with God is expressed in willing the order of the common good of the whole—which 
includes oneself—as the self-expression of the Good.  For Luther, the difficulty with this 
way of conceiving matters lies with the reduction of the relational dimension of love to a 
metaphysical order, and its failure to interrogate the centrality of the element of self-
preservation lying at the heart of the proposal.  Indeed, for Luther these two are of a 
piece, and represent a failure to fully interrogate the nature of the will as self-
preservation.   
In keeping with his dialectic of law and gospel, Luther understands the difficulty 
of the attempts of theologies of glory to map a general philosophical theory of action onto 
salvation, and to thereby reading salvation through that theory.  Luther insists that these 
attempts will always fail to do justice to the gospel, which fundamentally alters the 
meaning of such categories.  The upshot of all speculative systems is to subordinate the 
revelation of God to the self-interest of the human being.  This is, as Luther notes, merely 
an attempt to rob God of divinity, which he understands to consist most essentially in 
service rather than the reward of such self-interest.  There is a genuine transformation of 
the ordo caritatis when viewed from the theological perspective of the gospel as opposed 
to law.     
This problem was epitomized in the scholastic doctrine of justification.  The 
Protestant critique of this claim aims at its speculative structure, which is enshrined in the 
Aristotelian account of virtue.  This account is premised on the idea of the achievement 
of the perfection of the form of a being.  This perfection is attained on the basis of the 
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potentialities inherent in the being in question.  The problem that the Protestant account 
raises with this proposal does not lie with the Aristotelian structure itself, but rather with 
its use to describe the nature of salvation.  The point of the Protestant critique, however, 
is that this manner of framing things sets up the form of the good as an empty form 
whose actuality must be achieved, as opposed to this actuality being presupposed as its 
basis.  Luther‘s point regarding justification by faith is simply an elaboration upon 
Aquinas‘s point regarding the relationship between potentiality and actuality, namely, 
that the realization must be presupposed in order for the act to be possible, rather than 
conceived of as the result of becoming.  The reason for this is that the possibility of 
deification is destroyed if it is conceived in terms of the self-preservation of the creature. 
It is this that Luther most stridently rejects.  The rationale for his rejection reveals 
an important insight into the metaphysical approach itself.  Luther recognizes that this 
speculative abstraction to the transcendental union of the whole is implicitly an 
expression of human self-preservation.  This had been, in fact, the supposition of 
Aquinas‘ position all along, which he had sought to overcome in part by referring to the 
supernatural operation of the charitable will that adopts the good of another as its own.  
Aquinas, however, was forced by his metaphysical vision to see this transformation as the 
perfection of the natural impulse to self-preservation.  Justice as conceived in 
Augustine‘s mature theology of grace as interpersonal charity is completely collapsed 
into a reiteration of Augustine‘s earliest Neoplatonic vision of the ordo caritatis.  This 
was integral to Aquinas‘ position in that his conception of perfection is tied not to God‘s 
infinity, but to created finitude.  The creature thus receives its perfection by being rightly 
related to the will of God as expressed in the natural hierarchical ordering of the cosmos.  
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Indeed, the complexities regarding the Augustinian tradition that Aquinas is able to 
resolve with this approach come at the expense of the social dimension as elaborated 
upon by Aquinas.   
That recognition, however, is supplied through Luther‘s analysis of the role of 
justification as conceived in Scholastic theology as a second-act perfection of the 
creature, habitually achieved.  Luther rightly recognizes the internal connection this 
approach has with self-preservation,
4
 but unlike Aquinas ties it directly to the evasion of 
the social dimension.  Grace cannot simply be understood in terms of the status of one‘s 
relation to a metaphysical order, but must be tied directly to the quality of one‘s 
relationship to that which precedes and determines one‘s entire field of action.  Such is 
the status of election for Augustine, and though it is intimately tied to predestination, it 
has a distinctly ethical inflection that is absent from Aquinas‘s metaphysical inflection of 
predestination.  Luther‘s primary focus for emphasizing this dimension is the doctrine of 
justification.  As he notes, the Aristotelian doctrine of habitus, predicated as it is on this 
notion of perfection, not only conceives salvation completely in terms of a structure of 
self-preservation that is inimical to love, but builds the very structure of speculative 
metaphysics on it.  Such a structure requires also that the determination of the content of 
salvation be established in negative opposition to the principle upon which it is carried 
out. That is, cooperation with the divine operation must be immediately effective, if it 
means anything at all, which necessarily entails that justification is not the effect but the 
presupposition of those actions.  This point requires that these actions be seen, not as 
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 This connection to self-preservation or concupiscence is widely recognized as a difference between 
Protestant and Lutheran thought that persists even in light of the Joint Declaration.  See Kärkkäinen, One 
with God: Salvation as Deification and Justification, 99-108. 
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alterations of a metaphysical substance, but as prior motions determining the quality of 
actions—determined not by the presence or absence of a particular ontological aspect, but 
by the relation an action bears to what precedes it.   
In this way, Luther‘s thought is a direct elaboration upon the notion of operative 
grace as it develops in Aquinas.  Luther‘s appreciation for Lombard‘s insistence on the 
notion that charity is simply the presence of the Holy Spirit to the will makes this clear.
5
  
However, where Aquinas interprets this as a metaphysical principle by means of which 
the creature is enabled to produce its own operation of love, Luther insists that that action 
itself is love and its expression.  For Luther, it is Christ himself—and not an abstract 
―charity‖—who is the form of faith and the other theological virtues.  Christ is the agent 
of all good human actions for Luther.  The difficulty this poses is that the structure of 
negative determination that Luther rightly corrects by making grace a substantial rather 
than accidental form, also renders Christ an abstract actuality.  The result is that Luther 
establishes the framework within which the ontology of encounter can be developed as 
the mode of uniting creation and grace within the Protestant paradigm.     
It is the overarching significance of the role of the will in the Roman Catholic 
paradigm of nature and the supernatural that is overlooked by Henri de Lubac and Karl 
Rahner in the twentieth century.  Nonetheless, in light of our study, we are now in a 
position to see that their quest to overturn Neo-Scholasticism‘s sharp division of the 
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natural from the supernatural was most importantly an attempt to overcome the problems 
arising from the metaphysical reduction of the social dimension of grace—especially as 
these grew up in the aftermath of the First Vatican Council documents Aeterni Patris, and 
De Filius.  However, we have noted that their failure to attend to this legacy simply 
returned their thought to the framework of Augustinian Platonism that the 
nature/supernatural paradigm had been formulated to overcome, thereby returning the 
question of creation and grace to its origins in the early work of Augustine.  Though in 
light of this history, Lubac and Rahner prove to be of no particular help in forging a 
coherent union of creation and grace, they are essential for bringing to light what is most 
essentially at stake in this dispute.    
As the opening of the present chapter has shown, however, the difficulties Lubac 
and Rahner encountered are not internal to their own proposals.  Both Lubac‘s 
organicism and Rahner‘s personalism are struggles against the limitations of the Roman 
Catholic paradigm itself.  More precisely, they represent distinct but interrelated attempts 
to pour the social and relational dimension of grace into the old wineskin of a speculative 
metaphysical ontology.  Without a discrete concept of the operations of the will from 
those of the intellect, however, not only can they not arrive at a cogent distinction of 
grace from creation, but they cannot recognize that their own objections are tied to a 
social and relational protest against the speculative reduction of this dimension to 
metaphysics.  
Recognition of this fact sheds further light on the impasses arising within the 
Protestant account as articulated by Schleiermacher and Barth.  Where these 
representative Protestant figures evade the problems attendant to the Roman Catholic 
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reduction of sociality, they nonetheless wind up in a similar position.  Starting from a 
perspective that privileges sociality and relation, they still overlook the centrality of the 
will as developed in Aquinas‘ metaphysics.  This oversight has the result of inverting the 
Platonic emphasis of Lubac and Rahner, such that the will is rendered, in Scotist fashion, 
as an infinite potentiality that receives the specification of its operation by the intellect.    
The flaw is the same as in the Roman Catholic paradigm, but its expression is obverted.  
The doctrine of creation is here reduced to the doctrine of grace precisely because there is 
not a proper specification of the two.  The result is that grace itself becomes an 
ontological concept of differentiation and union, which merely repeats the problem of 
deploying a calculus for the apprehension of being.  Rather than correcting the problem, 
recovering the social dimension of grace in terms of an ontology of encounter simply 
perpetuates it by conceiving it in terms of the essence of reality.     
This would appear to place the question of the union of creation and grace in a 
double-bind.  On the one hand, as we have seen in Augustine, the doctrine of creation 
requires a clear metaphysical account in order to avoid Gnosticism and Manichaeism.  
That account must include a distinct notion of God‘s sovereignty and goodness, and must 
understand the world to be the direct result of a distinct act of God‘s will, with the 
introduction of evil in the world to be the result of the human misuse of its free will.  
Also from Augustine, we learned that the gratuity of grace demands that God‘s 
sovereignty and grace be given absolute priority in the achievement of salvation, and that 
this priority is tied directly to a social and relational understanding of justice and the 
rectitude of the will.  If the Roman Catholic paradigm of speculative metaphysical 
ontology is followed, even in Aquinas‘ most coherent articulation, the doctrine of grace is 
252 
 
reduced to a function of the doctrine of creation.  This is seen in the manner that Aquinas 
must ultimately understand grace to enable a concupiscent act of the will that takes God‘s 
universal goodness as its own, thus willing the manifestation of that good according to 
the order of the common good of the whole.  In this manner, the social dimension of 
grace is completely reduced to the metaphysical order of creation.  Conversely, if the 
Protestant paradigm of the ontology of encounter is assumed, then the doctrine of 
creation is effectively reduced to the doctrine of grace.  This is the case even in the most 
coherent expression in Luther, who must understand the encounter with Jesus Christ to be 
the ontological truth of being itself, such that the doctrine of creation is only meaningful 
as a refracted dimension of the doctrine of grace.   
Such is the impasse of the present conversation regarding the union of creation 
and grace.  One position requires a dimension of relation and sociality to complete its 
doctrine of grace that its metaphysics disallows, and the other requires a metaphysics to 
compete its doctrine of creation that its emphasis on relation and sociality disallows.  A 
very real zero-sum game is at work here.  What is asserted in one paradigm as pivotal 
comes at the expense of an equally integral dimension.  In this respect, we can see that 
we have not gotten beyond the impasse of the metaphysical demands of Augustine‘s 
grammar of the doctrine of creation and the social and relational demands of his mature 
theology of grace.  But with these elements clearly identified, we are in a position, 
perhaps for the first time, to more precisely identify the problem and begin to formulate 
the lineaments of a solution.   
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Metaphysics and the Will, Sociality and Being 
Ontology: Recollection and Mediation 
…the responsibility of what remains to be decided or done (in actuality) cannot consist in 
following, applying, or carrying out a norm or rule.  Wherever I have at my disposal a 
determinable rule, I know what must be done, and as soon as such knowledge dictates the 
law, action follows knowledge as a calculable consequence: one knows what path to take, 
one no longer hesitates.  The decision then no longer decides anything but is made in 
advance and is thus in advance annulled.  It is simply deployed, without delay, presently, 
with the automatism attributed to machines.  There is no longer any place for justice or 
responsibility (whether juridical, political, or ethical). 
 
—Jacques Derrida6 
 
 
Throughout my analysis of the two paradigms for uniting creation and grace, I 
have emphasized the role of the philosophical category of being as the category for 
uniting the two doctrines by appeal to identity, intellection, and participation.  In the case 
of the Roman Catholic paradigm, being is invoked as a speculative category through 
which creation and grace are distinguished, by appeal to nature and the supernatural, as 
different manifestations of a common reality.  It is in this way that the category of being 
serves a distinctively metaphysical function in the Roman Catholic paradigm insofar as it 
is oriented toward the designation of the whole of existence.  The union of creation and 
grace occurs in and through the intellectual apprehension of the proper relationship 
between to the one and the many, the whole.  In this structure, the intellectual 
apprehension of reality, especially the good expressed in the order of the whole, is the 
basis for the voluntary acts by which the individual intellectual creature elects the means 
to cooperate with that good.  The result is that the doctrine of grace is conceived as a 
                                                 
6
 Jacques Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas, 
Meridian (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 84-85. 
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transcendental designation of some aspect of the overarching order of the doctrine of 
creation.   
In the case of the Protestant paradigm, this speculative account of the whole is 
rejected.  That rejection is due to the reduction of the social and relational dimension of 
the doctrine of grace, which the metaphysical ontology achieves.  The Protestant 
paradigm does not invoke a third category, such as nature (and its modification, the 
super-natural), to distinguish different aspects of a common being.  Rather, it seeks to 
understand the truth and reality of being itself in terms of relation.  In this sense, the 
conceptual apprehension of being invoked in the Roman Catholic paradigm is simply 
inadequate to the proper identification of the truth of being because it effectively denies 
the reality of the experience of temporal existence.  Concrete existence is marked by an 
irreducibly dialectical movement between unity and multiplicity, intellect and action, 
harmony and distinction—all of which gives rise to, but is not identical with, the 
dialectical distinction of sin and grace occurring in the epistemic relation to being.  
Though abstraction is a necessary part of human existence, the desire to bring the reality 
of concrete existence into harmony with this abstraction is the clearest mark of human 
sin, for the Protestant paradigm.  It is the expression of the desire to submit reality to 
itself rather than itself to reality.  Only through the encounter that ruptures this 
dialectic—identified as Jesus Christ—can we apprehend the relational truth of being.  
Grace is the event alone within which truth is disclosed, with the result that the doctrine 
of creation is a conceptual abstraction from the event of grace.     
These approaches represent two different ways of distributing the terms of 
identity, intellect, and participation as constitutive of being.  The two approaches differ 
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only with regard to the position and role of intellectual abstraction in their accounts; they 
do not dispute its final significance; and they agree on the importance of identity and 
participation.  For the Roman Catholic paradigm, it is the intellectual apprehension of the 
order of and cooperation with the Good expressed in the order of the universe as a whole 
that is decisive.  Because this cooperative willing of the Good itself is not within the 
natural capacities of the creature, grace is understood as the infusion of charity that 
makes this act possible.  It is, however, the intellectual apprehension of the Good of the 
order as an abstraction that is significant.  For the Protestant paradigm, by contrast, it is 
the intellectual apprehension of the absolute priority of an all-determining relation that is 
crucial, a relation that is itself constitutive of intellectual abstraction.  Because this 
relation cannot be apprehended without subordinating oneself to it, grace is understood as 
the rupture of the structure that occludes this apprehension.  Once apprehended, the 
creature is free to conduct itself so as to bring its acts and thoughts into harmony with 
that truth.  In each account, what is intellectually apprehended is a more fundamental 
reality of identity within which the creature participates.  The fact of identity and 
participation are not in question, only the manner of their distribution in relation to the 
role of intellectual abstraction.  It is this distribution that accounts for the different ways 
that the Roman Catholic and Protestant paradigms understand and unite the doctrines of 
creation and grace.  In the Roman Catholic paradigm, participation is conceived as a fact 
of being, of which grace is an expression—thus disclosing their fundamental identity.  
Participation in the Protestant scheme, however, is a more dynamic reality that happens 
in and through the truth of reality revealed in the event of encounter.  It is one‘s 
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participation in the event of encounter that alone renders this identity apprehensible.  The 
former takes creation as primary and the latter insists that grace is primary.   
What is at issue here is the different punctuations and distributions of common 
being (ens commune).   This is not surprising, as it is the perennial problematic of all 
classical philosophical engagement on the question of the One and the Many, substance 
and act, form and matter, and time and eternity.  As I have been investigating them in this 
study, these concerns are taken up in a unique fashion not simply in relation to the 
doctrines of creation and grace, but specifically with regard to the question of their union.  
On the matter of the distribution of common being, both paradigms reveal a strange 
coincidence and reversal.   
The analysis of Søren Kierkeggard, as developed in Fear and Trembling, is 
helpful in illuminating the different structures at work in my analysis, as well as this 
reversal.  In that work, Kierkegaard (under the pseudonym of Johannes de Silentio) notes 
two distinct ways in which conceptual abstraction (―ethics‖) attempts to comprehend the 
act of faith.  The first is by virtue of Platonic recollection in which the demands of the 
multiplicities of finitude are transcended with reference to the eternal priority of the 
universal abstraction of form.  It is only with reference to the determinations of form that 
the value of the temporal order is apprehended and enjoyed.  It is for this reason, for 
example, that Kierkegaard will speak of the Knight of Infinite Resignation, who always 
seeks to attain her place in the world through conceptual abstraction to an eternal truth 
apprehended prior to and apart from time, though it is expressed in it.  But it is through 
this movement of recollection that the differences of time, becoming, matter, and action 
are resolved into a greater whole, by way of identity and participation.  Both the Roman 
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Catholic and Protestant paradigms for uniting creation and grace appeal to recollection 
and mediation in just this way, but to different ends.   
The Roman Catholic paradigm addresses this question in terms of mediation: how 
are the doctrines of creation and grace to be properly differentiated so as to maintain their 
unity?  The Roman Catholic response to this question is to posit the category of ―nature‖ 
to characterize the integral operations of creation and the ―supernatural‖ to designate 
those created actions that exceed those natural operations.  Thus, nature is the mediating 
term between creation and grace.  But this mediation functions in the paradigm to resolve 
these differences into a common union, which is recollected in the mediating term as the 
prior basis for and determination of the given itself.  One can see this in both Lubac‘s 
appeal to the twofold gratuity of the act of creation and its orientation to beatitude, and 
also in Rahner‘s appeal to the concretely graced status of all experience, the distinction of 
which can only be abstractly apprehended.  Thomas Aquinas deploys the idea of nature 
as mediator with regard to the role of the transcendental order of creation in which the 
good is expressed.  Recollection is the conclusion to the question for which mediation is 
the response.  Thus, what begins as an essentially Hegelian problem of the unity of the 
differentiations of speculative reason is resolved by appeal to Platonic recollection. 
The Protestant paradigm, conversely, begins with the question of recollection: 
how are the doctrines of creation and grace to be properly united, given their clear 
differentiation in concrete experience?   The response to this question is to recollect the 
unity that is the prior basis for and determination of the given order of experience.  It is 
because one apprehends, in the event of encounter with Jesus Christ, a prior identification 
that is expressed in and determines the differentiations of existence, that creation and 
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grace can be united in him.  The basis here is not the mediating concept of ―nature,‖ but 
the very encounter with Jesus Christ himself.  One can see this in both Schleiermacher‘s 
appeal to the union of election and preservation as disclosed in communion with Christ, 
and also in Barth‘s appeal to Jesus Christ himself as the temporal expression of the 
eternal covenant.  In both cases, reality is only apprehended from the perspective of the 
determination of existence disclosed in the encounter with Christ, who is thereby 
recognized as the ontological mediator of the coherence of existence.  This has the very 
different effect of accounting for an already existing distinction in terms of that prior 
unity that renders it intelligible, rather than introducing distinction into a presumed unity.  
Mediation here is a conclusion, grounded in the presupposition of recollection.  Thus, 
what begins as a Platonic problem of differentiations of unified experience is resolved by 
appeal to Hegelian speculative mediation.   As in Kierkegaard‘s analysis, the pattern of 
thought is consistent with appeals to mediation, namely, to maintain and articulate the 
equilibrium of a unified whole.
7
  This mediation is understood in terms of the recollection 
of a previously given principle of unity. 
 The differences between the approaches concern the distribution, application, and 
understanding of the nature of this mediation and recollection.  In the instance of Roman 
Catholic thought the unified whole is distributed through the conceptual mediation of 
―nature,‖ while in the Protestant paradigm Jesus Christ supplies the mediatory framework 
necessary to unify the disparate aspects of existence into a whole.  This difference is 
significant in that the speculative understanding of mediation at work in the Roman 
Catholic position concludes to a largely Platonic understanding of recollection, in which 
                                                 
7
 I am grateful to conversations had with Craig Keen while writing on this point regarding the 
relationship of mediation, recollection, and universal equilibrium.   
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the whole is metaphysically ordered according to the priority of form.  The Protestant 
position, on the other hand, begins with a Platonic understanding of form in its doctrine 
of election, only to introduce a speculative principle of mediation as the basis for 
distinction.  This difference of priority lies at the root of the dispute regarding the role of 
the analogia entis in contemporary Roman Catholic and Protestant theology, especially 
as that dispute has divided according to whether priority is granted to being or to 
becoming.
8
   
At issue in both cases is the most appropriate way to conceive of the participatory 
distribution of difference within an immanent, finite field of identity.  As a result, the two 
positions are locked in competition over a single conceptual field.  The different ways 
that the two paradigms distribute the doctrines of creation and grace within this field is 
their distinct ontological discourse.  These are the different ways of uniting identity, 
intellection, and participation according to metaphysical ontology and to an ontology of 
encounter, respectively.   
This is not, however, the whole of the story.  Where contemporary attempts to 
unite creation and grace according to a discourse of being have failed, I have tried to 
show that they do so precisely because they neglect the significance of the development 
of the notion of the will as an operation distinct from the intellect and desire.  I have been 
intent to note the manner in which this problem of distribution and mediation arises 
specifically from the priority granted to identity as a mediating abstraction of the 
intellect.  I pointed to this in both the Roman Catholic and Protestant paradigms, 
respectively.  In the four cases of Lubac, Rahner, Schleiermacher, and Barth, a 
                                                 
8
 See Davis, "The Fruit of the Tree: On the Affirmation and Use of Analogy." 
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remarkable union of creation and grace is achieved, but always such that the status and 
the role of the will becomes a function of the intellect or desire.  Indeed, my whole 
project has been oriented toward showing that the history of the attempts to unite the 
doctrines of creation and grace in the West pivots on the irreducibility of the will in those 
equations.  Where this distinction is not maintained and correctly expressed, the union of 
creation and grace inevitably results not only in the reduction of one doctrine to the other, 
but also in the repetition of a Gnostic metaphysics.  It is clear, at this junction, why it is 
that ontology is itself essentially Gnostic.   
I do not mean to suggest by this that the problem here pertains to the status or role 
of the category of ―being‖ in general.  On the contrary, I have gone to great pains to show 
the important role of Aquinas‘ understanding of Being (esse) for resolving the difficulties 
analyzed.  That difference pivots on the distinction of the act of being from the totality of 
the community of being.  Only on the basis of this distinction can Being not be 
understood in terms of the perfection of the immanent community of being.  The 
consequences of this idea will be unfolded in more detail in the following section in 
connection with a suggested alteration for understanding the significance of the doctrine 
of creation.  At present, it is enough to lift out the consequences of this difference for the 
ontological discourse as such.   
Ontological discourse is most fundamentally the attempt to produce a distinction 
and a union from out of an otherwise undifferentiated totality.  Such union and difference 
is achieved by way of a conceptual abstraction that mediates both the identity and the 
difference of the terms in question.  However, it can only properly determine the distinct 
content of these terms by setting them in generative opposition to one another, such that 
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the distinct content itself is produced from that opposition.  It is for this reason that I have 
focused, in the discussions of Augustine and Aquinas, on the sense in which creation is 
not an expression of generative production.  This is the problem that Augustine 
recognizes in both Manichean and Plotinian metaphysics, and is the rationale for his 
grammar of creatio ex nihilo.  Nonetheless, it continues to plague his understanding of 
God‘s agency insofar as he fails to comprehend God‘s act of existence, which Aquinas 
sees so well.  As we saw in the last chapter, however, this same confusion persists in 
Aquinas himself insofar as he thinks of justification as the creature‘s perfection, and 
understands perfection itself in terms of the ordered totality of creation.  Luther‘s 
appropriate advance beyond this implicit competition in his doctrine of justification only 
serves to further compound the problem, however.  He conceives of Jesus in terms that 
construe the form apprehended in the encounter with Christ to be the general truth of 
creation itself.  In this way, the social and relational dimension he recoups from 
Augustine and in continuity with Aquinas is compromised by a Christological formalism 
that effectively absorbs the creature‘s operational integrity, and with it the entire field of 
relation.
9
  In each of these cases, the problem arises not simply because of an impulse 
toward speculative metaphysics, but from an implicit reliance on ontology as such to 
generate both the necessary distinctions and unity.  The unity of the whole is maintained 
for both Aquinas and Luther by way of a category of mediation within which both the 
whole and its constitutive oppositions are resolved in relation to a specific categorical 
abstraction. At issue in the two different paradigms is the distribution of the terms 
―creation‖ and ―grace‖ as differentiations of determinate opposition within that whole.    
                                                 
9
 Aquinas‘ insistence that grace is an accidental rather than substantial quality was clearly intended to 
forestall just this. See ST I-II.110 
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 This principle of distribution is integral to ontological discourse as such.  
Ontology requires a negative principle of differentiation within being to supply the 
necessary determination for development and differentiation within the unity of the 
whole.  The problem encountered here is the same as the one that Augustine refuted with 
Manichaeism: namely, the notion that the unity of reality involves the mediation of a 
contradiction between a more primal union of opposition.  In this sense, creation and 
grace cannot be related except through a conceptual logic in which a presupposed 
opposition between the terms is overcome with reference to a more basic unity, or that 
more basic union is distributed between two opposing and complimentary terms.  In each 
case, as with Kierkegaard‘s analysis, this mediation preserves a more fundamental unity 
that is recollected as the ground for the relation itself within the order of being.   It was 
against this purely intellectualist discourse that Augustine apprehended the logic of 
creatio ex nihilo not simply as a more intelligible and consistent speculative metaphysics, 
but as a distinct operation of the divine will, which was irreducibly tied to the 
manifestation of the world‘s goodness.  This opens the door to the recognition that the 
doctrine of creation is inseparable from the notion of the will as the distinctively ethical 
operation of positively affirming otherness itself in its very otherness.  This claim means 
that otherness is inseparable from its concrete manifestation in appearing.   
As noted in Chapter Four, however, the deadlock between Augustine‘s grammar 
of creation and his mature theology of grace arises due to an attempt to distribute material 
and temporal development, change, and differentiation within a unified totality absolutely 
determined by God.  The metaphysical problem he encounters here concerns the fact that 
he is unable to account for these elements in a manner that does not result in the 
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eradication of the operational integrity of created reality.  We saw that this is due to the 
fact that he conceives God‘s immutability as an absolute self-determination standing in 
competitive relation to created self-determination.  It is only with Aquinas‘ doctrine of 
God as the act of existence (esse) that the groundwork is laid for overcoming this 
conflict, as it allows for a non-competitive relation between God and the world.  It is on 
this ground that the real operational integrity of created reality can be affirmed precisely 
through the differentiation of the operations of the will from the intellect, which give rise 
to the further differentiation of nature from the supernatural.  Thus the category of being 
itself remains an integral facet of the problem posed by the unity of creation and grace.   
Beyond this, we saw that the metaphysical response to these questions, even in 
the most sophisticated form of Aquinas, is unable to account for the social and relational 
dimension of Augustine‘s mature theology of grace.  Rather, the metaphysical account 
can only succeed by reducing the social and relational dimension of Augustine‘s 
emphasis on rectitude and justice to matters of the appropriate conceptual framework for 
thinking the operational integrity of created reality.  Thus, the social reality of the will‘s 
ethical orientation must also be retained, even as the metaphysical framework that makes 
the will itself intelligible appears to undermine that affirmation.    
What is needed is a metaphysics that can account for the doctrine of creation as 
specified by Augustine.  This metaphysics must be that of creatio ex nihilo, which can 
evade Gnostic and Manichean assumptions regarding Being by being specifically 
grounded in the divine will.  This metaphysics must further involve an understanding of 
Being in Aquinas‘ terms as the act of existence (esse), which can also serve as the basis 
upon which to maintain and articulate the differentiation of the operations of the will 
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from the intellect and desire.  But, concomitantly, this metaphysics must maintain the 
connection Augustine draws in his grammar of creation between God‘s will, sovereignty, 
and goodness, and in such a way that the social and relational element integral to 
Augustine‘s mature theology of grace must be retained and cannot be reduced to 
metaphysics.  But neither can this social element be reducible to an abstract ontological 
principle.  What is needed is a metaphysics of being that fully accounts for the social 
dimension of reality and in such a way that it is not reducible to a function of identity, 
intellect, and participation.  Such an account is simply a matter of fully applying the 
significance of the distinctiveness of the will from the intellect and desire to the 
metaphysical tradition of Christian theology.    That role, however, concerns the account 
of Being that is most appropriate to the understanding of the nature of reality as 
expressed in Christian doctrines of creation and grace.  This means that the question of 
the status and role of Being in Christian theology must be decided by the presentation of 
a coherent doctrine of creation.  Once this is done, a clear insight into the doctrine of 
creation will be opened up, which will shed light on its union with the doctrine of grace.  
This requires a significant reconstruction of each in light of the grammar of creation, 
history of reflection, and doctrinal stipulations we have outlined.   
 
Creation: Metaphysics, Being, and the Otherness 
The intellect is facing a blank and the will follows it. 
 
 —Dom John Chapman, OSB10 
 
 
                                                 
10
Quoted from Coakley, Powers and Submissions: Spirituality, Philosophy and Gender, 54.  See also 
her discussion of this idea on pp. 40-55.   
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The place to begin to reconstruct the union of creation and grace in the Western 
tradition is with the fundamental affirmation of the grammar of creatio ex nihilo as 
articulated by Augustine against the Manichees.  This involves a repetition of the basic 
themes of the relationship of sovereignty, goodness, and the will as their relationship was 
elaborated in Chapter Four.  The interrelationship of these categories demands that the 
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo sit at the heart of a coherent Christian doctrine and 
metaphysics of reality because the world has an operational integrity of its own that 
renders it essentially knowable as such and shows it to be fundamentally relational.  The 
doctrine of creation must be maintained as an accurate description of the reality of the 
world in its actuality, and not merely a unique determination of ―Christian‖ 
consciousness.  The doctrine of creation must, then, have the kind of realist metaphysical 
significance that Schleiermacher denied it, which further means that the metaphysical 
affirmation of creatio ex nihilo—precisely as a doctrine—cannot be understood as a 
function or extension of the doctrine of redemption.  Rather, the doctrine of redemption 
presupposes and perfects the doctrine of creation.  The world must have its own integral 
existence.  Anything other than this is Manichean.   
Proposals such as those of Catherin Keller, which seek to reformulate this 
doctrine in terms of a more fundamental ―depth‖ of fluid relations, are misguided for just 
this reason.  What they seek to gain regarding the goodness of God‘s relatedness to the 
world is compromised precisely at the point that God‘s sovereignty is set aside.11  The 
doctrine of creation is, then, essentially a metaphysical doctrine about the constitution of 
reality as absolutely dependent on the divine creativity and preservation.  Such 
                                                 
11
 See Catherine Keller, Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming (New York: Routledge, 2003). 
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dependence is the essence of creaturely life, meaning that there can be no absolute 
opposition between God and any aspect of the world.  To suggest this is to define the 
creature‘s relation to God in fundamentally negative terms that deny the creative relation 
of absolute dependence that unite them.  This relation is one in which dependence is 
understood to make the creature what it is.  Thus, the grammatical relation discovered by 
Augustine that connects God‘s absolute sovereignty over the whole of reality cannot be 
compromised in any cogent doctrine of creation.   
In connection with this point, God‘s absolute determination of the whole is not 
merely a matter of creating a world with its own distinct operational integrity, but is 
likewise the act of preserving it in that being, thereby expressing its fundamental 
goodness.  This claim means that the world can only be understood as the result of a 
distinct and voluntary divine action.  Claims that emanation is a wholly acceptable 
interpretation of the doctrine of creation and the world‘s relationship to God, must be 
rejected.
12
  A finite participation in God‘s infinite plenitude can only conceive the act of 
creating as either an effulgence of the divine intellect or as a finite differentiated 
expression of God‘s own absolute identity.  The primary difficulty with this way of 
conceiving matters is not merely that it refuses—at least implicitly—to link the creature‘s 
goodness to its operational distinction from God, but it must do so because it only 
conceives God‘s act of creating in terms of becoming (fieri) or making (factum), which 
repeats the basic structural dualism of negative determination.  As such, it remains an 
incomplete form of Gnostic thinking about the created order.  Created being is the direct 
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 For a nuanced acceptance of the emanationist position, see David Burrell, "Creation or Emanation: 
Two Paradigms of Reason," in God and Creation, ed. Bernard McGinn and David Burrell (Notre Dame, 
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990). 
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and immediate result of the divine will to create not simply a finite participation in God‘s 
life, but otherness as such.   
God‘s voluntary act of the will to create the world out of nothing cannot be 
captured in terms of the categories of participation or emanation.
13
  When God acts to 
create the world, God is doing much more than differentiating absolute and relative 
being, thereby manifesting finite being.  As we have shown in the discussion of 
Augustine on immutability and its relationship to Aquinas, were this action all that was 
entailed, then God could not properly be said to create, but only to make, to produce, to 
generate.  On the contrary, when God acts to create, God actually constitutes in existence 
that which did not exist before.
14
  As God is absolute, this action can only be properly 
understood as the very constitution of otherness.  That is, God not only acts to create 
what was not, but in doing so brings into being an other to Godself, which is 
fundamentally related—and therefore not dialectically opposite—to God as other in its 
mode of being.   
Importantly, if the act of creating is fundamentally related to otherness in this 
fashion, this can only be because this act of creating is a work of the will specifically, and 
is not merely a mediating differentiation within the intellect, achieved through 
determinate negation.  The world is not nor can it be related to God as a mere difference 
within the overarching identity of God‘s absolute Being.  Were this the case, the world‘s 
operational integrity would be compromised insofar as the world itself would be 
reducible to a modality of God‘s own self-apprehension.  This conclusion is, in fact, what 
Luther‘s ontology threatens to do with its ―Christomonism.‖  It is finally irrelevant 
                                                 
13
 Though, I do not think that this insistence means that these categories are absolutely invalid.    
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whether this mode of self-apprehension is necessary or gratuitous to God‘s life, as some 
would like to claim.  It is irrelevant because the world‘s relationship to God would 
remain confined to the external, finite manifestation of God‘s own internal intelligibility.  
On the contrary, in creating, God acts to create what is really and distinctively other to 
God, and does so as an act of the will.  The suggestion here is not that God creates with 
the will apart from the intellect, but that the will is an integral aspect of God‘s unifying 
action—that is, that God‘s act of creating is itself irreducible to a modality of God‘s own 
self-knowledge.   
This claim entails not only that creation is the constitution of otherness as such, 
but also that it is an act of affirming this otherness in that very otherness.  It is in this way 
that the creation of the world reaches beyond being a metaphysical account of the nature 
of created being to the claim that this being is integrally good in its very otherness.  Such 
goodness adheres to creation not in spite of its distinction from God, but in and through 
that distinction.  The world is the ―concupiscent‖ object of the divine good pleasure 
because it is distinct from God, is irreducible to God, and this because of God‘s action 
toward it.  By acting to create what is other, God does not merely constitute but affirms 
the goodness of otherness.  This other is the object of God‘s will and is created by that 
will.  This act is no mere function in the order of knowledge, but is an ethical affirmation 
of absolute and irreducible value.   
Further, this has implications for the metaphysics of the operation of the will in 
that it completes the articulation of the nature of the will as analyzed in this study. This 
way of tracking the metaphysics of the will to the point where it is irreducibly united to 
the positive affirmation of otherness means that the will can no longer be understood in 
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any way as an extension of the mode of intellect or desire.  Doing so merely obviates its 
uniqueness by reducing it to ontological identity.  On the contrary, as its very being is 
grounded in God‘s affirmation of otherness and is the ethical faculty of value, otherness 
itself is the site of value.  Otherness here is transcendental only in the sense of 
designating the universal value attached to every individual, specifically as other.  In this 
way, the will retains a discrete metaphysical integrity that is grounded in concrete 
otherness as it confronts an agent.  In this respect, concern for the rectitude of an action is 
inseparably tied to the affirmation of the other that precedes and determines it in its 
sensible appearing.  As such, the rectitude of an action pertains to whether a given action 
is taken up as an affirmation of the other that precedes, conditions, and establishes the 
possibility of that action, or whether that action is taken up in opposition to this fact.  
Such is the basis for understanding charity as a matter of rectitude in the same social and 
relational terms established by Augustine.       
Value is thus regulated by otherness.  This claim means that otherness is the mode 
within which absolute value is apprehended in the world.  This claim should not be taken 
to mean that the creation of otherness was necessary for God‘s goodness.  Rather, it notes 
that because the world is constituted in and by the volitional and contingent act to create 
otherness, the intelligible value of the world and its absolute point of reference (i.e., the 
Good itself) appears within the world as an-other.  As the set of operations related to 
contingency and value, this means that the will must be understood as the faculty of 
otherness, which is irreducible to the intellect.  If this claim is intelligible, then it is only 
appropriate to identify the will itself as that set of operations that has the act of affirming 
the otherness of the other as its proper goal, and the failure of which results in a 
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disordered relation to oneself, one‘s world, and God.  Here we have a reversal of the 
metaphysical ordering of the ordo caritatis, but only insofar as the path to the ―height‖ 
that conditions the whole passes irrevocably through the other that confronts and 
conditions every finite action.   
I do not mean by this that the will is not an intellectual appetite, as defined by 
Aquinas.  On the contrary, my claim in this study is that the affective relation to otherness 
lies at the heart of Thomas‘ formulation, and it is only as an intellectual appetite that the 
will is shown to be fundamentally related to the other.  As noted above, the will is 
actualized by an abstraction (the phantasm) in the intellect from a sensible object. This 
structure pertains to the manner in which the first operation of the will is passive in 
relation to the representation of material reality provoked by the sensory object.  The 
actuality of that object moves the intellect to generate a phantasm of the object, the 
general good of which actualizes the first operation of the will.  The significance of this 
relation, which our analysis puts into relief, is the sense in which the very materiality of 
the sensory object, tied as it is here to the goodness of reality, is fundamentally distinct 
from the abstractions of the intellect and has priority over them as the basis for their 
actualization.  As the entire study has been oriented to show, this abstraction is not itself 
sufficient for the performance of the good unless the will‘s action in relation to that good 
is first rightly ordered.  As adumbrated above, this means that the rectitude of the will‘s 
action is completely determined by whether that action is taken up not simply for the sake 
of attaining a good for itself that was presented in that object, but whether the will is 
fundamentally oriented, in its action, toward the positive affirmation of the otherness of 
the object that has affected it.  The former is characteristic of the speculative 
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metaphysical gesture that Luther rightly rejected as a wholly natural love, and the later 
alone is properly designated ―supernatural.‖  For, what is apprehended along with the 
form of the object in question is ethical obligation, which reaches beyond mere 
affirmation of the representational abstraction of the phantasm, to an unequivocal 
affirmation of the priority of concrete, material value of the object itself in its operational 
integrity.  The affirmation of the truth of a given representation is, then, necessarily 
inseparable from the act of the will that affirms the reality of the value of the otherness of 
the other.  Insofar as that reality is not affirmed, a true representation of the object cannot 
be said to have been obtained.  It does not obtain because truth itself is not an abstract 
expression of value in an object, but is rather invested in the value of the object in its very 
otherness.     
This understanding of truth ties the metaphysical reality of the world directly and 
uniquely to its status as created.  One does not so much abstract from the world to the 
truth of its status as created and valuable, but rather finds oneself so determined by the 
value of truth that one encounters obligation at the root of existence.  This obligation is 
bound up with the manifestation of the finite value of the world as distinctly related to 
Godself.  In this regard, when we act in such a way as to deny the reality of the value of 
the other that we encounter, that value is not destroyed, but it is subsumed into an object 
of our own self-preserving concupiscence.  Nonetheless, because the obligation we 
encounter is metaphysical, the truth of the world is inaccessible and the world is 
incoherent apart from it.  We perceive truth only in direct correlation with the rectitude of 
our willing, which is irreducibly tied to the positive affirmation of the other.       
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This affirmation of otherness is the metaphysical mode within which we 
recognize the absolute otherness of the divine life.  This absolute otherness is the basis 
for a metaphysics of relation that is not a ―relational metaphysics‖ that, with Hegel, 
conceives this relation as a metaphysical principle of logical contrast, as in Manichaeism.  
The kind of idea that is at work here is more consistent with the traditional perspective 
adopted by Schleiermacher‘s claim that God is to be distinguished from the world in such 
a way as not to stand in opposition to it.  I will return to this idea in reference to Aquinas 
once more below.  At present, it is more pertinent to underscore that this affirmative 
relation to the other as other locates the appearance of this absolute determination of 
finite existence, as Emmanuel Levinas has insisted, in the face of the concrete, material 
neighbor.
15
  It is in this way that we should come to understand the nature of the Golden 
Rule.
16
  The manner in which Luther‘s insight into the non-concupiscent demands of love 
becomes most important in just this form of the affirmation of relation.      
But the main concern of the metaphysical articulation of the significance of 
otherness in the grammar of creation concerns the manner in which these ideas are not 
alien to Aquinas‘ own vision, even as they specify and reach beyond the limitations of his 
project.  Within this frame, which sees the will as the faculty of the affirmation of 
otherness, it can be affirmed without reservation that the human being only finds 
fulfillment in attaining the goal of the intellectual and appetitive operations that define 
her.  In this respect, the overarching impulses of Lubac, Rahner, and Lonergan are 
affirmed without reservation.  The supernatural goal of human life is integrally related to 
                                                 
15
 See Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, 61-97. 
16
 This at least is Luther‘s position.  See Raunio, Summe Des Christlichen Lebens: Die "Goldene 
Regel" Als Gesetz Der Liebe in Der Theologie Martin Luthers Von 1510-1527, 319-62. 
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the natural operations of the human being, and their fulfillment comes to those operations 
in a manner that fulfills rather than destroys their natural operations.  There is a natural 
orientation, then, to the supernatural.  
 By understanding the will in this way, we see that the meaning of the 
supernatural is also illuminated.  The human being is, as Aquinas notes, both 
intellectually, appetitively, and voluntarily ordered toward a fulfillment of her natural 
operations in and with God alone.  Such fulfillment comes as the gratuitous ―perfection‖ 
of those operations.  This claim confirms Aquinas‘ teaching that no natural production is 
proportionate to that goal, but this fact is not, as Aquinas thought, due merely to the 
infinity of the concupiscent object and the finitude of the agent.  Rather, the attainment of 
that object occurs, paradoxically, on the condition of the will‘s positive affirmation of 
that object‘s otherness to the will, which entails acting in concert with and accepting the 
prior determination of the reality of the value of the other as other.  In this respect, it is 
not the concupiscence of the nature of the will that renders the action impossible.  Nor is 
it the case that these operations of self-preservation are evil.  This situation merely points 
to the fact that, because the will is ordered toward the goal of enjoying a value that is 
irreducibly tied to otherness as such, that goal is not one that it can be said to attain by 
virtue of its own production.     
This point is only reinforced by the logic of Aquinas‘ discussion of friendship.  
He states that beatitude is attained only where the good of another is taken up as one‘s 
own, and he recognizes that such an act is only possible for the will because of an infused 
habit of charity within it.  The previous chapter noted that Aquinas conceives this act of 
assuming another‘s good as one‘s own in a way that reduces the otherness of the relation 
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to the hierarchical ordering of the whole of reality as an expression of God‘s absolute 
goodness (ordo caritate), thereby reducing the social dimension of grace to a purely 
metaphysical relation.  When the will is understood as the faculty of otherness, however, 
we see that the impulse to abstraction is the perversion of the basic impulse to self-
transcendence toward the other.  Indeed, if the will is the faculty of otherness, then the 
perfection of the will lies not in the satiety achieved by the attainment of its object, but in 
the positive affirmation of its determination by the very otherness that establishes it.  This 
relation is, as Kierkegaard notes in Practice in Christianity:  
But the ultimate potentiation in every passion is always to will its own downfall, and so it 
is also the ultimate passion of the understanding to will the collision, although in one way 
or another the collision must become its own downfall.  This, then, is the ultimate 
paradox of thought: to want to discover something that thought itself cannot think.
17
 
 
And it is through this process that the self is established as a ―relation that relates itself to 
itself‖ that both ―wills to be itself‖ and ―rests transparently in the power that establishes 
it.‖18   
This observation is in continuity with the Roman Catholic tradition in claiming 
that grace perfects nature, and that the orientation to a supernatural goal is natural and 
inherent to the human being.  My proposed alteration of this understanding significantly 
transforms the meaning of these affirmations.  On my model, everything pivots on 
correctly ascertaining the ethical aspect of truth and being as they coincide with the 
positive affirmation of otherness.  Aquinas is correct to conceive the meaning of the will 
in metaphysical terms, but he develops his insight into a speculative ontology, 
                                                 
17
 Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments; Johannes Climacus, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna 
H. Hong, Kierkegaard's Writings (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), 37.  
18
 Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for Upbuilding 
and Awakening, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1980), 14. 
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demonstrating that he fails to recognize the continuity between the operation of the will, 
the actuality of the good, and the positive affirmation of otherness as integral to the 
doctrine of creation.  My observations open the door to correcting this oversight in such a 
way that the metaphysics of the will and the ―supernatural‖ orientation of its natural 
operations that are integral to the Roman Catholic paradigm are retained and 
uncompromised.    
Nonetheless, I have simultaneously argued that the value of the metaphysical 
orientation of the Roman Catholic paradigm is only retained when it is supplemented by 
relational critique of speculative metaphysics levied by Luther‘s doctrine of justification.  
In claiming that speculative metaphysics was inappropriate for theological truth, Luther 
saw quite rightly that the structure of such purported knowledge remains diametrically 
opposed to the relational affirmation of otherness lying at the heart of a genuinely 
Christian metaphysics, which always proceeds according to the absolute priority of the 
divine determination.
19
 It is for this reason that Luther insists that Scholasticism‘s 
assertion that grace is an accidental rather than a substantial quality of the soul is wide of 
the mark.  Indeed, for the same reasons specified by Aquinas, Luther believes that if the 
will is fundamentally ordered toward self-preservation, its basic orientation does not rise 
to the level of the supernatural, but remains ordered to and conditioned by the natural 
alone.  For Luther this simply means that they remain an instance of self-preservation, 
                                                 
19
 I am deliberately using the terms ―metaphysics‖ here in order to contrast my own interpretation with 
that of Juntunen, who insists that Luther has an ontology without a metaphyiscs. I certainly agree that 
Luther‘s thought is not speculative, but as I have tried to show in this chapter, this should be tied to 
ontology directly, and not to metaphysics.  By affirming metaphysics, I am merely attemptitng to lift out 
the sense in which the good is an integral component of any properly conception of Being.  This means 
Being as generically conceived, but most especially for Christian theology, grounded as that vision of 
Being is in the doctrine of creation out of nothing.   
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and not of charity.  Our analysis of Aquinas has shown that Luther‘s charge is essentially 
correct in the details, even if he does not capture Aquinas‘ intention.   
 Luther‘s critique involves a development of Aquinas‘ position that leads 
necessarily to the claim that, although the Roman Catholic paradigm‘s insistence on a 
metaphysical expression of the proportionality of the natural operations of the will‘s self-
determination must be maintained, the doctrine of creation likewise demands that this 
metaphysics adopt the distinctively Protestant rejection of concupiscence.  Luther‘s 
insistence on the form of faith as substantial rather than accidental takes on its full 
significance precisely as an alteration of the capacity of self-determination at work in 
those natural operations.  Yet even there, as discussed in Chapter Five, when this 
transformation is conceived in discretely ontological terms, the doctrine of creation is 
reduced to a function of the doctrine of grace, and the social and relational dimension is 
again lost.  From the perspective I am advocating, this reduction can be directly attributed 
not to a flaw in Luther‘s perspective, but, just as with Aquinas, to his failure to perceive 
the distinctively ethical affirmation of otherness that lay at its heart.  He sought instead to 
develop this claim in terms of an intellectual mediation of a recollected ontological union.   
From this standpoint, we can see that what is needed is a cogent way to reject this 
structure of concupiscence of the will that nonetheless maintains the metaphysics that 
specifies the will‘s operational integrity.  This category can be attained when the will is 
understood in the decisively ethical terms developed here, according to the voluntary 
affirmation of the value of otherness as such, which is the proper way to configure the 
rectitude of the will‘s natural operations.  The point here is not that the will cannot will 
the other as other, but that the will cannot move itself to this action apart from the other‘s 
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prior determination of it, and without the reduction of that other to itself.  Because this 
other is, effectively, internal to the will‘s operation, the failure to rightly will by 
positively affirming the otherness of the other, results in a contradiction at the heart of 
oneself—the contradiction of sin.  It is in this way that we should maintain Luther‘s 
teaching regarding the bondage of the will, especially as he states that true freedom 
consists in being bound to the Other that determines it absolutely.   
In this section I have laid out a cursory sketch for a metaphysics of Being that is 
irreducible to ontology.  In doing so, I mean to argue that the Christian doctrine of 
creation involves the unavoidable affirmation of a metaphysical account of reality, by 
which I mean an account of the whole.  However, because of the inherent and irreducible 
role of volition in that doctrine (that I addressed in Chapter Four), such a metaphysics is 
best conceived only according to what Edith Wyschogrod dubbed as Levinas‘ ―ethical 
metaphysics.‖20  When punctuated in relation to Christian theology, however, such a 
metaphysics takes on a very different cast than what Wyschogrod means by the term.  I 
mean to point to the manner in which Christian doctrine recognizes a unique, irreducibly 
ethical component of reality that is bound specifically to the volitional aspect of God‘s 
creative act of bringing into being otherness as such and bestowing upon it, by virtue of 
that act, a value that adheres specifically to its status as other.  The metaphysics implied 
by this doctrine of creation specifies the act of Being in its apophatic irreducibility to 
thought (even the thought of negativity) by recognizing that the truth of thought coincides 
                                                 
20
 I am not here directly following either Wyschogrod‘s interpretation of Levinas or Levinas‘ own 
proposal in formulating this ethical metaphysics, especially as worked out in Totality and Infinity.  I am, 
however, inspired by both of them, and find the phrase especially illustrative of a goal I understand myself 
to have acquired from Levinas, even as I depart from him.  This is especially true with regard to the criique 
of concupiscence at work throughout Otherwise Than Being.  On Wyschogrod‘s influence, see Chapter 
One, p. 36, especially n. 61.   
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immediately with the ethical value of otherness itself.  Because creation is the voluntary 
and contingent constitution and affirmation of otherness as such, Being is never 
conceptually apprehended or mediated as a whole.  The intelligibility of the whole does 
not obtain in relation to the conceptual apprehension of its overarching order, but in 
relation to the positive, creative affirmation of otherness as such.  This does not mean—
pace Barth—that God‘s act of existence includes otherness within itself.21  Rather, it 
means that only the God who is the act of existence can create because only the act of 
existence can absolutely affirm the positive value of otherness.  Furthermore, it is only 
because of this metaphysical identity that otherness stands in a non-competitive relation 
to God.  Because of this action, the whole of created reality is shown to be 
metaphysically determined as ethical, and Being itself is shown to stand in excess of the 
conceptual mediation of the whole, grounding its reality and ordering it toward the 
positive affirmation of the absolute otherness that grounds it.   
Though this affirmation is metaphysical, it is not and cannot be speculative.  
Indeed, the recognition of the world as created coincides immediately with the 
affirmation of the priority of otherness—in thought, in ethics, and in existence.  The 
creation of the world, then, is always principally a doctrinal affirmation, because it cannot 
be separated from the ethical act of affirming the otherness to which it points.  This 
affirmation entails the ethical recognition of God‘s final priority over the world as its 
other and the world‘s dependence on God‘s continued affirmation of it as God‘s other, 
but includes the active affirmation and reception of the value of the world itself that is 
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 See CD II/1, 371.   
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implied by these claims.  The apprehension of Being is always first dependent on 
otherness as such.     
 
Grace: Encounter, Ethics, and the Other 
...the very precocious idea that certain formal notions are not fully intelligible except in a 
concrete event, which seems even more irrational than the notions, but through which 
they are truly thought. 
 
 —Emmanuel Levinas22 
 
In addition to the metaphysical affirmation that the being of the world and the 
apprehension of its truth are integrally united with the positive affirmation of otherness is 
another factor that surpasses the significance of the proper metaphysics of Being.  This 
factor pertains directly to the social and relational dimension of Augustine‘s mature 
theology of grace, which I have pointed to throughout this study.  The previous section 
was devoted to showing how it is that the metaphysics of the doctrine of creation binds 
the ethical dimension of Being directly and irreducibly to the an otherness that cannot be 
what Hegel calls ―conceptually mediated‖ or what Kierkegaard referred to under the 
category of ―recollected.‖  My claims to this point have been Kierkegaardian insofar as 
they are intended to force one more deeply into the concreteness of existence rather than 
allowing one to abstract from it.  However, the metaphysics I am pointing to is not 
limited to the notion of an ongoing creative act of positively constituting otherness as 
such, but reaches out to include the possibility of real encounter.   
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 Jill Robbins, "Philosophy, Justice, and Love," in Is It Righteous to Be?: Interviews with Emmanuel 
Lévinas, ed. Jill Robbins (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 179. 
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What God constitutes as other in the act of creating simultaneously involves the 
continued affirmation, preservation, and sustaining of that other in its very otherness from 
God.  This moment of continuance is important to distinguish from the act of creation, 
and certainly should not be conflated with it as Schleiermacher does.  As itself an act of 
the will, this act of fidelity to the otherness constituted by the act of creating always 
remains contingent in relationship to the world.  It is this emphasis on contingency and 
fidelity that marks the overarching importance of covenant to the Hebrew people—
beginning as it does with the Hebrew people—and to the Protestant tradition more 
generally, as noted in Chapter Three.  In making this distinction, I am advancing a point 
similar to that of Lubac‘s ―second gratuity‖ in The Mystery of the Supernatural.  
However, I wish to distinguish my point by the fact that where Lubac speaks of the first 
gratuity of creation and the second gratuity of inscribing its supernatural end, I wish to 
join this second moment to the first as its constitutively ethical aspect.  I do this not 
simply in order to underscore that Being‘s ethical dimension remains irreducible to 
recollection, but because the act of voluntarily binding oneself to another is the deepest 
expression of the social and relational dimension that I have sought to emphasize.  I do so 
specifically in terms of intimate fidelity that is inseparable from a genuine encounter that 
is only conceivable in the terms I have described of the ethical as a positive affirmation of 
the otherness of the other.  God does not simply create otherness and observe its 
unfolding but, concomitant with the act of creating, elects to be bound to that other and to 
her history, assumes responsibility for her, and inseparably unites God‘s own identity to 
her particular history and responsibility.   
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Importantly, because this act of fidelity must be distinguished from the act of 
creating, but not conflated with it, God‘s act is not to be understood as the proper object 
of this fidelity, but rather the other in her otherness.  God‘s principle act of constituting 
the world in its being, as an ethical act, involves the continual affirmation of the relation 
established by that act, and not simply the act of fidelity as such.  The affirmation of this 
relation, as ethical, is not abstract, but marks a genuine and concrete encounter between 
God and humanity.  As David Burrell has brilliantly observed, it is precisely because 
God‘s knowledge is convertible with God‘s will that God‘s act of creating is eminently 
practical.
23
  God knows in the most concrete of ways precisely because the apprehension 
of the object of that action is inseparable from its emergence into material existence.  
What Burrell fails to elaborate upon are the distinctively ethical aspects of this claim—a 
mistake that his most recent work on the will simply elaborates upon, when he explicitly 
draws the Platonic conclusion that what is intellectually apprehended as good also 
necessarily entails the capacity for its performance.
24
  Rather, we should be more 
attentive to the nature of the affirmation of the distinctiveness of the will as an ethical 
faculty whose operations are ineluctably linked with otherness as such.  This is all the 
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 Burrell makes this claim in numerous places, but it was more characteristic of his early work, where 
he emphasized a distinctly practical knowledge in God‘s works.  See Burrell, "Creation or Emanation.", 
David Burrell, "Divine Practical Knowing: How an Eternal God Acts in Time," in Divind Action, ed. Brian 
Hebblethwaite and Edward Henderson (Edinburgh: T&T Clarke, 1990), Burrell, Aquinas: God and Action. 
24
 Burrell‘s most recent work explicitly notes that his view of freedom implies that knowledge of the 
good implies the capacity for perform it.  See David B. Burrell, Faith and Freedom : An Interfaith 
Perspective, Challenges in Contemporary Theology (Malden, MA ; Oxford: Blackwell Pub., 2004).  This 
strikes me as an unusual and unnecessary development in his thought.  The development appears to 
coincide with his greater appreciation for the Platonic tradition in general, especially emanationism.  I do 
agree that there is a Platonic element at work here that must be affirmed.  I will return to this point below.  
There I will note my essential agreement with Burrell‘s turn to a non-dualist interpretation of Aquinas‘ 
legacy.  I wish here to press Burrell to link those insights not to an Neoplatonic emanationism, but to an 
overtly ethical articulation of those elements of the doctrine of creation that link it to otherness as such.  
See Burrell, "Creation or Emanation." 
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more important if, as we have shown, the link between created existence, the good, and 
the will pivots around a distinctive positive affirmation of otherness itself.   
If God‘s ethical fidelity to the positive affirmation of creation as God‘s other 
involves a concrete encounter with that other, then this can also only mean, in Derrida‘s 
terms, that in the encounter, ―every other is wholly other‖ [tout autre est tout autre].  By 
invoking this turn of phrase, I mean to insist that God‘s act of creating is not the 
constitution of otherness as a generic and therefore transcendental category.  On the 
contrary, if otherness is the object of the divine creativity, then it is every other so 
constituted by that act that is encountered as other and in which otherness is expressed—
and this is not applicable to a collective.  It is for this reason that election is inseparable 
from the establishment of a covenant with a distinct people, but that this election must, as 
Augustine and Calvin understood (flawed as their proposals were), include individuals.  
Indeed, if we are to follow the most recent scholarship on the meaning of justification in 
Paul, then election is, as Barth taught us, most truly spoken of only of a single 
individual.
25
  There is, in this regard, no higher expression of God‘s ―righteous 
lovingkindness‖ than the attention to individuals which is testified to in the doctrine of 
election.  Such a claim is affirmed by Jesus himself about the hair on our heads, the lilies 
of the field, and every dying sparrow.
26
  When this aspect of the divine activity is 
understood in distinctively ethical rather than ontological terms, and when its social and 
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 On this point, the representative works are Richard B.  Hays, "Jesus' Faith and Ours: A Re-Reading 
of Galatians 3," in Conflict and Context: Hermeneutics in the Americas, ed. M. Branson and C. René 
Padilla (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986), Richard B. Hays, "Further Reflections on Galatians 3," in 
Conflict and Context: Hermeneutics in the Americas, ed. M. Branson and C. René Padilla (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1986). 
26
 When this doctrine is construed in ontological terms, it involves the claim that the divine will 
arbitrarily selects individuals to be the objects of divine grace.  Such an interpretation interprets the election 
as the ontological determination of the truth of reality.   
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relational dimension is not reduced to a metaphysical principle of the order of the whole 
of reality, then this intimate proximity of singular affirmation can be properly recognized 
and affirmed.   
God is ―closer to me than I am to myself,‖ not simply because God establishes me 
in my being, but because that act is the affirmation in and through which God encounters 
me as myself, along with every other as herself.  There is an interesting metaphysical 
parallel here to Aquinas‘ conception of the overarching order of the whole.  As noted in 
the previous chapter in relation to Blanchette‘s work on perfection in Aquinas, the term 
only properly pertains to the created world when considered as a whole.  This claim 
means that multiplicity, for Aquinas, is vital to the finite expression of divine goodness.  
A greater reflection of the absolute good is attained where greater diversity and 
complexity achieve harmony in spite of their requisite increased risk of disharmony and 
entropy.  I have gone to great pains to show that this principle finally fails to account for 
the overarching concerns it expresses; nonetheless, in the present context it gains new 
traction.  When viewed as an expression of the affirmation of otherness of created being 
(ens commune), we recognize God‘s act of fidelity to creation as a recapitulation of the 
originary, voluntary act of creating otherness itself.  This claim is not the kind of reversal 
of traditional metaphysics carried out by Eberhard Jüngel‘s suggestion that God‘s essence 
is constituted in and through existence.
27
   Because God‘s creative act is constitutively 
ethical, the harmony that is achieved in the created order, in its recapitulation of the 
original divine act, must be understood in terms of a recapitulation of this God‘s positive 
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 Eberhard Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the World: On the Foundation of the Theology of the 
Crucified One in the Dispute between Theism and Atheism (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1983). 
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affirmation of otherness as such.
28
  This claim means, however, that the harmony of the 
world is not now an established fact, nor is it ever properly finished in the sense of being 
complete.  Rather, the very diversity of the otherness that is manifested in and by the very 
act of creating summons human beings, as ethical agents, to the task of creating harmony 
where it does not yet exist.  Importantly and decisively, this means that such harmony 
cannot be conceptually invoked as an ontological principle mediating a recollected unity, 
but must be concretely enacted within the ethical encounter as the positive affirmation of 
the otherness of the other.  For this reason, God‘s creative act, precisely because it is the 
constitution of otherness and the faithful preservation of it, includes an element of social 
and relational encounter.   
We can and should invoke the Platonic tradition of the ―beyond Being,‖ the 
―above‖ of ―above Being.‖ Yet, in the context of creation out of nothing, we should not 
understand this, as Levinas does, as that which is superior to being, and which lies apart 
from and conditions a univocal being.  Rather, the beyond of Being, the Good that is 
above Being, is that aspect of created being that is not-yet.
29
  All the more, what is 
beyond being is that aspect of finite reality wherein God‘s creativity continues, in and 
through the ethical aspect of Being which works for greater and greater transparency to 
the benevolent act of the creator.  It is not enough to say, as does Kierkegaard, that it is 
the individual, the singular subjective agent, who stands in excess of mediated 
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recollection.  Rather, the creativity of the ethical encounter with the other must be 
asserted, such that what lies beyond the given reality of being is decisively thought in 
terms of an ethics that is convertible with creativity itself.  Thus, the ethical encounter 
that is coincident with the creation of being cannot be reduced to an ontological principle 
of order in reality. 
In this way, the element of encounter that is opened out by this ethical 
understanding of God‘s fidelity to the constitution of otherness in the act of creation is 
the proper fulfillment of Aquinas on friendship—both with God and with the neighbor.  
As we saw in Aquinas‘ discussion of charity, it is through the reception of an infused 
habit of charity, which exceeds the natural self-determination of the will, that the creature 
is brought to fulfillment.  With this habit, the creature comes to assume another‘s good as 
one‘s own concupiscent object for happiness.  We noted that this other, for Aquinas, 
cannot be the other human being because of the priority of the ordo caritatis, which 
orders loves properly according to a hierarchy that is determined by levels of universality, 
thus placing it firmly within the structure of Hegelian mediation as critiqued by 
Kierkegaard.  Rather than the other human being, one must come to take the good of 
Godself as one‘s object, which includes both the self and the other.  Most notably, 
Aquinas understands that the ordo caritatis places love of self, even in the order of 
charity, above love of the other.  While one may successfully defend Aquinas against 
egoism here, it is clear that this fact is in keeping with our analysis concerning the 
priority of the ontological discourse of intellect, identity, and participation.  The 
significance of this lies with the manner in which the priority of abstraction, operative for 
Aquinas at the level of the ordo caritatis, precludes any genuine ethical encounter with 
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the other.  Indeed, I insist that the priority of sensation in the apprehension of truth 
requires a certain ecstatic structure to human knowledge.  In this regard, Rahner is 
absolutely correct in his analysis in Spirit in the World.  The difficulty, however, 
concerns the fact that this inevitably involves the priority of the metaphysical order of 
being over the other (or, as is the case with Rahner, a distinctive Platonic personalism).  
In each case, the significance of the role of the will as the ethical faculty of the 
affirmation of the otherness of the other is overlooked.   
What Aquinas should perceive here is the manner in which the will is ordered 
toward a goal that requires the other for its fulfillment.  It is in this light that we should 
interpret and correct his teaching on friendship and charity.  Charity marks that act of the 
will whereby the human being adopts the good of the other as its own good.  This is what 
is disclosed in the doctrine of creation, when God‘s voluntary act of constituting 
otherness is shown to be that act by which the affirmation of the other as other is God‘s 
adopting the good of the other as God‘s own.  Such an action is impossible apart from 
real encounter with that other.  And it is this positive affirmation of the other as other that 
completes Aquinas‘ own analysis.  Charity cannot be the abstractive positioning of the 
other in a more universal field of reference.  Charity must be the actual, concrete, 
historical affirmation of the good of that other.  It is not that one seeks one‘s own good in 
that other, but that one actually takes that other‘s good as one‘s own—bears it, seeks it, 
knowing that one is bound to the good of this other.  Such an act demands real encounter.   
Luther is right, then, to protest this element of Aquinas‘ Scholastic legacy.  And 
he is right to emphasize the profoundly gratuitous factor of charity in response.  
Nevertheless, Luther‘s ontological discourse confounds the real insight at work here.  For 
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Luther, because Jesus Christ is the form of faith, the substantial alteration of my person 
and the act of my act.  Christ‘s work of redemption is pro me in justification, and reveals 
the being of God to be most profoundly pro nobis.   While this goes a long way toward 
correcting the overly metaphysical interpretation of charity by Aquinas in terms of the 
ordo caritatis, it remains bound by the limitations of ontology, overlooking the genuinely 
ethical component of this action.  Indeed, somewhat ironically, despite all of his emphasis 
on the priority of the encounter with the Word of God as the promise of fidelity, Luther 
himself manages to evade the encounter at just this point.  The act of justification is not 
shown to be pro me and pro nobis, but in the act is shown to be pro tu.  The ethical aspect 
of being discloses God, in all God‘s actions, to be, in relation to me, always acting for 
you (pro tu.)   
It is in this respect that proper attention to the ethical dimension of being includes 
an element of concrete encounter between God and humanity, in and through the other.  
As Kierkegaard—who appears to have been confused on this matter, given his emphasis 
on individual self-determination
30—states in Works of Love, God is the ―middle term‖ in 
every charitable relationship.
31
  We should understand this idea in the terms laid out by 
Luther in Two Kinds of Righteousness, where God‘s kenotic service to us directs us 
immediately to the neighbor.  Luther describes the attempt to stand before God with a 
righteousness attained by concupiscent action as ―robbery‖ of God, and it is in this light 
that the ethical imperative is best understood.  Our preoccupation with the righteousness 
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of our works, our sin, robs God of us, the objects of his service, and robs our neighbors of 
us in service.   
Luther‘s teaching on justification is the proper framework for understanding the 
distinctiveness of grace as being in continuity with and yet distinct from creation.  When 
justification is understood as a particular expression of God‘s fidelity to, preservation of, 
and encounter with the other in the act of creation, a unique paradigm arises for 
conceiving how it is that the genuinely new can appear in continuity with and in 
transformation of a given order of being.  This ethical emphasis opens out the possibility 
of talking about Being in such a way that it is not confined by ontological discourse, but 
is genuinely open to the appearance of the new as an expression of what most truly is in 
all its truth, beauty, and goodness.  Such a claim is what Luther expresses when he notes 
the profound transformation and conversion of philosophical concepts through their 
encounter with the Gospel.
32
  Such an idea is surely also at work in Frei‘s fascination 
with Barth‘s recovery of the typological reading of the Bible and Lindbeck‘s 
appropriation of his work to suggest that ―the text, so to speak, that absorbs the world, 
rather than the world the text.‖33 
In this way, Luther, Barth, and Frei all point toward some notion of a distinct 
appearance within the world of what previously had not been and what cannot be 
accounted for at all in terms of what was, but that stands in full continuity with what is by 
virtue of its pointing in the present to what shall be.  On these terms, the doctrine of grace 
can be conceived with complete metaphysical consistency, and in such a way that it is not 
reduced to the doctrine of creation.  Because creation includes not only the bringing of 
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another into existence, but the continued fidelity to that other as other, genuinely new and 
creative moments are possible in the world.  Such moments cannot be understood as 
ontological possibilities precisely because the condition of their possibility is not given in 
the structure of the world as it presently is.  Nonetheless, the possibility for such 
moments are included in the texture of being insofar as God has acted to create and 
continues to affirm the world in its otherness.  This means, unequivocally, that creativity 
is not an ontological but rather an ethical reality—and this because of the doctrine of 
creation.   
The fact of such relations does not precede their manifestation.  It is for this 
reason that the priority of justification as conceived by Luther must be insisted upon, 
because it is only in such terms that these relations can be said to be actual and real prior 
to and apart from the agency through which they are carried out.  As creative agents, 
human beings do not relate to these possibilities as ontological ideals to be realized.  As 
ontologically conceived, such possibilities can only appear as a negative determination of 
the self-identical given.  This is true even for the concept of Being at work in Aquinas, 
where the ethical order of being is conceived of in terms of the metaphysical ordo 
caritatis.  However, where Aquinas‘ metaphysics of being, together with his 
metaphysical distinction of the will from the intellect, is coincident with Luther‘s own 
doctrinal elaboration upon the social and relational dimension of Augustine‘s mature 
theology of grace, this new paradigm of the ethical creativity can be recognized.  
God‘s real encounter with the world, however, is central to this vision.  As the 
creative ethical agent, God truly encounters the world as the power of both real and 
actual precedence over all human activity.  This actuality is not to be conceived as a 
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given ontological fact, but as the manifestation of God‘s own continued fidelity to the act 
of creatively constituting otherness as actually real.  For this reason, human beings must 
be said to cooperate with God‘s operation.  Yet, because God‘s action is the constitution 
of otherness itself, this cooperation constitutes a true social and relational encounter. 
Luther‘s doctrine of justification is imperative here because it enables us to speak of 
Jesus Christ as the form of faith, which, when construed in these ethical rather than 
Luther‘s own ontological terms, can point toward a substantial and deifying 
transformation of the human being.  Such terms, however, do not involve construing 
Jesus himself as something of a metaphysical principle.  For, in this man God‘s act of 
knowing the world is coincident with God‘s fidelity to it as other to Godself in the person 
of Jesus Christ.  Every truly human affirmation of the other is preceded and determined 
by Jesus Christ‘s positive affirmation of us.  In him, the act of God that saves is 
coincident with both the act whereby God creates a world that is other to God and affirms 
that world in its otherness.   
The path to God moves through our affirmation of the otherness of our neighbor, 
for it is in our neighbor that God has appeared.  In him is disclosed that other that created 
us, the otherness that we are, and the otherness that we are summoned to affirm.   And so 
the possibility of actually affirming the goodness of the world is inseparable from the 
collective affirmation of the otherness of this man in his very concreteness.  Such an 
affirmation, then, can only be coincident with and absolutely determined by him in its 
positivity.  In this way, his act is irreducibly divine.  And it is by our participation in his 
act that we become participants in the eternal otherness of his divine life.  Indeed, it is 
only in giving ourselves to Jesus of Nazareth that we encounter him as God‘s own self-
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communicative affirmation of us, and as the reality that we seek.  Our encounter is with 
Jesus, the Jewish man from Nazareth.  This is an insight shared across Christian 
literature, and is not confined solely to Karl Barth.  As Teresa of Avila is keen to remind 
us, the deeper we make our way into the Interior Castle, the more significant it is that it is 
Jesus himself whom we find there.
34
  The same impulse resides in the hesychasts as well, 
in their prayer, ―Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy on me, a sinner.‖   
The association in this prayer of the recognition of the humanity of Jesus as 
perfectly coincident with his divinity is appropriate given the largely Antiochene (rather 
than Alexandrian) form it demands.  I make this point in continuity with Sarah Coakley, 
who has noted that what is at issue here, in keeping with the seventeenth century 
Lutheran kenoticists, is the idea that the incarnation marks the site of the emptying of the 
humanity of Jesus, and not the emptying of divinity into him.
35
  In this light, Jesus Christ 
is best thought of not as the most perfect historical instantiation of an ontological 
principle of reality, as Luther himself conceived the matter, but rather as completely 
transparent to the divine activity to which he ceded control.  In that act, Jesus marks the 
perfect coincidence of the divine fidelity to the other, and that other‘s perfect response of 
affirming the otherness of the Other that he is.  As Frei famously remarked, ―when God 
speaks, Jesus appears.‖  Our reception of him as the Christ is, thus, inseparable from the 
positive affirmation of the otherness of the other and can, in this light, be understood as 
truly transformative.   
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Because the reality of God is actual in his person, and because it is through our 
own acts of faith in him that we are joined to God in him as the form of our faith, we are 
truly deified by him.  Deification is, then, the paradigm for the creative transformation of 
being.  But this transformation is grounded in and presupposes the reality and actuality of 
the priority of God‘s fidelity to the positive affirmation of our difference.  It is through 
our own self-giving in faith that we join God in the creative affirmation of the pro tu. 
 Our affirmation of God‘s own affirmation of the other, then, is our deification. 
Yet this deification is not simply our coming to share in God‘s own life.  We are deified 
inasmuch as we have been given a share in God‘s own life as communicated in the act of 
creation.  Such participation opens the world, as Moltmann and Metz have insisted, to the 
future of God‘s purposes for the world, in which we have a decisive and significant share.  
We must speak, then, not simply of an infusion of a charitable habit that makes a 
supernatural act possible, but we must also understand this as our own share of God‘s 
self-communication in the act of creating.  Our own kenotic self-emptying to God in 
Jesus is the expression of God‘s own self-communication in the act of positively 
affirming the other as wholly other.   
It is in this way, as noted at the conclusion of Chapter Three, that the encounter 
with the man Jesus of Nazareth must be combined with the Schleiermacher‘s 
understanding of dialectic understood explicitly in the terms, as argued by Julia Lamm, of 
Socratic dialogue.  If the doctrine of creation is essentially the basis for an ―ethical 
metaphysics,‖ and it is this because God‘s positive fidelity to the act of constituting 
otherness as such involves genuine social and relational encounter, then this also entails 
not, as is often claim, that being is ―relational,‖ but that reality is fundamentally 
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dialogical.  Thought does not apprehend truth apart from encounter, and in that 
encounter, with the positive affirmation of the priority of the other.  Dialogue is the 
primary means of our apprehension of truth and of our creative transformation of reality.     
Having spoken of the genuinely creative aspect of this account of the relationship 
of the doctrines of creation and grace, and having noted this way of distinguishing them 
according to the proper understanding of the relation of the will to the intellect and ethics, 
it is now important that we specify how it is that these two doctrines can be thought of as 
united.  This union has already been anticipated in my discussion of their distinctions, 
especially as I have noted the manner that the encounter with grace is an extension of the 
ethical dimension of God‘s act of creating.  However, I have not yet specified the precise 
manner in which these two are united, and particularly how they should be understood as 
expressions of the relationship between the intellect and will, as well as what that union 
means and what it looks like.  The closing section is devoted to this concern.   
 
Attendance: Union of Creation and Grace—Intellect and Will, Being and Act 
This authentically human factor is passion, in which the one generation also fully 
understands the other and understands itself.  Thus no generation has learned from 
another how to love, no generation can begin other than at the beginning, the task of no 
later generation is shorter than its predecessor‘s, and if someone unlike the previous 
generation, is unwilling to stay with love but wants to go further, then that is simply idle 
and foolish talk. 
 
 —Johannes de Silentio36  
 
This reconstruction of the union between the doctrines of creation and grace has 
been oriented toward showing the essential neglect that the matter of the will has been 
given in the history of engagement with this question.  Within this framework, I have 
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claimed that it is precisely as a voluntary work that creation must be understood, 
emphasizing its ethical orientation toward the constitution and affirmation of otherness as 
much as the ―essential‖ continuity of this fact in intellectual apprehension.  I have argued 
that this affirmation requires a particular metaphysical structure, one distinctively and 
irreducibly ethical in orientation.  Yet despite what this emphasis owes to Levinas‘ 
insight into the good, the distinctively Christian conception of the matter includes a 
doctrine of Being—albeit, in the terms here articulated, a non-ontological one.  Only, I 
contend, such a non-ontological metaphysics of the ethics of Being can offer a rationale 
for the kind of claims Christians make concerning the distinctiveness of grace as a new 
aspect of being.  This new aspect is consistent, not with existence as such, but with the 
creativity that establishes and maintains existence as other.  Now I wish to draw these 
elements together, recapitulating them in a register other than the received terms I have 
been working with thus far.  This different register can only be cursorily developed here, 
but it is necessary as something of a concluding postscript to the study as a whole, which, 
though decidedly not scientific, is programmatic.   
First, the metaphysical perspective of the Roman Catholic paradigm involves the 
articulating of a unique account of Being, oriented toward supplying an account of the 
whole of reality as decidedly ethical but irreducible to a mediating ontological discourse 
that prioritizes identity, intellection, and participation.  This conclusion is an outworking 
of the distinction of the will from the intellect and desire, which is integral to the 
overarching metaphysics of the creatio ex nihilo.  This account of Being thus involves a 
separation of metaphysics from ontology as regards the articulation of the unity of the 
doctrines of creation and grace.  That is, the union of these doctrines must be according to 
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an account of the whole, and that union must entail an account of Being, but it cannot be 
said to be ontologically mediated.  Instead, the emphasis on the will that is integral to the 
metaphysical aspect of this account directly associates the doctrine of creation with the 
positive affirmation of otherness itself as the very expression of God‘s goodness.  In this 
regard, the otherness that is created being is the self-communication of Godself—the 
offer of communion.  The Christian account of Being, then, can only be offered as a 
distinctively ethical metaphysics. 
This vision is distinct from both classical and modern monisms and dualisms.  Its 
uniqueness is grounded in the priority of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, which I have 
shown to be the basis for the claim that created reality derives its share of being from 
God as the act of existence.  This derivation is the effect of a distinctively voluntary act 
of constituting and positively affirming otherness as the basis for and as integral to the 
world and its manifestation.  Value is thus attached irreducibly to the voluntary precisely 
as an integral aspect of Being.  In God, as the act of existence, this volition is coincident 
with knowledge and manifests as a singular actuality.  In the world, knowledge, 
existence, and volition are distinct operations.  It is because of the convertibility of these 
terms in relation to God‘s act of existence that the voluntariness integral to Being does 
not reside in the mediation of a transcendental order, but exists by virtue of the very 
immediate manifestation of otherness, which simply is created being (ens commune) and 
which God‘s own volitional act creates.  The unity of this act of constitution and 
affirmation, insofar as it also entails God‘s practical knowledge of the world in its 
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otherness, means that the Christian understanding of being must be non-dualist, 
apophatic, and dialogical.
37
   
This understanding is non-dualist because the relation that is established through 
the act of creating is not one of contrast.  Indeed, as we saw with Schleiermacher, this 
relation is like Nicholas of Cusa‘s non-aliud.  This relation is the kind spoken of and 
imagined by Sara Grant, and consistently affirmed by David Burrell, of a transcendence 
in which the differentiation of terms is such that they cannot be coherently divided 
without introducing an inappropriate dialectic.  What I have emphasized here in terms of 
the fundamental ethical and volitional character of the creation of the world parts ways 
from each of these authors in refusing to link the manifestation of the world to the 
intellect in a manner that reduces the volitional aspect.  I have sought, instead, to directly 
associate the volitional with the intellectual in this act of creating such that the world is 
known and apprehended by God immediately in the practical work of creating, which 
must be understood in terms no less radical than the very constitution and affirmation of 
otherness as such.  Only such a notion of otherness can adequately correspond to the non-
dual relationship of a proper understanding of transcendence.  The world is related to 
God as God‘s other because and only because God is not contrasted with the world.  This 
means that only such a relationship of absolute otherness is adequate to the radical 
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ontological affirmation made in the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo.  The contrast that is 
made in this affirmation is that of the most intimate unity and dependence, such that the 
two are, from the perspective of the creature, absolutely inseparable.  The very thought of 
the world cannot occur, as Schleiermacher saw so well, without the thought of God.  That 
Schleiermacher thought he could reverse this statement, however, is indicative of his 
misunderstanding of the ethical rather than the ontological aspect of this account of 
Being.  In this manner, the world and God are not one nor are they two,  They are related 
in an account of being that is radically non-dual.       
This concept of being is apophatic because non-duality is the form the God-world 
relation must take when expressed conceptually.  This kind of non-dualism refers to the 
very darkening of the intellect in its conceptual mode.  Insofar as Being is so radically 
non-dual, it is also shown to be radically in excess of all conceptual mediations, 
determining them and thereby ―blanking‖ them.38  Schleiermacher saw this relation as 
well, and it was the point he sought to make with reference to Gefühl.  But it runs much 
deeper in Christian theology and spirituality.  The quiet union of the mind and the heart 
reach the very limits of their adequacy as they are conjoined to the very act by which they 
are brought into being as other.  This is because all conceptual mediation, understood as 
abstract recollection, ceases as the mind and heart are rightly related in their operations to 
the operation by which they exist.  This involves the intellect in the pursuit of that which 
is always its excess by virtue of the fact that it is its ground.  Such is the union of the will 
and the intellect in this excessive movement-out.  What is affirmed of Being, therefore, 
occurs by virtue of denials.  It is not because such denials are the dialectical negations 
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through which Being attains its conceptual content, but because it is conceptual content 
itself that is rejected as adequate to the absolute priority of Being.  As Denys Turner has 
noted, ―We do not know what Being is.‖  Indeed, we cannot know what being is, if this 
means conceptual apprehension.  We can only, as Kierkegaard notes, live with passion. 
This non-dualism of being and its necessarily apophatic character entail a 
dialogical form.  This dialogical form of the intellectual apprehension of Being has been 
decidedly overlooked and misinterpreted. This is true of Schleiermacher himself, from 
whom this notion takes its inspiration in the present study.  It has been overlooked 
precisely because the will is misunderstood, in either Platonic or Scotist/Cartesian terms, 
as an aspect of either the intellect or desire.  The point is that the Christian understanding 
of our apprehension of Being is radically non-conceptual for the explicit reason that it 
finds its fulfillment in its ethical orientation to the other.  Julia Lamm has called attention 
to this in relation to what Schleiermacher rejected in what he wrongly understood to be 
Plato‘s early work.  Furthermore, it is what Kierkegaard sought to affirm in his project of 
indirect communication with reference to Socratic irony.  In Kierkegaard‘s terms, it is the 
attempt that Plato makes to recollect the form of Being through mediation that is so 
deeply problematic.  In contrast stands the irreducibility of the role of dialogue in the 
apprehension of Being, which is the Socratic form par excellence.  However, a Christian 
metaphysic of creatio ex nihilo recognizes that dialogue is integral not only to the 
pragmatic negotiation of our competing desires or to the formulation of greater 
conceptual clarity, but to the very form of the real.  This is true because the essence of 
what it means to be the world is to be other.  And within that world, every other is wholly 
other, such that any apprehension of reality is inseparable from the ethical affirmation of 
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the other as other.  This affirmation is able to be thought only in relation to the intellect 
inasmuch as it is carried out dialogically.  As Gadamer notes, it is in this dialogue that the 
truth happens in manifestation.
39
 
Second, the emphasis on encounter in the Protestant paradigm involves the 
orientation toward an account of the distinctively social and relational aspect of the 
ethical dimension of this non-dualist, apophatic, and dialogical understanding of Being.  
The metaphysical aspects of the first point are oriented toward articulating the intellectual 
inflection of the apprehension of Being when the integrity of the will is restored to the 
doctrine of creation.  The dynamic emphasis on encounter taken up from the Protestant 
paradigm gives expression to the volitional dimension of Being where the integrity of the 
will is restored to the doctrine of grace.  The non-dual, apophatic, and dialogical 
understanding of Being that results from the proper articulation of the doctrine of creation 
explicitly rejects a dialectical relation between God and the world.  Within this 
framework, the doctrine of grace nonetheless involves the affirmation of a real encounter 
between God and the world that is as an entirely gratuitous affirmation of the world in its 
otherness to God and genuinely transformative in that it is itself a creative production of 
the new that is not-yet, the beyond being.  
This means that the ontological transformation wrought by this encounter is 
fundamentally affective.  As in the doctrine of creation, the creature‘s relation to God is 
established in and through God‘s voluntary act to create an-other.   Such a relation is 
immediate and non-dual, but this means it is fundamentally and absolutely passive and 
affective.  The creature receives itself from God‘s act, and the fact that this reception 
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includes the capacity for its own integral operation is not contradicted by this receptivity.  
Contrary to critics of the classical doctrine of God, this absolute receptivity is not 
tantamount to an ontological determinism precisely because of the integral role of the 
will.  Determinism is the expression of created reality‘s absolute dependence in 
ontological rather than ethical terms.  On the contrary, insofar as the doctrine of creation 
is the constitution and affirmation of otherness, this absolute passivity and affection in 
relation to God‘s creative operation is the sole basis for a true relational encounter 
between God and the world.  As Luther repeatedly notes in his insistence that we let God 
be God, he intends that we allow ourselves to receive the service that God desires to give 
us.  Thus our freedom lies precisely in our bondage because we are only in a position to 
encounter God insofar as we have ceded control of our lives to God‘s own life-giving 
activity.  It is in that giving—of God to us and of ourselves to God from out of God‘s 
prior giving—that we coincide with the reality of ourselves.  In this manner, the 
encounter with God always takes the form, as Protestant theology insists, of the absolute 
priority of the divine election, the divine action, and the divine operation as the very 
condition for the possibility of our response.  Further, insofar as this encounter is concrete 
and not transcendental, it only occurs as the positive affirmation of the singular other.  It 
is in this way that the ‗individualism‘ of Kierkegaard finds its fulfillment in the structure 
discussed above of God‘s Being as ordered not pro me or pro nobis, but only being these 
as we know and encounter God pro tu.  God creates the new and we experience that 
appearing as ordered toward the affirmation of the other.  God‘s grace is the positive 
transformation of the other in and as the positive affirmation of the other in her very 
otherness.   
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The affective dimension of this orientation means that the ontological 
transformation wrought by this encounter is a matter of intention, and is not simply given 
in reality as such.   As Augustine recognizes in his reflection on Manichean and 
Neoplatonic metaphysics, God is not present to the world simply by virtue of its 
existence.  Rather, God is present to the world by virtue of an intention, God‘s and our 
own.  That intention, for Augustine, is charity, which is the sheer presence of God‘s own 
Spirit.  But, in this framework, the objection Aquinas levied at Lombard is not repeated 
because the one who is present, is present genuinely other to us: what binds us to God is 
our share in the act of positively affirming the other as other.   
This link between God‘s presence in the world and volitional intent is the primary 
basis for the fundamentally social and relational dimension of Augustine‘s mature 
theology of grace, especially as this dimension played out in his battle with Donatism.  
Importantly, Augustine did not realize that the ethical dimension of this claim, insofar as 
it is rooted in God‘s own act of creating and affirming otherness as such, entails 
affirmation of the fact that God‘s presence to the world in and through such intention is 
genuinely transformative because it is a new and distinct dimension of God‘s own 
creativity.  In and through human intention, rather than sheer existence, God comes to the 
world in a new way inasmuch as the world is rendered transparent to the divine activity in 
a unique and distinct way by that intention.  What is disclosed in that intention is not 
simply the act of creating and affirming otherness, but God‘s own faithful intention to 
affirm the other that God has created.  It is by virtue of the creature‘s intention that this 
divine fidelity is manifest in the world, serving as the means by which the very 
constitution of the being of the world is transformed.  As this unity of intention creates a 
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new relation between God and the world, we speak here of deification, or theosis.  It is in 
this new relationship, occurring by virtue of the ethical intention of affirming the other, 
that a new dimension of Being is created.   
As such, the ontological transformation wrought by the encounter of divine and 
human intention is concrete, historical, and genuinely creative.  As something of a 
parallel to the dialogical component of the Christian understanding of Being, here the 
other-affirming dynamic of existence takes on a uniquely contemplative form of 
engagement.  The Christian that has ceded control to God in such a manner as to be 
transformatively united to God in intention has sought to transform the historical 
conditions of reality not politically, but contemplatively.  This does not imply a divorce 
of politics and contemplation, but suggests that the only truly transformative agent is the 
contemplative, for only the contemplative is creative.   This claim serves to place 
ascetical theology back in its proper place beside systematic, moral, and pastoral 
theology.   
We must now speak of the unity of creation and grace in new terms.  That union 
is both essential and existential, but it is not achieved through a dialectical ecstasy.  
Rather, it proceeds by way of a more profound return to ourselves through what Simone 
Weil spoke of as attendance, waiting.  Weil speaks of attendance in a number of different 
locations, but in one of the more significant, ―Reflections on the Right Use of School 
Studies with a View to the Love of God,‖ she writes:  
Attention consists of suspending our thought, leaving it detached, empty, and ready to be 
penetrated by the object; it means holding in our minds, within reach of this thought, but 
on a lower level and not in contact with it, the diverse knowledge we have acquired 
which we are forced to make use of.  Our thought should be in relation to all particular 
and already formulated thoughts, as a man on a mountain who, as he looks forward, sees 
also below him, without actually looking at them, a great many forests and plains.  Above 
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all our thought should be empty, waiting, not seeking anything, but ready to receive in its 
naked truth the object that is to penetrate it.
40
 
 
 
In this posture of attendance, Weil points explicitly to prayer as the simplest expression 
by which all intellectual activity finds its orientation.  Though learning a new language or 
solving a problem in geometry require just this kind of use of the mind, prayer is the 
fullest and most simple expression of this most basic posture of the mind.   
Although this use of the mind is one of waiting, this attendance is nonetheless an 
active engagement with the world.   In this fundamental emptiness of the mind, ―waiting, 
not seeking anything,‖ a distinctively apophatic emptiness perfectly coincides with the 
absolute demand of the good.  In directing one‘s attention (intention) in this way, one 
remains open to perceive the truth of being in its manifestation.  It is a command to wait 
upon the appearing of the real and to be attuned to its appearing.  In this way, such 
attunement is a moral imperative to be aware, to intend the true, the good, and the 
beautiful.  The kind of attitude Weil is invoking here is that which is demanded for the 
learning of a new language: the kind of non-egoic release of the mind to a determination 
that precedes it, and to which its own operation are, after much concerted effort, merely a 
hindrance.
41
  For this posture of the mind, truth is not something that we apprehend, but 
something upon which we wait, attentively, to receive.  In this manner, our perception of 
the truth of being is perfectly coincident with the mind itself, but in such a manner as to 
compel us forward into that which darkens possessive abstraction, having ceded control 
to that which absolutely determines the whole of our being. 
                                                 
40
 Weil, Waiting for God, 111-12.   
41
 See Ibid., 105-16. 
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Attendance is not only waiting, but it is also tending, nurturing, cultivating.   
Attendance is thus simultaneously an active care for being.  This quiet attentiveness, 
however, is not quietism.  Rather, attentive waiting is a bidding to the service—the other 
meaning of attendance—that is itself expressed in Being.  In this regard, contemplative 
attendance is fidelity to Being.  We are summoned into existence and affirmed by God in 
our very otherness.  Thus and thereby our own attention, our own waiting, can only be 
the movement in and with the activity of ipsum esse to affirm the other in her being, 
absolutely.   Such attendance is not only attentive to the occurrence of truth as it ruptures 
our desire for apprehension and mediated totality, but insists that such apprehension and 
comprehensibility is found only in this service.  In service to the neighbor, in our 
attention to her, we await the reception of the truth, as it is manifested in our good action.  
This is our deification, for in it we are assumed into Godself, taken up into the expression 
of God‘s own life that is our own creation.  In this way, though we are not by nature 
creators, we are given the grace to create.  And it is in this new act of God, which 
includes us, that God‘s act of creation is fulfilled.   
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